ASHOK KUMAR MATHUR, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal directed against the order passed by the Learned single Judge dated 19/07/1988 whereby the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved against this order the present appeal has been filed. ( 2 ) THE brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the petitioner filed the present writ petition praying that the circular dated 4/04/1981 issued by the Manager Traffic Operation, Haldia Dock Complex as regards the imposition of penal rate at three times of the ordinary rate of rent on cargo not cleared within the month of the date of landing at Haldia General Cargo Berth be quashed. This notification was issued on 4/04/1981 and it was brought into effect from 1st of April, 1981. This was challenged by the petitioner on the ground that this circular for levy of penal rent at treble rate of the ordinary rate is wholly bad in law and without jurisdiction. According to the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 this cannot be levied without the approval of the Central Government. It was submitted that this circular is dehors the provisions of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963. It was submitted that formation of opinion of the Trustee is conspicuously absent and the Chairman is swayed by some co-lateral considerations and there is no provision for imposition of penal rent. The writ petition was contested by the respondent Port Trust Authorities and it was submitted that under S. 6-A (VI) of the Scale of Rates the Board on Port Trust is authorised to charge three times of scheduled rent. It was submitted that on account of congestion of Port that goods remain uncleared in the port premises for a long time and affect operational efficiency therefore the Board took this decision. This levy of treble rent on the uncleared consignment was resorted so as to expeditiously despatch goods which are stagnated on the Port premises. It was also submitted that all the actions taken under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 and the Scale of Rates (Scheduled of Charges) on the goods at the dock have been duly approved by the Central Government. It was also submitted that all the actions taken under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 and the Scale of Rates (Scheduled of Charges) on the goods at the dock have been duly approved by the Central Government. The learned single Judge after examining the matter found that the levy is correct and there is no infirmity in the aforesaid notification of imposing treble rent on the goods which have been brought on the Port beyond the period of one month hence the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved against that order the present appeal has been filed by the appellant. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the levy is without jurisdiction and will only have a prospective effect and the goods which have been already brought prior to this imposition and remained on the Port for beyond the period of one month cannot be subjected to treble rent as the notification is prospective in effect and all the goods which are brought after the notification that is 1/04/1981 and stacked beyond the period of one month then on that goods this levy of treble rent can be charged. Though the question of prospective/retrospective effect of the notification was not argued before the learned single Judge. Only point which was agitated before the learned single Judge was competence to issue this circular/notification. However, it was a pure question of law that it will have prospective or retrospective effect therefore we permitted learned counsel to make this submission. ( 4 ) WE have heard the learned counsel and perused records. So far as the competence of the notification imposing levy of treble the rent is concerned, it is suffice it to say that as per S. 6 (A) (vi) of Scale of Rates the Trustees have been delegated the power to charge treble rent. The relevant provision of the Scale of Rates is as under :the Trustees reserve to themselves the right to charge three time the schedule rates of rent on any goods, which in their opinion could have been removed before the rent was incurred. " ( 5 ) IN pursuance of this a resolution was passed by the Port Authorities and treble rent was enforced. The relevant resolution reads as under : 15. Subject1. Imposition of penal rent (treble rent) on consignment of uncleared imported goods from the Docks at Haldia. " ( 5 ) IN pursuance of this a resolution was passed by the Port Authorities and treble rent was enforced. The relevant resolution reads as under : 15. Subject1. Imposition of penal rent (treble rent) on consignment of uncleared imported goods from the Docks at Haldia. The Trustees by their Resolution No. 425 dated 29/12/1980 authorised the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and the General Manager, Haldia Dock Complex to levy treble rent on uncleared imported consignment in the interest of Port operations in anticipation of the Board's approval, the matter being placed before the Board at the next meeting for ratification. In January, 1981, the then General Manager, Haldia Dock Complex recommended imposition of penal rent at the rate of eight times the normal rent on all cargo remaining uncleared for more than one month from the date of landing. Imposition of treble rent was, however, sanctioned by the Chairman under the strength of the authorisation granted by the Trustees as above. This was made effective from 1/04/1981. 2. One importer, however, moved the Calcutta High Court and obtained an order of injunction restraining the Calcutta Port Trust from recovering treble rent at Haldia. Accordingly, recovery of treble rent was dis-continued with effect from 3/06/1981. The order of injunction is still in force and the suit is pending in the High Court. In other words, the treble rent was recovered at Haldia only during the period 1st April to 3/06/1981 on all import cargoes lying uncleared for more than a month. 3. Subsequently, the Trustees, by their Resolution No. 49 dated 22/02/1982, sanctioned recovery of treble rent on all goods which were not taken delivery of within thirty days from the date of landing. The said decision of the Trustees was made effective at Calcutta from 1/03/1983 but this could not be implemented at Haldia in view of the injunction order mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 4. Since treble rent was recovered at Haldia for the period 1/04/1981 in terms of the sanction accorded by the Chairman under the strength of the authorisation granted by the Trustees by their Resolution No. 425 dated 29/12/1980, the matter is placed before the Trustees for ratification of the decision taken by the Chairman. This would, however, be subject to the final result of the writ petition pending in the Calcutta High Court. This would, however, be subject to the final result of the writ petition pending in the Calcutta High Court. " ( 6 ) THIS Scale of Rates have been issued under the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 and by this Scale of Rates the trustee has been empowered to impose levy and in exercise of the power the trustee has imposed the treble rent which is evident from the aforesaid resolution. Therefore, so far as levy is concerned it is duly authorised and it is within the competence of the Trust as such this submission of the learned counsel has no merit and the same is rejected. ( 7 ) THE next question which is seriously debated before us is whether this notification would be given retrospective effect or not. Learned counsel for the appellant has seriously contended that the notification which has come into force with effect from 1/04/1981 cannot be given retrospective effect, it is prospective and the levy can be made treble the rent after 1/04/1981 on the goods which have been landed on the Port after 1/04/1981 and stayed at the Port beyond the period of one month but it cannot be made applicable to goods landed prior to 1/04/1981. Learned counsel for the respondent Port Trust submitted that all the goods which is to be taken out from the Port after 1st of April, 1981 and stayed on the Port for more than one month will be subjected to treble the rent as they have incurred the penalty of overstaying on the Port. Therefore, in substance the question is whether the notification of 1/04/1981 is to be given a retrospective or prospective effect. It is trite proposition of law that normally all the levy notifications are to be construed prospectively only unless it is so intended to operate retrospectively or from the scheme of things there is no option but to give it a retrospective effect. ( 8 ) WE have considered the rival submission of the parties. It is true that the notification has come into force with effect from 1st of April, 1981 and the language of the notification does not give any indication that it has to be operated retrospectively. For proper appreciation of the submission the impugned notification is quoted hereunder :calcutta Port Trust no. MTO manager Traffic Operation's Office, Haldia dock Complex,cheranjibpur, Haldia. It is true that the notification has come into force with effect from 1st of April, 1981 and the language of the notification does not give any indication that it has to be operated retrospectively. For proper appreciation of the submission the impugned notification is quoted hereunder :calcutta Port Trust no. MTO manager Traffic Operation's Office, Haldia dock Complex,cheranjibpur, Haldia. Dated 4/04/1981 circular re : Imposition of penal rent at 3 times of the ordinary rate of rent on cargo not cleared within one month from the date of landing at Haldia, General Cargo Berth. The Chairman/cpt has convened his approval to the recovery of treble rent on all cargo at Haldia if not cleared within one month from the date of landing. This order takes effect on and from 1-4-1981. " ( 9 ) A perusal of this circular makes it is very clear that it has come into force from 1st of April, 1981. It does not say that whether it will operate prospectively or retrospectively. In this connection it may be relevant to mention a passage from Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh 7th Edition page No. 367 which reads as under : statute dealing with substantive rights.- It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show in the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis". In the words of Lord Blanesburg, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment'. Every statute, it has been said', observed Lopes L. J. , which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have retrospective effect'. Every statute, it has been said', observed Lopes L. J. , which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have retrospective effect'. As logical corollary of the general rule, that retrospective operation is not taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication, there is a subordinate rule to the effect that a statute or a section in it is not to be construed so as to have larger retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. In other words close attention must be paid to the language of the statutory provision giving retrospectivity produces absurdities and anomalies, a case not prima facie within the words may be taken to be covered, if the purpose of the provision indicates that the intention was to cover it. The inhibition against retrospective construction is not a rigid rule and must vary secundum materium. It has been said that the basis of the rule is no more than simple fairness which ought to be the basis of every legal rule'. " ( 10 ) THE whole statement of law has been aptly summarised by the author in the aforesaid passage. Therefore, in this background we have to consider whether this notification should be given retrospective effect or not. It is true that as a result of this increase in rent all the cargoes which has stayed beyond the period of one month has to pay treble the rent. This impost of treble rent was introduced with a view to see that the owners of the cargoes clear the consignments quickly so as to make room on the Port. Therefore, the purpose was to create pressure on the owner to clear their cargoes as quickly as possible. But it has been brought into existence with effect from 1/04/1981 and what is intended to be done is that the cargoes which arrive at the Port after to 1/04/1981 and has stayed over a month has to be charged the treble rent by the Port Trust Authorities. Therefore, the question is this new obligation has come into force with effect from 1/04/1981 can it be applied to the cargoes which have already arrived at the Port prior to 1/04/1981. Therefore, the question is this new obligation has come into force with effect from 1/04/1981 can it be applied to the cargoes which have already arrived at the Port prior to 1/04/1981. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged before us that the notification cannot be given a retrospective effect as it has come into force with effect from 1/04/1981. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the cargoes which have come prior to 1/04/1981 and has remained there for more than one month and is sought to be cleared after 1/04/1981 will be governed by the rates as was being charged prior to 1/04/1981 because at that time when the goods were brought on the Port there was no provision or obligation to subject them treble the rent. The new rates have come into force with effect from 1/04/1981 and it cannot be given a retrospective effect as there is no such intention in this notification. The learned counsel has submitted that the provisions cannot be made retrospective unless it was so intended or there is no other inference then to give it a retrospective effect. In the present case there is no such intention in this notification nor it contemplates that all the goods which have come to the Port prior to 1/04/1981 and being sought to be cleared after 1/04/1981 will also have to suffer the penalty of treble the rent. As against this the learned counsel for the Port Trust submitted that by virtue of notification for treble the rent pressure is being applied to the owners of the cargoes to clear their consignments as early as possible. Therefore, the idea was to amend the rates so that the stagnation of the goods on the Port can be cleared expeditiously. The learned counsel further submitted that though the provision is prospective but the antecedent facts can be taken into consideration as the goods which have come to the Port prior to 1/04/1981 and have stayed more than a month from the date of coming into force and are cleared after 1/04/1981 will have to pay treble the rent. ( 11 ) NOW in this background the question before us is that whether the notification dated 1/04/1981 should be treated retrospectively or not. ( 11 ) NOW in this background the question before us is that whether the notification dated 1/04/1981 should be treated retrospectively or not. As far as the legal position is concerned it is well settled that retrospectivity is not to be presumed unless it is so intended by the Legislation or clearly intended from the provisions of the statute or circular. In the present case from the circular reproduced above does not give a clear indication for construing it retrospectively. Therefore, unless it is intended to be made retrospective no presumption of retrospectivity can be made in the circumstances as already pointed out above from the passage of Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G. P. Singh (supra) that retrospectivity is not to be presumed unless it is intended by the Statute. The present circular is in the nature of imposing certain obligations thereby increasing the rent for the goods which have stayed at the port for more than one month. Therefore this notification is fiscal in nature as such unless it is so provided or intended from the circular no retrospectivity can be given to this circular. In this connection it may be relevant to mention some of the decisions of the Apex Court on the subject. ( 12 ) IN the case of State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra reported in AIR 1961 SC 307 , Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 was amended and certain past action of the offender were taken into consideration for higher penalty. In that context their Lordships held : penal statutes which create new offences are always prospective. But penal statutes which create disabilities or statutes which create no new punishment but authorise some action based on past conduct may be interpreted retrospectively when there is a clear intendment that they are to be applied to past events. Against, an Act designed to protect the public against acts of a harmful character may be construed retrospectively, if the language admits of such an interpretation, even though it may equally have a prospective meaning. " ( 13 ) THEREFORE, it is clear that in a case where the statute was so intended to take into consideration past conduct then in that case for the benefit of the public, if the language permits, then such enactment can be given retrospective effect. " ( 13 ) THEREFORE, it is clear that in a case where the statute was so intended to take into consideration past conduct then in that case for the benefit of the public, if the language permits, then such enactment can be given retrospective effect. Therefore, the law as far as the enactments are concerned it is to be construed prospectively unless it was so intended by the statute. ( 14 ) IN the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1964 SC 464 their Lordships observed that the Act has no retrospective operation. To take into consideration the pecuniary resources or property in the possession of the accused or any other person on his behalf which are acquired before the date of the Act is not in any way giving the Act a retrospective operation. A statute cannot be said to be retrospective because a part of the requisites for such action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. Therefore their Lordships held that by this operation of the Act it does not operate in a retrospective manner. ( 15 ) THE case of Kapur Chand v. B. S. Grewal reported in AIR 1965 SC 1491 is under Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 wherein it was observed that no doubt a statute must be applied prospectively but a statute is not applied retrospectively because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a moment of time prior to its passing. It was observed that Clause (ii) of S. 9 (1) makes a particular conduct the ground for an application for eviction. The necessary condition for the application of S. 9 (1) (ii) may commence even before the Act came into force and past conduct, which is as relevant for the clause as conduct after the coming into force of the Act, cannot be overlooked. In that context their Lordships observed that this taking into consideration past act does not amount to operation retrospectively. ( 16 ) IN the case of Sree Bank Ltd. v. S. D. Roy and Co. reported in AIR 1966 SC 1953 their Lordships observed that retrospective operation of the provisions of an Act should not be inferred unless it is firmly established in the rule. ( 16 ) IN the case of Sree Bank Ltd. v. S. D. Roy and Co. reported in AIR 1966 SC 1953 their Lordships observed that retrospective operation of the provisions of an Act should not be inferred unless it is firmly established in the rule. However, it was observed that if the statutes are for the benefit of the public or to remedy some evil or abuse, it may be allowed to operate retrospectively, even if by such operation it will deprive some person or persons of their vested right. In the present case we have seen that the circular has come into force from 1/04/1981 and there is no such retrospectivity intended in this circular. ( 17 ) IN the case of Govinddas v. I. T. Officer reported in AIR 1977 SC 552 is with regard to interpretation of sub-section (6) of Section 171 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and their Lordships after examining the matter with reference to other provisions of the Income-tax Act and with regard to assessment of HUF held that sub-section (6) of Section 171 does not warrant by express language or by necessary implication to be retrospective in character and therefore the same cannot be given a retrospective effect. It is the settled proposition of law that statutes are normally prospective in operation unless they are specifically so intended to act retrospectively. ( 18 ) IN the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare reported in AIR 1989 SC 1247 the question was with regard to interpretation of the amendment in the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Sub-sections 4, 2 (a) and 3 of the Act came up for interpretation whether these provisions are to be treated retrospectively or not. Their Lordships in this judgment have summarised the law on the retrospective operation of statutes. It was observed :a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise then as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. Before applying a statute retrospectively the Court has to be satisfied that the statute is in fact retrospective. The presumption against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of past transaction, or impair contracts, or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or considerations already passed. However, a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The general scope and purview of the statute and the remedy sought to be applied must be looked into and what was the former state of law and what the legislation contemplated has to be considered. Every law that impairs or takes away rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectivity may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the Section which had to be construed. The question is whether on proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention. " ( 19 ) THEREFORE, as per the aforesaid decision it is very clear that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair the existing right or obligation unless effect cannot be avoided without doing violation to the language of the enactment. Therefore, existing rights and obligations is not to be impaired by interpreting a particular provision to be retrospective unless effect cannot be avoided. ( 20 ) OUR attention was also invited to the case of Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour and National Service reported in (1950) 2 All ER 525 wherein Somervell, L. J. observed : the fact that a prospective benefit is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent facts does not necessarily, and I think does not in this case, make the provision retrospective. The Attorney General referred to R. v. St. The Attorney General referred to R. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel (Inhabitants) (1), where this principle was stated by Lord Denman, C. J. , in very concise language. The Poor Removal Act, 1864, S. 2, provided that :. . . . . . . . . no woman residing in any parish with her husband at the time of his death shall be removed. . . . . . . . . . from such parish, for tweleve calendar months next after his death, if she so long continues a widow. ' it was sought to remove within the twelve months a widow whose husband had died before the Act came into force. It was argued that to make the Act apply in such a case was to construe it retrospectively. The right to remove was, it was argued, a vested right which accrued on his death. The Court held otherwise and Lord Denman, C. J. , used these words (1848) 12 QB 120 (127) :. . . . . we have before shown that the statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing. ' " ( 21 ) THEREFORE the survey of all these cases as mentioned above would show that normally the retrospectivity of an enactment is not to be presumed unless it is so intended or if the retrospectivity cannot be avoided without violence to the language or if the enactments are for the benefit of the public at large or some public injury is being sought to be rectified. These are the tests which can be inferred from the ratio laid down by the aforesaid cases. The learned counsel for the Port Trust has invited our attention to the decision of Lord Denman, C. J. (reported in (1848) 12 QB 120 (127) quoted in Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour and National Service reported in (1950) 2 All ER 525 to contend that the statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing. It is not a case of any social measure or any public injury sought to be rectified or any evil is sought to be removed. It is a new obligation which is sought to be imposed in the nature of impost. It is fiscal measure. The public at large did not know at the time goods were brought on the Port the effect of keeping goods at port beyond one month. Therefore, if it is given retrospective effect then this will amount to change the rates retrospectively and increasing rates retrospectively which cannot be doen as it is against the public policy and unfair. The goods when they landed at the port at that time the circular was not in force and there was no time limit fixed for clearance of the goods. Therefore, for the goods which have landed prior to 1/04/1981 there was no obligation on the owner to clear the same within one month or that the same will be subjected to treble the rent. This obligation which involves an additional financial obligation on the owner of the goods have come into force from 1/04/1981. Therefore, this financial obligation cannot be allowed to be operated retrospectively to the detriment of the owners of the goods. At the time of the landing of the goods there was no such obligation on the owner to pay treble the rent if the goods stayed at the port for more than one month. This new obligation to enhance the payment of port charges at treble the rent on the goods which has come after 1st of April, 1981 shall be treated to be prospective and it cannot be treated to be retrospective. All the cases of the Apex Court as well as the English decisions are cases in which certain public benefit or social welfare was involved for the betterment of the public at large. In the case State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra ( AIR 1961 SC 307 ) (supra) certain criminal tendency were sought to be checked under the Bombay Police Act. In the case State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra ( AIR 1961 SC 307 ) (supra) certain criminal tendency were sought to be checked under the Bombay Police Act. Similarly in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1964 SC 464 ) (supra) their Lordships held that antecedent factors can be taken into consideration but wherever new obligation are sought to be imposed or certain financial implications are involved or rates are increased casting financial burden then that cannot be allowed to be operated retrospectively as it impairs the pre-existing right of the incumbent. In the present case the pre-existing right of the incumbent was to clear the goods at normal rents but after 1st of April, 1981 treble the rent is being charged for the goods which have stayed for more than one month at the port. This new obligation is sought to be imposed retrospectively resulting financial burden on the incumbent. Such interpretation will cause havoc to the public at large. Therefore, in our opinion, the circular dated 1/04/1981 cannot be construed retrospectively and the goods which have come prior to 1/04/1981 and stayed at the Port for more than one month prior to 1/04/1981 cannot be made to suffer treble the rent. In this view of the matter the view taken by the learned single Judge cannot countenanced. Hence, as a result of the above discussion we are of the opinion that the goods which have come prior to 1/04/1981 shall not suffer treble the rent. The circular is prospective. ( 22 ) ). Hence, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed to this extent and we hold that the circular issued by the Board is valid. No order as to costs. ( 23 ) GIRISH CHANDRA GUPTA, J. :- I agree. ( 24 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent prays for stay of operation of the judgment and order. Such prayer is refused. Appeal allowed.