K.Narayana Kurup, J.: The order of detention clamped on the detenu in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Central Act 52 of 1974), by the first respondent as per proceedings G.O.No.SR.I/1225/2000, dated 16.10.2000, on the ground that the detenu has mis-declared the value of certain electronic goods imported by him is under challenge in this habeas corpus petition on the following grounds: (1) The representation dated 20.11.2000 addressed by the detenu to the President of India, which has been duly served and received in the President’s office on 21.11.2000 has not yet been disposed of. (2) The detention order is vitiated since the material documents which will influence the mind of the detaining authority either way were not placed before the detaining authority. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel for Central Government and the State Prosecutor, we are of the opinion that the petition is well founded in the above submissions: It is brought on record that the detenu in fact sent a representation to the President by speed post from the post office of the High Court Buildings, Chennai on 20.11.2000. According to the communication of the postal authorities, the aforesaid representation dated 20.11.2000 addressed to the Honourable President was served in the office of the President of India, New Delhi on 21.11.2000 under proper receipt. Therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the representation dated 20.11.2000 has been served in the President’s office on 21.11.2000. If that is so, an obligation is cast upon the President’s office to forward the aforesaid representation to the department concerned for disposal in accordance with law. Since, admittedly the President’s office after having received the representation as aforesaid las failed to forward the representation to the authorities concerned for disposal, we are of the opinion that there is violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India vitiating the order of detention. The question is no longer res integra. 3. Since, admittedly the President’s office after having received the representation as aforesaid las failed to forward the representation to the authorities concerned for disposal, we are of the opinion that there is violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India vitiating the order of detention. The question is no longer res integra. 3. The Honourable Supreme Court of India as early as in 1986 in the decision in Raghavendra Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur and others, 1986 S.C.C. (Crl.) 60, held in categorical terms that under Sec.3(8) of the General Clauses Act, the “Central Government” means the President and a representation addressed to the President must be considered to be a representation properly addressed to the Central Government. In the decision noted supra, the Apex Court ordered the detenu to be released on the ground, of unexplained delay of about two months in forwarding the representation from the President’s office to the Ministry of Home Affairs for disposal in accordance with law. The Supreme Court also noted that it is not a case of repeated representations to the Central Government as in the present case. Here, the position of the detenu is much better, in the sense, he has preferred the representation way back on 20.11.2000 and till today, it remains unattended. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the unexplained delay on the part of the Central Government in disposing of the representation preferred by the detenu has rendered his continued incarceration, illegal and unconstitutional. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was followed by this Court in H.C.P.Nos.1095 of 2000 and also in H.C.P. No.876 of 2000. In both the above, habeas corpus petitions, this Court held that it is obligatory on the part of the President’s Secretariat to have forwarded the representation to the concerned COFEPOSA Unit of the Finance Department and failure to do so will vitiate the order of detention. 4. The second ground of attack against the order of detention is that the detention order is vitiated since the material documents which will influence the mind of the detaining authority either way were not placed before the detaining authority. 4. The second ground of attack against the order of detention is that the detention order is vitiated since the material documents which will influence the mind of the detaining authority either way were not placed before the detaining authority. The specific case pleaded is that the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Economic Offences, Chennai while dismissing the bail, application as per proceedings in M.P.No.1756 of 2000 in R.P.No.61 of 2000, dated 11.9.2000 had observed that the detenue was suffering from brain tumour and was taking treatment regularly and considering his condition, the Superintendent, Central Prison, Chennai was required to give regular treatment for his illness and failure to place the aforesaid order before the detaining authority will vitiate the detention order. 5. According to the learned counsel, had this order been placed before the Detaining authority his subjective satisfaction would have been different and the detention order would not have been passed against the detenu considering his health condition. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel is liable to be accepted, since it is well-settled that failure to place material documents affecting the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, will have the effect of vitiating the order of detention. In the aforesaid view, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on both the above counts. 6. However, learned counsel for the Union of India vehemently contends that so long as the Finance Ministry has not received any representation from the detenu, they cannot be faulted for the undue delay that was incurred in disposing of the representation of the detenu. We find no substance in the aforesaid contention. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances brought to our notice and as per the provisions contained in Sec.27 of the General Clauses Act, 1987. It is not disputed that the detenu has sent the representation by Speed Post and it is also not disputed that the same has been duly served in the President’s office. Accordingly, we reject this contention. 7. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are inclined to allow this habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we allow this habeas corpus petition, quash the detention order impugned herein and direct that the detenu be set at liberty forthwith, unless wanted in connection with any other case.