ARUNABHA BARUA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application is directed against an Order dt. 27. 1. 1999 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. 6th Court, Calcutta in Case No. C/2442/97. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the present revision may be shortly stated thus: The O. P. No. 1, MIs. Modi Cement Ltd. , through its constituted Attorney, Tarapada Saha, lodged a complaint with the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Calcutta; against the petitioneraccused under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It was alleged that the petitioner accused purchased diverse quantities of cement from the O. P. No. 1 on credit and a sum of Rs. 65,888. 93 was due and payable from the petitioner accused to the Opposite Party No. 1 Cement Company. In liability and in payment of the aforesaid dues the petitioneraccused issued a cheque for Rs. 65,888. 93 drawn on the State Bank of India, Memari but the cheque was returned dishonoured with remarks, out of funds by the bank. Despite due legal notice served upon the petitioner by the complainant to make the payment, the petitioner failed and neglected to pay up the said dues or sum of money covered by the cheque. Hence, the complaint. On the basis of the said complaint, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was pleased to take cognizance and transferred the case to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. 6th Court, Calcutta. Then what the learned Metropolitan Magistrate 6th Court, did was, he issued summons to the accused (petitioner) for his appearance without examining the complainant on S/a under section 200, Cr. P. C. and when the petitioner accused actually made his appearance before the Court on 27. 1. 1999 in pursuance thereof and prayed for bail the learned Magistrate allowed the prayer and granted a bail of Rs. 1. 000/- and fixed 18. 3. 1999 for plea. But later on the same day i. e. 27. 1. 1999 the learned Magistrate made another order to say that summons to the accused was issued inadvertently, that process could not at all be issued according to law without examining the complainant on S/a and hence, the learned Magistrate immediately recalled his own order made earlier on the day in respect of the bail fixed and 4. 2. 1999 for S/a directing the complainant to come ready as last chance. 2. 1999 for S/a directing the complainant to come ready as last chance. In February, 1999 the complainant was examined and on a consideration of his evidence and entire materials on record the learned Magistrate found that the complainant had made out a prima facie case and so, he ordered issuance of process against the petitioneraccused under Section 138, N. I. Act fixing 8. 4. 1999 for SIR and appearance. ( 3 ) NOW, the twin grievance, the petitioneraccused has come up with are that the direction for appearance of the petitioner without examining the complainant on S/a under section 200, Cr. P. C. was illegal and vitiated the whole proceedings and next, that by recalling his own order granting bail to the petitioner, the learned Magistrate had violated the provision of section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid grievances were highlighted by the learned Advocate for the petitioners while making his submissions, According to him the provisions of section 200, Cr. P. C. is mandatory and that the learned Magistrate should not have issued summons to the accused before examining the complainant on S/a under section 200, Cr. P. C. which might or might not have satisfied him that there was sufficient ground for proceeding. The next part of the submission of the Id. advocate for the petitioner is that the learned Magistrate after allowing the prayer for the petitioner for bail could not recall his own order because section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a clear bar to such a recall of any order passed by the same court. He therefore, submits that non- examination of the complainant under section 200, Cr. P. C. has vitiated the proceeding and any further continuance thereof would be an abuse of the process of the Court, that to secure the ends of justice, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the proceeding liable to be quashed. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate on the other side has argued that the summons were wrongly issued through inadvertence and that was duly rectified, that it was neither a judgment nor a final order disposing of the case, that, therefore, Section 362, Cr. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate on the other side has argued that the summons were wrongly issued through inadvertence and that was duly rectified, that it was neither a judgment nor a final order disposing of the case, that, therefore, Section 362, Cr. P. C. could not stand as a bar to his recalling his own order passed earlier on the same day and, therefore, this revisional application has no merits and should be rejected. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner in support of his contention has cited the following case laws: Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande and Ors. v. Uttam and Anr. , Moti Lal v. State of M. P. , Ramesh Chandra Biswas v. The State and Anr. , Mayur Chandulal Contractor and Ors. v. Hercules DTSouza and Anr. , Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra. ( 7 ) EACH case has its own peculiar facts and facet. If we look at ours at hand and take a realistic view of the totality of facts and circumstances, in the light of the legal provisions, we might possibly end up with the ends of justice being achieved. ( 8 ) WHAT had really happened to compel the petitioner to rush to this revisional Court to secure the ends of justice? It was simple enough. The allegation against the petitioner by the O. P. No. 1, Cement Company was that the petitioner bought cement worth Rs. 65,888/- from O. P. on credit and in payment of the said dues issued a cheque for the said amount in favour of the O. P. No. 1 which bounced and despite notice of demand as per law, the petitioner failed to payoff the dues. Hence, the case in question was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the O. P. No. 1 against the petitioner. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, to whom the case was transferred, with out applying his mind signed off an order for issuance of summons upon the petitioner accused without first examining the complainant under section 200, Cr. P. C. When the petitioner-accused appeared and prayed for bail on 27. L 1999, the learned Magistrate granted the bail and fixed 18. 3. 1999 for plea. But it had dawn on him soon enough that he had made a mistake and later on the same day, 27. 1. P. C. When the petitioner-accused appeared and prayed for bail on 27. L 1999, the learned Magistrate granted the bail and fixed 18. 3. 1999 for plea. But it had dawn on him soon enough that he had made a mistake and later on the same day, 27. 1. 1999, he made the following order: Just immediately after passing order as above J find on perusal of the record that complainant has not been examined at all on S/a and process was not at all issued according to provision of law. It is not understood how summons was issued, may be inadvertently. So, order dt. 27. 1. 1999 in respect of bail order is recalled. Fix 4. 2. 1999 for S/ A. Complainant must come ready as last chance. On 10. 2. 1999, the complainant was present and examined and then on perusal of his evidence and also the entire materials on record, the learned Magistrate found that the complainant had made out a prima facie case and so, he ordered issuance of process against the accused i. e. the petitioner here under section 138, N. J. Act fixing 8. 4. 1999 for SIR and appearance. ( 9 ) IT appears from the above facts and circumstances peculiar to this case that when the learned Magistrate signed off (emphasis mine) the initial order of, issuance of summons to the petitioner without first examining the complainant under section 200. Cr. P. C. , which ought to have been legally done there was total non-application of mind on the part of the learned Magistrate or as the learned Magistrate sought to explain later in his impugned order dt. 27. 1. 1999. inadvertence. There was no semblance of merits in that decision to issue summons without first examining the complainant under section 200. Cr. P. C. But it was not left at that. When the learned Magistrate later discovered the mistake as stated above, he immediately rectified the mistake recalled his order and subsequently went on the right track to issue process after examination of the complainant under section 200. Cr. P. C. and after having satisfied about the prima facie case having been made out. When the learned Magistrate later discovered the mistake as stated above, he immediately rectified the mistake recalled his order and subsequently went on the right track to issue process after examination of the complainant under section 200. Cr. P. C. and after having satisfied about the prima facie case having been made out. ( 10 ) HAVING said that, the twin grievances of illegality arising out of issuance of summons without examining the complainant and that arising from recall of the bail order by the learned Magistrate must not be seen in isolation. Because, recalling of his own order dt. 27. 1. 1999 by the learned Magistrate was necessitated only since issuance of summons to the petitioner earlier without examination of the complainant was found not according to law and a product of inadvertence. ( 11 ) THE points, therefore, should ultimately boil down to thiswhether the learned Magistrate could thus recall his own order in question dt. 27. 1. 1999 and whether it would really be in the interest of justice to quash the entire proceeding as sought for by the petitioneraccused. ( 12 ) IF there was no legal impediment to the recalling of the order by the learned Magistrate, the initial issuance of process, which was almost mechanical without any application of mind and minus merits loses its significance, more so when the learned Magistrate subsequently took to the right, legal track by issuing process after duly examining the complainant and after considering the materials on record, finding a Tprima facie case to proceed against the petitioneraccused under section 138 of the N. J. Act. ( 13 ) THE petitioner indeed has it that there was really an impediment or bar for the recalling of the order by the learned Magistrate in view of the provisions of section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 14 ) I have carefully gone through the decisions cited above by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. In view of what has been discussed above narrowing down the factual and the legal proposition three decisions to my mind, would be worth a deliberation. They are: 1994 Cri. L. J. 1134 (Cal), 1999 Cri. L. J. 554 (Bom) and most importantly, the Supreme Court decision in 1999 Cri. L. J. 1620. ( 15 ) BUT first thing firstwhy Section 362 should be a bar? What precisely is Section 362, Cr. They are: 1994 Cri. L. J. 1134 (Cal), 1999 Cri. L. J. 554 (Bom) and most importantly, the Supreme Court decision in 1999 Cri. L. J. 1620. ( 15 ) BUT first thing firstwhy Section 362 should be a bar? What precisely is Section 362, Cr. P. C. ? Section 362, Cr. P. C. reads thus: 362. Court not to alter judgment Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, where it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The cardinal principle that has been incorporated in section 362 is that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, die said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a Court of Competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law ( AIR 2001 SC 43 ). ( 16 ) IT is to be noted that the embargo under section 362 does not operate against interlocutory order and a Magistrate can pass a different order at a later stage. ( 17 ) I might straightaway say that we have not come across any order passed by the learned Magistrate which can in any manner by said to be a final order disposing of a case. Why should then section 362, Cr. P. C. at all come into play? The decision reported in 1994 Cri. L. J. 1134 (Cal), which says that the Magistrate cannot review its own order was on a totally different set of facts where application by Investigating Officer for addition charges under section 201/218, I. P. C. once rejected by the Magistrate could not be subsequently allowed by the Magistrate. The decision of the Honble Supreme Court in 1999 Cri. L. J. 1620 says that order directing issue of process is not a purely interlocutory order and so bar under section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. was not applicable. This case also stands on a different footing. The issuance of process there in that case was backed by sufficient materials. The decision of the Honble Supreme Court in 1999 Cri. L. J. 1620 says that order directing issue of process is not a purely interlocutory order and so bar under section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. was not applicable. This case also stands on a different footing. The issuance of process there in that case was backed by sufficient materials. Here in our case it was a mechanical inadvertent issuance of summons in breach of legal provision without any application of mind. Moreover, though the Supreme Court said that order directing issuance of process was not purely interlocutory order, it was not a final order either to attract the bar of section 362. Cr. P. C. Rather, the Honble Supreme Court in that decision (para 5 p. 1622) clearly said that order directing issuance of process must be held to be one which was intermediate or quasifinal. And needless to say, quasifinal is certainly short of final and it is only a final order that cannot be revised or altered by the Court. There was no finality at all attached to the orders in question passed by the learned Magistrate and. therefore, there is no question of any bar of section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 18 ) THE decision of the Bombay High Court in 1999 Cri. L. J. 554, which says that belated issuance of process is liable to be quashed is not applicable here either because some very strange procedure was adopted by the Magistrate and it was held that the Magistrate could not split offences according to the wishes of the complainant as it was done there. That comes nowhere near the factual situation here in our case. ( 19 ) LASTLY, to my mind, interest of justice is not a one-way-track. It needs an overview that balances both sides, substantially on equal footing. The point need not be missed that here in this case, so far as the complainant, O. P. No. 1, is concerned he was not at fault. The learned Magistrate did legitimately set things right and went to the length of examining the complainant according to law, duly considered his evidence and materials on record, satisfied, himself that there was prima faciet case made out by the complainant for proceeding against the petitioneraccused under section 138. The learned Magistrate did legitimately set things right and went to the length of examining the complainant according to law, duly considered his evidence and materials on record, satisfied, himself that there was prima faciet case made out by the complainant for proceeding against the petitioneraccused under section 138. f the Negotiable Instruments Act and, therefore, he ordered issuance of process against the accused in accordance with law by his order dt. 10. 2. 1999. I think, ends of justice rather demands that the proceedings should now be carried on and not quashed. After all, procedure is intended to help and not to hinder justice. ( 20 ) IN the result, this revisional application, in my view, has no merits and must fail. ( 21 ) ACCORDINGLY, the Criminal Revision is dismissed. The learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible. Let the lower Court records together with a copy of this order be sent down to the Court below at once. Urgent xerox certified copy be given to the learned Advocate, if applied for. Revision dismissed