B. K. RATHI, J. ( 1 ) THE dispute in this case is regarding a shop situated in Arat Bazar, Mohalla Gulam Aulla gangoh, district Saharanpur. The respondent No. 2, who is the landlord of the disputed shop moved a combined application under Section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "act") against the petitioner, who is the tenant of the shop being p. A. No. 7 of 1985. The said application for release of the respondent No. 2 was rejected by the prescribed authority, Saharanpur by Judgment Annexure-8 to the writ petition, on 15. 2. 1989. Aggrieved by that order, the respondent No. 2 preferred appeal No. 38 of 1989, under Section 22 of the Act which has been allowed by the respondent No. 1 on 17. 7. 1997 by Judgment, annexure-11 to the writ petition and he has ordered that the shop in dispute be released in favour of the respondent No. 2. Aggrieved by it, the petitioner-tenant has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India requesting for quashing of the order of the respondent No. 1 dated 17. 7. 1997, Annexure-11 to the writ petition. ( 2 ) I have heard Sri R. K. Jain, learned senior advocate assisted by Sri P. K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rajesh Tandon learned senior advocate for the respondent No. 2. ( 3 ) THE first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the joint application under section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) of the Act is not maintainable. That the need is not required to be considered for release under Section 21 (1) (b) and the consequence mentioned in Section 24 will follow in case the release is allowed under Section 21 (1) (b ). That, therefore, in this case only need can be considered and release under Section 21 (1) (b) cannot be considered. ( 4 ) I have considered the argument. In my opinion, there is no bar in filing joint application under section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) of the Act. In this regard, reference may be made to Division bench decision of this Court in Gur Prasad v. 1st Additional District Judge. Kanpur Nagar and another, 1997 (1) ARC 462. In this case. In my opinion, there is no bar in filing joint application under section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) of the Act. In this regard, reference may be made to Division bench decision of this Court in Gur Prasad v. 1st Additional District Judge. Kanpur Nagar and another, 1997 (1) ARC 462. In this case. It was held that it cannot be accepted that when building is in dilapidated condition, it stands excluded from being released under Section 21 (1) (a ). It has also held that a composite application is maintainable and the landlord may press his case in any one of the two clauses. That the need can be considered for release under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act even if it has been pleaded that the building is in dilapidated condition and requires demolition. ( 5 ) IN view of the above decision. an alternative pleading under Section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b) is maintainable. ( 6 ) NOW coming to the merit of the case, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 that the question that there is faonafide need of the landlord and that the hardship is also in his favour and that the building is in dilapidated condition recorded by the appellate court are the findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in this writ petition. Learned counsel in support of the argument has referred to the decision of Honble Supreme court in Civil Appeal No. 266 of 1999, Ram Shanker Dixit and another v. Vijay Bahadur Singh and another, decided on 15. 1. 1999. It was observed that : "it is well settled that a finding of an inferior tribunal can be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction only when the High Court comes to the conclusion that the tribunal has entertained any inadmissible evidence or that it has ignored to consider any vital piece of evidence or that the finding is based on no evidence at all. " On the strength of above observation, it has been contended that this Court cannot interfere in the findings of the appellate court regarding facts as the appellate court has not admitted any inadmissible evidence nor has ignored any vital piece of evidence- That, therefore, the finding cannot be challenged. " On the strength of above observation, it has been contended that this Court cannot interfere in the findings of the appellate court regarding facts as the appellate court has not admitted any inadmissible evidence nor has ignored any vital piece of evidence- That, therefore, the finding cannot be challenged. ( 7 ) IN the light of this decision of the Apex Court. I consider whether this Court can interfere in the finding of the first appellate court. ( 8 ) AS already stated, the application is a joint application under Section 21 (1) (a) and 21 (1) (b)of the Act. Firstly, 1 consider whether the application can be allowed under Section 21 (1) (b)and building is in dilapidated condition and is required for demolition and reconstruction. On this point, there is affidavit and counter-affidavit of the parties supporting their case, which need not be considered in detail. The landlord-respondent No. 2 also filed the report of Mittal and associates, Architects, Engineers and Valuers, Annexure-3 to the writ petition along with the affidavit of Sri Bhupendra Mittal. According to this report, the rainwater has entered in the slab and has rusted the iron bars and due to that, iron bars have lost their strength about 60% to 70% and slabs are segging. He has also mentioned that vertical and diagonal cracks have developed in the walls due to sinkage of foundations. The floors are also sinking due to the sinking of the foundations. Only a portion of the property is bit safe now. As against this, the petitioner filed a report along with affidavit of Sri Rakesh Mohan Gupta, Architect from Roorkee University. According to his report, the building is in fit condition and does not require demolition or reconstruction. It is to be considered as to which of the two reports should be accepted. The trial court has accepted the report of the petitioner whereas the first appellate court has accepted the report of the respondent No. 2. ( 9 ) FROM the perusal of the report of Mittal and Associates, it does not appear that on what data the observations as referred to above are based. It also appeared that the report of Mittal and associates is regarding the entire house of which the disputed shop is a part. There is no specific mention in the report regarding the disputed shop. It also appeared that the report of Mittal and associates is regarding the entire house of which the disputed shop is a part. There is no specific mention in the report regarding the disputed shop. Therefore, much reference can be placed on this report. ( 10 ) IT may also be mentioned that there are two contrary reports of the Architects filed by both the parties. Therefore, in the appellate court the petitioner moved an application for local inspection by the Court, which is Annexure-9 to the writ petition. The request for local inspection was refused obviously for the reason that it might have been opposed by the respondent 2. ( 11 ) IN the case where there are two contrary reports, it was incumbent on the courts below to have made local inspection of the shop to ascertain the correct position. ( 12 ) THE other evidence is that the respondent No. 2 has also filed a notice of Nagar Nigam issued to the respondent No. 2 for the demolition of the building. This notice also does not show that the shop is in dilapidated condition. ( 13 ) IT was for the respondent No. 2, landlord to prove that the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for demolition and reconstruction. He has failed to produce any reliable evidence in support of his allegation. He did not make any request for local inspection by the prescribed authority. Considering the evidence and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the prescribed authority has rightly held that the building is not in dilapidated condition. The finding of the appellate court is based on misreading of the evidence and is liable to be quashed. He has not considered as to what has been mentioned in the notice of Nagar Palika and how it shows that the building is in dilapidated condition. I, therefore, find that the building is not in dilapidated condition and cannot be released in clause (b) of Section 21 (1) of the Act. ( 14 ) NOW coming on the question of bonafide need and release under Section 21 (1) (a) of the act. The allegation of the land lord-respondent No. 2 is that he is agriculturist having large agriculture land, but unfortunately he met an accident on 16. 5. 1982 resulting in fracture of both thighs which have been jointed by iron rods. The allegation of the land lord-respondent No. 2 is that he is agriculturist having large agriculture land, but unfortunately he met an accident on 16. 5. 1982 resulting in fracture of both thighs which have been jointed by iron rods. That, therefore, he is in ill-health and he could not look after the agriculture and has problem in moving. It was also alleged that the petitioner is also suffering from anginal disease and has undergone by-pass surgery. The certificates regarding all this have been filed, which is Annexure-6 to the writ petition. The report, regarding the anginal cardiac of Apollo Hospital, Madras, has been filed, which is Annexure-11 of the counter-affidavit. All these documents no doubt clearly prove that the respondent No. 2 is not in a position to do agriculture work due to his ailments. It is alleged by the respondent No. 2 that for this reason, he wants to start the business of agriculture implements for which the disputed shop is suitable and is required. It is mentioned that he will use the disputed shop as show room and the adjoining shop as office. That, therefore, there is bona fide need of the disputed shop of the respondent No. 2. ( 15 ) FIRSTLY, it may be mentioned that the map showing the position of the disputed shop was not filed by the parties. However, a map was prepared by Mittal and Associates, which is paper No. 43. In this map, the existing constructions of the ground floor and the proposed construction has been shown separately. The existing construction shows that in the east of the disputed shop is a varandah ; in the west there is rasta ; in the south there is another shop and in the north there is house of some other person. The respondent No. 2 has alleged that in the south, there is baithak and not the shop. This fact was considered in detail by the prescribed authority and he has mentioned that in the original application. It was mentioned to be the shop. However, later on by amendment it was pleaded that it is a baithak, which is an afterthought. However, in para 3 of application still, it has been referred to as shop. Not only this, the Architect whose report was filed by the respondent No. 2 has also mentioned it as shop and not baithak. However, later on by amendment it was pleaded that it is a baithak, which is an afterthought. However, in para 3 of application still, it has been referred to as shop. Not only this, the Architect whose report was filed by the respondent No. 2 has also mentioned it as shop and not baithak. Therefore, I find that it is a shop and not baithak and there is no question as to why this shop cannot be used for the business and the eastern varandah of the same cannot be used as office. It is no doubt true that it is unfortunate thaf the respondent No. 2 is suffering from ailments and has suffered a serious accident but for this reason, the need of the respondent No. 2 for the disputed shop cannot be said to be bona fide as he has other place to start business. This aspect of the matter that there is adjoining shop to the disputed shop which can be used by the respondent No. 2 as show room and there is also place which can be used as office has conspicuously been ignored by the first appellate court. The finding of the first appellate court is, therefore, perverse and cannot be maintained. ( 16 ) APART from this, the documents and affidavits filed show that during the pendency of the case, one shop was vacated by Som Prakash and the respondent No. 2 has got its possession. This fact has not been denied and the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the said shop can be used by the respondent No. 2 for starting the proposed business. Regarding this, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 that it is situated in the lane and is a ball-khana and is not fit for business. He also alleged that the same is being used by the respondent No. 2 for parking his tractor. The first appellate court has accepted the contention of the respondent No. 2 without considering the evidence. in the application. Annexure-9 to the writ petition, the request for local inspection was also made for the inspection of this shop. This local inspection was also refused on the opposition of the respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the adverse inference has to be drawn against him. in the application. Annexure-9 to the writ petition, the request for local inspection was also made for the inspection of this shop. This local inspection was also refused on the opposition of the respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the adverse inference has to be drawn against him. Therefore, there is no reason as to why the shop vacated by Som Prakash cannot be used for business by the respondent No. 2. ( 17 ) THE learned prescribed authority has further mentioned that the respondent No. 2 started constructing two shops in the gher of which the construction was stopped by the respondent No. 2 when the plea regarding alternative place was raised by the petitioner. This fact has also been totally ignored by the first appellate court. The respondent No. 2 has started construction of two shops in the gher, he could very well complete the shops and start his business in the same. ( 18 ) AFTER considering the argument and the evidence on the record. I am of the view that the findings of the first appellate court are based on ignoring the vital piece of the evidence and the finding recorded by the prescribed authority on the basis of the evidence appeared to be correct. ( 19 ) THEREFORE, considering the evidence on the record carefully. I am of the view that no doubt the allegations of the respondent No. 2 that he wants to start a business of agriculture implements is correct, but he has number of alternative accommodations for starting the said business. If it is so, the need of the disputed shop of the respondent No. 2 cannot be said to be bonafide. ( 20 ) IN view of the above, the question of comparative hardship is not required to be considered in this writ petition. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the judgment, Annexure-11 to the writ petition is quashed. .