JUDGMENT- A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---This writ petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, takes exception to the order passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Pune, dated February 21, 1989 in Civil Appeal No. 481 of 1988. 2. The petitioner is the landlord in respect of the suit property situated at House No. 429, Budhwar Peth, Pune consisting of a garage on the ground floor admeasuring 17' x 9' only. The suit premises were let out to the respondents on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- plus Rs. 5/- towards education cess and other taxes. According to the petitioner, the suit premises was let out to the respondent No. 1, which is a registered partnership firm. The respondent No. 2 is one of the partner in the said firm along with his brother Jasbirsingh. The respondent No. 2 is stated to be managing all the business and the affairs of the firm. As the petitioner required the suit premises for his personal use for keeping his car, he called upon the respondents to vacate the suit premises, by a written notice. Inspite of the said notice, the respondents did not vacate the suit premises-for which reason the petitioner instituted the suit for recovery of possession against the respondent before the Court of Small Causes Court at Pune, being Civil Suit No. 46 of 1985, on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. This suit was resisted by the respondents. The respondents raised preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the suit on the ground of non joinder of necessary parties; for, according to the respondents, all the partners of the respondent No. 1 firm were not impleaded as defendants to the suit. Though other points were raised, we are not concerned with the same in this petition and are therefore not adverted to herein. 3. Suffice it to mention that the suit proceeded before the trial Court and the trial Court by its judgment and order dated April 25, 1988 decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner. In so far as the abovesaid issue of maintainability of the suit, the trial Court in para 31 of its decision has observed that the said issue was not at all argued on behalf of the respondents nor any evidence was led. In so far as the abovesaid issue of maintainability of the suit, the trial Court in para 31 of its decision has observed that the said issue was not at all argued on behalf of the respondents nor any evidence was led. Nevertheless the trial Court, having regard to the materials on record held that there was no substance in the said objection. Moreover, according to the trial Court, the law was that-suit against the firm without joining the partners as defendants was competent. Besides, on the issue of reasonable and bona fide requirement, the trail Court recorded a clear finding that the same was duly established in evidence by the petitioner. Even on the issue of greater hardship, the trial Court answered the same in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, the trial Court directed the respondents to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the petitioner. 4. The respondents took the matter in appeal before the District Court, Pune being Civil Appeal No. 481 of 1988. The Appellate Court although formulated four points for consideration however, answered only the first point that the suit was bad for non joinder of necessary parties. The Appellate Court found that it was imperative to implead all the partners of the defendant firm to prosecute the suit for possession under the provisions of the Rent Act. The Appellate Court, however, held that instead of dismissing the suit, the petitioner plaintiff can be given opportunity to amend the pleadings and go back for fresh trial on the basis of amended pleadings. Accordingly, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the trial Court. It would be apposite to advert to the operative order passed by the Appellate Court, which reads thus :- "15. The appeal is allowed. The decree of the lower Court is hereby set aside. However, both the parties are directed to remain present in the lower Court on 4-3-1989. The learned Judge is directed to allow both the parties on record and also incoming parties to file their written statements and to record the evidence fresh, if necessary, and to dispose of the matter on merit within six months from the date of receipt of the record. The record and proceedings be sent back to the lower Court forthwith. The learned Judge is directed to allow both the parties on record and also incoming parties to file their written statements and to record the evidence fresh, if necessary, and to dispose of the matter on merit within six months from the date of receipt of the record. The record and proceedings be sent back to the lower Court forthwith. In the circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs." What is relevant to note is that, the Appellate Court was not only pleased to set aside the decree passed by the trial Court but also remanded the suit for further trial before the trial Court. The effect of this order was, obviously to restore the suit on the file of the trial Court on the date when the said order came to be passed. 5. The petitioner being aggrieved by the abovesaid remand order has preferred the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court assailing the opinion expressed by the Appellate Court on the issue of non joinder of necessary parties. This Court while admitting the writ petition on July 4, 1989, was pleased to grant interim stay as prayed for by the petitioner in terms of prayer Clause (c) of the writ petition. Prayer Clause (c) reads thus :- "(c) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the aforesaid writ petition all further proceedings in Civil Suit No. 46 of 1985 pending in the file of the learned 4th Additional Small Causes Judge, Pune, be stayed." 6. The effect of the interim order passed by this Court was only to stay the further hearing of the said suit which already stood restored to the file of the trial Court. Indubitably, in fact, as well as in law, the subject suit filed by the petitioner against the respondents stood restored on the file of the trial Court on February 21, 1989, consequent to the order passed in appeal. As a necessary corollary, the suit can be said to be still pending before the trial Court subject, however, to the order to be passed in the present petition. I shall elaborate on this matter a little later while considering the objection raised on behalf of the respondents before this Court. 7. As a necessary corollary, the suit can be said to be still pending before the trial Court subject, however, to the order to be passed in the present petition. I shall elaborate on this matter a little later while considering the objection raised on behalf of the respondents before this Court. 7. Be that as it may, the petitioner has challenged the conclusion recorded by the Appellate Court being wholly in appropriate and not germane to the issue that was raised for consideration before the Appellate Court. It is contended that, it is well settled position that all the partners need not be impleaded in a suit of this nature filed against the firm; and it is enough if the firm is impleaded as the defendants. Even in that case, it is argued that, the decree passed would bind all the partners. On the other hand, Mr. Anturkar for the respondents joined caveat to this proposition. He submits that in any case there would be no occasion for this Court to examine the said issue inasmuch as, the present writ petition cannot be entertained on merits in the wake of certain legislative changes. According to him, the present writ petition arises against the order passed by the courts below in the proceedings commenced under the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1947 for the sake of brevity) whereas the said Act was to last only till 31-3-2000 and with the efflux of time that Act was to lapse on the midnight of the given date but, before the expiry of its period, the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1999) intervened as it came into force with effect from 31-3-2000. It is submitted that with the introduction of the Act of 1999, and by virtue of section 58(1) of that Act, the entire Act of 1947 stood repealed. As a consequence of this development, Mr. Anturkar submits that, all the writ petitions pending in this Court under Article(s) 226/227 of the Constitution of India emanating from the original proceedings under the Act of 1947, will have to be terminated as the same have not been specifically saved by the Act of 1999. As a consequence of this development, Mr. Anturkar submits that, all the writ petitions pending in this Court under Article(s) 226/227 of the Constitution of India emanating from the original proceedings under the Act of 1947, will have to be terminated as the same have not been specifically saved by the Act of 1999. He submits that what has been saved is only the "proceedings under the said Acts (i.e. Act of 1947 in this case) and that writ petition cannot be said to be such proceedings-for writ petition is not a "proceeding under the Act of 1947". According to him, therefore, no proceedings arising out of the Act of 1947 can be continued except to the extent of one saved by sub-section (2) of section 58 of the Act of 1999. The submission proceeds on the premise that by efflux of time the Act of 1947 was to expire on the midnight of 31-3-2000 and the same be deemed to have expired and as a consequences of which the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be pursued and continued in law, as there is no enactment to save or validate such proceeding and the orders to be passed thereon. Besides, it is also contended that, in any case, with the introduction of the Act of 1999 on 31-3-2000, the entire Act of 1947, stood repealed by virtue of section 58(1) of the Act of 1999, including the saving provision in the Act of 1947; and, even for this reason, the present petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India, though de facto pending in this Court cannot be continued as de jure it stood terminated and dissolved. To buttress the abovesaid contentions reliance has been placed on several decisions to which I shall make a reference at the appropriate time. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Pungalia the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the premise on which the objection regarding the continuation and maintainability of this writ petition is raised is ill-advised and not in accord with the provisions of the Act of 1947 or for that matter the Act of 1999. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Pungalia the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the premise on which the objection regarding the continuation and maintainability of this writ petition is raised is ill-advised and not in accord with the provisions of the Act of 1947 or for that matter the Act of 1999. He submits that inspite of the lapsing of the Act of 1947 and also inspite of the introduction of the Act of 1999, the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India could not only be maintained but, also continued against any order passed by the courts below in the proceedings which were commenced under the provisions of the Act of 1947. 9. I shall now advert to the objection raised regarding the maintainability and continuation of the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There can be no doubt that if this Court was to accept this objection then, it will have a cascading effect not only on the pending writ petitions before this Court which have emanated from the orders passed by the subordinate courts on or before 30-3-2000 under the provisions of the Act of 1947, but, it will possibly also govern the writ petitions pending against similar orders passed by the subordinate Courts under the other two enactments which have been repealed by sub-section (1) of section 58 of the Act of 1999 viz., the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 and the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. 10. There can be no doubt that the courts while considering the relevant provisions of the Act, should try to interpret the said provisions by giving true meaning to those provisions and not be deterred by the consequences that would flow from its interpretation. Keeping this principle in mind I shall now proceed to examine the force of the objection raised by the respondents. In my view, it would be apposite to first advert to the legislative history. It is not in dispute that till recently i.e. till 31-3-2000 the Act of 1947, which was initially introduced as a temporary statute was to remain in force. That Act, though originally enacted as a temporary statute for a limited period, from time to time, its life has been extended till 31-3-2000. It is not in dispute that till recently i.e. till 31-3-2000 the Act of 1947, which was initially introduced as a temporary statute was to remain in force. That Act, though originally enacted as a temporary statute for a limited period, from time to time, its life has been extended till 31-3-2000. The last such extension was done on 24-4-1999 by the Maharashtra Act No. XXVIII of 1999. If the Act of 1947 was to expire on its own, with the efflux of time on the mid night of the 31st of March, 2000, then this Court would have been required to only examine the efficacy of the saving clause contained in the Act of 1947 in the form of sub-section (3) of section 3 of that Act. However, this is not what has happened in the present case. For, before the Act of 1947 expired between the mid night and night of 31-3-2000 and 1-4-2000, the Act of 1999 was introduced on the same day. The effect of introduction of the Act of 1999 on 31-3-2000 is that the same came into force from the midnight and night between 30-3-2000 and 31-3-2000. This position is reinforced from the purport of section 5 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. As a consequence, the Act of 1947 stood repealed by virtue of section 58(1) of the Act of 1999 on the midnight and night between 30-3-2000 and 31-3-2000, just the previous night before it would have lapsed on the midnight and night between 31-3-2000 and 1-4-2000. To my mind, the legislature was fully conscious of this position having specifically adverted to the Act of 1947 in section 58(1)(a). If this be so then, we are not dealing with the case of the lapsing of a temporary statute and its effect but, we are directly concerned with the case of a repeal of the statute albeit a temporary one and which was to incidentally expire on the midnight of that very day. The fact that the repealed statute was to expire on the very day will make no difference to the application of the legal principles. 11. Having discerned this position, now we will advert to the provisions of the Act of 1999 to find out the consequences of the introduction of that Act. This would require consideration of section 58 of the Act of 1999. 11. Having discerned this position, now we will advert to the provisions of the Act of 1999 to find out the consequences of the introduction of that Act. This would require consideration of section 58 of the Act of 1999. But before I proceed to examine the said provision, I would think it apposite to point out that the Act of 1999 was enacted with a view to unify, consolidate and amend the law relating to the control of rent and repairs of certain premises and of eviction and for encouraging the construction of new houses by assuring a fair return on the investment by landlords and to provide for the matters connected with the purposes aforesaid. The preamble of the Act proceeds to observe that this act has been enacted with the above purposes-so as to unify, consolidate and amend the law prevailing in the different parts of the State relating to the subjects stated therein. We shall now examine the efficacy of section 58 of the Act of 1999, which reads thus :- "Section 58: Repeal and Saving.---(1) On the commencement of this Act, the following laws, that is to say, (a) the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bom. LVII of 1947) (b) the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (C.P. and Berar Act XI of 1946) including the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 and (c) the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (Hyderabad Act No. XX of 1954) shall stand repealed. LVII of 1947) (b) the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (C.P. and Berar Act XI of 1946) including the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 and (c) the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (Hyderabad Act No. XX of 1954) shall stand repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal (a) all applications, suits and other proceedings under the said Acts (pending) on the date of commencement of this Act before any Court, Controller, Competent Authority or other office or authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Acts so repealed, as if the said Acts had continued in force and this Act had not been passed; (b) the provisions for appeal under the Acts so repealed shall continue in force in respect of applications, suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder: (c) any appointment, Rule and notification made or issued under any of the repealed Acts and in force on the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been made or issued under this Act and shall continue in force until is superseded or modified by any appointment, Rule or notification made or issued under this Act; (d) all prosecutions instituted under the provisions of any of the repealed Acts shall be effective and disposed of in accordance with the law." On the plain language of the aforesaid provision it would be seen that all the enactments mentioned in Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) stood repealed on the commencement of this Act i.e. from the mid night and night between 30-3-2000 and 31-3-2000. However, by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 58, certain matters referred to therein have been saved notwithstanding such repeal. The question posed in this case is; whether writ petitions under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India can be said to have been specifically saved by that provision and, if the answer was in the negative then would all the writ petitions pending in the High Court against the orders passed by the subordinate courts prior to 30-3-2000 in proceedings instituted under the said Acts can be validity prosecuted? No doubts Clause (a) of sub-section (2) makes reference only to all applications, suits and other proceedings under the said Acts pending on the date of commencement of that Act before any Court, Controller, Competent Authority or other office or authority. In that sense the provision makes no specific reference to the pending writ petitions as such nor is it possible to take the view that writ petitions under Article 226/227 can be said to be "applications, suits and other proceedings under the said Acts". It is in this backdrop the respondents contend that, though writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would broadly fit into the expression "proceedings" but, since the same cannot be said to be one under the Act of 1947-as it is instituted and continued or governed by the provisions of the Constitution of India, the same has not been saved and therefore cannot be continued in law. This argument though seems to be attractive, however, I have no hesitation in straight way rejecting the same being totally misconceived. No doubt a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not a proceeding under the said Act as such but, that would not mean that the same has not been saved by the provisions of the Act of 1999. There is nothing in the Act of 1999 to even remotely indicate that the legislature had intended to terminate and dissolve all the pending writ petitions directed against the orders passed by the subordinate courts in proceedings, suits or applications instituted under the Act of 1947. On the other hand, the settled legal position, to my mind, seems to be that the Court ought not to restrict the plenitude of savings merely with reference to the saying provision in the repealing Act. It will be useful to advert to the enunciation of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in 1989(2) Supreme Court Cases 557 (Bansidhar and others v. State of Rajasthan and others)1. This decision, to my mind, would put the other derivative contentions raised on behalf of the respondents at rest as, it will not be necessary to elaborate on those aspects. This decision, to my mind, would put the other derivative contentions raised on behalf of the respondents at rest as, it will not be necessary to elaborate on those aspects. Be that as it may, the Apex Court has observed in para 21 that when there is a repeal of a statute accompanied by the simultaneous enactment of a law on the same subject, just as in the present case, the provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked into not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the consequences envisaged by section 6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or not-section 6 would indeed be attracted unless the new legislation manifests a contrary intention-but only for the purpose of determining whether the provisions in the new statute indicate a different intention. The Apex Court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of (State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh)2, reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84. The Apex Court then in para 28 has expressly observed that a saving provision in a repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or the rights that survive the repeal. This principle has been discerned by the Apex Court from its earlier decision in (I.T. Commissioner v. Shah Sadiq and Sons)3, reported in 1987(3) S.C.C. 516 . In my view, it will be apposite to reproduce the relevant observations of the Apex Court in particular in paras 21 and 28, which read thus:- "21. When there is a repeal of a statute accompanied by re-enactment of a law on the same subject, the provisions of the new enactment would have to be looked into not for the purpose of ascertaining whether the consequences envisaged by section 6 of the General Clauses Act ensued or not-section 6 would indeed be attracted unless the new legislation manifests a contrary intention but only for the purpose of determining whether the provisions in the new statute indicate a different intention. Referring to the way in which such incompatibility with the preservation of old rights and liabilities is to be ascertained this Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh said: Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. Of course the consequences laid down in section 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. .......... 28. A saving provision in a repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights and obligations so saved or the rights that survive the repeal. It is observed by this Court in I.T. Commissioner v. Shah Sadiq and Sons; In other words whatever rights are expressly saved by the savings provision stand saved. But, that does not mean that rights which are not saved by the 'savings' provision are extinguished or stand ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing the old statute is enacted. Rights which have accrued are saved unless they are taken away expressly. This is the principle behind section 6(c), General Clauses Act, 1897....." We agree with the High Court that the scheme of the 1973 Act does not manifest an intention contrary to, and inconsistent with, the saving of the repealed provisions of section 5(6-A) and Chapter III-B of 1955 Act' so far as pending cases are concerned and that the rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the old law are not effaced." To my mind, the question raised in the present petition virtually stands concluded in the light of the abovesaid decision of the Apex Court. For, similar question was directly in issue before the Apex Court as would appear from the points formulated in para 7 of this decision. Atleast two clear principles would emerge from this decision. Firstly, that section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act (corresponding section 6 of the General Clauses Act) would indeed be attracted as there is no provision in the Act of 1999 manifesting a contrary intention. Secondly, a saving provision in a repealing statute (section 58 in the Act of 1999) is not exhaustive. The conjoint effect is that even if section 58 of the Act of 1999 does not specifically save the pending writ petitions, that would not ipso facto result in termination of those proceedings-as that has not been done expressly, by the repealing Act. The conjoint effect is that even if section 58 of the Act of 1999 does not specifically save the pending writ petitions, that would not ipso facto result in termination of those proceedings-as that has not been done expressly, by the repealing Act. This is the plain effect of section 7(c) of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. 12. On the other hand, the respondents relied on the observations made in several other decisions to contend that on repeal of the Act of 1947 all matters except the ones which have been specifically saved by section 58(2) will have to be treated as if non existing and never to have happened. This submission cannot be countenanced in the wake of the abovesaid enunciation of the Apex Court. In my view, having regard to the scheme of the repealing Act of 1999 it will have to be held that the provisions of section 7 of Bombay General Clauses Act are applicable. As a necessary corollary, all the pending writ petitions in this Court arising against the orders passed by the subordinate courts prior to 30-3-2000 in the proceedings instituted under the provision of the Act of 1947, the same will have to be treated as alive and entitled to be maintained and continued between the parties. At this stage it would be appropriate to advert to section 7 of Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which reads thus:--- "7. At this stage it would be appropriate to advert to section 7 of Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which reads thus:--- "7. Where this Act, or any Bombay Act (or Maharashtra Act), made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment either to made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not--- a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed." On plain reading of the above said provision it would appear that this provision is pari materia as section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Proprio Vigore, the principles deduced from Bansidhar's case (supra) shall apply with all force and the question posed earlier will have to be answered against the respondents. 13. According to me, no further examination would be necessary. However, in all fairness to Mr. Anturkar I shall now proceed to examine his next contention that the Act of 1947 was a temporary statute and on expiry of the said Act all matters arising from the provisions of the said Act would get effaced and as a necessary consequence thereof the proceedings pending before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be maintained or continued. This submission has been advanced on the basis of certain observations made by the Apex Court that the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 will have no application to a temporary statute when it lapses by efflux of time. This submission however, clearly over-looks that we are not concerned with a case of a lapsing statute and its effect. This submission however, clearly over-looks that we are not concerned with a case of a lapsing statute and its effect. In the present case, as pointed out earlier, on and from the midnight and night between 30-3-2000 and 31-3-2000 the Act of 1999 came into effect; and as a consequence of which the Act of 1947 stood repealed with immediate effect, by virtue of section 58(1) of the Act of 1999. Once we have reached at this conclusion then, it is not possible for us to go back and decide the matter on the assumption that the repealed Act was a temporary statute and had lapsed with the efflux of time. On the other hand, the Act of 1947 has been expressly repealed by the Act of 1999 and the matter will have to be examined only in that perspective. 14. Mr. Anturkar, learned Counsel for the respondents had placed emphasis on the observations made by the Apex Court in various decisions which, in my view, are in the context of issues which were raised before the Apex Court in those cases. In any case, the view expressed by the Apex Court even in respect of a temporary statute is that, generally on expiry of a temporary statute all matters arising from such statute would lapse as if it had never existed. But, at the same time, the Apex Court has made a guarded observation that, even in such a situation the legislature in its wisdom can save certain matters which it may think appropriate. In that context the Act of 1947 had made a provision in the form of sub-section (3) of section 3 of that Act. But for the said provision, section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would have had no application to the repealed Act of 1947 which was undoubtedly a temporary statute and was to expire with the passage of time. In this context it will be useful to refer to sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act of 1947 which reads thus:--- "3. Commencement and duration: 1 x 2 x 3. In this context it will be useful to refer to sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act of 1947 which reads thus:--- "3. Commencement and duration: 1 x 2 x 3. Section 7 of the Bombay General Clause Act, 1904, shall apply upon the expiry of this Act or upon this Act or any provision thereof ceasing to be in force in any area as if it has then been repealed by a Maharashtra Act." As observed earlier, it is not necessary to examine this aspect of the matter in greater details. 15. In all fairness to Mr. Anturkar, I shall now advert to the decision relied by him. Reliance was placed on 1999(9) S.C.C. page 312 (State through C.B.I., Delhi v. Gian Singh)4. This is a decision of three Judges of the Apex Court. In this case the Court was called upon to examine the efficacy of introduction of the TADA Act of 1987 before the TADA Act of 1985 was to expire on 23-5-1987, some what a parallel situation. Emphasis was placed on para 25 of the said decision to contend that if temporary statute which was to expire by efflux of time was repealed by another statute, nothing would survive from the repealed statute unless the succeeding enactment incorporates necessary provisions to the contrary. In the first place, this is a clear misreading of the said decision. Whereas, what has been observed is, to my mind, the consistent view of the Apex Court that the legal implication of repeal of a statute cannot be applied in the case of expiry of a statute. The Apex Court has therefore once again pointed out the perceptible distinction between the expiry of a statute by efflux of time i.e. lapsing and its effect in contradistinction to repeal of a statute. Moreover, on careful reading of this decision it will be seen that the Apex Court while referring to its earlier decision has observed that the legislature can, and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision (like sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act of 1947), the effect of which is in some respects similar to that of section 6 of the General Clauses Act (section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act). Such provision is enacted by the legislature so that by a legal fiction the operation of the Act which was otherwise to expire would still continue to be in force in so far as the matters which have already crystallized. The Court further found that the provisions of the subsequent enactment with regard to the severity of punishment were materially different and therefore proceeded to decide the matter on the basis of those provisions. This decision, therefore, is not an authority which would support the respondents contention that with the introduction of the Act of 1999 the pending writ petition would stand terminated. 16. The next decision relied by the learned Counsel for the respondents is reported in 2000(2) S.C.C. 536 in the matter of (Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others)5. This is again a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of five Judges. However in this case the issue that was considered was very limited. The question raised was, when the old Rules were deleted by a subsequent notification, can the show-cause notice issued on the basis of the old Rules which stood deleted can be governed by section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In this context the matter was examined by the Apex Court and the Apex Court has answered that section 6 of the General Clauses Act can have no application in case of omission of a rule as it applies only to repeal of enactments by a Central Act or Regulation. The Apex Court has however observed that in absence of any provisions in the statute and/or rule the pending proceedings would lapse on the deletion or omission of the rule under which the notice was issued. No doubt while examining this aspect of the matter in para 37 of the same judgment the Apex Court has prefaced the legal position with regard to the effect of repeal, which reads as follows:--- "37. The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of section 6(1). To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of section 6(1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in section 6 or in special Acts may modify the position. Thus the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case where a particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the legislature is that the pending proceedings shall not continue but fresh proceedings for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision." Much emphasis was placed on the observations made in this para, to contend that since proceedings under Article 227 of Constitution have not been specifically saved by section (2) of section 58 the same will have to be treated as having effaced and not existing being not saved. This submission is totally misplaced. Even this decision reiterates the view expressed by the earlier Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Bansidhar's case (supra). Moreover, the point in issue in Bansidhar's case was precisely the one which arises in our case. In Bansidhar's case the Apex Court has clearly observed that besides the saving provision the Court would be obliged to give effect even to section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. Understood thus, it will have to be observed that the proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are obviously one governed by the provisions of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. In that sense, besides the matters which are saved by section (2) of section 58 of the Act, even the proceedings under Article 227 of Constitution of India will have to be held as having been saved by virtue of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act which applies in case of repeal of a statute. 17. Reliance has been placed on several other decisions including the judgment reported in 1974(1) S.C.C. 202 (Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Barilly)6. 17. Reliance has been placed on several other decisions including the judgment reported in 1974(1) S.C.C. 202 (Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Barilly)6. In this decision a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court was required to examine the question, "If Ex. "1" is a lease wholly of an accommodation, can the plaintiff claim possession based on the repeal of the Act by the later Act during the pendency of the present appeal?” This is the point formulated in para 9 of the judgment. It was a question in the context of the fact situation of the case that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. No doubt from reading the observations in paras 16 and 17 of this decision it would appear that the situation of introducing subsequent Act was a parallel one. The Court however proceeded on the premise that the suit filed in the said case was not under the repeal Act but proceeds on the footing that the defendant was only a licensee. These observations are found in para 19 of the judgment. Moreover, in this case the Court analysed the provisions of the two enactments and opined that the scheme under the repealing Act was materially different and, therefore, the pending proceedings would be governed by the repealing Act. However, in the present case, it is not possible to even suggest nor it has been argued by the learned Counsel in this behalf that the repealing Act (Act of 1999) was materially different from any of the provisions of the repealed Act of 1947 or for that matter would indicate intention so as to efface the right of either the landlord or the tenant which had crystallized under the Act of 1947. Be that as it may, the Apex Court in a subsequent decision of (Idul Hasan and others v. Rajindra Kumar Jain)7, reported in 1989(4) S.C.C. 550 , has distinguished the decision in Quadrat Ullha's case (supra) by pointing out that in that case the suit was not one under the Act but proceeded on the fact that the contractor was only a licensee and so none of the savings clauses of section 43(2) of that Act would apply. Later on, in the same judgment the Court went to examine the purport of section 43(2)(h) and 43(2)(s) and held that the suit which was filed on the ground that there was material alterations simplicitor under the provisions of the old Act would continue to be valid even after coming into operation of the new Act in view of Clause (s) of sub-section (2) of section 43 of the new Act. The principle deduced from this judgment is that on filing of eviction suit under the temporary Act the prevailing rights of the parties would get crystallized and tenants would be liable to be evicted notwithstanding the repealed Act being temporary. Assuming that Mr. Anturkar is right in contending that some of the observations in Qudrat Ullah's case would indicate that the writ petition not having been specifically saved by Act of 1999 will have to be treated as terminated, however, to my mind, that shall make no difference because I am bound by the latter decision of the Constitution Bench (five Judges) of the Apex Court in Bansidhar's case (supra). 18. The learned Counsel for the respondents also relied on another decision of the Apex Court reported in 1994(5) S.C.C. 465 in (Manphul Singh Sharma v. Ahmedi Begum)8. Even this decision is of no avail to the respondents. This decision was relied to support the contention that the Court will have to find out the intention of the legislature from the provisions of the repealing Act. There can be no dispute with this proposition. To my mind, even in this case the question examined by the Apex Court was when a repeal is accompanied by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the new Act will have to be looked into to determine whether and how far the new Act protects or keeps alive the old rights and liabilities. I have already examined this aspect of the matter in the foregoing paras and held that the new enactment being the Act of 1999 does not in any manner affect or take away the rights of the landlord and the tenant nor does it manifest a different intention that the matters flowing from the Act of 1947 have been affected. 19. 19. There can be no doubt that writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India emanating from the orders passed by the subordinate courts in proceedings instituted under the provisions of the Act of 1947 are "legal proceeding or remedy" within the meaning of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. The meaning of expression "proceeding" is no more res integra. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Prabhulal Chhogalal Mandore v. Bastiram Himatram Bhutade and another)9, reported in 1990(1) Bom.C.R. 529 has held that word "proceeding" is of wide amplitude. In its wider sense it will include proceedings instituted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are not original proceedings in that sense. It arises out of some decision of the subordinate Courts or Tribunal. Under the said Article High Court has power of superintendence over all courts and Tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Once the order passed by the Appellate Court under section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act is challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the matter becomes sub-judice. The Division Bench went on to further observe that the word "any proceeding" must take in its import all the proceedings. The said expression is used in a wider and comprehensive sense. This decision has been relied even by the Counsel for the petitioner to contend as to what approach should be adopted by the Court while interpreting the provisions of a beneficial legislation like the present one. To my mind, therefore, even if section 58(2) of the Act of 1999 cannot be said to have specifically saved writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless by virtue of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act the same will have to be treated as alive. 20. Besides, the learned Counsel for the respondents has also relied on the decision of another Division Bench of this Court reported in (Azimshah Hydershah v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal)10, 66 Bombay Law Reporter 605, to contend that the saving clause in sub-section (2) of section 58 would not apply to writ petition as the same are not under the Act of 1947. However, that would make no difference as I have already taken the view that notwithstanding the non-inclusion of writ petition in the saving clause under section 58(2) of the Act that would not mean that the same is not saved at all. On the other hand in such a situation section 7 of the Bombay General Causes Act would apply on account of which the same will have to be treated as saved. 21. The learned Counsel for the respondents has relied on another decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in 1948(LI) Bom.L.R. 280 in the matter of (Nilkanth Ramchandra Chandole v. Rasiklal Mulchand Gujar)11, to contend that expression employed in sub-section (2) of section 58 of the Act of 1999 would only mean that proceedings under the said Act have been saved. Reliance was placed on the observations made in this judgment that the Court cannot strain the language of any enactment so as to apply to suits which were already pending when the Act was put on the statute book. This decision however clearly recognises the principle that section 7 of Bombay General Act would be applicable to save the pending legal proceedings unless there is a different intention in the statute itself. In the said case, the Court examined the provisions of the Act of 1947 which repealed the provisions of the earlier Bombay Act of 1944 and took a view that the legislature's intention in enacting the provisions in the repealing Act was obviously not to govern the suits instituted under the repealed Act but by the provisions of the new Act. This decision is of no avail to the respondents. I have already observed that the legislature while enacting sub-section (2) of section 58 in the Act of 1999 by legal fiction has not only expressly saved the pending suits/proceedings under the Act of 1947 but also saved the provisions for appeal under the Act of 1947. 22. Reliance was then placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose and others)12, reported in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 945. In this case the Apex Court was considering the effect of expiration of a temporary statute. 22. Reliance was then placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose and others)12, reported in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 945. In this case the Apex Court was considering the effect of expiration of a temporary statute. It has observed that if the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person, that right cannot be taken away because the statute by which it was created has expired. Relying on the earlier decisions, the Court observed that the general rule is that after the expiration of a temporary statute in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. That is why the legislature can and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in some respects similar to that of section 6 of the General Clauses Act (section 7 of Bombay General Act in our case). I have already observed that we are not concerned with the lapsing or expiration of a temporary statute by efflux of time as such. Understood thus, it will be preposterous to contend that because of the repealing Act of 1999 all the pending writ petitions which are not under the repealed Act, would lapse. Such proceedings, though not under the repealed Act, would however be saved by virtue of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. It is seen that sub-section (1) of section 58, although is a repealing provision and, intends to repeal the old enactments but, sub-section (2) of section 58 postulates to save the matters referred to therein, notwithstanding such repeal. Sub-section (2) of section 58 by itself does not exclude the application of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. This provision is however only in addition to and not in substitution of the provisions of the Bombay General Clauses Act. It is well-settled that even if no saving provision is enacted in the repealing Act, even in such a situation section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would automatically apply unless the repealing Act expressly manifest a different intention. It is well-settled that even if no saving provision is enacted in the repealing Act, even in such a situation section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would automatically apply unless the repealing Act expressly manifest a different intention. Accordingly, writ petitions under Article 227 which can be ascribed to the "legal proceedings" contemplated by the provisions of the section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, the same would be saved notwithstanding the repeal of the Act of 1947, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the present writ petition stood terminated. 23. The preliminary objection in any case will have to be answered against the respondents because, in the present case, the Appellate Court by the impugned order dated February 21, 1989, while setting aside the decree of possession passed by the trial Court has remanded the matter to the trial Court for further evidence and decision on the matters referred to in its judgment. The effect of this order is that on February 21, 1989 the suit instituted by the petitioner against the respondents for possession stood restored to the file. Moreover, the order passed by the Appellate Court has not been interdicted by any order of a Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, in fact as well as in law, the Civil Suit No. 46 of 1985 instituted by the petitioner against the respondents will have to be treated as pending. A fortiori, by virtue of Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 58 of the Act of 1999 we will have no option but to hold that since the said suit is under the Act of 1947 and was pending on the date of commencement of the Act of 1999 before the trial Court, the same shall have to be continued and disposed of an accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1947 as if that Act had continued in force and the Act of 1999 had not been passed. To counter this position the learned Counsel for the respondents would contend that assuming that the suit can be said to be pending but since the Act of 1947 was to expire on 31-3-2000, such a suit could not be continued beyond the life of that Act. To counter this position the learned Counsel for the respondents would contend that assuming that the suit can be said to be pending but since the Act of 1947 was to expire on 31-3-2000, such a suit could not be continued beyond the life of that Act. The submission is that no life can be infused in the Act which has become dead; and as a necessary corollary all matters under the said Act will have to be treated as having lapsed as if they had never happened. This argument clearly overlooks the mandate of sub-section (2) of section 58 of the Act of 1999. The mandate is that it will have to be presumed that the provisions of the Act of 1947 have continued to be in force and the Act of 1999 had not been passed. 24. The respondents would then contend that the Act of 1999 repeals the Act of 1947 in its entirety which would include the saving provision contained therein being sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act of 1947. The argument is that since the Act of 1999 repeals the said provision it can be inferred that the legislature had excluded the application of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act to this enactment in which case the writ petitions cannot be said to have been saved. There is absolutely no force in this contention. It is not possible to ascribe such intention to the legislature. On the other hand the language of section 58 of the Act of 1999 leaves no manner of doubt that the legislature intended to save all the pending matters and rights and liabilities which had crystallized on the date of introduction of that Act. If the legislature had intended to exclude the application of section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act then it would have had made an express provision in that behalf. 25. The respondents would then contend that section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act cannot be pressed into service because that provision is not referable to the Act of 1999. Inasmuch as, the expression "Maharashtra Act" contained in section 7 does not mean the subject Act. It is not possible to give such a restricted meaning, for it would amount to adopting a pedantic approach. The expression "Maharashtra Act" referred in section 7 would encompass any enactment of the State. Inasmuch as, the expression "Maharashtra Act" contained in section 7 does not mean the subject Act. It is not possible to give such a restricted meaning, for it would amount to adopting a pedantic approach. The expression "Maharashtra Act" referred in section 7 would encompass any enactment of the State. The expression Maharashtra Act has been defined under the provisions of Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. In the circumstances we will have to hold that since the suit filed by the petitioner against the respondents is pending which is undoubtedly under the Act, the same will have to be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1947 as if the said Act had continued in force and the Act of 1999 had not been passed. Even on this count the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents will have to be repelled. 26. Now reverting back to the merit of the controversy, the Appellate Court has taken the view that all the partners of the firm ought to have been impleaded as party defendants in the suit. This view is obviously inappropriate. The law on the other hand, postulates that it is suffice to implead the partnership firm. In this context it will be useful to refer to Order 30, Rule 1 of C.P.C. It provides that any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time of accruing of the cause of action. The law is also well-settled that individual partners will have to be joined only when they are to be bound personally. In this behalf reliance has been rightly placed on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1971 M.P. 190 in the matter of (Smt. Viraj Kuwar Bai and others v. Kunjibharilal Krishnachandra and others and another)13, decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1718 (Her Highness Maharani Mandalsa Devi and others v. M. Ramanarian Pvt. Ltd. and others)14. 27. In the circumstances, the Appellate Court clearly misdirected itself in taking the view that other partner was also a necessary party to the suit for possession filed against the respondent No. 1 partnership firm which was undisputedly the tenant in respect of the suit property. 27. In the circumstances, the Appellate Court clearly misdirected itself in taking the view that other partner was also a necessary party to the suit for possession filed against the respondent No. 1 partnership firm which was undisputedly the tenant in respect of the suit property. Besides, the record indicates that the respondents had not pressed that issue before the trial Court by not arguing that point and also by not adducing any evidence in support thereof. In such a situation the Appellate Court ought not to have allowed the respondents to urge that issue in appeal, for that issue did not transcend on the question of inherent jurisdiction of the Court as such. This issue could thus be waived and it was so waived before the trial Court. In any case, the Appellate Court for observing that the other partner was also a necessary party has taken into account several matters which are wholly not germane to the point in issue. The only objection taken with regard to the maintainability of the suit by the respondents before the trial Court was of non-joinder of other partner of the defendant firm. The same was not elaborated nor made good during the trial. Thus the view taken by the Appellate Court on this aspect cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny and the same deserves to be set aside. As a necessary consequence, this Court will have no other option but to remand the matter to the Appellate Court to examine the merit of the contentions regarding the issue of reasonable and bona fide requirement and comparative hardship. It is distressing to note that inspite of the mandate of law, the Appellate Court should have chosen to answer only one issue when it was obliged to answer all the points that arose before it for consideration. The Appellate Court will have to be reminded of the provisions contained in Order 14, Rule 2 of C.P.C. which obligates the subordinate Courts to not only frame all the issues that arise for consideration but also to answer each of them. On the same analogy even the Appellate Court by virtue of provision in Order 41, Rule 31 is not only required to frame all the points for its determination but is obliged to answer each of them. On the same analogy even the Appellate Court by virtue of provision in Order 41, Rule 31 is not only required to frame all the points for its determination but is obliged to answer each of them. To my mind, even if the Appellate Court is satisfied that the appeal can be disposed of by answering only one or some of the points that arises for its determination-even in such a situation it will be obligatory for the Appellate Court to record its decision on all the points that arise for its consideration while disposing of the appeal. In the present case, the Appellate Court answered only point No. 1 and declined to answer points 2 and 3 which related to the merits of the case. The Appellate Court assumed that it was not necessary to answer the same as it was inclined to remand the matter. This approach is not only contrary to the mandate of law but clearly over looks the principle that the view taken by the subordinate Court is not final as it is always subject to appeal or any other remedy before the superior Court, just as in this case by way of writ petition. And if the superior Court was to reverse the view which found favour with the subordinate Court then, for want of finding on the other issues, the parties will necessarily have to be relegated back to that Court. This not only causes insurmountable prejudice to the parties but results in avoidable delay. The courts cannot be oblivious of the fact, to borrow the expression from the decision of the Apex Court in (Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava)15, reported in 2001(2) S.C.C. 604 , para 15 thereof, that: "The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long years from the start to the ultimate termini, a malady afflicting the system." As in the present case, the writ petition has matured for hearing almost after 12 years of waiting; and at this stage to relegate the parties to the Appellate Court to examine the points on merit of the case, which was set up by the petitioner landlord on the ground of bona fide requirement in respect of the demised premises as back as in the year 1985, to say the least would be traversity of justice. This has happened because of the mistake of the Appellate Court. If on the other hand the Appellate Court had also answered the other points this Court could have examined the correctness of that view and decided the matter finally. In the circumstances, the approach of the Appellate Court in answering only one issue cannot be countenanced and will have to be deprecated strongly as it has caused manifest injustice to the petitioner-landlord. 28. For the aforesaid reasons this writ petition succeeds. The impugned order passed by the Appellate Court dated February 21, 1989 is set aside and the appeal is restored to the file of the District Judge, Pune. The District Court shall decide the civil appeal expeditiously preferably within four months from the receipt of writ of this Court. 29. Rule made absolute in the above terms with costs throughout. Certified copy expedited. Writ petition succeeds. -----