MOHAMED ANWAR, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel for both sides on LA. I which is filed under section 378 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code for the proposed appellant seeking leave to prefer an appeal against the order dated 22-9-1997 of the learned Sessions Judge, passed allowing the respondent's Cri. R. P. No. 19 of 1997 and discharging the latter for the alleged offences, following the direction of Supreme Court in "common Cause" a Registered society through its Director v Union of India. ( 2 ) ON 26-4-1989, the complaint under Section 200 of the Criminal procedure Code was presented before the learned Magistrate by the appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the complainant') against respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'the accused') alleging commission of the offences under Sections 114, 117-A and 122 of the Karnataka Agricultural produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 ('the Act' in short ). On 22-7-1996, a memo was filed for the accused before the learned Magistrate, praying to acquit him in the light of the direction of Supreme court in the "common Cause" judgment, supra. That memo was rejected by the learned Magistrate by his order dated 24-12-1996, which was challenged by the accused in revision in the Court of the XXIII Additional city Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, in Cri. R. P. No. 19 of 1997. The learned Sessions Judge, on consideration of the relevant direction in the "common Cause" judgment, supra, passed the impugned order dated 22-9-1997, allowing the revision and acquitting the accused by setting aside the said order dated 24-12-1996 of the learned Magistrate. ( 3 ) SECTION 114 of the Act prescribes penalty for evasion of payment of any fee, or other amount due by a person under the Act or the rules, or the regulations or the bye-laws thereunder. It contemplates that on conviction of a person on this count, he shall be punishable with fine which shall be a sum equal to three times the amount of fee or other amount due or three thousand rupees whichever is more and in the case of continuing evasion with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees every day during which the evasion is continued after conviction therefor. Section 117-A provides for penalty for contravention of section 66 of the Act and it states that on conviction of the accused for this offence, he shall be punishable with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees. Section 122 of the Act is a general provision for punishment of offences thereunder which states that, in the absence of any express provision under the Act, prescribing the penalty for the particular offence, the convicted accused be punished with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, ( 4 ) EVIDENTLY, Section 122 does not come into play in the instant case, it being the definite case of the complainant that the accused committed the specific offences under Sections 114 and 117-A of the Act. However, as could be seen, the punishment prescribed for these offences is the sentence of fine only. The relevant direction given by Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of "common Cause", judgment supra is contained in paragraph 2 (d), which reads:"2 (D) Where the cases pending in Criminal Courts under IPC or any other law for the time being in force are pending in connection with offences which are punishable with fine only and are not of recurring nature, and if such pendency is for more than one year and if in such cases trial have still not commenced, the Criminal court shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, and close such cases". ( 5 ) THIS is a clear direction given to the Criminal Courts in respect of the offences which are punishable with fine only and are not of recurring nature, and if they are not excepted by any of the clauses given in paragraph 4 of the judgment, they shall discharge or acquit the accused, as the case may be, if such cases are pending for more than one year and where the trial therein have not yet commenced. ( 6 ) IN the instant case, as indicated, the said complaint against accused was filed on 26-4-1989 and the memo seeking his discharge was filed on 22-7-1996. It is not in dispute that till 22-7-1996, i. e. , for over seven years, there was no progress whatever in the criminal proceeding against him and even his plea was not recorded as on that date. It is not in dispute that till 22-7-1996, i. e. , for over seven years, there was no progress whatever in the criminal proceeding against him and even his plea was not recorded as on that date. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge is perfectly justified in passing his impugned order in the light of the aforequoted direction of Supreme court. This is a case where the complainant on the pretence of prosecuting the accused, subjected him to unwarranted mental agony and humiliation by initiating the criminal proceeding and then callously neglecting to lead evidence in support of the charge against him. There does not, therefore, exist any valid ground to permit the appellant to prefer an appeal against the same. ( 7 ) HENCE, LA. I is rejected and consequently, the appeal is dismissed. --- *** --- .