N. K. PATIL, J. ( 1 ) THESE cases had come up for hearing on 27-7-2001. On that day, neither the counsel for the petitioners nor the petitioners was present. In view of important subject matter involved in these petitions and as larger implication to the profession of the Advocates is involved, this Court felt to take the assistance from one of the counsel from Bar. Accordingly, among the counsel who were present in the Court, Mr. Keshava Bhat was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court and at his request, the matter was adjourned to 3-8-2001. On that day, at the request of the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, the matter was adjourned to 6-8-2001 with a direction to the Govt. Pleader to get the stage of O. S. No. 2413/1984 pending on the file of the Addl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore. ( 2 ) HEARD the learned amicus curiae for the petitioners and the learned Govt. Pleader for the respondent. ( 3 ) ). The petitioners assailing the impugned order passed by the respondent dated 28-5-1998 in O. S. No. 2413/1994 produced at Annexure D as being illegal, unjustified and unconsitutional have filed these petitions. The case of the petitioners is that the Central Bank of India, a Nationalised Bank filed a suit in O. S. No. 2413/1984 on the file of Addl. City Civil Judge, Bangalore for recovery of certain amounts of money alleged to be due from an erstwhile partnership firm viz. , Standard Electronic Engineering Corporation and its then Partners and a Private Limited Company which has taken over the said partnership firm as a going concern. The said suit is pending on the file of the respondent. The Ist and 2nd petitioners arrayed as 3rd and 4th defendants in the suit. The defendants were represented in the suit by their counsel viz. , the 3rd petitioner herein. The 3rd petitioner is a registered legal practitioner and among his various clients, he also appears on the panel of Corporation Bank, a nationalised bank, which is not concerned with the present proceedings and it is worthwhile to mention here itself that the said Central Bank of India is not his client. ( 4 ) THE suit has been pending on the file of the respondent since 1984 and it is at the stage of recording the evidence of the defendants /petitioners-1 and 2. ( 4 ) THE suit has been pending on the file of the respondent since 1984 and it is at the stage of recording the evidence of the defendants /petitioners-1 and 2. The other defendants have led their evidence and several witnesses have already been examined and have also been cross-examined by the petitioners-1 and 2 herein through their advocate viz. , the 3rd petitioner. ( 5 ) STRANGELY and without any objections being raised by any of the parties to the proceedings, the respondent has unilaterally and without any justification raised an objection to the participation of 3rd petitioner and his authority to represent 1st and 2nd petitioners in the said suit on untenable grounds. However, the 3rd petitioner found it appropriate to file a memo before the respondent bringing it to the notice of the respondent that there is no legal bar against Advocates appearing for particular Nationalised Bank from appearing against any other Nationalised Bank and that the Nationalised Banks are distinct entities, separate in its management and other formalities. It is also brought to the notice of the respondent that neither the plaintiff Bank nor the Bank on whose panel the 3rd petitioner appearing have at any time taken exception to his participation in the present proceedings or any other proceedings before any Court. Without taking into consideration the detailed explanation filed by way of memo by the 3rd petitioner, respondent has passed the impugned order dated 28-5-1998 thereby restraining the 3rd petitioner from appearing against the plaintiff Bank and further directed the matter to be posted for evidence of 1st and 2nd petitioners by engaging other counsel. ( 6 ) THE learned amicus curiae contended that 3rd petitioner represented petitioners 1 and 2 throughout the pendency of proceedings before the respondent even earlier and as such, 3rd petitioner has gained confidence of the other petitioners and as requested by them to appear on their behalf and to defend them in the proceedings on hand appeared on their behalf. Now the matter is at the stage of recording evidence of petitioners 1 and 2 and other witnesses were already cross examined. Now the matter is at the stage of recording evidence of petitioners 1 and 2 and other witnesses were already cross examined. At this stage, it is not open for the respondent to initiate suo motu proceedings and pass the arbitrary order on assumption that all the nationalised banks are owned and managed by the Central Bank which is one without jurisdiction since all the nationalised banks are distinct entities and they are neither owned nor managed by the Central Government except being governed by the fiscal guidelines formulated by the Government from time to time. Hence the respondent has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him by holding that professional ethics requires an Advocate not to appear for and against a same Corporation or Association inasmuch as the respondent is neither empowered by any law or statute to pass order restricting the practice of an Advocate nor he is the regulatory body provided under the Advocates Act, 1961 (for short the Act, 1961) either for the maintenance of discipline or for observance of ethics in the practice of the profession. Further it is contended that it is surprising to note that the respondent having observed that there is no express bar in law, has proceeded to pass the impugned order which is neither endorsed by any legal sanction nor supported by any tenable reason. It is further contended that the right of the 3rd petitioner to practice the profession as an Advocate and to represent his clients in legal proceedings emanates from provisions of the Act, 1961. Chapter IV of the Act declares the right of Advocates enrolled under the Act to practice. Further the said right being protected as a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution of India and in particular, Articles 19 and 21, the impugned order has the effect of encroaching upon the rights of the 3rd petitioner and imposing an unreasonable restriction thereon. It is also contended that the impugned order is also violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as there are various proceedings that are pending in the same Court in which various Counsel do appear for and against various Banks. ( 7 ) FURTHER the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Rule11 of the Bar Council of India Rules, Partvi, Standard of Professional Conduct and Etiquette, Chapter II. ( 7 ) FURTHER the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Rule11 of the Bar Council of India Rules, Partvi, Standard of Professional Conduct and Etiquette, Chapter II. Section II of the Rule 11 provides for Duty to the client, which reads thus :"11. An Advocate is bound to accept any brief in the Courts or Tribunals or before any other authority in or before which he professes to practice at a fee consistent with his standing at the Bar and the nature of the case. Special circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief. "rule 12 of the Rules provides an Advocate shall not ordinarily withdraw from engagements once accepted, without sufficient cause and unless reasonable and sufficient notice is given to the client. Upon his withdrawal; from a case he shall refund such part of the fee as has not been earned. It is clear from the said Rule that it is the duty cast on the Advocate to accept any brief in the Court which he professes to practice. ( 8 ) FURTHER the learned counsel also placed reliance on Rule 33 of the said rules. Rule 33 reads thus :"an Advocate who has, at any time, advised in connection with the institution of a suit, appeal or other matter or has drawn pleadings or acted for a party, shall not act, appear or plead for the opposite party. " ( 9 ) PLACING strong reliance on Rule 33 of the Rules, the learned counsel contended that there is no prohibition for 3rd petitioner to appear for petitioners-1 and 2 to defend their case. When this is the position of law, there is no justification for the respondent to pass the impugned order. Therefore, it is contrary to the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules. ( 10 ) THE learned amicus curiae has also placed reliance on the decision reported in 1964 (1) Cri. LJ 89 (Andh. Pra) between Chenna Reddi Veera Reddi v. Chillakuru Rama Chandra Reddi. The Court held that -the Court had no power under Ss. 30 and 32, Advocates Act, 1961 to prohibit the counsel from appearing as a Advocate of A. The Bar Council was an autonomous body and in view of the provisions of S. 7 of Advocates Act, the Court was not justified in exercising its inherent power. The Court held that -the Court had no power under Ss. 30 and 32, Advocates Act, 1961 to prohibit the counsel from appearing as a Advocate of A. The Bar Council was an autonomous body and in view of the provisions of S. 7 of Advocates Act, the Court was not justified in exercising its inherent power. Advocates were members of a highly honourable and learned profession and it was expected that they would do nothing which would adversely affect the reputation and good name of the profession. On ethical and professional ground if it appeared that continuance on the part of an advocate in a case was liable to objection, the advocate would dissociate himself keeping in view the highest traditional of the profession. The Court must desist from any action which was likely to injure or jeopardize the interests of the profession. ( 11 ) FURTHER the learned counsel placed reliance on the latest judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2000 SC 3344 (H. V. Panchaksharappa v. K. G. Eshwar) contending that in view of well settled law the impugned order passed by the respondent is not sustainable in the eye of law. ( 12 ) IN my opinion, the Advocates are members of the highly honourable and learned profession and it was expected that they would do nothing which would adversely affect the reputation and good name of the profession to which they belong. On enthical and professional ground if it appeared that continuance on the part of an advocate in a case was liable to objection, I hope and trust in that event, the advocate would dissociate himself keeping in view the highest traditions of the profession. Interference by a Court in the matter of regulation of conduct of the advocates should be, in my opinion, only in very exceptional circumstances and the Court must desist from any action which is likely to injure or jeopardize the interests of the profession. It is left to the advocate concerned to judge for himself whether it would be proper for him to continue to conduct the case on behalf of the parties. ( 13 ) IN the instant case, the 3rd petitioner has represented the 1st and 2nd petitioners throughout the pendency of the proceedings before the respondent. In the proceedings, several other defendants have been examined and some of the witnesses were also cross examined. ( 13 ) IN the instant case, the 3rd petitioner has represented the 1st and 2nd petitioners throughout the pendency of the proceedings before the respondent. In the proceedings, several other defendants have been examined and some of the witnesses were also cross examined. At no point of time, the predecessor of respondent have raised any objection regarding defending the case of petitioners-1 and 2 by the 3rd petitioner. Further it is surprising to note that the respondent having observed that there is no express bar in law, proceeded to pass the impugned order which is neither endorsed by any legal sanction nor supported by any tenable reasons except stating that since 3rd petitioner is appearing for another Bank which is also a nationalised bank which is nothing but acting against same person or association or company. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the finding given by the respondent is one without jurisdiction and contrary to the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules. ( 14 ) YET another reason the impugned order is liable to be quashed is, when once the finding is given to the effect that there is no express bar in the law, the respondent ought not to have observed that the professional ethics requires an advocate not to appear for and against a same corporation or association. Such an approach is not at all permissible nor sustainable in the eye of law. There is no prohibition for an advocate acting for one party in one litigation and he should not act for the other in another petition arising out of the same dispute. In such circumstances, it is improper for a legal practitioner who has acted for one party in a dispute and acting for other party in subsequent litigation between them relating to or arising out of that dispute. Such conduct is open to mis-conception and is likely to raise suspicion in the mind of the original client and to embitter the subsequent litigation. And this is a matter which concerns the honour of the profession. But in the instant case, the facts reveal that 3rd petitioner has not appeared or acted for the opposite party. neither the plaintiff nor his counsel raised objection regarding defending the case of petitioners 1 and 2 by 3rd petitioner. In such circumstances, much credibility cannot be attached to the finding given by the respondent. But in the instant case, the facts reveal that 3rd petitioner has not appeared or acted for the opposite party. neither the plaintiff nor his counsel raised objection regarding defending the case of petitioners 1 and 2 by 3rd petitioner. In such circumstances, much credibility cannot be attached to the finding given by the respondent. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. ( 15 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, writ petitions filed by the petitioners are allowed. The impugned order passed by the respondent dated 28-5-1998 in O. S. No. 2415/1984 is quashed. ( 16 ) THE valuable assistance rendered by the learned amicus curiae Mr. Keshav Bhat is placed on record. The fee of the amicus curiae is fixed at Rs. 1000/ -. --- *** --- .