Judgment :- K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. In these original petitions, the common third respondent appears through Advocate Jayasurya. The challenge in both these original petitions is against the same order, Ext.P1, marked in O.P. No. 24709/2001. It is with respect to the claim for the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher in the school managed by the petitioner in O.P. No. 24709/2001. The rival claims are between the petitioner in O.P. No. 24709/ 2001 and the third respondent in these original petitions, who is the same person. Therefore, appearance of these parties is sufficient to resolve the dispute raised in these two original petitions. Accordingly though service is not complete in respect of other parties, I am disposing of these original petitions as the said parties are ready and reveal that there is urgency in the matter. Other respondents are not really interested parties. 2. The petitioner in O.P. No. 24709/01, the manager of an existing aided high school was granted higher secondary divisions in the year 1998. Ten posts of Higher Secondary School Teacher were sanctioned, out of which one was for English. The method of appointment to the said post was, at the relevant time, governed by government Order, G.O. MS. No. 162/98/G.Edn. dated 13.5.1998. This is not disputed by any of the parties. As per the said government order, 25% of the post of teachers is reserved for appointment from qualified members of staff in service under the management. The third respondent was, at the material time, a member of the staff of the school managed by the petitioner in O.P. No. 24709/01. The third respondent possess MA Degree in English and also B.Ed. MA and B.Ed. are the requisite qualification for appointment as Higher Secondary School Teacher. These are not disputed. But the manager appointed an incumbent from outside, the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01 against the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher English. It is an admitted position before me by the petitioner in O.P. No. 24709/01 the manager of the school, that out of the 10 posts sanctioned in the year 1998-99 in the higher secondary school only one was filled up from the staff of the school as against the two reserved for them. The third respondent claimed the post which was filled up by appointing the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01. 3. The third respondent claimed the post which was filled up by appointing the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01. 3. An original petition was filed before this court , O.P. No. 19701/99 by the third respondent. That was withdrawn without any reservation, as per Ext. P10 judgment. Thereafter the third respondent filed another original petition, O.P. No. 32496/00-R . The original petition was disposed of as per Ext. P11 judgment directing the second respondent to consider the representation filed by the third respondent. It was in compliance with the said direction, Ext. P1 order was issued upholding the claim of the third respondent and directing his appointment in place of the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01. It is in the above circumstances that Ext. P1 is challenged by the manager as well as the appointee, the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01. 4.Both the petitioners contend that when the earlier original petition seeking a direction for appointment was withdrawn by the third respondent, as is revealed by Ext. P10 judgment based on Ext.P9 affidavit, the third respondent cannot now seek the very same relief. He ought not to have filed the original petition which led to Ext.P11 judgment. He had filed that original petition suppressing the factum of filing of the original petition which led to Ext.P10. Therefore, there was total abuse of the process of the court. Counsel for the petitioners submits that when the third respondent had withdraw the earlier original petition, he had abandoned all his claims in that original petition. In the absence of reservation of any right at the time of withdrawal, the reliefs claimed ought to have been taken as relinguished or deemed to have been considered in the case so withdrawn. The relief sought for before the second respondent who was directed to consider and dispose of the representation was the same as the one said to be abandoned in the earlier original petition. So there is no reason to direct appointment of the third respondent. 5.It is further contended by both the petitioners that the fresh hand has been appointed as Higher Secondary School Teacher (English) on 14.9.1998. Thereafter there were several cases with regard to appointment of Higher Secondary School Teachers challenging the Government order dated 13.5.1998 mentioned at the initial portion of this judgment. Finally the litigation went up to the Supreme Court. 5.It is further contended by both the petitioners that the fresh hand has been appointed as Higher Secondary School Teacher (English) on 14.9.1998. Thereafter there were several cases with regard to appointment of Higher Secondary School Teachers challenging the Government order dated 13.5.1998 mentioned at the initial portion of this judgment. Finally the litigation went up to the Supreme Court. The Supreme court passed an interim order like Ext.P5 in O.P. No. 24709/2001. Later, the Supreme Court finally disposed of the case, as per Ext.P12, with certain directions. The directions 3 and 4 therein are relevant in this case. Those directions read thus: "(3) If there has been any appointment made pursuant to the Govt. Order of 13.5.1998 as on today those appointment also would continue and will not be annulled. (4) There will be no further appointment from any source either in the private school or in the Government schools from today for a period of 3 months." Government was also directed to bring in statutory rules governing such appointments within three months. It was further provided that if due to any unforeseen circumstances the statutory rules could not notified and brought into force within the aforesaid period, it would be open for the parties to move the Supreme Court for appropriate directions. 5. Referring to the aforesaid directions extracted above, it is contended by the petitioners that as the petitioner in O.P. No.32142/2001 had been appointed on 14.9. 1998, it shall continue without any disturbance and that appointment cannot be annulled as well. Moreover, no appointment can also be effected by the Manager. Compliance with the direction in Ext.P1 will amount to annulling the appointment of the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/2001 and the appointment of the third respondent in these original petitions and will militate against the judgment of the Supreme Court. Those directions are reiterated in Ext.P13 government order passed pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court. Para 3 thereof also provides. Any appointments made in pursuance to the government order dated 13.5.98 and continuing as on the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court will also be regularized. Going by Ext.P13, the appointment of the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/2001 has to be regularized. Nobody can replace him. Para 3 thereof also provides. Any appointments made in pursuance to the government order dated 13.5.98 and continuing as on the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court will also be regularized. Going by Ext.P13, the appointment of the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/2001 has to be regularized. Nobody can replace him. Even if any appointment is to be made, in the absence of the rules framed by the government, the parties have to get orders from the Supreme Court. So Ext.P1 in O.P. No. 24709/2001 cannot be implemented. It cannot have any sustenance in the light of these facts. 6. First of all, I will examine whether there had been any abuse of the process of the court by the third respondent in the original petitions. It is true that the third respondent had earlier filed O.P.No. 19701/99 and it had been allowed to be withdrawn as is seen from Ext. P10 judgment. No right is reserved. Explaining these circumstances, the third respondent contends that though he had claimed appointment in the said original petition, the petitioner in O.P. No. 24709/2001 filed a counter affidavit, Ext.R3 (c) in that original petition contending that: But due to the stay order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court this respondent entertained a bonafide doubt regarding their power to make appointment after the said stay order. It was in the said circumstances clarified was sought from 1st respondent. But so far 1st respondent has not so far given any specific reply in the said matter." Of course, the petitioner in O.P. No.24709/2001 submits that it is with respect to another direction. Whatever that be, there was a direction from the Supreme Court. In was in the perspective of this averments, the third respondent had sought withdrawal of the earlier original petition. It was further contended that the withdrawal of the original petition will not disable an incumbent from agitating the matter departmentally. The original petition under Article 226 depends upon the discretionary relief to be granted. In such circumstances, even after it is withdrawn, when one seeks appropriate orders under the remedies available departmentally or through administrative process, it cannot be said to be one to come within the principles of 'might and ought'. Obviously, 'might and ought' principle is applicable only if the matter is reagitated before the court. In such circumstances, even after it is withdrawn, when one seeks appropriate orders under the remedies available departmentally or through administrative process, it cannot be said to be one to come within the principles of 'might and ought'. Obviously, 'might and ought' principle is applicable only if the matter is reagitated before the court. Withdrawal of the original petition, therefore, did not affect the third respondent to claim the benefits available departmentally. 7. The other allegation of the petitioners that the third respondent did not, in O.P. No. 32496/00 disclose the filing of the earlier original petition, O.P. No. 19701/99, also does not deserve much consideration because the relief sought for in the two original petitions were entirely different. The substantial prayer in the original petition which led to Ext. P11 was disposal of the representation; whereas that in Ext.P8 Original Petition was a claim for appointment . In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the third respondent had abused the process of the court.' 8. Even otherwise also, the petitioners cannot contend so because there is now a judgment Ext.P11. It is very well known to both the petitioners. The impugned orders have been passed pursuant to that judgment. None of he petitioners has filed any appeal or review against Ext.P11. The petitioner in O.P. No.24709/2001 had participated in the proceedings initiated by the Director pursuant to that judgment without any demur. The petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01 also has not filed an appeal against Ext.P11. Therefore, nothing can be said against that judgment at present. 9. It is true that before passing Ext.P1 order, the petitioner in O.P. No.32142 had not been given an opportunity. In normal case, it was incumbent to hear the affected person as the direction issued affects the incumbent adversely. But even if an opportunity has been granted. I think, the petitioner in O.P. No.32142/01 could not have improved the case more than what is contended before me. It is also conceded that there is nothing more than what had been submitted before me. But even if an opportunity has been granted. I think, the petitioner in O.P. No.32142/01 could not have improved the case more than what is contended before me. It is also conceded that there is nothing more than what had been submitted before me. In such circumstances, going by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (AIR 1981 SC 137) and also the decision reported in Alegarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan { [2000] 7SCC 529} unless prejudice is caused, violation of the principles of natural justice cannot be projected to a situation of directing the administrative authority to pass an order in the very same nature. If the only conclusion possible is nothing other than the impugned order, then also the violation of principles of natural justice shall not matter much. Therefore, I will deal with the legality or otherwise of Ext.P1, the impugned order with reference to the relevant government order and the contention on either side and decide whether any prejudice is caused to the petitioner in O.P. No. 32141/2001 and whether even if an opportunity had been given to the petitioner he could meet the case. 10. Admittedly at the relevant point of time, the appointment had to be governed by G.O. MS. 162/98/G.Edn. dated 13.5. 1998 which directed reservation of 25% of the vacancies of High Secondary School Teachers for appointment from qualified hands in service. As already mentioned above, it is an admitted fact that the third respondent was such a qualified hand for appointment as Higher Secondary School Teacher ( in English). It is also not disputed by the Manger, petitioner in O.P. No.24709/01, that out of the 10 posts sanctioned in 1998-99, though two posts were so reserved to the incumbents in service only one had been filled up appointing an incumbent in service. Thus one vacancy was available for appointment from among the staff of the school. When it is so available and when the thirds respondent was qualified for the post, necessarily, the third respondent ought to have been appointed, before preferring the petitioner in O.P. NO. 32142/01, an outsider. Going by the said government order, the third respondent did have a right fro appointment against the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (English), when it was filled up by an outsider, the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01. 11. 32142/01, an outsider. Going by the said government order, the third respondent did have a right fro appointment against the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (English), when it was filled up by an outsider, the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01. 11. The next question to be looked into is whether the Supreme Court judgment, Ext.P12 and the government order passed pursuant there to, Ext.P13, will make the position different. 12. As already mentioned above, what was directed by the Supreme Court is that: " If there has been any appointment made pursuant to the Govt. order of 13.5.1998 as on today those appointment also would continue and will not be annulled". It is contended that the appointment of the petitoner in O.P. No. 32141/2001 was an appointment based on the said government order. The said government order as already mentioned, has reserved 25% of the vacancy for qualified hands in service. Thus two posts of Higher Secondary School Teacher were so reserved. But admittedly, only one had been so appointed so far. Further admittedly, the third respondent was qualified for one among the 10 posts created and that post has been filled up by appointing the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01. That vacancy ought to have been filled up by appointing the thirds respondent as per the government order dated 13.5.1998. Therefore, the appointment of the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01 cannot be said to be one made "pursuant to the government order dated 13.5.1998" to come within the direction contained in Ext.P12 judgment of the Supreme Court. His appointment was really in violation of the said government order. 13. Further it cannot be said that the Supreme court had, by Ext.12 taken away the eligible and legitimate right of any person in terms of the said government order on 14.9.1998. Ext.P12 does not legitimates any illegal appointments made in flagrant violation of the said government order defeating the rights of any candidate in terms of the said government order. Therefore, on that count also, the petitioners cannot sustain the challenge Ext.P1. 14. The 4th direction contained in Ext.P12 is that "there will be no further appointment from any source either in the private school or in the govt. school from today for a period of 3 months". First of all three months have elapsed. Therefore, on that count also, the petitioners cannot sustain the challenge Ext.P1. 14. The 4th direction contained in Ext.P12 is that "there will be no further appointment from any source either in the private school or in the govt. school from today for a period of 3 months". First of all three months have elapsed. What is directed in Ext.P1 is not in respect of further appointment to be made after the Supreme court judgment. But this was an appointment to be effected on 14.9.1998, when the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01 had been illegally appointed. Third respondent was denied of that appointment. He was Clamoring for appointment from that date. Claim of the third respondent and legality of the appointment of the outsider were considered with reference to the circumstances obtaining on 14.9.1998. That cannot be therefore covered by the direction No. 4 of Ext.P12. 15. The direction No.6 in Ext.P12 is that parties shall obtain orders from the Supreme Court to make any appointment before framing of rules. This also does not arise in this case because non of the parties before me was a party before the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Government is not bound to make any appointment. The direction is with reference to the appointment which has to be effected by the manager, the petitioner in O.P. No. 24709/01. He was not admittedly a party before the supreme Court. Moreover, consideration of the grievance and grant of relief to the incumbent, whose claim arising on the basis of the government order dated 13.5.1998 had been denied illegally by any manager, do not come within any of the directions contained in Ext.P12. What the director has done in Ext.P1 impugned order is to uphold the claim of the third respondent for the post of Higher Secondary School Teacher (English). That was the second post out of the 10 posts sanctioned in 1998-99 to be filled up by the manager appointing a qualified hand in service. Then alone the 25% quota reserved for qualified hands in service as per government order dated 13.5.1998 will be satisfied. 16. In such circumstances, the direction in Ext.P1 is perfectly justified. Even if the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01 had been granted an opportunity by the Director before passing Ext.P1 order, his appointment could not have been saved, as he could not have contended more than what is discussed above. 16. In such circumstances, the direction in Ext.P1 is perfectly justified. Even if the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01 had been granted an opportunity by the Director before passing Ext.P1 order, his appointment could not have been saved, as he could not have contended more than what is discussed above. In such circumstances even if that petitioner had been granted an opportunity, the irrebutable conclusion that is possible is as contained in Ext.P1 alone. Therefore, there is no reason for quashing the impugned order only on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. No prejudice is caused to him, thus, solely because of such violation. The dictum is Jagmohan's case and Mansoor's case (supra) will squarely apply to the situation. Even if Ext.P1 is quashed and sent back on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, the order that can be passed will be the same as Ext.P1 as there is nothing further to be placed for consideration. Apart from that, the manager had been heard. The manager was aware of the appointment of the petitioner in O.P. No. 32142/01, because he was the chosen hand of the manager. Necessarily the manager would have urged his claim and protected his chosen candidate. Accordingly, the challenge against Ext.P1 in O.P. No. 24709/01 which is same as Ext.P9 in O.P. No. 32142/01 fails. Original petitions are dismissed. No costs.