ORDER: One Shankararaman filed a private complaint against the petitioners on 12.7.1999 for the offences under Secs.120-B, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 read with Sec.34, I.P.C. before the II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai. The said complaint was referred to the respondent police for registration and investigation under Sec.156(3), Cr.P.C. Accordingly, a case was registered in Crime No.258 of 1999 for the said offences. 2. After investigation, the respondent police filed a report on 16.7.1999 referring the matter. By order dated 26.7.1999, the II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, accepted the referred report and dropped further action by closing the F.I.R. 3. Subsequently, the very same investigating officer filed another report on 10.8.1999 requesting for reinvestigation by reopening the case under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. to enable the Investigating Officer to make further investigation and file a final report. Accordingly, the II Metropolitan Magistrate, on perusal of the report in the light of Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. granted permission for further investigation and ordered to reopen the investigation. This order was passed on 17.8.1999. 4. In pursuance of the said order, the F.I.R. which was earlier registered in Crime No.258 of 1999 was reopened and restored. After thorough investigation, the respondent-police filed a charge-sheet against the petitioners and others for the offences under Secs.120-B, 341, 385, 465, 468, 471, 506(ii) and 420 read with 511, I.P.C. on 14.2.2000 and the same was taken on file for the above offences and summons were issued to the accused. On receipt of summons, the petitioners have preferred this petition under Sec.482, Cr.P.C. seeking to quash the proceedings. 5. Mr.V.Padmanabhan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, would elaborately argue by citing several authorities. 6. The gist of the arguments could be summarised as follows: “Having accepted the referred report filed by the respondent-police dated 16.7.1999 by passing a detailed order on 26.7.1999, the learned II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, would not be empowered to order re-investigation under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. Once the referred report was accepted and further action was dropped, invoking of Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. for ordering further investigation is illegal. Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. applies only when a case is pending before the court of law wherein the charge sheet was already filed under Sec.173(2), Cr.P.C. As such, the order for re-investigation under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. is illegal and consequently, the charge-sheet on the basis of the materials collected in the said further investigation is also illegal and the same is liable to be quashed.” 7. In elaboration of this point, the learned counsel for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the judicial order, which was passed by the learned II Metropolitan Magistrate by accepting the report of the police officer and dropping the case by order dated 26.7.1999, has been reviewed and set aside by the very same court by order dated 17.8.1999 and this is quite impermissible under law. 8. On this aspect Mr.Reghunathan, the learned counsel for the first informant, and the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent are heard at length. 9. In a similar situation, I had occasions to render judgments on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court holding that the police officer would be entitled to make further investigation after obtaining permission from the court concerned, even though the earlier referred report filed by the police officer was accepted by the court. Those decisions are as follows: (1) K.V.Kandasamy and others v. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, (2001)1 Crimes 27; (2) Meera Sahib v. The State, (1999)1 L.W. (Crl.) 118; and (3) Chelliah v. Yesuvadial, (1998)2 L.W. (Crl.) 566. 10. These decisions have been rendered by me mainly on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1285. In the said decision, it is held that where the Magistrate to whom a report was forwarded under Sec.173(2), Cr.P.C. decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceedings as requested by the police, the Magistrate shall give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. 11. The above observation would make it clear that the report under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. would include both positive as well as negative report. In this case, the respondent-police filed a referred report on 16.7.1999 and the same was accepted and action was dropped. The said report, as laid down by the Supreme Court, would certainly come under the provision of Sec.173(2)(i), Cr.P.C. 12. In this case, the respondent-police filed a referred report on 16.7.1999 and the same was accepted and action was dropped. The said report, as laid down by the Supreme Court, would certainly come under the provision of Sec.173(2)(i), Cr.P.C. 12. In the light of the said situation, there is no bar for the respondent-police to file an application under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. requesting for permission for further investigation. The order dated 17.8.1999 also would indicate that the II Metropolitan Magistrate took into consideration on the earlier report and the earlier order and gave reasonings for granting such permission for further investigation under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. Therefore, the question of review his own order would not arise, since the order for further investigation would be under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C. which confers such power to the court. 13. As a matter of fact, the decisions referred to above would make it clear that the filing of the charge-sheet even without getting such permission would not be a ground for quashing the entire proceedings. 14. In this context it would be appropriate to quote the observation of the Supreme Court in Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Administration), A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1791 Which Is As Follows: “We think that in the interest of independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the eomity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh fact come to light ......Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.” 15. In view of the above observation, the police would be certainly entitled to make further investigation after getting formal permission from the court concerned. That is what exactly done in this case. 16. Incidentally, it was argued that before ordering further investigation, no notice was issued by the court to the accused. In view of the above observation, the police would be certainly entitled to make further investigation after getting formal permission from the court concerned. That is what exactly done in this case. 16. Incidentally, it was argued that before ordering further investigation, no notice was issued by the court to the accused. But, this submission is liable to be rejected in view of the verdict of the Supreme Court in (1999)2 Supreme (Crl.) 90 wherein it is held that before giving direction for fresh investigation under Sec.173(8), Cr.P.C., the court need not give opportunity to the accused to be heard. 17. Furthermore, it is to be noticed that the present petition has not been filed to challenge the said order dated 17.8.1999. As a matter of fact, the order passed on 17.8.1999 directing further investigation has been complied with by the respondent-police and in pursuance of the said order, the respondent-police fully investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet which was taken on file by the trial court on 14.2.2000. Thus, the order dated 17.8.1999 does not survive anymore, as it is merged with the order of taking cognizance dated 14.2.2000. 18. Though several other authorities were cited by both sides, I am not inclined to swell this order by referring all the other decisions, as they are not relevant or necessary to deal with the question posed before this Court. 19. In view of what is stated above, the petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, the connected Crl.M.Ps are closed. The trial court is directed to go on with the trial and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. The Registry is directed to send back the records forthwith.