JUDGMENT - KHANDEPARKAR R.M.S., J.:-Since common question of law and facts arise in all these petitions, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgement. 2. Rule. By consent, Rule is made returnable forthwith. 3. Heard the learned Advocate for the parties. Persued the records. 4. The petitioners challenge the common judgment and order dated 24th May, 2000 passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nashik in Appeals Nos. DHL-3/2000 to DHL-12/2000. By the impugned judgment and order, the Tribunal has directed the petitioners to reinstate the first respondents with full backwages. 5. The facts in brief, relevant for the decision are that since 1984-85, the petitioners were running an unaided English Medium school named as Sandipani Public School, Shahada. The first respondents in all these petitions are the teachers employed in the said school over a period of ten years, some of them being employed since 1990 and some since 1988. Since, November, 1997 the petitioners paid salary to the respondents after deducting 25% therefrom and further from July, 1999 each of them were paid Rs. 3000/- per month towards their salary. The respondents, therefore, made a representation to the petitioners claiming for their salary as per the law. As there was no response from the petitioners to the said representation, the respondents served an Advocate's notice dated 2-11-1999 upon the petitioners requesting them to pay their salary according to the Rules. The petitioners, thereafter, by notice dated 29th December, 1999 informed the first respondents that the petitioners had decided to close down the said school and hence, their services would be terminated from expiry of the month of May, 2000. Meanwhile, the petitioners by their letter dated 20th November, 1999 had intimated the Regional Deputy Director of Education; Nashik that the management had been constrained to take most unpleasant and unfortunate decision to close down the school in question w.e.f. June, 2000. The same was sent to the authorities under the certificate of posting. Further, the petitioners in continuation of the said notice of closure, intimated the Regional Deputy Director of Education on 21st February, 2000 that the petitioners had complied with the provisions of Rule 25-A of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter called as "the said Rules"). Further, the petitioners in continuation of the said notice of closure, intimated the Regional Deputy Director of Education on 21st February, 2000 that the petitioners had complied with the provisions of Rule 25-A of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter called as "the said Rules"). By the letter dated 27th March, 2000 and in reply to the said letter dated 21st February, 2000 of the petitioners, it was informed to the petitioners by the Deputy Director of Education, Nashik that it was necessary for the petitioners to obtain prior permission of Regional Education Officer at least one academic term in advance, if the petitioners were desirous of closing down the school and that since such notice was given in February, 2000, the petitioners were not entitled to close down the school. Attention was drawn to the letter dated 6th September, 1999 of the Director Education of Maharashtra Government in that regard. The petitioners thereafter, filed an appeal against the said order dated 25th March, 2000 to the Director of Education in terms of Rule 7.5 of the Secondary School Code (hereinafter called as "the Code"). Meanwhile, the first respondents also filed appeals against the orders of termination of their services dated 29th December, 1999 before the School Tribunal and the same were allowed by the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 24th May, 2000. Hence, the present petitions. Meanwhile, the petitions, without prejudice to their rights to close down the school on expiry of the month of May, 2000, by their letter dated 26th May, 2000 asked for permission for closure of the school at least from end of the first term of the academic year, 2000-2001. The Divisional Deputy Director of Education by his letter dated 16th April, 2001 granted said permission for the closure of the school. 6. Perusal of the impugned judgment disclose that the Tribunal, on detailed analysis of the materials on record, has arrived at the following findings which are apparently, the findings of fact: i) The petitioners' society had been running the school in question under heavy losses; ii) On account of financial constraints, the management had taken decision for closure of the school; iii) Before taking the said decision to close down the school the petitioners' society had not obtained the permission from the Competent Authority. The said findings being findings of fact, based on detailed analysis of the materials on record, the same are not liable to be interfered with at the instance of either of the parties in writ jurisdiction. Merely, because some other opinion may be possible on fresh analysis of the evidence on record, that can be no justification for setting aside the findings of fact and to arrive at some other conclusion on reassessment of the materials on record. Besides, considering the materials placed on record, and analysis thereof by the Tribunal, there is no scope for castigating the said findings to be perverse or arbitrary. 7. Considering the factual matrix with the said findings and applying the law on the subject, the Tribunal has arrived at the following conclusions: A) The closure of the school without prior permission of the competent Authority is bad in law in view of the amendment to the Code by Government Resolution dated 17th December, 1990; B) The meaning of the expression "any other bona fide reason of similar nature" in Rule 26(1)(v) of the said Rules and that of "voluntary closure of the school" under Rule 25-A of the said Rules is one and the same; and C) In case of voluntary closure of the school, the services of the employees of such schools are required to be put to an end by following the procedure under both the Rules namely Rule 25-A and Rule 26 of the said Rules and that, the compliance of Rule 25-A alone is not sufficient. In other words, the Tribunal has set aside the order of termination of services of the first respondents broadly on two counts, namely; Firstly that in the absence of prior permission of the Competent Authority, the decision for voluntary closure of the school can neither be said to be legal nor bona fide under Rule 26(1)(v) read with Rule 25-A of the said Rules and hence, the same is bad in law and secondly that the procedure laid down for termination of the services of the employees of the school allowed to be voluntarily closed as comprised in Rules 25-A and 26 of the said Rules having not been followed in the cases of first respondents, the termination of their services is bad in law. 8-9. 8-9. In the facts and circumstances of the case and upon hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and perusal of the records, the following points for consideration arise in these petitions: i) Whether prior permission of any authority under the said Code is necessary for voluntary closure of the school ? ii) Whether the voluntary closure of a school under Rule 25-A of the said Rules is the same as the closure of the school for "any other bona fide reason of similar nature" under Rule 26(1)(v) of the said Rules? iii) Whether for the purpose of termination of the services of the employees of the school, allowed to be closed down voluntarily, is it necessary to comply with the procedure prescribed under Rule 26 of the said Rules along with the procedure prescribed under Rule 25-A of the said Rules? 10. As already observed above, from the analysis of the materials on record, by the Tribunal, it is clear that the petitioners society has voluntarily closed down the school on account of financial constraints. No doubt, the respondents in the counter affidavit referring to 200 acres of land owned by the petitioner-society and various other colleges those are being run by the petitioner society sought to raise doubt about the contention of the petitioners regarding financial constraints to run the school in question. It is sought to be contended that considering the immovable property of the society, funds, donations and various other sources from which the financial assistance can be raised by the petitioners it cannot be said that the financial condition of the petitioners society to run the said school is not sound. It is to be noted that the financial constraints spoken of by the petitioners are apparently, in relation to the school in question arising from the situation of the fall in students population in the said school and considering the number of English Medium Schools in the locality around the place where the school in question is situated. It is to be borne in mind that there are no allegations of mala fide or lack of bona fide on the part of the petitioners society in deciding to close down the school in question. It is to be borne in mind that there are no allegations of mala fide or lack of bona fide on the part of the petitioners society in deciding to close down the school in question. The only contention raised by the respondents before the Tribunal on this aspect of the case was that the decision to close down the school was not proper and justifiable and is prejudicial to the future prospectus of the respondents. Besides, the Tribunal, on its part, has arrived at finding about the financial constraints being the reason for the decision to close down the school and it is nobody's case that the said finding is perverse one. Therefore, the points for consideration as framed above, are to be decided in the background of these facts. 11. The said Code is a compilation of the executive instructions dealing with the various subjects relating to the secondary schools and same includes recognition, organisation and management of the schools, staff service conditions, records and inspection as well as grant-in-aid. Chapter II, section I deals with the provisions relating to the conditions, grant, refusal and withdrawal of recognition to the schools. Rule 1 provides that the schools may be recognised by the department provided they conform to Rules set forth in the said Code. Rule 2.1 provides that the application for recognition of school shall be in a prescribed form. Rule 2.5 provides that in no case the school be started, unless the written previous permission of the department is obtained and that the schools started without such a permission shall not ordinarily be considered for recognition. Rule 3 provides for various conditions to be satisfied for seeking recognition to the school. Rule 4.1 provides that the recognition of the school shall be continued provisionally from year for subsequent four years by the appropriate authority after their first year of recognition, provided they continue to fulfil the conditions of recognition laid down in Rule 3. Rule 4.2 provides for permanent recognition by the Deputy Director, if the school continues to fulfil the conditions laid down in Rule 3. 12. Rule 3.2(3) of the said Code refers to the financial stability of the management to be assessed before grant of recognition. Rule 6 speaks of refusal of recognition. Rule 7 deals with the withdrawal of recognition. Rule 4.2 provides for permanent recognition by the Deputy Director, if the school continues to fulfil the conditions laid down in Rule 3. 12. Rule 3.2(3) of the said Code refers to the financial stability of the management to be assessed before grant of recognition. Rule 6 speaks of refusal of recognition. Rule 7 deals with the withdrawal of recognition. Rule 7.1 provides that when a school, including a permanently recognised school, has ceased in the opinion of the department, to fulfil any of the conditions of recognition, recognition of that school may be withdrawn. Rule 7.5 provides that the management of the school, the partial or the total recognition to which has been withdrawn by the Deputy Director, may submit an appeal to the Director within thirty days from the date of receipt of the said order, that the appeal shall be sent by registered post, and that the appeals received after the prescribed time limit would not be entertained. It further provides that the Director or his representative not below the rank of the Joint Director of Education, may decide the appeal after giving hearing to the representatives of the management and his decision shall be final and binding on the management. 13. In the year 1990 a sub-clause to Rule 7.5 was added by the State Government under Government Resolution No. E D : GAC 1090/254/SE-2 dated 17th December, 1990. The said sub-clause reads thus:-- "No management shall close school or any of the recognised classes or make voluntary change in approved school subjects, which may result in any of its permanent staff rendered surplus, without due notice to the Regional Director of Education, at least one academic term in advance, and act as per his decision. An appeal on the decision of the Deputy Director of Education in this case shall lie with Director of Education." 14. Referring to the above quoted sub-clause added to the Rule 7.5 of the said Code, it is sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents that the said provision speaks about the decision on the application by the management for closure of the school and the requirement of the management to act according to such decision. Referring to the above quoted sub-clause added to the Rule 7.5 of the said Code, it is sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents that the said provision speaks about the decision on the application by the management for closure of the school and the requirement of the management to act according to such decision. Placing reliance upon the decision in the matter of (Babaji Kondaji Garad and others v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Nasik and others)1, reported in 1984(1) Bom.C.R. 399 , it was submitted that when a thing is required to be done in a particular way or manner, then the same must be done in that way or manner alone and not in any other way or manner. The said arguments were sought to be countered on behalf of the petitioners submitting that the decision spoken of under the said Rule 7.5 of the said Code is one relating to the action to follow after closure of the school and not pertaining to the conclusion arrived at by the management for the closure of the school. 15. The Apex Court in Balaji Kondaji Garad's case has observed that when statute requires a certain thing to be done in a certain manner, it can be done in that manner alone unless a contrary indication is to be found in the statute. The Apex Court therein was considering the scope of sections 73 and 73-B of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, particularly in relation to the method of filling of the reserved seats. It was observed by the Apex Court therein that "If the legislature uses the expression if no such persons are elected it indubitably suggests that primarily the reserved seats are to be filled in by election. Failing the election, one can resort to appointment or co-option." Being so, it was held by the Apex Court therein that "the condition precedent to filling in reserved seats by appointment or co-option is holding of the election and failure to elect such persons would permit resort to other methods of filling in the reserved seats". 16. Failing the election, one can resort to appointment or co-option." Being so, it was held by the Apex Court therein that "the condition precedent to filling in reserved seats by appointment or co-option is holding of the election and failure to elect such persons would permit resort to other methods of filling in the reserved seats". 16. It is well established that the requirement of a thing to be done in a prescribed form or manner can be said to be mandatory if the statute provides for consequences of nullification of the thing done contrary to or without following the prescribed form or manner or the mode or the procedure. In (Banarasi Das v. Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh and another)2, reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1417, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has held that if the agreement is required to be "in writing" it does not necessarily follow that the statute in addition to the formality of a writing also requires that both the parties should sign the writing. Likewise, when a statute prescribes the condition of "permission" of some authority for acquisition of some property, it does not necessarily mean "prior permission" and the permission ex post facto may also validate the acquisition. In fact, such construction may be rightly drawn when the statute at other places uses the words "prior permission" whereas in the section under consideration, it uses the expression "permission" without any qualifying word or clause. Vide (Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1370. 17. Perusal of the various provisions relating to the ground for withdrawal of recognition to the schools under the said Code discloses that for the purpose of recognition as well as de-recognition of a school by the competent authority under the said Code, an elaborate procedure has been prescribed containing various provisions dealing with serious consequences for non-compliance of some of the conditions, as also providing for remedial measures in case of some other situation and likewise, also enumerating certain provisions without any adverse effect for non-compliance thereof or irregularity in performance thereof. Apparently, there are certain provisions in the said Code which are mandatory in nature and any failure to comply the same may result in nullification of the action taken, whereas there are some other provisions which are directory in nature. 18. Apparently, there are certain provisions in the said Code which are mandatory in nature and any failure to comply the same may result in nullification of the action taken, whereas there are some other provisions which are directory in nature. 18. Various provisions relating to the conditions which are required to be fulfilled for the purpose of obtaining recognition of a school are apparently mandatory in nature as the said provisions not only require certain conditions to be fulfilled in order to obtain recognition of school but also provide for consequences for failure to comply the same and in some cases, not only that, but the said Code specifically provides that no school should be started without prior written permission of the Competent Authority and those who take risk of starting such school without such prior permission, they may invite penalty of refusal of recognition for such school. In other words, the very expression "written previous permission" being made necessary for starting of the school, the said condition has to be construed as mandatory in nature. When one compares these provisions relating to recognition with those in relation to the matter of derecognition of a school and particularly, on account of voluntary closure of the school, the difference between two is clear and apparent. 19. The provisions dealing with the voluntary closure of the school do not speak of any permission as such from any authority for closure of the school. It only speaks about notice by the management to the competent authority well in advance to the next academic term. This condition for the notice well in advance to the next academic term is obviously to enable the authority to take necessary steps for accommodating the students, if any, and for rehabilitation of the employees, if any, from the school to be closed, to any other school or schools, as the case may be. This is not similar to a recognition of the school. Neither there is any provision for prior written permission nor even permission as such being made necessary from the Competent Authority for the closure of the school. Of course, whether such a closure should be for a bona fide reason or could be even on whimsical ground is totally different issue to be considered under Point No. (ii) for determination framed above. Of course, whether such a closure should be for a bona fide reason or could be even on whimsical ground is totally different issue to be considered under Point No. (ii) for determination framed above. The fact remains that the Tribunal has clearly observed, on analysis of the materials on record, that the school is sought to be closed on account of financial constraints and certainly, in any case, financial constraints cannot be said to be whimsical ground. Therefore, the provision which deals with the matter pertaining to voluntary closure of the school under Rule 7.5 of the said Code, cannot be said to be providing for necessity of any permission either prior or subsequent for the purpose of the closure of the school. The Tribunal has sought to import theory of permission for voluntary closure of the school under Rule 7.5 of the Code solely by referring to the expression "to act as per the decision" subsequent to the notice being served upon the authority by the management. 20. It is true that Rule 7.5 provides for the decision by the authority pursuant to the notice of closure served upon such authority by the management and further for action by the management in accordance with the said decision. However, the decision spoken of in the said Rule is not regarding the propriety or correctness of the closure of the school but, it relates to the after effects of the closure of the school. It basically shall pertain to the students, if any, of the school to be closed down and the employee thereof. The notice of closure is basically required to be given in advance thereby giving sufficient time to the authority to make alternate arrangements for the students and the employees of the school to be closed down. In the process, it may also be permissible to give certain directions to the management but, the same shall be in relation to the matters referred above and not relation to the decision of the closure of the school itself. The provision regarding the notice to the authority is to be held as directory and not mandatory in nature. In the process, it may also be permissible to give certain directions to the management but, the same shall be in relation to the matters referred above and not relation to the decision of the closure of the school itself. The provision regarding the notice to the authority is to be held as directory and not mandatory in nature. It is well established principle of law that when the provision in a statute is found to be directory, the penalty may be incurred for non-compliance thereof but the act or thing done is regarded good and not affected by the failure to comply with the provision. Therefore, even in case of any delay in giving notice under Rule 7.5 of the Code, in respect of voluntary closure of the school to the Competent Authority, it may warrant penalty upon the management but, it will not affect the decision to close the school itself. The said decision will remain good notwithstanding the delay, if any, in serving notice or any irregularity in issuing notice to the Competent Authority and can only warrant penalty or direction to accommodate the students and the employees for some time sufficient to make out the deficiency specified in said Rule 7.5 i.e. one full term or to propose actual closure of the school by the end of the succeeding academic term so as to enable the authority to make necessary alternative arrangement regarding the students and the employees of the school to be closed. 21. It is to be noted that the said Rules were also amended by Government Resolution No. PST. 1087/11/SE-3-Cell dated 20th October, 1987 published in Maharashtra Government Gazette dated 29th October, 1987. By way of amendment, Rule 25-A was introduced after Rule 25 in the said Rules as also Rule 26 was restructured. If the amended Rules are compared with the unamended Rules, then it is apparent that prior to 1987 amendment, for the purpose of voluntary closure of a school, prior permission of the Education Officer was necessary under Rule 26(2)(ii), as was in force then. However, by way of amendment, such a requirement was done away with. 22. Being so, it is to be held that prior permission of any authority under the said Code is not necessary for voluntary closure of the school. 23. However, by way of amendment, such a requirement was done away with. 22. Being so, it is to be held that prior permission of any authority under the said Code is not necessary for voluntary closure of the school. 23. The finding that the expression "voluntary closure of a school" under Rule 25 and the Rule 26(1)(v) of the said Rules means once the same has been arrived at by the Tribunal without any reasoning and without any analysis of the relevant provisions of law. In fact, the said finding has been arrived at by merely observing that under Rule 26, five grounds, for retrenchment of the employees are mentioned and retrenchment means termination of service of an employee by the employer for some reason. Apart from this, the impugned judgment does not disclose any reasoning for arriving at the said finding. 24. Rule 25-A(1) of the said Rules which provides for termination of services of the employees of the school to be closed voluntarily, reads thus: "The services of permanent employee may be terminated by the Management on account of abolition of posts due to closure of the school after giving him advance intimation of three months to the effect that in the event of closure of the school, his services shall automatically stand terminated. In the case of closure of school due to derecognition, such advance intimation of three months shall be given by the Management to the permanent employees after receipt of a show cause notice from the Deputy Director. Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-rule, the expression closure of the school shall include-- (i) Voluntary closure by the management of the entire school if it is imparting instruction through one medium or a part of the school comprising one or more media of instruction if it is imparting instruction through more than one medium; and (ii) closure of the school due to derecognition by the department." Rule 26(1) of the said Rules, as amended since 1987 reads thus: 26. Retrenchment on account of abolition of posts.-(1) a permanent employee may be retrenched from service by the management after giving him 3 months notice, on any of the following grounds, namely-- (i) reduction of establishment owing to reduction in the number of classes or divisions; (ii) fall in the number of pupils resulting in reduction of establishment; (iii) change in the curriculum affecting the number of certain category of employees; (iv) closure of course of studies; (v) any other bona fide reason of similar nature." At this stage, it is to be noted that Rule 26(1) prior to the amendment in 1987 used the expression "terminate" in the main body of the said sub-rule (1) and Clause (iv) thereof and the provision used do read thus: "(iv) closure of course of studies or of the school itself." In other words, the provision relating to the closure of the school was dealt with by Rule 26 itself prior to its amendment in the year, 1987. But, since the time of amendment in the year, 1987, the provision dealing with the matter pertaining to the closure of the school as such has been made separately under Rule 25-A of the said Rules. Therefore, since, 1987 the Rule 26 ceases to be the provision relating to the closure of the school and the said issue is independently dealt with under the provision of Rule 25-A of the said Rules. 25. Bare reading of Rule 25-A of the said Rules would disclose that it nowhere refers to the reasons for voluntary closure of the school. However, needless to say that any decision for closure of the school cannot have legal sanctity if it lacks bona fide. However, that by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that the decision for closure of the school by the management referred to in Rule 25-A has necessarily to be for "any other bona fide reason of similar nature" as provided in Rule 26(1)(v) of the said Rules. First of all, it is to be borne in mind that the expression "similar nature" in Clause (v) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 26 is to be understood to confine to the cases within the genus or category of which the reduction in classes or division, fall in number of pupils, change in curriculum affecting the number of certain category of employees, and closure of course of studies are specific instance. Those instances relate to a particular type of instances enumerated in the said rule. The rule of ejusdem generis has been well established to mean that when particular words pertaining to a class or category or genus are followed by general words then such general words are to be construed as limited to things of the same kinds as those specified. The Apex Court in the matter of (Kawalappara Kottarathil Kochuni @ Moopil Nayar v. The State of Madras and Kerala and others)4, reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080 has ruled that "The Rule is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified." Undoubtedly, the specific words must form a distinct genus or category and the rule of ejusdem generis is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary. In (Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India)5, reported in A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1019 the Apex Court while dealing with the scope of Rule of ejusdem generis has observed thus: "The preceding words in the statutory provision which, under this particular rule of construction, control and limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members. If there is only one species, it cannot supply the idea of a genus." It has been further held thus: "The expression ejusdem generis of the same kind or nature signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list of string of family of genus describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words." 26. If a list of string of family of genus describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words." 26. Applying the Rule of ejusdem generis and the law laid down by the Apex Court in relation to the said Rule and considering the amendment of 1987 whereby the words "of the school itself" from Clause (iv) being deleted from sub-rule (1) of Rule 26, it is abundantly clear that the instances of closure of the school itself was forming one of the categories relating to the closure of the school either in entirety or part thereof under Rule 26(1) till it was amended. In other words, the instance of closure of the school itself was one of the species of the genus dealt with under unamended Rule 26 of the said Rules. The subject dealt with under the unamended Rule 26 was that of closure of the school either in its entirety or partial closure. Though, by amendment the issue relating to the closure of the school in entirety was taken out from the provision contained in Rule 26 and is being dealt with independently under Rule 25-A, nevertheless it continued to be from the class or genus dealt with in unamended Rule 26 and, therefore, closure of the school under Rule 25-A has also to be for any bona fide reason of similar nature as specified in Clause (v) of Rule 26(1). Undoubtedly, bona fide reason would include fall in number of pupils or financial constraints. As disclosed in the case in hand, the financial constraints is the cause which compelled the petitioners to decide to close down the school. 27. The next point for consideration is relating to the mode of termination of the services of the school employees in case of voluntary closure of the school. 28. Section 4 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter called as the 'said Act') empowers the Government to frame Rules relating to the procedure and qualifications for recruitment, duties, pay, allowances, post-retirement and other benefits, and other conditions of service of employees of private schools. 28. Section 4 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter called as the 'said Act') empowers the Government to frame Rules relating to the procedure and qualifications for recruitment, duties, pay, allowances, post-retirement and other benefits, and other conditions of service of employees of private schools. Sub-section (6) of section 4 reads thus: "No employee of a private school shall be suspended, dismissed or removed or his services shall not be otherwise terminated or he shall not be reduced in rank by the management, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made in that behalf." Section 16 makes provision for procedure to be adopted in making the Rules. Accordingly, the said Rules were framed by the State Government. It is the contention of the petitioner that in case of voluntary closure of the school, the procedure relating to the termination of the services of the school employees is and has to be in terms of Rule 25-A and the provisions of Rule 26 of the said Rules are not attracted. On the other hand, it is the contention of the first respondents that the procedure for termination of services in such cases could be one specified under Rule 26 as for all purposes, such termination amounts to retrenchment. 29. The provision relating to the termination of the services of the school employees are dealt with under Rule 25-A to Rule 29 of the said Rules. Rule 25-A speaks of termination of services on account of closure of the school. Rule 26 deals with the provisions relating to the retrenchment of the employee. Rule 27 relates to the principles of termination of service in the event of retrenchment and Rule 28 provides for the procedure to be a followed for removal of the permanent and temporary employees including by way of punishment. Rule 29 specifies the penalties to be imposed by way of punishment specified under Rule 28. 30. Both the Rules, namely Rules 25-A and 26 of the said Rules speak of abolition of post to be the cause for putting an end to the service of the school employees. However, the difference lies in the manner or the mode of snapping of relationship of employer employee under these two provisions. 30. Both the Rules, namely Rules 25-A and 26 of the said Rules speak of abolition of post to be the cause for putting an end to the service of the school employees. However, the difference lies in the manner or the mode of snapping of relationship of employer employee under these two provisions. Under Rule 25-A it is the termination simpliciter whereas under Rule 26, it is by way of a retrenchment. Under Rule 25-A such termination of services could be on account of; (i) Voluntary closure of the school; or (ii) Closure of the school pursuant to the derecognition. Under Rule 26, the retrenchment can be on account of: (i) reduction in classes or divisions; (ii) fall in number of pupils strength; (iii) change in the curriculum affecting the number of certain category of employees; (iv) closure of course of studies; (v) any other bona fide reason of similar nature. Apparently, Rule 25-A attracts in case of closure of the school whereas the provisions of Rule 26 can be attracted in a situation otherwise than the closure of the school itself. Rule 26 nowhere refers the closure of the school but, it discloses specific reference to the situations whereby the school continues to exist without being permanently closed. Various situations referred to in the said Rule can occur only in cases where the school does not stop from functioning but, very much continues to function. Apart from this broad difference in two provisions of the said Rules, one has to take note of Rule 26 as it existed prior to 1987 amendment to the said Rules. In fact, by amendment to Rule 26 in the year 1987, the following changes were brought upon: (i) The expression "termination of services" in sub-rule (2) was replaced by the expression "retrenchment". (ii) The expression "terminated" in sub-rule (1) and in sub-rule (2)(iii) was deleted and replaced by the word "retrenchment". (iii) Clauses Nos. (3), (8) and (9) as they exist now, were added to the said unamended Rule. The provisions contained in sub-rules (3), (8) and (9) were not available in the unamended Rule. These sub-rules added to Rule 26 refer to the situations which were not covered by the then existing unamended Rule. 31. (iii) Clauses Nos. (3), (8) and (9) as they exist now, were added to the said unamended Rule. The provisions contained in sub-rules (3), (8) and (9) were not available in the unamended Rule. These sub-rules added to Rule 26 refer to the situations which were not covered by the then existing unamended Rule. 31. In this regard, it is also necessary to take specific note of sub-rule (8) added to Rule 26 by the amendment of 1987 and the same reads thus : "(8) In the event of the employee opting to continue in the school in which he has been absorbed, and even during the intervening period when he has not been given an opportunity to re-join his previous school, his services shall not be terminated by the management under sub-rule (1) of Rule 28 by treating him as temporary. If the services of such an absorbed employee are required to be terminated under Rule 25-A or he is to be retrenched under this rule, the procedure prescribed under Rule 25-A or, as the case may be, in this rule, shall apply. However, his seniority for the purpose of promotion in the school in which he is absorbed shall be fixed in the respective category from the date of his absorption." 32. Considering the provisions contained in amended Rule 26 and comparison thereof with the provisions contained in Rule 25-A, it is apparent that the two Rules deal with two different situations. Rule 25-A exclusively deals with the situation arising from the closure of the school itself whereas, the situation dealt with in Rule 26 refers to partial closure of the school or similar such situation wherein the school continues to function but, subject to the eventualities mentioned in the said Rule. Apparently, therefore, the provisions which are to be followed for the purpose of termination of services in case of the entire closure of the school, cannot be said to be the same as those to be dealt with in case of partial closure of the school for which the specific provisions are found in Rule 26 whereas, for former situation the provisions are found in Rule 25-A. This is also apparent from sub-rule (8) of Rule 26 itself. The above quoted sub-rule clearly gives an indication of intention of the framers of the said Rules to exclude the application of the provisions of Rule 26 to the cases of total closure of the school. In sub-rule (8) of Rule 26, it has been specifically provided that in case the absorbed employees are required to be terminated under Rule 25-A or they are required to be retrenched under Rule 26, the procedure to be adopted is as prescribed under Rule 25-A or 26 as the case may be. In other words, in cases of termination of the absorbed employees where situation is one disclosed under Rule 26, the procedure to be followed for termination would be as provided under Rule 26 whereas, if the situation is that one contemplated in Rule 25-A, then the procedure for termination would be as contemplated under Rule 25-A. Indeed, Rule 25-A further makes it obligatory on the department to take initiative for rehabilitation of such school employees in case of termination of their services resulting from closure of the school itself. The very purpose of providing necessity of serving a notice in advance by at least one academic term is to give sufficient opportunity for the department to take appropriate action in that regard. Being so, the findings arrived at by the Tribunal that for the purpose of putting an end to the services of the school employees in case of closure of the school, the procedure prescribed under Rule 26 is to be followed cannot be held to be good and is liable to be quashed and set aside. 33. Before concluding, it is necessary to refer to two of the decisions relied upon by the learned Advocates for the parties one by the petitioners and the other by the respondents. The petitioners have referred the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (State of Maharashtra and others v. Lok Shikshan Sanstha)6, reported in 1973 Mh.L.J. 712 while contending that the provisions of the grant-in-aid Code are executive instructions and are in the nature of administrative instructions without any constitutional force. There is no doubt that the Apex Court therein has clearly ruled accordingly. There is no doubt that the Apex Court therein has clearly ruled accordingly. At the same time, however, it is to be noted that the Apex Court in the matter of (Tikaram v. Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal and others)7, reported in 1984 Mh.L.J. 861 has ruled that though a teacher cannot seek to enforce the right under the School Code which is non-statutory in character against the management, but a petition against the order passed in a quasi judicial proceeding by the authorities acting under the said provision is clearly maintainable. Another decision which is relied upon by the learned Advocate for the first respondents is in the matter of (College of Engineering of Yeshwant Rural Education Society, Sewagram, Dist. Wardha v. Mrs. Asmita Basole and another)8, reported in 1987 Mh.L.J. 676 in support of his contention that subsequent attempt to ratify the decision of closure of the school would not validate the decision for closure of the school taken by the management without prior permission of the authorities. In the said decision, the Division Bench of this Court has held that if the rights of subjects are affected the principle of ratification cannot validate the action without prior permission. The said observation was made by the Division Bench after taking into consideration the Ordinance No. 24 which provided that it is the governing body or the local Managing Committee of a college which alone is the Appointing Authority of a teacher in an affiliated college. It was further observed that since the said appointing authority alone could terminate the service. Chairman in the said case had no authority whatsoever to issue order of termination and basically, therefore, the order of termination was illegal. It was further held therein thus : "It is the case of the petitioner that by resolution of the governing body dated 5-8-1995 (i.e. four months subsequent to filing of appeals before the College Tribunal) the action of the Chairman was ratified. What is the effect of that ratification has been a matter of controversy before us. It was further held therein thus : "It is the case of the petitioner that by resolution of the governing body dated 5-8-1995 (i.e. four months subsequent to filing of appeals before the College Tribunal) the action of the Chairman was ratified. What is the effect of that ratification has been a matter of controversy before us. Masih's case (supra), which dealt with Ordinance No. 24 and nearly a similar point about ratification by the governing body of the order of termination by the Chairman, has held relying on various principles/provisions in general and section 200 of the Indian Contract Act in particular, that the act of the Chairman was void ab initio, which was not ratifiable in view of section 200 of the Indian Contract Act and Illustration (b) to that section." It has already been held above that the decision for closure of the school by the management does not require prior permission of the authority. Being so, the decision relied upon by the learned Advocate for the first respondents in the case in hand is of no assistance to the respondents. The same would have been of assistance if the prior permission for closure of the school would have been necessary from the Education Officer or any other Government Authority. 34. Referring to the preamble of the said Act, it was sought to be contended on behalf of the first respondents that the statute in question being beneficial legislation for the protection of the employees of the private schools, the provisions thereof are to be interpreted for the benefit of the class of the people for whose protection the statutory provisions have been brought into force under the said Act. The preamble of the said Act reads thus: "Whereas, it is expedient to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of employees in certain private schools in the State, with a view to providing such employees security and stability of service to enable them to discharge their duties towards the pupils and their guardians in particular, and the institution and the society in general, effectively and efficiently; And whereas, it is further expedient in the public interest to lay down the duties and function of such employees with a view to ensuring that they become accountable to the management and contribute their mite for improving the standard of education; And whereas, it is also necessary to make certain supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions." With the above objections disclosed in the preamble, the said Act has been enacted. The preamble, on the face of it, discloses that it is not the legislation merely for the benefits of the employees of the private schools but, it is with the main objective of allowing the teachers from such schools to discharge their duties towards the pupils effectively and bearing in mind the constitutional provisions relating to right to education. It cannot be disputed that to enable the teachers to discharge their duties towards the pupils effectively and efficiently, the conductive atmosphere should prevail in private schools and viewed from that angle, certain provisions regulating the service conditions of the teachers performing the said duties are necessary and with that view the Act has been enacted. However, at the same time, the preamble itself discloses the necessity of teachers being accountable to the management for their contribution for improving the standard of education. Considering the same as well as the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it cannot be said that the financial constraints of the management to run the school has to be totally discarded or cannot be taken into consideration as a justifiable cause for closure of the school. It cannot be disputed that the necessary infrastructure is absolute necessity for conductive atmosphere to impart proper education in the school. In order to attain necessary result in that regard, certainly finance would play an important role. Bearing the same in mind, there are certain provisions made in the said Act which enables the management to take appropriate decision in cases where the running of the schools becomes impossible. In order to attain necessary result in that regard, certainly finance would play an important role. Bearing the same in mind, there are certain provisions made in the said Act which enables the management to take appropriate decision in cases where the running of the schools becomes impossible. It is well established rule of interpretation that when the words are plain and simple, by way of interpretation, nothing can be read in the statute which is not intended to be there by the legislature. Harmonious construction of the interpretation of the statute is the well established principle of law. It cannot be accepted that the statute in question is a purely beneficial legislation to the school employees and in unconcerned with the other aspects of the management of the school as such. Hence, the contention that the preamble of the Act discloses the Act to be a beneficial legislation for the school employees alone cannot be accepted. 35. In the result, therefore, the petitions succeed. The impugned order is hereby set aside and the appeals filed by the respondents before the School Tribunal are dismissed. This, however, shall not preclude the authorities from taking appropriate decision under Rule 25-A of the said Rules in respect of the first respondents. Rule is made absolute accordingly, with no order as to costs. Petitions allowed. -----