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2001 DIGILAW 669 (KER)

Joseph @ Jose v. Gulam Gasool

2001-11-21

B.N.SRIKRISHNA, M.RAMACHANDRAN

body2001
Judgment :- Srikrishna, C.J. The appellant is a landlord of certain lands leased out the first respondent for commercial Purposes. The first respondent has constructed a building thereupon wich is admittedly used for Commercial purposes. Alleging that the first respondent was in arrears of rent, the appellant filed An application under Section 26 of the Kerala land Reforms Act, 1963, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') read with rule 16 of the Kerala land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970. An objection was taken to the maintainability of the said application. The land Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the claim application of the appellant. Being aggrieved, the first respondent moved the learned single Judge by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The original petition was allowed.Being aggrieved thereby, the first respondent is in appeal before us. 2. The learned single judge has taken the view that by reason of the exemption granted under Section 3(1) of the Act to leases for commercial purposes, the land Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the first respondent.the relevant portion of section 3 of the Act reads as under: 3. Exemption.-- (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to - (111) leases of land or of buildings or of both specifically granted for industrial or commercial purposes; or 3. It is seen that the intention of the legislature is not to apply anything cotained in chapter II to specified categories of leases, including lease of land or of buildings or of both specifically granted for industrial or commercial purposes. It is not, in dispute that the lease of the appellants land in favour of the first respondent was specifically of the type described in clause (111) of sub- section (1) of section 3 of the Act. Chapter II of theAct comprises several provisions commencing from section 3 and ending with section 80G. When the legislature by express provision at the commencement of chapter II declares that nothing in the chapter shall apply to leases of specified categories, what is meant thereby is that sections 3 to 80G would not apply to leases of specified categories including the one specified in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) opf section 3 of the Act. Consequently, Section 26 would not apply to such a lease at all. This is precisely the reasoning of the learned single judge. 4. Consequently, Section 26 would not apply to such a lease at all. This is precisely the reasoning of the learned single judge. 4. The learned counsel for the appallent however placed great reliance on the non- substance clause with which sub-section (4) of Section 26 begins . The relevant sub- section is: "(4) Nothwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court or other authority or officer other than the Land Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain any claim for arrears or rent." Learned counsel for the appellant urges that the force of the non obstante clause of sub section (4) of Section 26 operates not only against any la w contained in any other enactment but also against the provision of all other sections contained in the ACT itself. it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel. It is elementary that one reads an enactment from beginning to end. When one does so, one comes across Chapter II commencing from Section 3, which declares that nothing the chapter would apply to leases intended for commercial purposes falling within the description of the clause (ii) of section 3 (1). The impact of this exemption is that Section 26 itself would not apply to such a lease. Sub section (4) is part and parcel of Section 26 and, therefore in a situation when section 26 is exempted, subsection (4) of Section 26 cannot operate independently. The non obstante clause in subsection (4) could operate only if the entire Section 26 is allowed to operate. In our judgment and as found by the learned single judge rightly, there is an exemption from the operation the entire provisions of Section 26 in the case of leases for commercial purposes falling within the ambit of clause (iii) of subsection (1) of Section 3. Thus, no part of Section 26 would apply. Ergo the non obstanate clause would not apply. The learned Judge is right in his decision that the Land Tribunal erroneously held thart it had jurisdiction to entertain that application of the first respondent and in setting aside the order of the Land Tribunal. We see no reason to differ from the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Writ approval is dismissed. No order as to costs.