P. K. RAY, J. ( 1 ) THE judgment-debtors of Money Suit No. 8 of 1991 of the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 3rd Court at Howrah have come up with this application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code challenging the order dated 17. 8. 2000 passed by the said Court in connection with the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act praying condonation of delay in filing the application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code for review of the judgment and decree of the said suit as was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1998. ( 2 ) BY the impugned order, the learned Court rejected the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and as a consequence thereof, the application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code was also rejected. For adjudication of the matter, the relevant facts are necessary to be discussed and accordingly the said facts in brief are stated hereinbelow: ( 3 ) M/s. Minoti Engineering Works being the plaintiff filed the Money Suit No. 8 of 1991 against the present petitioners and Union of India as defendants for realization of Rs. 6,36,200. 87 p. , the value of the goods as supplied by the plaintiff to the defendants. The plaintiff prays for the following reliefs: (A)decree for realization of the entire amount, i. e. Rs. 6,36,196. 87p. from the defendants be passed; (B) decree for interest as per Government rate for withholding payment illegally; (C) any other equitable relief/reliefs as the plaintiff is entitled to get; (D) cost of the suit; (E) attachment. ( 4 ) THE said suit was decreed ex parte against the defendants by the judgment and decree dated 15. 02. 1993. The learned Assistant District Judge, 3rd Court at Howrah, ordered that the defendants would get a decree for the said amount with cost and interest @ 22. 25% per month till the satisfaction of the decree, but, in the findings of the said judgment, the Court held 'hence, the suit for realization of the price with interest @ 22. 25% per annum till the satisfaction of the decree'. Claim is proved by exparte evidence of P. W. 1 coupled with the documents marked exhibit as per list'. 25% per month till the satisfaction of the decree, but, in the findings of the said judgment, the Court held 'hence, the suit for realization of the price with interest @ 22. 25% per annum till the satisfaction of the decree'. Claim is proved by exparte evidence of P. W. 1 coupled with the documents marked exhibit as per list'. ( 5 ) IN the said Money Suit while it was pending before the learned sub-Judge, Howrah, the present petitioner who was the defendant in the said suit, filed an application under Order 7 rules 10 and 11 unsuccessfully questioning the jurisdiction of the said Court to decide the matter. Learned 3rd Assistant District Judge, Howrah by the order dated 9th September, 1992 held that the Clause 8 of the agreement had not given exclusive jurisdiction of Dhanbad Court situated within State of Bihar to decide the matter and had not ousted the jurisdiction of other Courts where any part of cause of action arose. It was further held that the same question could not be decided as preliminary issue as same was a question of law and fact. ( 6 ) ON 15th February, 1993, suit was decreed ex parte and execution case was filed, which was registered as Execution Case No. 2/1993 of the Court of learned Sub-Judge, 3rd Court at Howrah within the State of West Bengal wherein present petitioner as defendant filed an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure as defendant/judgment-debtor before the said executing Court namely sub-Judge, 3rd Court at Howrah on the point that decree was nullity and it was registered as Misc. Case No. 58/93. By the order dated 21st January, 1994 this Misc. Case was dismissed. Thereafter by order dated 29th January, 1994 decree was transferred to the Court of learned Sub-Judge, First Court at Dhanbad within the State of Bihar for attachment. An objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on behalf of the present petitioners as judgment debtor in the said Court at Dhanbad on the same ground as was taken in Misc. Case No. 58/93 and it was dismissed resulting to a revisional application before the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court which was registered as Civil Revision No. 315/95, unsuccessfully and order dated 28. 9. 95 was passed by the said High Court rejecting the said revision case. Case No. 58/93 and it was dismissed resulting to a revisional application before the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court which was registered as Civil Revision No. 315/95, unsuccessfully and order dated 28. 9. 95 was passed by the said High Court rejecting the said revision case. Fresh objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on 31st March, 1995 by the judgment-debtor before the said Dhanbad Court for setting aside the decree on the ground that the same was nullity, as Howrah Court had no territorial jurisdiction to pass decree. The learned Court at Dhanbad by the order dated 24th July, 1996 allowed the said objection and dismissed said execution petition holding that Howrah Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. This order became a challenge in the revision petition being Civil Revision No. 400/96 (R) before the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court by the decree-holder and by the order dated 8th October, 1996 said High Court allowed the revision application holding that same was maintainable before the executing Court and accordingly directed to proceed with the execution proceeding by Dhanbad Court in accordance with law. This order was challenged before the Supreme Court of India in the special leave petition registered as special leave to appeal (civil) No. 212/97 by the judgment-debtor Union of India and it faced the dismissal order dated 20th January, 1997. An application under section 137 of the Constitution of India, the review application, was filed to review the order dated 20th January, 1997 which was registered as review petition (civil) No. 742/97. In the review petition, however, a contention was made by the judgment-debtor that the interest @ 22. 5% per month as allowed by the learned trial Judge was contrary to mandatory provision of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also beyond the prayer of the respondent plaintiff. Review petition faced dismissal order of apex Court. In the review petition, however, a contention was made by the judgment-debtor that the interest @ 22. 5% per month as allowed by the learned trial Judge was contrary to mandatory provision of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also beyond the prayer of the respondent plaintiff. Review petition faced dismissal order of apex Court. 11 ( 7 ) AFTER the dismissal of such review application, petitioner filed an application for clarification of the order dated 20th January, 1997 passed by the apex Court of India in the special leave petition aforesaid being SLP No. 212/97 contending, inter alias, in view of the fact that judgment-debtor a Central Government Company and enquiry under section 16 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provision) Act, 1985 was pending with the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, such excessive amount of interest namely 22. 5% per month on the decreetal amount would cause a heavy burden upon the public exchequer. On such contention, it was prayed that the judgment/order dated 20th January, 1997 passed in the aforesaid special leave petition may be clarified to the extent that whether decreetal amount would carry 12% interest per annum as per Code of Civil Procedure or 22. 5% per annum or 22. 5% per month that is 272% per annum. Such application for clarification, however, was dismissed on 5th May, 1997 on the ground that the application was not maintainable since special leave petition as well as review petition were already dismissed, as it appears from the communication by the Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of India. However, after all these proceedings, the judgment-debtor found a mistake in the judgment and decree of the trial Court namely that in the judgment when the trial Court found and observed that plaintiff decree holder was entitled to get 22. 5% interest per annum on the decreetal amount but in the ordering portion, such was made as 22. 5% per month on the decreetal amount namely 272% per annum. In view of such, the judgment-debtor filed an application for review of the judgment and decree of the trial Court on that score along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act praying condonation of delay, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 11/98 of the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 3rd Court at Howrah. In view of such, the judgment-debtor filed an application for review of the judgment and decree of the trial Court on that score along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act praying condonation of delay, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 11/98 of the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), 3rd Court at Howrah. By the order dated 17th August, 2000 the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act dated 27th February, 1998 of judgment debtor was rejected and as a consequence thereof the Misc. Case under Order 47 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code praying review of the judgment and decree also was rejected. This order is impugned order in this application. In the impugned order learned trial Court upon considering the rival contentions of the parties namely the different proceedings as were filed by the respective parties even up to the apex Court of India, rejected the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act only on the ground that since the point of interest was thrashed in the special leave petition which faced dismissal order, thereafter review application also was rejected and furthermore clarification application as filed also was not entertained, the trial Court would not be inclined to reopen that point as decided by the apex Court. ( 8 ) LEARNED Advocate for the petitioners submit that the impugned order is vitiated with illegality since the learned Court below misdirected his view by holding that the apex Court considered the interest point and accordingly the same would not be reopened. It is contended by the learned Advocate of the petitioner that in the apex Court, the lis was not on the issue namely the mistake in the judgment qua the ordering portion of the judgment as is being thrashed now in the application for review and accordingly there was no question of re-agitating or re-litigating the same issue as held by the trial Court in dismissing the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is further contended by the learned Advocate of the petitioner that since there is ex facie on record, a mistake as was committed by the learned trial Court, it was the duty upon the learned Court below to correct such even exercising power suo moto upon exercising the power under section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is further contended by the learned Advocate of the petitioner that since there is ex facie on record, a mistake as was committed by the learned trial Court, it was the duty upon the learned Court below to correct such even exercising power suo moto upon exercising the power under section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the basis of the doctrine that nobody will be punished for fault of the Court, it is contended further that on merit when the judgment ex facie is required to be reviewed in view of the mistake in the finding portion qua the ordering portion, application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was required to be allowed. Further it is contended that application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was required to be considered with pragmatism and in justice oriented approach avoiding any technicalities. Reliance has been placed to the judgment in the case State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. , reported in JT 1996 (3) SC 371 and the judgment in case of Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma, reported in (1996) 10 SCC 634 . ( 9 ) LEARNED Advocate of the opposite party, however, submits that there was no due diligence on the part of the decree-holder to file the review application along with application under section 5 of the Limitation Act since the decree was passed in the year 1993 whereas the application was filed in the year 1998 that is after long 5 years. It is further contended that there was no explanation for the delay as caused for the period 5th May, 1997 to February, 1998 even it was assumed that the application for clarification as filed in the apex Court was the factor for such wait of decreeholder to approach the Court for reviewing the judgment till 5th May, 1997. It is contended further that decree-holder did not approach the Court in good faith on relying upon the judgments in the case Rajendra Nath Kanrar v. Kamal Krishna Kundu Chowdhury, reported in 36 Calcutta Weekly Notes 352, in the case M. Satyanarayana Murthy and Ors. v. Mandal , Revenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, reported in AIR 1999 SC 40 . It is contended further that "other cause of like nature" as appearing under section 14 of Limitation Act would required to be read applying the ejusdem generis principle. v. Mandal , Revenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, reported in AIR 1999 SC 40 . It is contended further that "other cause of like nature" as appearing under section 14 of Limitation Act would required to be read applying the ejusdem generis principle. ( 10 ) LEARNED Advocate of the decree holder further contended on relying upon the different proceedings as filed by the judgment-debtors, that section 14 of the Limitation Act had no applicability. The main attack to oppose this application is mainly on the point that there was no due diligence on the part of the judgment-debtor to point out such mistake to the Court. ( 11 ) CONSIDERING the rival contention of the parties, the point as required to be considered is whether the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act on the grounds as mentioned legally tenable? On reading of the impugned order, it appears that learned Court below has rejected the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act solely on the ground that the point of interest since was agitated by the decree holder before the apex Court and he was unsuccessful therein even by filling the clarification application where the question on interest also was referred to and agitated, the Court cannot reopen the matter. Learned Court below did not at all consider the point whether the application of the petitioner suffers from 'due diligence' or not as now is urged by learned Advocate of the opposite party herein. Learned Court below further also has not considered the point whether a case of 'sufficient cause' was made out to agitate the matter. Further the learned Court below did not at all consider the settled legal position to decide an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act in such type of cases. ( 12 ) ON bare reading of the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court, it appears that there is a mistake in the finding of judgment qua the ordering portion to this effect namely in the finding of judgment, the learned trial Court allowed the prayer of the plaintiff directing payment of interest on decreetal amount @ 22. 5% per annum whereas in the ordering portion, learned Court below that is the learned trial Court passed the order directing the payments of interest @ 22. 5% per annum whereas in the ordering portion, learned Court below that is the learned trial Court passed the order directing the payments of interest @ 22. 5% per month on decreetal amount namely @ 272% per annum. Hence, ex facie from the judgment and decree it is clear that there was a gross mistake as the judgment as pronounced on the lis allowing the interest is not tallying with the decree as passed and such mistake surely would be termed as a 'mistake of the Court'. It is now a settled legal position that nobody will suffer for the mistake of the Court in terms of the maxim "actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit". It is now a settled legal position that even upon exercising inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and/or under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court can correct such mistake, which is ex facie on record. Reliance may be placed to the judgment in the case Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. , reported in 1996 (5) SCC 550 , para 23 of which speaks as follows:"since fraud affects the soleminity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practiced upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order. (See: Benoy Krishna Mukherjee v. Mohanlal Goenka; Gajanand Sha v. Dayanand Thakur; Krishnakumar v. Jawand Singh; Devendra Nath Sarkar v. Ram Rachpal Singhl Saiyed Mohd. Raza v. Ram Saroop; Bankey Behari Lal v. Abdul Rahaman; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma v. Mammen Mammen.) The Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practiced upon the Court (Ishwar Mahton v. Sitaram Kumar) or to set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud. (Bindeswari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd. Raza v. Ram Saroop; Bankey Behari Lal v. Abdul Rahaman; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma v. Mammen Mammen.) The Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practiced upon the Court (Ishwar Mahton v. Sitaram Kumar) or to set aside the order recording compromise obtained by fraud. (Bindeswari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd. Singh; Tara Bai v. V. S. Krishnaswamy Rao.)" ( 13 ) FURTHER it is now a settled legal position that by exercising inherent power, Court can review the mistake of the judgment, when it is apparent on the face of the record, reliance may be placed to the judgment in the case Shivdeo Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 1963 SC 1909 , a judgment of Constitution Bench. ( 14 ) FURTHER, the apex Court in the judgment as passed in the case Parsion Devi and Ors. v. Sumitri Devi and Ors. reported in 98 WBLR (SC) 80 decided the same point. Learned Court below has not considered the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act as filed by the decree holder, praying to correct the mistake as ex facie on record, which was pointed out by the judgment-debtor by filling the application of review before the learned trial Court on applying those principle. In adjudicating the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, learned Court below has not at all considered the settled judgment of the apex Court, which held that technicalities would not prevail in the matter of rendering justice, that application under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay would be considered in the pragmatic view not in the pedantic way and that everything should be judged on justice oriented manner. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. , reported in 1996 (3) SCC 132 , wherein the apex Court on consideration of about 15 cases right from the year 1962 to 1993 on this point held in paragraph 11 and 12 to this effect:"11. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the case State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. , reported in 1996 (3) SCC 132 , wherein the apex Court on consideration of about 15 cases right from the year 1962 to 1993 on this point held in paragraph 11 and 12 to this effect:"11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private part or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, dealy on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, that decisions are taken by officers / agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No. separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No. separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an imersonal machinery working through its officers of servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay. 12. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case for condoning the delay. The delay is accordingly condoned. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. " ( 15 ) FURTHER, the apex Court in the matter of consideration of delay held that when the matter deserve adjudication on merit in view of ex facie illegality of the impugned order, such delay to be condoned. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the State of U. P. and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors. , reported in 1996 (9) SCC 309 wherein the apex Court condoned the delay of 480 days, applying the principle that delay was required to be condoned as the matter required adjudication on merit. Reliance may be placed to the judgment passed in the State of U. P. and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors. , reported in 1996 (9) SCC 309 wherein the apex Court condoned the delay of 480 days, applying the principle that delay was required to be condoned as the matter required adjudication on merit. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:"so far as the question of delay is concerned the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of CWT v. Amateur Reiders Club and urged that the ground taken for condonation is due to the delay in processing the matter through official channel and cannot be held to be a good ground for condonation. It is undoubtedly true that the applicant seeking for condonation of delay is duty-bound to explain the reasons for the delay but as has been held by this Court in several case, the very manner in which the bureaucratic process moves, if the case deserves merit the Court should consider the question of condonation from that perspective. That apart the respondents themselves approached the High Court in the year 1990 making a grievance that they had not been appointed even though they are included in the select list of 1987 and the 1987 list itself expired under rules on 4. 4. 1988. In this view of the matter and in view of the merits of the case we are of the opinion that sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay and accordingly we have condoned the delay. " ( 16 ) HENCE, it is clear that the learned Court below did not at all consider the matter on settled legal position on condonation of delay in such type of cases when ex facie on record it is clear that there is a discrepancy in the judgment portion qua the ordering portion. From the judgment and decree of the learned Court below it appears that in one place Court observed entitlement of the relief of the plaintiff interest @ 22. 5% per annum but in other place in ordering portion, the Court passed the order allowing interest @22. 5% per month which comes to the figure 272% per annum. From the judgment and decree of the learned Court below it appears that in one place Court observed entitlement of the relief of the plaintiff interest @ 22. 5% per annum but in other place in ordering portion, the Court passed the order allowing interest @22. 5% per month which comes to the figure 272% per annum. This is a clear case of mistake and on merit accordingly, relying upon the judgment of the apex Court, learned Court below was required to allow the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. But on perusal of the impugned order it appears that the learned Court below directed the entire attention namely on the issue that learned Court below would not reopen the matter since the same was adjudicated by the apex Court, which view of the learned trial Court below is completely misconceived. Earlier in all the proceedings as filed by the judgment-debtor assailing the point of interest never such point was thrashed but for the first time in the review application such mistake in the judgment qua the ordering portion was pointed out. In all earlier proceedings on the interest point, the decree holder simply urged that under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the interest as granted by the learned Court below in the ordering portion, which was crystallized to a decree of the Court, the interest was maximum namely 22. 5% per month and accordingly the said was illegal not only on application of the Civil Procedure Code but also on the application of the contractual agreement in between the parties. Hence, the point as was agitated up to the apex Court unsuccessfully by the decree holder was the order granting relied of interest @ 272% per annum, which was violative of Civil Procedure Code and the prayer as made by the plaintiff and also the agreement as entered into by and between the parties relating to such interest. Hence, never it was urged before the apex Court that there was a mistake in the finding of judgment qua decree to this effect that in the judgment Court observed and came to the findings that plaintiff was entitled to get the interest @ 22. 5% per annum whereas in the ordering portion as was terminated to a decree, such was noted 272% per annum in view of the word 22. 5% per month. 5% per annum whereas in the ordering portion as was terminated to a decree, such was noted 272% per annum in view of the word 22. 5% per month. Hence, it appears that there is a mistake ex facie on record over the words "annum qua month" and such point never was agitated before the apex Court by the decree holder. In the view of the matter, the point as now urged cannot be said as res judicata or it cannot be considered as a point suffering embargo, applying the doctrine of issue estoppel. However, learned senior Advocate of the opposite party Mr. Sudhish Dasgupta very frankly accepted the point that the point of res judicata and/or doctrine of issue estoppel had no applicability. Hence, from the impugned order since it appears that the learned Court below considered the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act only on that angle by holding "accoordingly I feel disinclined to find that there is any scope to reopen this points decided by the apex Court here at this stage", the learned Court below did not consider at all the basic principle for adjudication of the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and did not apply the law to that effect and thereby mis-directed his decision keeping in mind that the matter was agitated before the apex Court unsuccessfully by the decree holder. Such view of the learned Court below is ex facie wrong in view of the different proceedings as were laid by the decree holder up to the apex Court, as already discussed holding that never at any point of time it was the issue before any proceeding that there was a mistake in the judgment qua the order on the issue of granting interest. Hence, this point cannot be said as adjudicated to apply the doctrine or res judicata and / or issue estoppel or the doctrine analogous to res judicata. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the learned Court below is not legally sustainable and hence, the same is set aside and quashed. Hence, this point cannot be said as adjudicated to apply the doctrine or res judicata and / or issue estoppel or the doctrine analogous to res judicata. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the learned Court below is not legally sustainable and hence, the same is set aside and quashed. However, learned Court below is directed to decide the application as filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act by the decree holder on the basis of the settled legal position for adjudication of such application for condonation of delay as settled by the apex Court and as already referred to in this judgment by this Court including the point of lack of due diligence as urged by opposite party and thereby to decide and dispose of the matter within three months from this date without granting adjournment to any party. Revision application is accordingly allowed but no order as to costs. 19. 10. 2001 xerox certified copy of the order, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously. Application allowed