JUDGMENT Bakhshish Kaur, J. - This revision is directed against the orders passed by the courts below as interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was declined. 2. Krishan Parkash Singh and Baldev Krishan Singh, plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants Ajmer Singh and others from interfering in their possession over the land measuring 13 Kanals 3 Marlas, situated in village Sohal Jagir, Tehsil Shahkot, District Jalandhar. As per averments, the land originally belonged to Ajmer Singh, who had agreed to sell it in favour of Lal Singh, defendant No. 2. Lal Singh further sold the same in favour of Karnail Singh, father of the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs. 93,450/- vide sale deed dated 14.6.1991. Karnail Singh being the bona fide purchaser had transferred the land in favour of the plaintiffs by virtue of a decree passed by the civil Court. Wazir Chand, defendant No. 3 is threatening to interfere in their possession on the grounds that the decree is and null and void having been obtained in collusion with defendants No. 1 and 2 and the same is not binding upon him. 3. I have heard Mr. Jasbir Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. G.S. Nagra, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. 4. Mr. Jasbir Singh, learned counsel contended that the plaintiffs were not party to the decree, therefore, the judgment and decree set up by the defendants is not binding upon them. In fact, it is a collusive one. 5. Apart from this, it is contended that defendant No. 4 Karnail Singh has been recorded as owner in possession as per entries recorded in Jamabandi for the year 1993-94 and Khasra Girdawari from 1994 to 1997. Thus, the findings recorded by the trial Court that the sale in favour of the plaintiffs is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens is of no avail. The first Appellate Court has observed that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land even then they have been declined the right to protect the possession under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, therefore, the impugned orders suffer from illegality and infirmity. The first Appellate Court has observed that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land even then they have been declined the right to protect the possession under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, therefore, the impugned orders suffer from illegality and infirmity. The possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land may be unlawful if according to the defendants it is hit by the principle of lis pendens, yet balance of convenience lies in their favour and they would suffer irreparable injury if the interim injunction is declined without going into the merits of the case. 6. I have given my careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel but I do not find myself in agreement with the same. Where a party is getting possession of the land in pursuance of a decree or an order of Court, he should not be deprived of the fruits of the decree. 7. It is well settled that a party is required to prima facie establish three concomitants, i.e. the person claiming the relief has a prima facie case and there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by him; secondly, that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury if injunction is not granted to him and thirdly, that balance of convenience is in his favour. If the injunction is not granted, the comparative mischief will be greater than that which is likely to arise if it is granted. In this regard, reference can be easily made to Thakar Singh v. Jagat Singh and another, 1986(1) CLJ (C&Cr.) 506. A somewhat similar situation also arose in that case. A sale deed was got executed after the passing of the decree. Thus, it was held that the transfer prima facie appear to have been made mala fide with a view to delay the execution proceedings. 8. What is the effect of the sale during the pendency of the litigation has been dealt with by Story in his treatise "On Equity", 3rd Edition, at page 116 as follows :- "Ordinarily, it is true that the judgment of a court binds only the parties and their privies in representation or estate. But he who purchases during the pendency of an action, is held bound by the judgment that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. But he who purchases during the pendency of an action, is held bound by the judgment that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigations parties are exempted from taking any notice of the title so acquired; and such purchaser need not be made a party to the action. Where there is a real and fair purchase, without any notice, the rule may operate very hardly. But it is a rule founded upon a great public policy; for otherwise alienation made during an action might defeat its whole purpose, and there would be no end to litigation. And hence arises the maxim, pendente lite nihil innovetur; the effect of which is not to annul the conveyance but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. As to the rights of these parties, the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does not vary them." While allowing the revision petition in Thakar Singhs case (supra), it was held that, "the plaintiff who obtains a decree should not be deprived of the fruits of his decree by the unsuccessful defendant. Thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to obtain injunction restraining the defendant from executing his decree in this case." 9. In Bishan Singh v. Hukam Chand and others, (1989-2) 96 PLR 175, it has been held, "that otherwise in equity also, plaintiff is none else than the father of the vendee who has fought the litigation till the end and lost. If the temporary injunction is granted, the respondents shall be deprived of their right to execute the decree passed in their favour. Courts should be slow in granting injunction restraining the execution of lawful decrees affirmed by superior Courts. There is no balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner." This view was taken by this Court in Civil Revision No. 328 of 2001, decided on April 20, 2001. 10. In Jit Singh v. Sardara Singh, 2000(3) RCR(Civil) 566, it was held that, "if a person is in long possession of property without any right, title, grant, lease, such possession does not give any right to the person to retain possession against true owner and he is not entitled to injunction." 11. 10. In Jit Singh v. Sardara Singh, 2000(3) RCR(Civil) 566, it was held that, "if a person is in long possession of property without any right, title, grant, lease, such possession does not give any right to the person to retain possession against true owner and he is not entitled to injunction." 11. In the given case in hand where both the courts below have given a concurrent finding that the plaintiffs have no prima facie case to go to the trial, in such a situation High Court will be very slow in interfering. In this regard, reference is made to Devi Dayal v. Gram Panchayat, Hari Majra and another, 2001(1) RCR(Civil) 554. For the aforesaid reasons, this revision petition is dismissed as no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order in the exercise of revisional powers to this Court. Revision dismissed.