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2001 DIGILAW 663 (BOM)

LALITA MALHARI BARVE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

2001-08-08

R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR

body2001
ORAL JUDGMENT :- As common questions of law and facts arise in all these petitions, the same were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Rule. By consent, the rule is made returnable forthwith. 3. In all these petitions, the petitioner challenges the orders dated 5th July, 2001 passed by the respondent No.2 disqualifying the petitioners from being the President as well as the members of the Raver Municipal Council, Raver as well as debarring the petitioners from contesting the election to the membership of the Municipal Council for a period of six years. 4. It is the contention of the petitioners that the show cause notices which were issued in the matter were vague and did not disclose the charges properly so that the petitioners could file an effective reply in the matter to the same. It is their further contention that the orders passed by the respondent No. 2 do not explicitly disclose the reasons for arriving at the conclusions arrived at and to take action either under section 55A or 55B of the Maharashtra Municipal Council, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act 1965 (hereinafter called as "the said Act") and that the impugned orders have been passed for extraneous reasons with ulterior motive to give set back to the political career of the petitioners. It is also their contention that the impugned orders disclose non application of mind by the respondent No.2 while deciding the matter. It is their further contention that the report, based on which the action is stated to have been taken, was neither made available to the petitioner nor that the report itself disclosed sufficient material which would warrant penalty of disqualification of the petitioners from the membership of the Council. Arguments were also advanced in relation to the effect of 72nd amendment to the Constitution of India vis-as-vis the authority of the State Government to take action in the matter. Arguments were also advanced in relation to the effect of 72nd amendment to the Constitution of India vis-as-vis the authority of the State Government to take action in the matter. Reliance is placed in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and others reported in AIR 1981 SC 136 ; S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 SC 1984 of the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in the matter of Surinder Prakash Goel vs. The Stare of U.P. and others reported in AIR 1993 Allahabad 50; of the Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Baburao Vishwanath Mathpati vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 1996(1) Mh.L.J. 366 and another Division Bench of this Court in Sureshkumar s/o Kanhaiyalal Jethlia vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. 901 . Attention was also drawn to the Lok Sabha debates at the time when the Parliament considered nnd amendment to the Constitution of India. In the course of arguments attention was drawn to various provisions of the said Act as well as those of the Maharashtra Municipalities (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter called as "the said rules"). On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that the action was taken on the basis of report prepared after conducting necessary enquiry as well as the provisions of the Circular No. 1089/CR-73/89/3 dated 30th September, 1989, as the petitioners were found to have passed the resolutions in relation to the subjects which were not on the agenda of the meetings but were taken up for consideration at the eleventh hours. The same resulted in great loss to the Municipal Council amounting to the misconduct on the part of the petitioners who were, at the relevant time, the President of the Council. The action is also justified by the respondent No.4 in Writ Petition No. 2953/2001 and the respondent No.4 in Writ Petition No. 2954 of 2001 contending that the action of declaring disqualification of the petitioner has been taken pursuant to the enquiry held by the Government and after the petitioners were heard in the matter. The action is also justified by the respondent No.4 in Writ Petition No. 2953/2001 and the respondent No.4 in Writ Petition No. 2954 of 2001 contending that the action of declaring disqualification of the petitioner has been taken pursuant to the enquiry held by the Government and after the petitioners were heard in the matter. In that reference was also made to section 311 of the said Act and it was submitted that the Government is sufficiently empowered to hold necessary enquiry as regards to the municipal administration and, therefore, even assuming that copy of the enquiry report was not made available to the petitioners, no fault can be found with the action taken against the petitioners on the basis of the misconduct of the petitioners having been established in relation to the causing of financial loss to the Municipal Council. 5. In all these petitions, the petitioners were holding the office of President for the periods in relation to which the accusation of passing of resolutions on the subjects which were taken up for discussion at the eleventh hours without prior inclusion of the same in the agenda has been made. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were served with the show cause notice and thereafter the respondent NO.2 has passed the order after receipt of the replies from the petitioners to the said show cause notices. At the same time it is also a matter of record that the inquiry by the municipal administrative department was conducted and the report in respect thereof was made without hearing the petitioners and without the knowledge thereof to the petitioners. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners belong to a political party other than the political party which is in power in the State of Maharashtra. Though, arguments were advanced and contentions were raised about incorrect reference to the Circular number and date in the show cause notice and orders passed by the authority in the matter, the fact that there was a Circular dated 30th September, 1989, which is stated to be the basis for taking action, is not in dispute. The main contention of the petitioners relates to the charges being vague and the orders being without sufficient, clear and explicit reasons and that the entire proceedings have been initiated with the ulterior motive of giving set back to the political career of the petitioners. The main contention of the petitioners relates to the charges being vague and the orders being without sufficient, clear and explicit reasons and that the entire proceedings have been initiated with the ulterior motive of giving set back to the political career of the petitioners. At this stage, before considering the rival contentions, it will be worthwhile to scan through various decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioners. 6. In S. L. Kapoors case the Apex Court, while dealing with the rights and duties of Municipal Committees constituted under Punjab Municipal Act has observed that "a Committee as soon as it is constituted, at once, assumes a certain office and status, is endowed with certain rights and burdened with certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way as to suffer in public esteem, is certainly to visit the committee with civil consequences." With these observations it has been opined by the Apex Court in the said judgment that "the status and office and the rights and responsibilities of the members of the committee of the Municipal Council and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded, would entail civil consequences upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before an order of supersession is passed." 7. In S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, AIR ]990 SC ]984 (supra), the Constitution Bench while considering the point as to whether there is any general principle of law requiring an administrative authority to record the reasons for its decision and after taking into consideration the law in that regard prevailing in the Unites States, England, Canada Australia and India as well as the recommendations of the Donoughmore Committee and the Franks Committee, as also 14th Report of the Law commission and the earlier decisions of the Apex Court on the point, namely in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala reported in AIR 1961 SC 1669, Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1966 SC 671 , Travancore Rayon Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1971 SC 862 , Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1970 SC 1302 , Woolcombers of India Ltd. case reported in AIR 1973 SC 2758 , Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Limited case reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 , Tarachand Khatri vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in AIR 1977 SC 567 , Raipur Development Authority vs. M/s Chokhamal Contractors reported in AIR 1990 SC 1426 and of another Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Bhagat Raja case reported in AIR 1967 SC 1606 , has ruled thus: " ... recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review." (Emphasis supplied) After considering the rationale for the requirement to record reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions the Apex Court has examined the legal basis for imposing such obligation and thereafter considering the law laid down in all the decisions referred to above, has held thus: "The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action". As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decisions by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding charges of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. " (Emphasis supplied) 8. In the said S. N. Mukherjees case the Apex Court has also referred to its earlier decision i.e. in Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Limited reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 . In Siemens Engineering case, after holding that the authority making an order in exercise of quasi-judicial function must record its reason in support of the order being a settled law, has held thus: " ..... it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals, exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem. a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. " (Emphasis supplied). 9. In Surinder Prakash Goel vs. The State of U.P., a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while considering the provisions contained in section 48(2) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, which provided that "after considering any explanation that may be offered by the President and making such enquiry as it may consider necessary, the State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing remove the President from his office," has held thus: Thus, it can be seen that sub-section (2A) of section 48 specifically requires the State Government to consider the explanation offered by the President. This consideration of the explanation means that the State Government must, in its order, properly deal with the explanations given by the President in his reply, and give its reasons why it finds the same unacceptable. This requirement in sub-section (2A) of section 48 was deliberately introduced into the Statute by the Legislature by an amendment of 1964 so as to ensure that the President, who is a democratically elected person, is not removed on flimsy grounds". (Emphasis supplied) It was further observed that the President of a Municipal Board is an elected functionary, and in a democracy any provision for removing an elected functionary should be strictly construed. An elected person in a democracy should not be easily removed by the order of an executive authority, and it is only in clear case of flagrant and gross misconduct that such power of removal should be resorted to. Referring to section 48(2)(vi), it was further held that the said section enables the State Government to remove a President if he is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties. However, the said provision cannot be construed to mean that the President can be removed for any kind of misconduct in the discharge of his duties but the same can be only for some flagrant and serious misconduct and not that he can be ousted for some slight or technical misconduct. It is further observed that the provisions for removing elected functionaries should be strictly construed, and cogent reasons should be given for passing the order of removal. 10. The Division Bench of this Court in Baburao Vishwanath Mathpatis case has held that section 55-A of the said Act empowers the State Government to remove the President of a Municipal Council for "misconduct in discharge of his duties or neglect of or incapacity to perform his duties or for being guilty of any disgraceful conduct". This provision sufficiently entails civil consequences and attaches stigma to the President and therefore to remove a President on these grounds, the order must be founded on strong grounds. From that view point, the word neglect as used in the section must be understood from the gravity of the charges. There should be flagrant disregard of duties so as to call for removal of the President under section 55-A. 11. From that view point, the word neglect as used in the section must be understood from the gravity of the charges. There should be flagrant disregard of duties so as to call for removal of the President under section 55-A. 11. In Sureshkumar Jethlias case the Division Bench of this Court has held that when an elected representative is being proceeded against by way of disciplinary action under the provisions of the Act, the charges against him must be clear and proved beyond reasonable doubt and even otherwise failure or laxity on account of supervision cannot be a reason justifying removal from the post of President of the Municipal Council and one such human aberration certainly would not even remotely justify the action of removal. 12. In a recent decision in the matter of Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs. State of Punjab and others reported in 2001 AIR SCW 2689, the Apex Court has ruled thus: "In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within S.22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of S.22, on the ground of "abuse of his powers" (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case." 13. Section 81 of the said Act provides for procedure to be followed in the meetings of the Council. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of S.22, on the ground of "abuse of his powers" (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case." 13. Section 81 of the said Act provides for procedure to be followed in the meetings of the Council. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that for the disposal of general business, the same shall be restricted to matters relating to the powers, duties and functions of the Council as specified in the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. Clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 81 provides that a seven clear days notice of an ordinary meeting and three clear days notice of a special meeting shall be issued. Clause (b) thereof provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clause (a) in an emergency, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the President may call a special meeting of the Council with only one days notice served upon the Councillors and pasted up at the municipal office. Sub-section 10 provides that except with the permission of the presiding authority (which shall not be given in the case of a motion or proposition to modify or cancel any resolution within three months after the passing thereof) no business shall be transacted and no proposition shall be discussed at any meeting unless it had been mentioned in the notice convening such meeting or in the case of a special meeting, in the written request for such meeting. Sub-section (11) provides that subject to any rules made in this behalf, the order in which the business shall be transacted at any meeting shall be determined by the presiding authority. Provided that, if it is proposed by any Councillor that priority should be given to any particular item of business, or to any particular proposition, the presiding authority shall put the proposal to the meeting and be guided by the majority of votes of the Councillors present and voting, given for or against the proposal. Sub-section (19) of Section 81 provides that the State Government may make rules in respect of matters relating to the conduct of business at meeting of the Council not provided for in the said section. Sub-section (19) of Section 81 provides that the State Government may make rules in respect of matters relating to the conduct of business at meeting of the Council not provided for in the said section. The Government has accordingly framed the said rules and rule 17(1) thereof provides that unless otherwise expressly provided, every motion (not being a formal motion, such as a motion for adjournment, closure, and the like) shall be handed over or sent by the proposer in writing after putting his signature or thumb impression thereon to the President or the Chief Officer before it is moved. Where a motion has been handed over or sent to the President, a copy thereof shall be sent to the Chief Officer. Sub-rule (2) of rule 17 provides that subject to the provisions of clause (10) of section 81, no motion which has not been received by the President or Chief Officer as provided in sub-rule (1), at least fifteen days before the date of a meeting, shall be included in the business to be transacted in that meeting; provided that, the President may in special circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing, include a motion which has been received not less than seven days before the date of the meeting. 14. From the decisions, referred to above, it is abundantly clear that it is now well established that a fair and proper hearing of the persons sought to be affected by the orders of administrative authorities exercising quasi judicial powers is a pre-requisite for passing an order which entails civil consequences and that the orders so passed should disclose sufficient, clear and explicit reasons in support of such orders. Bearing in mind this proposition of law which by now is well established and which flows from the various judgments, referred to above, it is necessary to consider the rival contention in the matter in relation to the show cause notice and the impugned orders. As already observed above, the basis for the action taken against the petitioners is admittedly the Circular dated 30th September, 1989 and the report of the Assistant Regional Director, of Municipal Administration Amravati dated 22nd August, 2000. As already observed above, the basis for the action taken against the petitioners is admittedly the Circular dated 30th September, 1989 and the report of the Assistant Regional Director, of Municipal Administration Amravati dated 22nd August, 2000. As regards the Circular dated 30th September, 1989 controversy was sought to be raised that the same was not made available to the petitioners besides the fact that the Circular referred to in the show cause notices as well as in the impugned orders is of 1998 and not of 1989 and that even the numbers of the circulars differ. However, now it is well established that mere wrong reference to any statutory provisions in an order by itself cannot vitiate the order. The contention of the petitioners is that they were also not aware of such a circular. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Once the fact of issuance of the circular in question is not disputed, mere lack of knowledge thereof to the petitioners can be of no advantage to them in assailing the impugned orders. 15. The Circular dated 30th September, 1989, however, as rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioners, is in the nature of directions to the Chief Officer rather than to the President of the Municipal Council and rightly so because the rights and duties of the Municipal Councillors and the President are enumerated under the Act itself. Circulars issued by the Government cannot substitute or supplement the statutory rights and duties of the authorities duly constituted under the statute. Such circulars at the most be construed as recommendations and nothing beyond that. Besides, as regards the conduct of the meeting of the Municipal Council as well as the committees of the Municipal Council, there are specific statutory provisions made in the said Act as well as the said Rules framed thereunder. Even the Government is not entitled to amend such provisions of law and rules by issuing mere circulars. Besides bare reading of the said Circular discloses that the same has not been issued by the Government as such but by the Deputy Director of the department of the municipal administration. The Circular only brings to the notice of the Chief Officers of all the Councils about their obligations under the said Act and the said Rules made thereunder in relation to conduct of the committees of the Council. The Circular only brings to the notice of the Chief Officers of all the Councils about their obligations under the said Act and the said Rules made thereunder in relation to conduct of the committees of the Council. As rightly submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioners the same has been with the object and view that many a times the elected persons are not well versed with the statutory provisions and it is the duty of the Chief Officer in that regard to give proper assistance to such elected councillors, so that any illegality on their part in the matter of conduct of the meetings is avoided and the municipal administration is not made to suffer from any such illegality. 16. As already pointed out earlier, section 81 of the said Act deals explicitly regarding the meetings of the Municipal Councils and the procedure regarding the meeting also has been made clear by the said rules framed by the State Government under sub-section (19) of section 81. In these circumstances, the Circular cannot be read as an addition to those statutory provisions contained in the said Act and the said rules made thereunder but the same has to be read as mere direction to the Chief Officers to ensure that the appropriate assistance is provided by them to the elected members of the Council while conducting the meetings of the Council and passing resolutions therein. At this stage it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Ex. Capt. K. Balasubramanian and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and another reported in (1991)2 SCC 708 wherein it has been ruled that the administrative instructions cannot alter or supersede the statutory rules. So also, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and another VS. G. S. Dall and Flour Mills reported in AIR 1991 SC 772 has held that the executive instructions cannot go against statutory provisions so as to whittle down the effect of such provisions. Considering that the entire action in the matter having proceeded on the allegation of violation of the certain directions given in the said Circular, the same would be ab initio bad in law. 17. Considering that the entire action in the matter having proceeded on the allegation of violation of the certain directions given in the said Circular, the same would be ab initio bad in law. 17. Section 81(10) of the said Act specifically provides, as already observed above, that, except with the permission of the presiding authority, no business shall be transacted and no proposition shall be discussed at any meeting unless it had been mentioned in the notice convening such meeting or in the case of a special meeting, in the written request for such meeting. In other words, sub-section (10) of section 81 prohibits transaction unless it had been disclosed in the notice convening the meeting, except with the permission of the presiding authority. Undoubtedly, under rule 17(2) of the said rules, the reasons for the same are required to be recorded. But, there is no provision providing that the President can never entertain any subject at the eleventh hours or that no subject can be discussed in the meeting of the Municipal Council unless the same found to have been already entered in the agenda published prior to the holding of the meeting. Reference was made to various provisions of the said Act and the rules to contend that eleventh hour or the last minute consideration of new subject is not permissible. It is true that Section 81(4)(a) provides that seven clear days notice of an ordinary meeting and three clear days notice of a special meeting and sub clause (b) thereof provides that an emergency meeting can be called within one days notice. In other words, it is sought to be contended that unless at least 24 hours notice is given, no subject can be entertained at the eleventh hour of the meeting. I am afraid that such a proposition cannot be entertained, considering the provisions of law contained in section 81 of the Act and the said rules made thereunder. As already observed above, sub section (10) of section 81 clearly permits the presiding officer to entertain any motion even at the eleventh hour for a justifiable reason. Rule 17 specifies how motion to be moved and sub rule (2) of the said rule clearly speaks of "subject to the provisions of clause (10) of section 81". As already observed above, sub section (10) of section 81 clearly permits the presiding officer to entertain any motion even at the eleventh hour for a justifiable reason. Rule 17 specifies how motion to be moved and sub rule (2) of the said rule clearly speaks of "subject to the provisions of clause (10) of section 81". This shows that provisions relating to inclusion of subjects in the agenda of the meeting and giving notice well in advance is certainly subject to the powers of the presiding authority to entertain any subject even at the eleventh hour in a justifiable case. Therefore, the Circular dated 30th September, 1989 cannot be read as empowering the Government to impose embargo on the powers of the Presiding Officers of the Municipal Council which are otherwise given to that authority under section 81(10) of the said Act. Certainly, those power can be regulated to some extent by framing proper rules. The contents of the Circular nowhere find the place in the rules framed by the Government under section 81(19) of the said Act. Being so, any action initiated based on such a Circular cannot be held to be good and is to be declared as bad in law. 18. It is pertinent to note that the petitioners have made specific allegation in the petitions that the proposed action is tainted with ulterior motive to cause a set back to the political career of the petitioners and that the actions taken in the matter by the impugned orders is mala fide. The orders in question are passed by the respondent No.2. There is no affidavit in reply filed by the respondent No.2 himself in reply to the allegations of mala fide. The affidavit of Pandurang Dayaram Sonwane discloses that he is Chief Officer of Municipal Council Raver and claims to have filed the affidavit on behalf of the respondents No.1 to 3. It also discloses that the affidavit has been filed on authorization given to him by the Joint Secretary, Urban Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai. There is no reason to doubt about the veracity of the said claim of the officer and it is also not disputed by the petitioners. It also discloses that the affidavit has been filed on authorization given to him by the Joint Secretary, Urban Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai. There is no reason to doubt about the veracity of the said claim of the officer and it is also not disputed by the petitioners. However, the fact remains that there are allegations in the petitions to the effect that the petitioners belong to a particular political party and that the respondent No. 2 belongs to another political party and said party is in power in the State of Maharashtra. In this background when there are specific allegations of mala fide being made against the respondent No. 2 and the action being sought to be challenged on the ground that the same has been taken to cause set back to the political career of the petitioners, least that is expected is an affidavit from the respondent No. 2 himself in reply to those allegations. There is no explanation for absence of such an affidavit on record. Reluctance on the part of the respondent No.2 in this regard is certainly to the advantage of the petitioners. 19. The affidavit in reply filed by Pandurang Sonwane discloses that the facts stated therein are on the basis of office record. The said affidavit discloses that the show cause notices were issued after receipt of the report from the Assistant Regional Director of Municipal Administration Amrawati dated 22-82000 a copy of the said report is annexed at Exhibit R-l collectively. It is further stated that the final orders have been passed taking into consideration the said report as well as annexures thereto and the Circular dated 30th September, 1989. Bare perusal of the impugned orders discloses that the same nowhere refers to the report dated 22-8-2000. Firstly it is well established that any order passed by the administrative authority in quasi-judicial powers can be justified only on the basis of the materials which are reflected from the order itself to be relied upon or referred to by the authority passing such order. In this regard reference can be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Mohinder Singh Gill and another VS. In this regard reference can be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Mohinder Singh Gill and another VS. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 wherein it has been clearly laid down the law that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Once it is clear that the impugned order does not disclose any reference to the said report nor there is anything placed on record either in the form of affidavit of respondent No. 2 himself or any record which can disclose, the report having been placed before the respondent No.2 and the same having been referred to by the respondent No. 2 while passing the impugned orders, the report dated 22-8-2000 can be of no help to the respondents to justify the impugned action. 20. It is to be noted that the entire action is sought to be justified on the basis of the report dated 22nd August. 2000. Undisputedly, neither the show cause notices nor the final orders refer to the said report. The show cause notices as well as the final orders apparently do not refer to any specific document as such or specific material on record as being the basis either for the initiation of the action or for the final order passed. Apart from the affidavit of Pandurang Son wane making a categorical reference to report dated 22-8-2000 being the basis for action, no other material is placed on record to justify the same. Admittedly the report was not disclosed to the petitioners at any point of time prior to the filing of the said affidavit of Son wane in this Court in reply to the petitions. In other words, the entire action is based on the material which was never disclosed to the petitioners and on that count alone the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 21. In other words, the entire action is based on the material which was never disclosed to the petitioners and on that count alone the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 21. Even otherwise and even for the sake of arguments if it is to be presumed that respondent No.2 has passed the impugned order after considering the said report, a bare perusal of the report itself discloses that the same nowhere makes out any case sufficient to warrant action by the competent authority either under Section 55-A or Section 55-B of the said Act. The report in fact is as vague as the show cause notices as well as the impugned orders. It is always to be borne in mind that any decision which would entail civil consequences to the party or person against whom the decision is taken the same should disclose analysis of the facts and the reasons for arriving at the conclusion warranting the decision. 22. The charges against the petitioners are so vague that the same neither disclose any instance of irregularities or defaults as such in the performance of their duties either as President or even as Councillors of the Municipal Council, nor the same relate to any of the acts on the part of the petitioners in their capacity as President or as Councillor of the Municipal Council. In all the petitions, the common charge against all the petitioners relates to the fact of allowing the resolutions pertaining to the financial and policy matters having allowed to be considered and passed at eleventh hours i.e. without prior inclusion thereof in the agenda of the meetings and approval of 90 per cent works of the Council without inviting tenders and without making budgetary provisions for the same. There are neither details regarding the meetings disclosed nor a single meeting in which any such action is alleged to have been taken has been identified. Regarding 90 per cent of the works, no details thereof are disclosed nor the link between the work, the disbursement of amount for the same and the action on the part of the petitioners in that regard has been established. In addition to the said two charges, in Writ Petition Nos. Regarding 90 per cent of the works, no details thereof are disclosed nor the link between the work, the disbursement of amount for the same and the action on the part of the petitioners in that regard has been established. In addition to the said two charges, in Writ Petition Nos. 2936/2001, 2942/2001, 2943/2001 and 2954/2001 there is common charge in relation to conveyance of the property of the Council in the form of shop and land in favour of the third parties without following the procedure prescribed under the law. However, no identification of the land or shop is disclosed, no details regarding any specific transaction has been disclosed and there is no reference to any specific act on the part of the petitioner in regard to any such conveyance of shops or land. In Writ Petition No-2943/2001 there is additional charge of carrying out certain work in an area of 20 square meters but disclosing in the records that the work was carried out over an area of 29 square meters. In what way the petitioner is concerned with the said work is not disclosed. In Writ Petition No. 2954/ 2001 there are two more additional charges. Firstly regarding to carrying out some work of canal beyond the jurisdiction of area of the Municipal Council and second relating the failure to take action in respect of illegal work alleged to have been carried out by the brother of the petitioner therein. As regards the work of canal, there is no material establishing the link between the petitioner and the said work except that the petitioner was the President for certain time. In what way the petitioner has acted in not taking steps against the alleged illegal work carried out by the brother of the petitioner is not disclosed. Indeed, the charges as well as the orders passed are totally vague in relation to the allegations against the petitioners. No material appears to have been referred so as to justify any link between the alleged acts and the petitioners. 23. The Apex Court in Mukhtiar Singh and another vs. State of Punjab reported in (1995)1 SCC 760 has ruled that a "decision" does not merely mean the "conclusion"-it embraces within its fold the reasons which form the basis for arriving at the "conclusions". 23. The Apex Court in Mukhtiar Singh and another vs. State of Punjab reported in (1995)1 SCC 760 has ruled that a "decision" does not merely mean the "conclusion"-it embraces within its fold the reasons which form the basis for arriving at the "conclusions". Bare perusal of the impugned order discloses that various charges sought to be levelled against the petitioners were dealt with in a very cavalier manner. There is no specific reference to any particular incident as such which can be said to have been committed by any of the petitioners warranting their disqualification either under section 55-A or 55-B of the said Act. Apart from the Circular dated 30th September. 1989 (that too is mentioned as of the year 1988) there is no reference to any provisions of law nor the discussion of the facts in order to conclude that the petitioners are guilty of any particular provisions of law. Even assuming that the specific reference to the statutory provisions was not required in the impugned order, it discloses no fact which can be said to be constituting a ground for taking action either under section 55A or 55B of the said Act. There is no analysis of any materials as such in any of the impugned orders. Undoubtedly in case of one of the petitioners, namely, petitioner Dnyaneshwar there is reference to the incident of having carried out certain construction in private property by investing the funds of the Council. Neither the show cause notice nor the impugned order nor the affidavit in reply filed by Pandurang Son wane nor the records before the Court discloses in what manner the said Dnyaneshwar was responsible for spending Rs.51,974/- of the Council for carrying out the construction in a private property. Similar are the conclusions in relation to other charges found in all the orders. There is neither disclosure of the minimum relevant facts nor reference to the documents which can disclose a link between the petitioners and the expenditure said to have been incurred by the Municipal Council. Undisputedly the resolutions of the Council were never challenged in the manner required to be challenged. The orders do not disclose justifiable reasons for taking action against the petitioners under section 55-A or 55-B of the said Act. Undisputedly the resolutions of the Council were never challenged in the manner required to be challenged. The orders do not disclose justifiable reasons for taking action against the petitioners under section 55-A or 55-B of the said Act. The petitioners, therefore, are justified in contending that the show cause notices as well as the impugned orders disclose total non application of the mind by the authority and the contention that proposed action has been taken with the ulterior motive to give set back to their political career cannot be brushed aside. The petitioners are also justified in contending that the report dated 22-8-2000 was prepared on the back of the petitioners and the report itself does not disclose to have been prepared after hearing the petitioners. Besides, undisputedly the copy of the said report was never supplied to the petitioners prior to filing of the petitions under consideration. In the circumstances, all the justifications sought to be given by the respondents by referring to various sections of the said Act are of no help in the matter. The impugned orders do not disclose any reason for rejecting the contentions which were raised by the petitioners in their replies. 24. Reference was also made to the effect of 72nd Amendment as regards the entitlement of the Government to take action of the nature which has been taken in the case in hand and attention was drawn to the speech of the Minister of State in the Ministry of Rural development, Shri G. Venkatswamy in the Parliament at the time of moving the bill in relation to the seventy-second amendment wherein he had stated thus: "However, barring these exceptions, in most other States, the record as far as Panchayati Raj institutions is concerned, has not been very good. On the other hand, attempts have been made in many of the States to weaken the existing Panchayati Raj structure by imposing other nominated bodies at the same level. Elections have been irregular and many times unnecessarily delayed or postponed. Elected bodies have been superseded or suspended without adequate justification at the whims and fancies of the Government and Governmental authorities. Even where these institutions function, they came to be dominated by economically and socially privileged sections of the rural societies and were utilised to serve the class and sectorial interests of the entrenched vested interests. Elected bodies have been superseded or suspended without adequate justification at the whims and fancies of the Government and Governmental authorities. Even where these institutions function, they came to be dominated by economically and socially privileged sections of the rural societies and were utilised to serve the class and sectorial interests of the entrenched vested interests. It has, therefore, been felt that a Constitutional sanction is as indispensable to democracy at the grass-root level as it is to democracy at the State level or national level. Thus we intend to inscribe in the Constitution certain core clement of grass-root democracy to take them beyond the pale of changing political expediency." It is not necessary to go into the said controversy in these petitions, suffice to say that since the show cause notices and the impugned orders passed in these cases apart from being very vague do not disclose any sufficient reason which can walTant action either under section 55-A or 55-B of the said Act, the same are bad in law and cannot be sustained and for the reasons stated above the entire proceedings are to be quashed and set aside. 25. In the result, the petitions succeed. Rule is made absolute in the above terms with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.