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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 638 (MP)

Prakash Gupta v. Ramrati Devi

2001-08-28

S.P.KHARE

body2001
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is defendants second appeal under Section 100, CPC. Arguments on the question of admission heard. ( 2. ) THE plaintiffs suit for eviction has been decreed under Section 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) by the Trial Court and this decree has been affirmed by the First Appellate Court. The notice dated 12-9-1994 (Ex. P-11) was served on the defendant on 14-9-1994 as per postal acknowledgment Ex. P-12. The rent from 1-10-1993 at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month was demanded by this notice. The rate of rent is not in dispute. The defendant did not pay or tender the arrears of rent within two months of the receipt of demand notice. The Courts below have found that the defendant had already paid rent upto January, 1994. Thus the rent from 1-2-1994 was due. It was neither paid nor tendered as required by Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, and therefore, the defendant became liable to eviction. ( 3. ) THE question is whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of Section 12 (3) of the Act. For that he has to show that he has deposited the rent as per Section 13 of the Act. The writ summons of the suit was served on the defendant on 20-7-1995. It was necessary for him to deposit the arrears of rent upto 20-8-1995. But he did not do so. He deposited an amount of Rs. 3,000/- for the first time on 12-12-1995. On the date of this deposit the rent for 22 months amounting to Rs. 6,600/- was due. Thus there was not only delay of about four months the deposit which fell short was of rent of 12 months. There was no deposit in the year 1996. The first deposit in the year 1997 was made on 8-8-1997 and that was for Rs. 2,600/ -. Thus there was again delay of 19 months in the deposit of rent of 30 months. The subsequent deposits were in time. It is submitted on behalf of the defendant that he had raised the dispute as to arrears of rent and, therefore he was not obliged to deposit the rent till the time the dispute was decided by the Trial Court. The subsequent deposits were in time. It is submitted on behalf of the defendant that he had raised the dispute as to arrears of rent and, therefore he was not obliged to deposit the rent till the time the dispute was decided by the Trial Court. This argument cannot be accepted in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jamnalal Vs. Radheshyam, 2000 (4) MPHT 218 (SC) = 2000 (2) MPLJ 385, in which it has been held that where there is no dispute about the rate of rent the dispute is not covered by Section 13 (2) of the Act and a tenant takes the risk of suffering an order of eviction by raising a dispute in regard to the amount of rent payable by him while admitting the rate of rent and not making payment or deposit under sub-section (1) because where the dispute raised by the tenant is outside the ambit of sub-section (2), sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act does not become inoperative. ( 4. ) THE next question is whether the delay should have been condoned. Both the Courts have held that there was not sufficient ground for condoning the delay as the plea of the defendant that there was crisis in his business was not substantiated. Legally speaking, the delay or default can be condoned and that is permissible even in respect of the rent which becomes due from month to month after the institution of the suit as held by the Supreme Court in Shyamcharan Vs. Dharamdas, AIR 1980 SC 587 , Ram Murti Vs. Bhola Nath ( AIR 1984 SC 1392 ) and by this Court in Manoharlal Vs. Abdul Mazidkhan, 1997 (1) MPLJ 232 . The time for deposit of future rent can be extended where the failure of the tenant to make such payment or deposit was "due to circumstances beyond his control". In the present case the circumstances were not such in which the delay of 19 months as noted above could be condoned. The Court has to strike a balance in exercising its judicial discretion between the conflicting interests of the landlord and tenant. In the present case the circumstances were not such in which the delay of 19 months as noted above could be condoned. The Court has to strike a balance in exercising its judicial discretion between the conflicting interests of the landlord and tenant. A few lapses here and there can be condoned but the Court must also see that the landlord under the statutory scheme has the right to get timely payment of rent - a quid-pro-quo for parting with the possession of his house to the tenant. Extreme view on either side would not be conducive to the interest of justice. The Court should be neither too strict nor too liberal. There is no room for too much benevolence to one party at the cost of the other. Viewed in light of this principle the abnormal delay on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case could not be condoned. The view taken by the Courts below cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable and, therefore, it would not be proper for this Court in second appeal to interfere with the eviction decree. No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. ( 5. ) THE appeal is dismissed in limine and the stay order passed earlier is vacated.