JUDGMENT - S.G. MAHAJAN, J.:---The appellants herein were the accused in Sessions Trial No. 53/98 on the file of Additional Sessions Judge, Washim. They have challenged the order of conviction and sentence passed against them by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Washim in the aforesaid session trial. The accused/appellants were charged with the offences under sections 498-A, 306 and 304-B read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. In the operative order, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Washim has mentioned that the accused are convicted of the offences under sections 306 and 304-B read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. There is no mention in the said order that the accused are convicted also of the offence under section 498-A read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. But it is stated that since the accused are convicted of the offence under section 306 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code, no separate sentence is awarded for the offence under section 498-A read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. This means the accused/appellants are convicted also of the offence under section 498-A read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. The sentence awarded to each of the accused/appellants is of rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and of payment of fine of Rs. 1,000/- or in default to suffer R.I. for one month more on each count i.e. for the offence under section 306 and section 304-B read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. The substantive sentence of imprisonment is directed to run concurrently. No separate sentence is awarded for the offence under section 498-A read with section 34 Indian Penal Code as stated above. 2-(A) Deceased Gangabai was the daughter of complainant Shankar Narayan Mutkule resident of Suldari, District Parbhani. She was married to accused/appellant No. 1 Madhav about two years before the incident in this case. Accused/appellant No. 2 Sakharam and accused/appellant No. 4 Shashikalabai are the parents of accused/appellant Madhav and accused/appellant No. 3 is his brother. All the accused are the residents of village Sonda, Taluka Washim, District Akola. (B) It is the case of the prosecution that in the marriage the dowry of Rs. 90,000/- was settled. Out of this amount, Rs. 50,000/- were paid and the amount of Rs. 40,000/- had remained unpaid. The remaining dowry was to be paid lateron. The accused/appellants were ill-treating Gangabai for the unpaid dowry. (B) It is the case of the prosecution that in the marriage the dowry of Rs. 90,000/- was settled. Out of this amount, Rs. 50,000/- were paid and the amount of Rs. 40,000/- had remained unpaid. The remaining dowry was to be paid lateron. The accused/appellants were ill-treating Gangabai for the unpaid dowry. As and when Gangabai used to visit the place of her father she used to disclose the above facts to him. She had been to her father's place one month before her death. That time also she told her father that all the accused were ill-treating her for the non-fulfilment of demand of dowry. (C) During the night between 9-5-1998 and 10-5-1998 after 2 O'clock, when complainant Shankar was present at home, he received a message that his daughter had died in a well in her field at Sonda. He thereupon proceeded to her village in the morning and reached there around 10 a.m. He approached Police Station, Ansing and lodged an oral report against the accused/appellants alleging therein that he had given the dowry of Rs. 50,000/- to his son-in-law Madhav and it was decided to give Rs. 40,000/- lateron; that about one month before, Gangabai had come to his house and had disclosed that all the accused were beating and harassing her for the remaining amount of dowry and they had asked her to bring the dowry amount. Complainant Shankar stated in the aforesaid report that his daughter Gangabai who was fed up with the harassment over the issue of remaining amount of dowry, committed suicide by jumping in the well along with her daughter Deepa. (D) On the abovesaid report being lodged by complainant Shankar, Head Constable Udaysing registered the crime. The investigation was conducted by Head Constable Sudamsing and P.S.I. Pujjalwar. The spot panchanama was already drawn in the morning of 10-5-1998 itself. The body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem. Dr. Ghunage and Dr. Ahale, the Medical Officers attached to Primary Health Centre, Ansing conducted the post mortem. The cause of death recorded by them was asphyxia as a result of drowning. During the further investigation, the statements of the witnesses were recorded. On completion of the investigation, the accused/appellants stood charge-sheeted. 3. Dr. Ghunage and Dr. Ahale, the Medical Officers attached to Primary Health Centre, Ansing conducted the post mortem. The cause of death recorded by them was asphyxia as a result of drowning. During the further investigation, the statements of the witnesses were recorded. On completion of the investigation, the accused/appellants stood charge-sheeted. 3. After the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Washim framed the charge of the offences under sections 498-A, 306 and 304-B read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. The charge was read over and explained to the accused persons and they pleaded not guilty. 4. In order to bring home the guilt to the accused persons, the prosecution in all examined six witnesses. The allegations as regards the settlements of dowry were denied on the part of the accused/appellants. It was also denied by them that any dowry had remained unpaid. The allegations in respect of ill-treatment were also denied on their part. The accused No. 1 Madhav filed his written statement at Ex. 40 wherein he expressed some possibilities. The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the allegations that deceased Gangabai committed suicide by jumping into the well with her 6-7 months old female child because of the ill-treatment given to her by the accused persons on account of non-fulfilment of the demand of unpaid dowry, were proved. He accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused persons as detailed earlier. 5. At the hearing in this appeal, the learned Counsel for appellants submitted that the initial fact of the commission of suicide by the deceased by jumping into the well with her child, itself is not proved by the prosecution, and therefore, the offences under sections 304-B and 306 I.P.C. are not attracted. In the aforesaid written statement filed by accused/appellant No. 1 in the Session Case, it was alleged that there is a well in the field of the accused and adjoining to that well there are some trees. Deceased Gangabai and all the members of the family of the accused used to do the cultivation. It was their usual practice to leave the children in the shadow under the trees at the time of doing the work in the field. It was further pleaded that on 9-5-1998 deceased Gangabai had gone to the field along with her female child Deepa for doing the work. Deepa used to crawl. It was their usual practice to leave the children in the shadow under the trees at the time of doing the work in the field. It was further pleaded that on 9-5-1998 deceased Gangabai had gone to the field along with her female child Deepa for doing the work. Deepa used to crawl. It was further expressed that while doing the work in the field deceased Gangabai might have kept Deepa under the tree in a shadow as usual and Deepa, while playing, might have fallen into the well. It was further contended that in order to save Deepa, Gangabai might have jumped into the well and consequently both of them might have died an accidental death. In this connection, the learned Counsel for appellants cited (Vazirchand and another v. State of Haryana)1, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 378. The authority is on the point that in the case of abetment of the commission of suicide, the proof that the deceased committed suicide is a condition precedent. In this cited case, the evidence on record was not sufficient to establish with certainty that a newly married wife committed suicide. So, it was held that her husband and in laws could not be convicted under section 306 I.P.C. 6. The learned Counsel for appellants submitted that the evidence on record in this case is not sufficient to hold that the deceased had committed suicide. He canvassed that if the deceased intended to commit suicide she would not have jumped into the well with the child and she would have kept the baby away. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the possibility of the fall of the female child Deepa in the well while crawling and thereafter that of jumping of the deceased into the well to save the child cannot be excluded. The submissions made by the Counsel for appellants are not acceptable. The learned Counsel who was engaged by the complainant in this case pointed out that during the preparation of spot panchanama Ex. 30, no Articles were found in the surrounding area in the field. He canvassed that had deceased Ganga gone for the work to the field she would have taken food with her. No food was found on the spot. As per the defence, Ganga had been to the field for giving fodder and water to the cattle. 30, no Articles were found in the surrounding area in the field. He canvassed that had deceased Ganga gone for the work to the field she would have taken food with her. No food was found on the spot. As per the defence, Ganga had been to the field for giving fodder and water to the cattle. However, no instrument for cutting the fodder was found on the spot. The learned Counsel also pointed out that no carpet for keeping the child in the shadow below trees was found. According to the learned Counsel all this indicates that deceased Ganga had not gone to the field for work. The parapet of the well, as per the spot panchanama, was of the height of 1 foot. The Counsel for complainant canvassed that it is not possible for a baby of 6-7 months to climb the parapet so that she would fall into the well. Any how it is not the case of the defence that the deceased was knowing the swimming. So had the baby fallen in the well, the deceased would have raised the cries for help and she would not have jumped into the well as she could not have saved the baby thereby. It is thus quite obvious that the deceased committed suicide by jumping into the well. Why the deceased might have jumped in the well with the child can be understood. A woman must be feeling that after her death the child may not be left to the care of others and may not suffer. A woman having a love for her child must be feeling that at the time of her death she should have no worry as to what would happen to the child after her death. 7. The learned Counsel for appellants submitted that the accused are convicted of the offences under section 304-B as well as section 306 Indian Penal Code. He posed a question whether the conviction can be under both the sections. According to him, if there is an abetment of the commission of suicide, the channel would be entirely different and in this case there is no material to show that the accused persons abetted the commission of suicide. Thus, the question is whether sections 304-B and 306 I.P.C. can go together so as to say that the accused can be convicted of both these offences. Thus, the question is whether sections 304-B and 306 I.P.C. can go together so as to say that the accused can be convicted of both these offences. In this connection suffice it to say that in (Kansraj v. State of Punjab and others)2, 2000 Cri.L.J. 2993, the Apex Court had upheld the conviction of accused/respondent No. 2 in respect of the offences under section 304-B as well as section 306 I.P.C. both. 8. The Counsel for appellants canvassed that the allegations about the ill-treatment in this case are too vague. He pointed out that the prosecution witnesses made merely a general statement that all the accused were ill-treating the deceased for the remaining dowry. He submitted that no specifications about the ill-treatment are given; no instances showing the cruelty are stated and no details as to who asked to bring the remaining dowry are given. He posed a question whether such omnibus statement would make out an offence under section 304-B I.P.C. The learned Counsel further contended that in absence of specific instances, the nature of cruelty is not known. The cruelty is a subjective factor. According to him, the prosecution has to show that the cruelty is of such a nature that the deceased would be driven to commit suicide. 9. The learned Counsel for accused/appellants submitted that although complainant Shankar who is the father of deceased deposed that as and when his daughter had been to his place, she used to tell him about the ill-treatment being given by the accused persons for the unpaid dowry, he omitted to state in his report about the disclosure made by his daughter as and when she used to visit his place. The Counsel further submitted that the version of complainant Shankar is that she last complained about the ill-treatment given by the accused persons on account of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry one month before her death. The learned Counsel raised a question whether the demand of dowry one month before the death can be a cause for suicide. He canvassed that there should be a proximity between the demand of dowry and death. The learned Counsel raised a question whether the demand of dowry one month before the death can be a cause for suicide. He canvassed that there should be a proximity between the demand of dowry and death. It was pointed out that though P.W. Prabhu who was the middleman in the settlement of marriage of deceased Ganga with accused Madhav, deposed to the effect that deceased Ganga had told him about the ill-treatment given by the accused for the remaining dowry on the 6th, which was just 3 days preceding her death, his version in the cross-examination shows that after the birth of the daughter of Ganga, he had no occasion to see her, which suggests that he had not met Ganga for about 6 to 7 months as the daughter of Ganga was aged 6-7 months at the time of her death. The learned Counsel also pointed out the evidence of P.W. Namdeo which shows that Ganga had made a complaint to him about the ill-treatment given by the accused persons to her on the count of demand of money, one month before her death. So, as per the learned Counsel, the evidence discussed above does not show the proximity between the so-called demand of remaining dowry and the death and thus the proximate link between the two is missing. The learned Counsel contended that the wording 'soon before the death' appearing in section 304-B of I.P.C., and section 13-B Evidence Act would mean that there must not be a lapse of long time between the alleged harassment in connection with the dowry demand and the death of the woman. 10. The learned Counsel for appellant also canvassed that the prosecution has to prove that the demand was of such a nature that the accused wanted the victim to commit suicide, and there is nothing in the evidence in this case that the accused persons had a design in their mind that the deceased should commit suicide. 11. As already stated above, the stand of the accused/appellants is that the fact of commission of suicide by the deceased is not established. However, in the aforesaid written statement filed by accused Madhav on the trial Court's record, one more possibility is suggested in the alternative. 11. As already stated above, the stand of the accused/appellants is that the fact of commission of suicide by the deceased is not established. However, in the aforesaid written statement filed by accused Madhav on the trial Court's record, one more possibility is suggested in the alternative. In the later part of the abovesaid written statement, it was pleaded that the marriage of accused Laxman was settled and it was to take place on 18-5-1998. On 9-5-1998, the accused/appellants had to go for the purchase of cloth and other articles including the presents for the marriage ceremony. Deceased Ganga insisted that she would also come to Ansing, but the accused/appellants went to Ansing without taking Ganga with them. She was sent to the field for doing the work and giving fodder and water to the cattle and that time she was very unhappy. By these averments the accused wanted to suggest alternatively that if deceased Ganga has committed suicide she might have taken this extreme step because she was not taken for shopping at Ansing meaning thereby the accused/appellants did not abet the commission of suicide. 12. The Counsel for the appellants also submitted that there is always a tendency of the relatives of the deceased to rope all the relations of the husband and in order to establish the case against the other relatives some overt acts on their part are necessary. 13. On the point that the general allegations as regards cruelty would not suffice, the Counsel for appellants cited (Ravindra Pyarelal Bidlan and others v. State of Maharashtra)3, 1993 Cri.L.J. 3019. In this cited case in para 24 it was observed that the entire evidence in that respect was of general allegations; No specific instance of demands and ill-treatment were given and the general allegations were made against all the accused; An omnibus statement was made regarding the demands, harassment and beating. No reliance was placed on such evidence. 14. The above cited authority was cited by the learned Counsel for appellants also on the point of necessity of establishing the reasonable nexus between cruelty and suicide. No reliance was placed on such evidence. 14. The above cited authority was cited by the learned Counsel for appellants also on the point of necessity of establishing the reasonable nexus between cruelty and suicide. Reliance was placed by him on the following observations-- "If cruelty is by itself established and the fact of suicide is also established, it would not be sufficient to bring home the guilt of committing cruelty as defined in Explanation to section 498-A I.P.C. A reasonable nexus has to be established between the cruelty and the suicide in order to make good the offence of cruelty. Alternatively, the cruelty established has to be of such a gravity as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. If suicide is established, it has further to be established that it was occasioned on account of cruelty which was of sufficient gravity so as to lead a reasonable person placed in similar circumstances to commit suicide." 15. The learned Counsel for appellants cited (Shankar Mungelal Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra)4, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 554. This authority is on the point as to what constitutes abetment to the commission of suicide. In this cited case, the wife had committed suicide due to the harassment by a drunkard husband. It was held that to constitute an offence of abetment, there must be an instigation and intentional aid with mens rea. Such elements were not found in the dying declarations of the victim in this cited case. Hence it was held that the charge under section 306 I.P.C. could not sustain. 16. The learned Counsel for appellants further cited (Maulana Ali Yakub Jamadar and others v. State of Maharashtra)5, 2001 All.M.R.(Cri.) 317. In this cited case, the suicide was committed by the wife on account of the quarrels with the husband and in-laws. There was no evidence showing that the demand of money alleged to have been made by the deceased to her father was on being prompted by her husband. It was held that such demand would not be helpful and could not be a cause of any harassment or torture to the victim. 17. The next authority cited by the Counsel for the appellants was (Bhiwa Tukaram Tarkase v. State of Maharashtra)6, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 498. In this cited case, the dowry death was alleged. The husband was charged with making demand for dowry resulting in wife's committing suicide. 17. The next authority cited by the Counsel for the appellants was (Bhiwa Tukaram Tarkase v. State of Maharashtra)6, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 498. In this cited case, the dowry death was alleged. The husband was charged with making demand for dowry resulting in wife's committing suicide. The facts of the case were showing that the demand for the part of the amount was made long back. The immediate cause behind the commission of suicide by the victim was that she was not allowed to attend the marriage ceremony of her brother and was forcibly taken back by the appellant to his village. It was held that in order to bring the case under the dowry death, there should be a nexus between the demand and suicide. The harassment was held to be only on account of taking back the victim to the house, and it was held not to be in connection with the dowry demand. So, the conviction for harassment under section 498-A of I.P.C. was upheld but that under section 304-B I.P.C. was set aside. 18. On the point of tendency to implicate all the relatives along with the husband, the Counsel for appellants cited Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and others, 2000 S.A.R. (Cri.) 673. The learned Counsel invited the attention of this Court to the following, in para 4 of the cited case; "For the fault of the husband, the in-laws or the other relations cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved in the demand of dowry. In cases where such accusations are made, the overt act attributed to persons other than husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. By mere conjectures and implications such relations cannot be held guilty relating to a dowry death. A tendency has however developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wife in the matters of dowry death, which if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case." 19. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case." 19. The evidence of complainant Shankar who is the father of deceased Gangabai is as is detailed in the prosecution story above. He deposed about the dowry that was settled and the amount which had remained to be paid out of that dowry. His evidence is that, the accused were ill-treating his daughter for the remaining dowry. According to him, as and when his daughter used to come to his place she was telling all these facts to him. He further testified that about one month before her death also she had been to his place and that time she told him that all the accused were ill-treating her for the demand of dowry. The next witness examined by the prosecution on the point of ill-treatment is P.W. Prabhu who was the middleman in the settlement of marriage of deceased Gangabai with accused Madhav. He also deposed that the dowry settled was Rs. 90,000/-; Out of that amount Rs. 50,000/- were paid and the remaining dowry was to be paid lateron. This witness contended that he used to visit the house of the accused frequently and that time he used to meet Gangabai. She was telling him that for the remaining dowry all the accused were ill-treating her. P.W. Devidas also deposed that the deceased Gangabai had visited his place once or twice and that time she told that some dowry amount had remained to be paid and he should inform her father that all the accused were ill-treating her. The evidence of P.W. Namdeo shows that a month before the death of Gangabai she had met him in her village and that time she told that the accused i.e. her mother-in-law, father-in-law, her husband Madhav and his brother were ill-treating her on the count of money demand. None of the above witnesses deposed as to what sort of ill-treatment given by the accused persons was communicated by the deceased to them, such as whether she was being beaten, was being kept without food etc. None of the above witnesses deposed as to what sort of ill-treatment given by the accused persons was communicated by the deceased to them, such as whether she was being beaten, was being kept without food etc. The learned Counsel for appellants canvassed that without such details the degree of cruelty cannot be ascertained. 20. Ordinarily, general allegations about the ill-treatment or cruelty would not suffice. The degree of cruelty is required to be proved by giving details in order to show that the deceased was forced to commit suicide. However, in the instant case, as argued by the learned Counsel for complainant, the degree of cruelty is a matter of inference. The learned Counsel canvassed that the demand of remaining dowry which was a heavy amount of Rs. 40,000/- itself is a harassment to the victim. Even if it is taken that an independent proof of cruelty or harassment is needed besides the demand, in the instant case, the circumstances are such that they raise a strong inference about the cruelty and harassment. 21. The first circumstance is that, the deceased committed suicide by jumping into the well with her 6-7 months old child. This has to be seen in the light of the fact that the demand was for heavy amount. The dowry settled was Rs. 90,000/-, out of which Rs. 50,000/- were already paid and the persistent demand for the unpaid dowry of Rs. 40,000/- was being made. The inference would be that the suicide was on account of demands. There seems to be no other reason why the deceased should take such extreme step of jumping into the well with child. As stated earlier, accused No. 1 Madhav pleaded in his written statement that the deceased was not taken for the purchase of cloth for the marriage ceremony of his brother and so she was unhappy. The accused thereby suggested that the deceased might have committed suicide for the above reason and the death of the deceased was not therefore in connection with the dowry demand. To my mind for such a simple reason the deceased would not commit suicide with the child. The learned Counsel for the complainant argued that the demand of remaining dowry communicated by the deceased to her father was just one month before her death. To my mind for such a simple reason the deceased would not commit suicide with the child. The learned Counsel for the complainant argued that the demand of remaining dowry communicated by the deceased to her father was just one month before her death. He canvassed that an inference can be raised on the basis of certain circumstances that further also there was a constant demand. According to him the accused persons were in need of money for meeting the expenses of marriage of the brother of accused No. 1. The evidence on record shows that the marriage was going to take place on 18-5-1998. The evidence of P.W. Shankar- the father of complainant shows that though he assured to arrange for money within one month he could not arrange for the same. On the fateful day i.e. on 9-5-1998 the accused had to purchase the cloth for the marriage. Till that day the amount was not paid. 22. The Counsel for complainant submitted that the story should be looked from the angle that the important lady of the house i.e. the deceased was left at the house and was not taken for purchasing the cloth and obviously this was by way of punishment as her father could not arrange for money. The reason as to why the deceased was not taken for purchasing the cloth for marriage ceremony was not so simple as pleaded by the accused. The aforesaid circumstances clearly indicate that it was by way of punishment. Naturally the deceased must have felt humiliated. There is a reason to believe that this humiliation made by the accused persons was in connection with the non-fulfilment of demand of unpaid dowry. So, the inference has to be raised as to the degree of harassment or cruelty. The case cited by the learned Counsel for appellants---Bhiwa Tukaram Tarkase v. State of Maharashtra, is therefore not applicable to the present case. The immediate cause behind the commission of suicide by the deceased in this case as can be inferred is the demand of dowry. Though the prosecution could not give evidence as to what happened during one month after the deceased last met her father, not proof in that respect would be available. But the abovesaid circumstances show that it was a continuous harassment. There is a reasonable nexus between the dowry demand and death. Though the prosecution could not give evidence as to what happened during one month after the deceased last met her father, not proof in that respect would be available. But the abovesaid circumstances show that it was a continuous harassment. There is a reasonable nexus between the dowry demand and death. The case cited by the Counsel for the appellants Ravindra Pyarelal Bindlan and others v. State of Maharashtra has also no application to the present case on facts, as already discussed above. Although the specific instances of cruelty are not given in the present case, the circumstances are sufficient to raise the inference of cruelty. So also, the cruelty which is established was of a gravity which would result in forcing the woman to commit suicide. The facts of Maulana Ali Yakub Majadar's case have also no application to the instant case, because in the instant case, the demand was at the instance of the accused persons and not by the deceased on her own. The facts of Shankar Mungelal Lokhande's case are also different. In that case, the suicide was due to harassment by a drunkard husband. Therefore, it was held that there was no instigation and intentional aid with mens rea. In the present case, mens rea is manifest. 23. The learned Counsel for complainant submitted that in the cases under section 304-B I.P.C. the proof as to the actual participation of the accused in causing the death of a woman is not necessary. He cited in this connection (Bapu Sukhdeo Jagtap v. State of Maharashtra)7, 1992(2) Bom.C.R. 450 : 1992 Mh.L.J. 402. The learned Counsel canvassed that in the instant case necessary ingredients of section 304-B I.P.C. are made out by the prosecution and the circumstances indicated above are sufficient to raise a presumption about the dowry death. On the point of proximity between the demand and death, the Counsel for the complainant cited Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and others 2000 Cri.L.J. 2993. (This case is also reported in 2000 S.A.R. (Cri.) 673 and the same is also cited by the learned Counsel for appellants on the point of tendency of the relatives of the deceased to implicate or rope in all the relations and in-laws). The term "soon before the death" appearing in section 304-B I.P.C. is interpreted in this authority. (This case is also reported in 2000 S.A.R. (Cri.) 673 and the same is also cited by the learned Counsel for appellants on the point of tendency of the relatives of the deceased to implicate or rope in all the relations and in-laws). The term "soon before the death" appearing in section 304-B I.P.C. is interpreted in this authority. The case enunciates that "soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straight jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular incident but normally referred to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand of dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before death" if any other intervening circumstances showing the non existence of such treatment is not brought on record before the alleged such treatment and the date of death. The learned Counsel for complainant submitted that in the present case although the last meeting of the deceased with her father was one month before her death, the evidence does not show any intervening circumstance showing the non existence of ill-treatment such as settlement of dispute etc. and the circumstances show that the ill-treatment continued even till the date of death of the deceased when she was punished or humiliated for non-fulfilment of the demand of unpaid dowry. The submission of the Counsel for complainant is acceptable and I am also of the view that the proximity between the harassment connected with demand of dowry and the death is established. 24. The evidence as to the ill-treatment on the count of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry is against all the accused. Complainant Shankar deposed that the deceased told him all the accused were ill-treating her for the demand of dowry. Though in the evidence the appellant Shankar did not give the names of the accused, his version that all the accused were ill-treating, means the accused before the Court. In the oral report lodged by him which is at Ex. Complainant Shankar deposed that the deceased told him all the accused were ill-treating her for the demand of dowry. Though in the evidence the appellant Shankar did not give the names of the accused, his version that all the accused were ill-treating, means the accused before the Court. In the oral report lodged by him which is at Ex. 21 he has specifically given the names of all the accused with their relationship with the deceased. The evidence of P.W. Prabhu also shows that the deceased had disclosed to him that all the accused were ill-treating her for the remaining dowry. P.W. Namdeo has deposed specifically that within one month before the death deceased Gangabai met him in the village; she told him that the accused i.e. the deceased's mother-in-law, father-in-law, her husband Madhav and his brother were ill-treating her on the count of money demand. Thus, the evidence as regards the ill-treatment on the count of non-payment of remaining dowry is against all the accused. The written statement Exh. 40 filed by accused Madhav on the trial court's record also suggests that on the date of incident all the accused had gone for the purchase of cloth leaving the deceased alone at home. This itself is the proof of the overt act of all the accused. Thus, the case of Kansraj v. State of Punjab has no application to the present case on facts. 25. The accused persons examined one Sayabai w/o Dajiba Wable as a defence witness. She is the real sister of complainant Shankar. She is the resident of Sonda which is also the village of the accused. She deposed that she and others had settled the marriage of accused Madhav with deceased Ganga; there was no dowry in the marriage and complainant did not pay any dowry to the accused. The witness claimed that she used to visit the house of Ganga daily and that Ganga had no ill-treatment on account of dowry. The learned Counsel for the accused/appellant submitted that when the own real sister of complainant Shankar states that there was no dowry in the marriage and the deceased Gangabai was not ill-treated on the count of dowry, her version should be believed. It is worth noting that D.W. Sayabai is also the relative of accused. Accused Madhav is her nephew. The learned Counsel for the accused/appellant submitted that when the own real sister of complainant Shankar states that there was no dowry in the marriage and the deceased Gangabai was not ill-treated on the count of dowry, her version should be believed. It is worth noting that D.W. Sayabai is also the relative of accused. Accused Madhav is her nephew. Further the version of this witness during her cross-examination reveals that she was not certain on the point of settlement of dowry. So also, as regards the ill-treatment, she deposed that she was under the impression that Ganga was not having any ill-treatment. Thus, the evidence of D.W. Sayabai does not positively show that there was no settlement of dowry and Gangabai was not being ill-treated. 26. As a result of the whole discussion made above, I hold that the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not commit any error in passing the order of conviction and sentence against all the accused. The sentence passed was also appropriate. The appeal therefore deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed. 27. Accused/appellants No. 1 Madhav and No. 3 Laxman are in jail. Accused/appellants No. 2 Sakharam and No. 4 Sau. Shashikalabai are on bail. They shall surrender to their bail. The learned Counsel for appellants requests for the grant of time to appellants No. 2 and 4 to surrender to bail. Request granted. Two months time is granted to appellants No. 2 and 4 for that purpose. Certified copy be expedited. For the reasons stated in the accompanying judgment which will follow, the Court dismisses the appeal and grants two months time to accused/appellants No. 2 Sakharam and No. 4 Sau. Shashikalabai to surrender to jail. -----