Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment of the first appellate Court passed by Sri Prem Narayan Shukla, Sub-ordinate Judge, Gopalganj in Title Appeal No. 197 of 1976. The plaintiff before this Court had filed title Suit No. 244 of 1966 which was dismissed by the 2nd Additional Munsif, Gopalganj by a judgment dated 12th July, 1976. Then the plaintiff filed the aforesaid appeal which was partly allowed and partly dismissed. Hence, this second appeal. 2. The matrix of the case of the plaintiff-appellant before the trial Court was that he was one of descendants of one Nayak Mian who left behind two sons Jhapas Mian and Moharram Mian. Moharram Mian died in the life time of his father. So on the death of Nayak, Jhapas alone inherited the property of Nayak and Nakchhed got nothing. Jhapas Mian left behind Ali Sher and Dil Mohammad who came in possession of their fathers property. Ali Sher died leaving behind his wife Khatijan and his brother Dil Mohammad and his son Phool Mohammad. Ali Sher had gifted his property to his wife Khatijan (defendant No. 4) and Phool Mohammad (plaintiff No. 2) who came in possession of the entire property of Ali Sher. One Mohidan, defendant No. 1 (wife of late Nakchhed) had no title or interest in the suit property, but she executed Jarpeshgi of the suit property in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3, but the latter did not come in possession of the suit land. They, however, destroyed the maize crop over plot No. 129 and threatened to dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land. 3. The case of the defendant-respondents was that Jhapas was not the son of Nayak Mian nor he inherited his property. It was denied that Moharram died in the life time of Nayak Mian. It was pleaded further that Nayak Mian had left behind a daughter Jokhani and his son Moharram who inherited his entire property. It was still further pleaded by different respondents that Nakchhed had executed a sale-deed in lieu of dower debt of Rs. 700 (seven hundred) in favour of his wife Mohidan over plot No. 730, 845, 387 and some other lands. It was further denied that Plot No. 129 was ever in possession of the plaintiff. It was rather asserted that this plot was in possession of defendant No. 1. 700 (seven hundred) in favour of his wife Mohidan over plot No. 730, 845, 387 and some other lands. It was further denied that Plot No. 129 was ever in possession of the plaintiff. It was rather asserted that this plot was in possession of defendant No. 1. She executed sale-deed over this plot on 15th December, 1965 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It was averred by the respondents that Jhapas was the son of Bhaglu Mian and his wife Chirai came to live with Nayak Mian with whom she remarried. So the entire property of Nayak was inherited by his daughter Jokhani and Moharram and then Nakchhed and Jokhani. Subsequently, Jokhani died leaving behind Raj Mohammad and Mohidan (defendant No. 1). By a family arrangement between Mohidan and Raj Mohammad, plot No. 129 came in possession of defendant No. 1. 4. The trial Court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant in which they had sought relief of declaration of their title and confirmation of possession and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession, The appellate Court, however, held that Jhapas was the son of Nayak, but other relief claimed by the plaintiff-appellant was not allowed by the appellate Court also. 5. In this appeal, the substantial questions of law framed by order dated 6-4-1984 were to the following effect: (a) Whether the Court below was correct in law in dismissing the entire suit? (b) Whether in view of the finding of the Court below rejecting the defendants case of oral gift by Nakchhed Mian, the plaintiff was entitled to at least a partial relief? (c) Whether the Court below failed to appreciate that under the Mohammedan Law, the wife is not the sole heir to her husband? Hon ble Mr. R.N. Sahay, J. heard the appeal earlier and by order dated 8th January, 1998, he remitted the case back to the first appellate Court to give its finding whether Mohidan had sold property in excess of her share. The order dated 8th January 1998 shows that the substantial question of law framed were not raised before this Court and appellants lawyer did not address the Court on any of those questions. The only question, therefore, for the Court was that the transfer made by defendant No. 1 (Wahidan) as per Ext-A/11 was in excess of her sha-3. Her sale-deeds exhibited as Ext. The only question, therefore, for the Court was that the transfer made by defendant No. 1 (Wahidan) as per Ext-A/11 was in excess of her sha-3. Her sale-deeds exhibited as Ext. A, A/1, A/2, A/3, A/6, A/8, A/9, A/ 10, A/11 and A/12 were referred to. Thereafter the learned single Judge (Hon ble R.N. Sahay, J.), referred the case back to the appellate Court to give its finding whether Mohidan had sold property in excess of her share. The appellate Court thereafter by its order dated 21st December, 2000 reported that Mohidan had sold property within her legitimate share. The Court said in the order aforesaid that both the parties were noticed and they appeared and submitted their written argument. The Court also considered all the sale-deeds executed by Mohidan and came to the conclusion that Mohidan had sold property within the limit of her share. In the instant case, the property sold by Ext-A/11 was in dispute. So in view of the finding of the first appellate Court on the fact whether Mohidan has sold property in excess of her share is almost final. It was submitted before me during the course of argument that the learned sub-ordinate Judge (first appellate Court) did not take into account all the sale-deeds executed by Mohidan. Therefore, the finding recorded by the first appellate Court is not acceptable. But I find that the order-sheet of the first appellate Court shows that he came to his conclusion on the basis of written argument submitted by both the parties and after taking into consideration the sale-deeds executed by Mohidan. I am, therefore, of the opinion that before this Court, now nothing is left for decision regarding the facts decided by the two lower Courts. 6 In the result, this appeal is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.