JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—This petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Shimla respondent No. 1 herein on 25th July, 2000. 2. The case of the petitioner was that he and his brothers were having l/3rd share in the land comprising Khasra No. 2258 situated in village Chalali, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra in the Jamabandi for the year 1984-85. According to. the petitioner, one Smt. Goga Devi was also having l/3rd share and respondents No. 2 to 5 (contesting respondents herein) were having rest of the 1/3rd share in the said land. The land comprising Khasra No. 2258 is abutting the, road "Dehra-Chintpurni". 54 metres of the Khasra touches the road, out of which 0-23-75 C, about 0-10-00 C is plain/levelled land and rest of the land of the said Khasra number is slanting and precipitoils. According to the petitioner, about 37 metres of land of old Khasra No. 2258 abut the road. A copy of Jamabandi is also annexed to the petition. It is asserted by the petitioner that in the year 1989-90, the land comprising Khasra No. 2258 was re-partitioned during the consolidation operation. A scheme was prepared wherein it was provided that the land abutting the road will be partitioned in such a manner that all co-sharers will be allotted land in accordance with the share on the basis of the location of the land. It was, however, not done. The petitioner hence, made a grievance before the authorities. It is stated by the petitioner that though the scheme was finalised in 1988, the petitioner came to know about the same only in the year 1992 about the allotment to respondents No, 2 to 5. He, therefore, immediately approached the Director, Consolidation of Holdings exercising the power under Section 54 of the Himachal Pradesh Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The case was registered as case No. 394 of 1992 and was transferred to Additional Director of Consolidation of Holdings, respondent No. 1 herein, who by the order impugned in the present petition, dismissed the same. 3. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition. 4. I have heard Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, instructed by Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. 3. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition. 4. I have heard Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, instructed by Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No. 1 and Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 to 5. 5. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the revisional authority has committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition on the ground of limitation. He submitted that when the petitioner came to know about the scheme and the scheme was to be implemented in 1992, immediately he approached the revisional authority and it was incumbent on the part of the revisional authority to decide the question in accordance with law on its own merits. He also submitted that there is an error apparent on the face of the record committed by the revisional authority in not implementing the scheme as per the respective shares of all co-sharers when the land touching the road was to be divided equally between all co-sharers. It was the duty of the implementing authority to see that the respective shares are given to all co-sharers. Since it was not done, the illegality has been committed. It was also urged that even today, the petitioner is in possession of the land in question and hence the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. Mr. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 to 5, on the other hand, supported the action taken by the respondent-authority They submitted that the revision application was filed in 1992 against the order, which was passed in 1988 and the revision petition was, therefore, not within the reasonable period and such revision application was liable to be dismissed. They, however, submitted that over and above delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the revisional authority, even on merits the 1st respondent has considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner before him and came to the conclusion by recording a finding that the scheme was implemented in accordance with law. The petitioner has no right to make grievance in this Court when the Court is exercising power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. The petitioner has no right to make grievance in this Court when the Court is exercising power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, in my opinion, it cannot be said that any error of law and/or jurisdiction can be said to have been committed by the revisional authority. My attention was invited to the relevant provisions of the Act. Looking to those provisions, it is clear that Chapter III speaks of revision and correction of maps and records as also consolidation of holdings. Section 14 provides for declaration regarding consolidation and Section 15 deals with effect of such declaration. Section 22 provides for consolidation scheme and Section 28 makes provision for publication of draft scheme. A provision is also made for inviting objections. If no objections to the proposed scheme are filed, or such objections are dealt with and decided, Section 29 enacts that the scheme will be confirmed. After the second stage of repartition under Section 30 of the Act, the scheme which was prepared, finalised and confirmed under Section 29 of the Act will be implemented by the authorities. Even at that stage sub-section (2) of Section 30 enables a party to raise objections within the period stipulated in the said subsection, if a party is aggrieved by any decision regarding repartition of the scheme. It is not even the case of the petitioner that the scheme was not finalised or confirmed. The scheme was finalised in 1988 and thereafter it was implemented. 8. It is no doubt true that in paragraph 6 of the petition, the petitioner has stated as under : "That the petitioner came to know about only during the year 1992 about the said allotment and he immediately approached the Director Consolidation of Holdings exercising the powers of State Government under Section 54 of H.R Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971". 9. But there is no material on record to that effect nor anything to show as to on what basis such a statement is made. That apart, even in the order passed by the 1st respondent, which is impugned in the present petition, no such argument was advanced. Looking to the revision application, which was shown by the learned Deputy Advocate General, no such contention was advanced even in the revision application. 10. That apart, even in the order passed by the 1st respondent, which is impugned in the present petition, no such argument was advanced. Looking to the revision application, which was shown by the learned Deputy Advocate General, no such contention was advanced even in the revision application. 10. The question, therefore, is whether the petitioner had approached the revisional authority within a reasonable period. Now, it is true that Section 54 of the Act provides for a revision petition before the State Government. The said Section empowers the State Government to call for the records and proceedings of the officers exercising power under the Act at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of the order passed by subordinate officers. It is, therefore, clear that no period of limitation is prescribed. 11. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 to 5 drew my attention to Rule 28 of the Himachal Pradesh Holdings (Consolidation of Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) which lays down that an application under Section 54 shall be made within six months of the date of order against which it is filed. But Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, learned Counsel is right in relying a decision of this Court in Rattan Chand etc. v. The Deputy Commissioner, Bilaspur etc., ILR 1974 HP 599, wherein it has been held that when the Parent Act does not prescribe a period of limitation, it is not open to the State Government (delegated authority) in exercise of powers under Section 59 of the Act to prescribe a particular period virtually curtailing or interfering with the Parent Act. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it cannot be said that when a revision petition is not filed within 90 days, it must necessarily be held that the filing of the revision petition was not within the prescribed period. But it is equally settled law that when no period of limitation is prescribed, such power must be exercised within reasonable period. But it is equally settled law that when no period of limitation is prescribed, such power must be exercised within reasonable period. The point is no longer res Integra and in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others, AIR 1969 SC 1297, the apex Court has held that when the powers can be exercised by the revisional authority "at any time", such power must be exercised "in reasonable time" and "length of reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised." 12. Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, learned Counsel placed reliance on several decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. Dolly Das, (1999) 4 SCC 450; Mangheru v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, ILR 1981 HP 283; Ajudh Raj and others v. Moti, AIR 1991 SC 1600; Hukamchand Amolikchand Longde and others v. Madhava Balaji Potdar and another, AIR 1983 SC 540 and Abhijit Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Terai Tea Co. (P) Ltd. and others, (1996) 1 SCC 589. 13. So far as Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. is concerned, (i) a new contention was sought to be raised before the Supreme Court for the first time : (ii) the period of lease was not over and lease was subsisting and (iii) as observed by their Lordships, no hardship was caused to the other side. In the light of all those facts, the power was exercised. 14. In Mangheru, considering the relevant Rule under the Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968, the Full Bench of this Court held that the Division Bench was not right in observing that reasonable time would be one year, but it would be three years. It was in the light of the provisions of the Nautor Land Rules that the question was considered by the Full Bench of this Court. 15. In Ajudh Raj, the Court was concerned with the applicability of a particular Article of limitation to the facts of the case and it was held that if no specific Article can be applied, residuary Article (Article 137) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would operate. 16. In Hukamchand Amolikchand Longde, the facts were entirely different, and their Lordships held that once the matter was admitted, it was to be decided on merits. 17. 16. In Hukamchand Amolikchand Longde, the facts were entirely different, and their Lordships held that once the matter was admitted, it was to be decided on merits. 17. The last case related to non-implementation of an order passed by the Apex Court. There was default on the part of the Registrar of the High Court of West Bengal. The above cases, therefore, were not to the point and were totally different. In the instant case, apart from the provisions of Sections 14, 21 and 22, the draft scheme was published and confirmed and it is not even the case of the petitioner that there was no publication of scheme or the scheme was not confirmed. It was at the second stage of repartitioning that some dispute arose. In the facts and circumstances, therefore, in my opinion, the revisional authority was not wrong in observing that there was delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in invoking the provisions of Section 54 of the Act. 18. It was further contended that the re-partition which was done under Section 30 of the Act was not according to the scheme, which was confirmed. In this connection, however, the revisional authority has observed in the impugned order as under : 19. The translation, which has been supplied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner himself, the above sentence reads thus: "Each right holder has been allotted land according to the consolidation scheme." 20. In my view, the above finding is a pure finding of fact. Once it has been held that repartition has been made under Section 30 of the Act and that each right holder has been allotted land according to the consolidation scheme, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court cannot re-appreciate the above finding. 21. Thus, on merits also, it cannot be said that the revisional authority has committed any error, which deserves to be interfered with by this Court. 22. For the foregoing reasons, in my opinion, no case has been made out to interfere with the order passed by the 1st respondent. The petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Notice discharged. No costs. CMP No. 6 of 2001 : 23. In view of the dismissal of the petition, the present application stands also dismissed and ad-interim relief granted on 12th January, 2001 stands vacated. Petition dismissed.