JUDGMENT: The appellants in these appeals are the plaintiffs in suit in O.S.No.140 of 1984 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tindivanam, seeking for declaration of their title to the suit schedule properties and for permanent injunction in S.No.4/1 measuring about 3.26 acres at Meladayalam village. The respondents 1 and 2 are the wife and son of one Narayanasamy Gounder, the first defendant in the above suit, who filed a separate suit in O.S.No.154 of 1984 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tindivanam, for declaration of his title to the suit properties and for permanent injunction against the appellants in respect of four items including S.No.4/1. 2. The trial Court decreed the suit in O.S.No.140 of 1984 filed by the appellants and dismissed the suit in O.S.No.154 of 1984 filed on behalf of the respondents’ side. Having aggrieved over the same, Narayanasamy Gounder, the first defendant filed two appeals in A.S.Nos.128 and 129 of 1991 before the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Tindivanam, as against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.Nos.140 of 1984 and 154 of 1984. The lower appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by dismissing the suit filed by the appellants in O.S.No.140 of 1984 and decreed the suit in O.S.No.154 of 1984 filed on behalf of the respondents. During the pendency of the said appeals, the first defendant Narayanasamy died. Therefore, the respondents 1 and 2 namely wife and son, filed an application to record them as L.Rs. of the deceased defendant. Accordingly, they were impleaded as respondents 1 and 2. On being aggrieved over the judgment of the lower appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appellants have preferred these appeals. 3. For convenience sake, we would refer the appellants as plaintiffs and the respondents as defendants. 4. The case of the plaintiffs in O.S.No.140 of 1984 is as follows: "The plaintiffs’ father Natesa Gounder, the first defendant Narayanasamy Gounder and Ramachandra Gounder are the sons of one Perumal Gounder. The suit property in S.No.4/1 measuring about 3.26 acres in Meladayalam village was divided into three equal shares among the three brothers. In that, 1 acre 26 cents fell to the share of the plaintiffs’ father Natesa Gounder and 1 acre 26 cents fell to the share of Ramachandra Gounder. The suit property in S.No.4/1 measuring about 3.26 acres in Meladayalam village was divided into three equal shares among the three brothers. In that, 1 acre 26 cents fell to the share of the plaintiffs’ father Natesa Gounder and 1 acre 26 cents fell to the share of Ramachandra Gounder. The remaining extent fell to the share of Narayanasamy Gounder, the first defendant. In 1952, the father of the plaintiffs purchased the share of Ramachandra Gounder under a sale deed. Those properties were divided in 1982 between the plaintiffs who are the brothers, by a registered deed dated 22.2.1982. The properties allotted to the plaintiffs 1 to 4 were described as Schedule A, B, C, D. The father of the plaintiffs had not retained any share in the suit property. Narayanasamy Gounder, the first defendant taking advantage of the difference of opinion between the plaintiffs and their father, filed a suit in O.S.No.596 of 1979 against their father and brother and obtained a collusive decree for partition of 1/3rd share in the suit property. In that suit, though the plaintiffs attained majority at the time of the suit, were not impleaded. The father of the plaintiffs also was not arrayed as a Karta of the family. Taking advantage of the decree in O.S.No.596 of 1979, the defendants were denying the title of the plaintiffs and interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment. Hence, the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction." 5. The case of the first defendant in his written statement in the suit and the plaint in O.S.No.154 of 1984 is as follows: "The suit properties were the joint family properties of himself and his brothers Natesa Gounder and Ramachandra Gounder. There was no partition taking place as alleged by the plaintiffs. In the year 1979, on refusal of the father of the plaintiffs to partition for his 1/3rd share, the first defendant was constrained to file O.S.No.596 of 1979 for a decree for partition in the suit properties. In the suit, the preliminary decree was passed on 26.2.1980. Ultimately, final decree also was passed on 20.12.1982. In pursuance of the final decree, he took possession of his 1/3rd share. As such, he is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. In the suit, the preliminary decree was passed on 26.2.1980. Ultimately, final decree also was passed on 20.12.1982. In pursuance of the final decree, he took possession of his 1/3rd share. As such, he is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. In view of the decree in O.S.No.596 of 1979, the suit filed by the plaintiffs, is not maintainable, as the decree would operate as res judicata against the plaintiffs, since the plaintiffs’ father who was a Karta of the family was a party to the decree." 6. On the above pleadings, both the suits were tried together and a common judgment was delivered by the trial Court on 28.2.1991 wherein the trial Court decreed the suit in O.S.No.140 of 1984 filed by the plaintiffs as prayed for and dismissed the first defendant’s suit in O.S.No.154 of 1984. 7. The findings given by the trial Court are as follows: (1) The documentary evidence filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.140 of 1984 had established that there was a partition between the first defendant in O.S.No.140 of 1984 and his brothers even before the filing of the suit by the defendant in O.S.No.596 of 1979. (2) The decree in O.S.No.596 of 1979 would not operate as res judicata against the plaintiffs in O.S.No.140 of 1984 as they were not made as parties inspite of having attained majority. (3) The defendant in O.S.No.140 of 1984 was not in possession of the suit properties. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the first defendant filed two appeals before the lower appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeals, the first defendant died. Therefore, the wife and son of the first defendant were brought on record as L.Rs. of the deceased Narayanasamy Gounder. The lower appellate Court by allowing their application allowed them to prosecute the appeals with observation that their title or heirship would be considered and decided at the time of the final, disposal of the main appeals. 9. Thereafter, the respondents 1 and 2 adduced evidence to show that they are the legal heirs of the deceased Narayanasamy Gounder. On the side of the respondents, Exs.B6 to B9 were marked and Kannammal and Kabali, the respondents 1 and 2 and Kuppusamy Nadar and Govindasamy, the local villagers also were examined to prove the marriage between the deceased and the first respondent. On the side of the respondents, Exs.B6 to B9 were marked and Kannammal and Kabali, the respondents 1 and 2 and Kuppusamy Nadar and Govindasamy, the local villagers also were examined to prove the marriage between the deceased and the first respondent. On the side of the appellants, Elumalai, the second appellant was examined to prove that the said marriage was not valid, since her marriage with one other Natesa Gounder was subsisting and there was no customary divorce. 10. The lower appellate Court by its common judgment dated 28.1.2000 allowed the appeals thereby dismissing the suit filed by the appellants and decreed the respondents’ suit on the following grounds: (1) The judgment and decree passed in the earlier suit filed by Narayanasamy in O.S.No.596 of 1979 against the appellants’ father Natesa Gounder for partition of his 1/3rd share would operate as res judicata. (2) The partition between the appellants on 22.2.1982 is hit by lis pendens. (3) The plaintiffs’ did not prove that there was a partition between Narayanasamy and his brothers even prior to the partition suit in O.S.No.596 of 1979. (4) The customary divorce pleaded by Kannammal, the wife of the deceased Narayanasamy Gounder has been proved. Hence, she is the legally wedded wife of Narayanasamy and Kabali being the son of the said Kannammal is the legitimate son of Narayanasamy and as such, they are entitled to the suit properties as heirs of Narayanasamy. 11. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the appellants herein have filed the above second appeals. 12. Even at the time of admission, the counsel for both the parties agreed for posting the matter for final disposal. Accordingly, the matter was pasted for final disposal on a future date. The counsel for both the parties were heard at length. 13. Ms.N.Mala, the learned counsel for the appellants, while challenging the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial Court, would make the following contentions: (1) The suit filed by the appellants is not barred by res judicata on the basis of the decree passed in O.S.No.596 of 1979, since the appellants who were the majors at that time were not made as parties and as such, any decree passed against the father of the plaintiffs in his individual capacity is not binding on the other coparceners. Furthermore, the mere filing of the final decree in the earlier suit is not sufficient to raise the plea of res judicata as the necessary ingredients such as the identity of the parties, identity of the properties, identity of the issues, etc. have not been shown. Unless the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier suit have been marked in the trial Court to establish the said ingredients, the question of res judicata would not arise. Consequently, the lis pendens which is an extension of the Rule of res judicata would not apply to this case. (2) The family partition among Natesa Gounder, the father of the plaintiffs and two other brothers including the first defendant had taken place even before 1952. Suppressing the said fact, Narayanasamy Gounder filed a collusive suit in O.S.No.596 of 1979 and obtained an ex parte decree. Exs.A1 to A4 would show that partition took place between the brothers long prior to 1952 and subsequently, various sale documents have been executed by both the father of the plaintiffs and other brothers including the first defendant in respect of the properties allotted to them. This aspect also has been admitted by the first defendant while he was deposing before the Court. When that being so, the law would raise a presumption in favour of the appellants and the burden is on the respondents to show that the earlier partition was a partial one. The lower appellate Court has not considered the recitals of Exs.A1 to A4 by proper construction and interpretation. (3) The first respondent herein claimed to be the legally wedded wife of the deceased Narayanasamy Gounder and the second respondent was said to be the son born to her through Narayanasamy Gounder under the wedlock. The appellants contested the said claim of the respondents on the ground that the first respondent was already married to one Natesa Gounder of Theparumpattu and her marriage with the said Natesa Gounder was not dissolved and therefore, the second marriage with Narayanasamy Gounder was illegal. The respondents 1 and 2 pleaded customary divorce. When such is the plea stating that the marriage was dissolved in caste Panchayat, the respondents ought to have proved the same by examining some persons who were party to the said Panchayat. The evidence of the first respondent alone would not prove her case of dissolution of marriage before the caste Panchayat. When such is the plea stating that the marriage was dissolved in caste Panchayat, the respondents ought to have proved the same by examining some persons who were party to the said Panchayat. The evidence of the first respondent alone would not prove her case of dissolution of marriage before the caste Panchayat. As far as the legal aspect of the customary dissolution of marriage is concerned, Sec.29 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lays down that there can be a customary dissolution of marriage, but the custom to override the express provision of the Act, should be such that it should have the force of law. In other words, the custom for proving dissolution of marriage as well as the customary form should be properly proved. In this case, there is no such proof. The finding by the lower appellate Court with regard to the proof of customary divorce is against law and not on the basis of the acceptable evidence. 14. In reply to the above submissions, Mr.Maninarayanan, the learned counsel for the respondents would make the following contentions: (1) The suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable, in view of the partition decree passed in O.S.No.596 of 1979. The said partition suit was filed by the first defendant against his two brothers, one of them is Natesa Gounder, the father of the plaintiffs and another is Ramachandran. Ramachandran was set ex-parte in that suit. But, Natesa Gounder had participated in the final decree. As such, the plaintiffs were represented by their karta. In such a suit, individual coparceners need not be made parties. Further, the plaintiffs were aware of the said suit. In the plaint itself, they made it clear that they were aware of the suit. Therefore, the said decree is binding on the appellants, especially when they did not plead fraud or collusion or let in evidence to prove the same. Consequently, the suit is hit by Sec.11, C.P.C. (2) The pleadings and the judgment in the earlier suit need not be marked before the trial Court, since the plaintiffs were aware of the prior suit as admitted by them in the plaint. The plaintiffs’ father was a party to the final decree proceeding. Admittedly, the said decree was passed on 20.12.1982. In the meantime, the partition among the plaintiffs being the sons of Natesa Gounder was registered on 22.2.1982. The plaintiffs’ father was a party to the final decree proceeding. Admittedly, the said decree was passed on 20.12.1982. In the meantime, the partition among the plaintiffs being the sons of Natesa Gounder was registered on 22.2.1982. Therefore, as per Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is a lis pendens, which bars the transfer of property pending suit. (3) The respondents 1 and 2 have not only proved through the documents that they are the wife and son of the deceased but also they were so recognised by the deceased himself which is evident from the settlement deed and Will. The defendant and his wife continuously lived as husband and wife from 1965 to 1993. The fact of continuous living has been admitted by the second plaintiff himself in his deposition. Further, custom of divorce is prevalent in the community as proved by examination of two independent witnesses, viz., P.W.3 and P.W.4 examined before the lower appellate Court. They are aged and qualified enough to speak about custom. Therefore, the finding given by the lower appellate Court is perfectly justified. Consequently, the appeals are liable to be dismissed. 15. I have heard the counsel for the parties, perused the records and given my thoughtful consideration to various aspects pointed out by the counsel for the respective parties. 16. According to the appellants/plaintiffs, the suit properties were allotted to the father of the plaintiffs in the family partition which took place long back and the final decree passed in the suit for partition filed by Narayanasamy Gounder would not bind them as they were not made as parties and therefore, the question of res judicata and lis pendens would not arise. 17. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand would contend that there is no acceptable oral or documentary evidence to prove that there was a partition between Narayanasamy and his brothers even prior to the partition suit filed by Narayanasamy Gounder. 18. This argument is on the basis of the finding given by the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court would mainly hold that one of the documents, namely Ex.A.4 would show that the properties mentioned in the said document were undivided properties. It is true that it is mentioned as But, it is to be noticed that all the boundaries are mentioned in the said deed. 19. The lower appellate Court would mainly hold that one of the documents, namely Ex.A.4 would show that the properties mentioned in the said document were undivided properties. It is true that it is mentioned as But, it is to be noticed that all the boundaries are mentioned in the said deed. 19. It may be true that Exs.A1 to A4 would not relate to the details of the partition which took place earlier. But, the fact remains that Exs.A1 to A4 would show that Natesa Gounder, the father of the plaintiffs, Narayanasamy Gounder, first defendant and Ramachandra Gounder were dealing with the properties, which were allotted to them, independently. The evidence of D.W.1 Narayanasamy Gounder would show that he admitted that the properties in the Jambothi village were allotted to him in the partition and further admitted that his joint family had properties not only in Mel Edayalam village where the suit properties were situate, but also in Jambothi village. 20. According to the plaintiffs, there was a family partition long years back. On the other hand, it is the case of the first defendant that there was no family partition earlier. But, while he was confronted with Exs.A1 to A4 in the cross-examination, he stated that the partition was partial and Jambothi lands which were allotted to him also were the joint family properties. The stand of the first defendant as is evident from the cross-examination is not consistent. 21. If it is the case of the first defendant that it was a partial partition. It is settled law, as laid down in Kumarappa Chetty v. Adaikkalam Chetty, 62 M.L.J. 141: I.L.R. 45 Mad. 483, that it would raise the presumption that there was a total partition of the entire joint family properties and the burden, therefore, shifts on the defendant to show that earlier partition was only a partial one. The relevant observation is as follows: “Where a partition has taken place the presumption is that it was a complete partition and the burden lies upon him who alleges that a certain property was excluded from the partition to show that it was a partial partition.” 22. The relevant observation is as follows: “Where a partition has taken place the presumption is that it was a complete partition and the burden lies upon him who alleges that a certain property was excluded from the partition to show that it was a partial partition.” 22. But, the case of the first defendant in the written statement and the finding of the lower appellate Court is that there was no partition at all in the family prior to the suit filed by the first defendant in O.S.No.596 of 1997. 23. Regarding the family partition, the trial Court considered Ex.A1, the sale deed executed by Narayanasamy Gounder in favour of one Ponnusamy on 3.10.1970 in respect of the suit properties, Ex.A2, the sale deed executed by Natesa Gounder in favour of Narayanasamy Gounder on 15.11.1954, Ex.A3, the sale deed executed by Narayanasamy Gounder in favour of Natesa Gounder in respect of suit properties on 9.12.1947 and Ex.A4, the sale deed executed by Ramachandra Gounder in respect of the suit properties in favour of Natesa Gounder and also the evidence of P.W.1 Elumalai, the second plaintiff and one Adimoolam who stated that there was a partition among the three brothers and the suit properties were enjoyed by the father of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs. 24. The trial Court also considered the other documents, namely Exs.A6 to A13, which were filed to show that the patta was issued in favour of Natesa Gounder and kist receipts had been obtained in the name of P.W.1, the second plaintiff. As pointed out by the trial Court, the documents such as kist receipts produced by the first defendant before the Court would relate to the period subsequent to the filing of the suit. 25. Under those circumstances, the finding of the lower appellate Court, which is only on the basis of some portion of the recitals found in Ex.A4, is not proper. 26. Furthermore, D.W.1 himself would state that the properties were under the possession of Natesa Gounder from the beginning and when the partition was denied, he had to file a suit for partition. 27. The next aspect is regarding the effect of partition decree passed by the civil Court in the suit filed by the first defendant in O.S.No.596 of 1979. Admittedly, the plaintiffs were not the parties in the said suit. 27. The next aspect is regarding the effect of partition decree passed by the civil Court in the suit filed by the first defendant in O.S.No.596 of 1979. Admittedly, the plaintiffs were not the parties in the said suit. In the said suit filed by Narayanasamy Gounder, Natesa Gounder and Ramachandra Gounder alone were made as parties. On that score, it is contended that the decree is not binding on the plaintiffs/appellants. 28. On the other hand, it is contended by the counsel for the respondents, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Amrit v. Sudesh, (1969)2 S.C.J. 691: A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 5, that Natesa Gounder was made a party defendant as a Karta of the family and though the cause title in the suit does not disclose that he was a karta, the decree or finding given in the suit is binding on the plaintiffs, the other coparceners. On the basis of the said principle, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata. 29. In reply to the said submission, it is stated that it is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the decree obtained by Narayanasamy Gounder was a collusive decree and the same was obtained by playing fraud on the plaintiffs by not impleading the plaintiffs inspite of their having attained majority and as such, it is not binding, even though they are the coparceners. 30. It is further contended that even assuming that the suit had been filed against Natesa Gounder as the Karta of the family, the mere filing of the final decree in the earlier suit would not be sufficient to raise the plea of res judicata. 31. This submission, in my view, has some force. In this suit, the only document filed to prove the earlier decree is the final decree. There are no other documents such as pleadings, judgment and other records to show the important ingredient so as to invoke the plea of res judicata. 32. As laid down in Subba Rao v. Subba Rao, 71 M.L.J. 419: A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 689 and Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, (1965)2 S.C.J. 588: A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1810, the party who pleads res judicata has to establish three important ingredients, viz., (1) identity of the parties; (2) identity of the properties and (3) identity of the issues. 33. 32. As laid down in Subba Rao v. Subba Rao, 71 M.L.J. 419: A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 689 and Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, (1965)2 S.C.J. 588: A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1810, the party who pleads res judicata has to establish three important ingredients, viz., (1) identity of the parties; (2) identity of the properties and (3) identity of the issues. 33. The relevant observation made by the Supreme Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, (1965)2 S.C.J. 588: A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1810 is this: “From this analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily be traceable to a particular cause of action but this might, by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that a plea of a bar under O.2, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the causes of action in the two suits. The cause of action in the previous suit would be the facts, which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed. Without placing before the Court the plaint in which those facts were alleged, the defendant cannot invite the Court to speculate or infer by a process of deduction what those facts might be with reference to the reliefs which were then claimed.” 34. Admittedly, neither the pleadings in the previous suit regarding the identity of the cause of action nor the judgment rendered in the earlier suit filed by the first defendant had been placed. So, the trial Court was not able to see whether the issues that have to be decided are the same. 35. Furthermore, it is noticed, one of the defendants, viz., Ramachandra Gounder was set ex parte. So, the trial Court was not able to see whether the issues that have to be decided are the same. 35. Furthermore, it is noticed, one of the defendants, viz., Ramachandra Gounder was set ex parte. It is the case of the appellants/plaintiffs that there was a misunderstanding between the plaintiffs and their father Natesa Gounder and that was the reason why the suit for partition was filed and the same was not seriously contested by the said Natesa Gounder and ultimately, they obtained final decree. 36. When such a plea had been raised by the plaintiffs, it is all the more reason that the defendants had to place all the necessary documents such as pleadings, judgment and records to decide the said question. This aspect has not been correctly dealt with by the lower appellate Court. 37. So, in the absence of proof regarding the pleadings and issues in order to invoke the plea of res judicata, I am of the view that the trial Court is correct in holding that the defendant cannot be allowed to contend that the suit is barred on the plea of res judicata. Therefore, the finding by appellate Court with reference to the res judicata also is not legally valid and the contention urged by the counsel for the respondents in regard to the same is not tenable. 38. In view of the above conclusion, it would automatically reveal that Ex.A5, which is a partition deed executed by the appellants inter se dated 22.2.1982 is not hit by lis pendens, though the final decree was passed on 22.12.1982, in view of the fact that the earlier decree is not binding on the appellants. Therefore, the submission regarding Sec.52 of the Transfer of Property Act would not help the respondents. 39. Thirdly, while challenging the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the respondents 1 and 2 who claimed to be wife and son of the first defendant Narayanasamy Gounder, have not proved that the marriage between the said Narayanasamy Gounder and the first respondent was valid and the second respondent was said to be the legitimate son born to her through Narayanasamy Gounder under the wedlock. 40. 40. The learned counsel for the respondents would emphatically submit that the first respondent examined herself as P.W.1 in the application filed by her to bring the respondents 1 and 2 as L.Rs. on record and would state in the chief examination itself that she was married to one Natesa Gounder of Theparumpattu and after some years, due to misunderstanding, the marriage was dissolved through the customary divorce and subsequently, the marriage was held with Narayanasamy Gounder in the “Nadu Veetu Thali” form and as such, the respondents 1 and 2 are competent enough to be legal representatives to prosecute the appeals filed before the lower appellate Court. 41. The learned counsel for the appellants would cite Subbaraj v. Indirani, (1999)2 M.L.J. 579 to show that the customary divorce has to be proved by the acceptable materials in order to show that the custom which will have the force of law is clear, continuous and immemorial in time. She would also cite Chinnammal v. Elumalai, (2000)2 C.T.C. 214 , in which it is held that mere proof of marriage will not validate the said marriage when the earlier marriage was subsisting. 42. There is no dispute in these propositions. As held in the later decision, there is a distinction between the proof of marriage and validity of marriage. The proof of marriage can be achieved, by direct evidence of the marriage ceremony or registration of marriage or by circumstantial evidence, one of the circumstances being long cohabitation and living together. But, a marriage which is questioned on the ground of being subsequent to and during the subsistence of an earlier marriage, could not, by any stretch of argument or imagination, be sanctified or validated by any length of cohabitation or living together. 43. Keeping in mind the above principles, if we look at the facts of the case, it is clear, in my view, that both the factors, namely divorce of the earlier marriage through custom and the second marriage in the form of “Nadu Veetu Thali” have been proved by adducing evidence by P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.4. 44. 43. Keeping in mind the above principles, if we look at the facts of the case, it is clear, in my view, that both the factors, namely divorce of the earlier marriage through custom and the second marriage in the form of “Nadu Veetu Thali” have been proved by adducing evidence by P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.4. 44. The lower appellate Court would consider the evidence of not only the first defendant’s wife P.W.1 but also P.W.3 and P.W.4 who speak about the divorce and the marriage between Narayanasamy Gounder and the first respondent in the “Nadu Veetu Thali” form and found that the said custom in the Gounders’ caste was prevailing for a long number of years and under the custom in a caste panchayat, the marriage was divorced and thereafter, the divorcee, the first respondent got married to the first defendant Narayanasamy Gounder. 45. On going through the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4, it is clear that “Nadu Veetu Thali” marriage form would be conducted only for a widow or a divorcee. So, in that context, it cannot be contended that the customary divorce has not been proved, even though there are materials to show that marriage ceremony was solemnised between Narayanasamy Gounder and the first respondent Kannammal 46. The decisions referred to above would not be applicable to the present facts of the case, since in those cases, the finding given by this Court is that there was no material to show that the custom was prevailing there and the same was proved. But, in this case, in my view, the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 clearly show that under the custom prevailing in the area for long number of years, the marriage was dissolved in a caste Panchayat and the same is spoken to by P.W.1 even in the chief examination and the form of marriage, namely, “Nadu Veetu Thali” form has been clearly spoken to by the other witnesses examined on her behalf. 47. Under those circumstances, I am of the view that the respondents 1 and 2 are the legally wedded wife and son of the said Narayanasamy Gounder and as such, the finding of the lower appellate Court observing that they are legal heirs of the said Narayanasamy Gounder and the order bringing them on record as L.Rs. is legal. 48. 47. Under those circumstances, I am of the view that the respondents 1 and 2 are the legally wedded wife and son of the said Narayanasamy Gounder and as such, the finding of the lower appellate Court observing that they are legal heirs of the said Narayanasamy Gounder and the order bringing them on record as L.Rs. is legal. 48. So, except the above finding, the other findings rendered by the lower appellate Court, as noted above, are not justified and as such, the same are liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in both the suits are restored. Thus, the second appeals are allowed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P. Nos.13193 and 13645 of 2000 are closed.