P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD both sides. ( 2 ) THE revision is directed against an order made in I. A. No. 784 of 1985 in o. S. No. 133 of 1973 on the file of the District munsif, Srugavarapukota. ( 3 ) THE facts in brief are as follows: The second defendant the subsequent purchaser in the litigation is the revision petitioner. The first defendant sold the property under an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff respondent and the plaintiff had instituted a suit O. S. No. 133 of 1973 on the file of the District Munsif Court at srungavarapukota for specific performance and the suit was decreed on 15-11-1978 granting two months time to deposit the remaining sale consideration. The second defendant had carried the matter in appeal a. S. No. 151 of 1978 on the file of the subordinate Judge, Visakhapatnam and the appeal was dismissed on 13-2-1981 granting two months time and the respondent plaintiff had not deposited the amount even within time granted by the appellate Court. As per record, it appears that I. A. Nos. 252 to 255 of 1982 were filed by the plaintiff respondent in the present revision for extension of time and without notice to the above said parties the time was extended. Consequently the present application i. A. NO. 784 of 1985 in O. S. No. 133 of 1973 was filed under Section 28 of the Specific relief Act read with Section 151 C. P. C. praying rescinding of the contract on that ground. The said application was dismissed by an order dated 6-8-1993 and aggrieved by the same the present revision is filed. ( 4 ) SRI E. V. Bhagiratha Rao, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner second defendant in the suit contends that the dismissal of the application filed by the revision petitioner is totally unsustainable since a right had accrued even in favour of the revision petitioner by the respondent not depositing the amount as specified even by the appellate Court. It was further contended that I. A. NOS. 252 of 1982 to 255 of 1982 for extension of time were allowed even without issuing notice to the revision petitioner in whose favour a right had already accrued and who will be the aggrieved party in the event of granting extension of time. It was further contended that I. A. NOS. 252 of 1982 to 255 of 1982 for extension of time were allowed even without issuing notice to the revision petitioner in whose favour a right had already accrued and who will be the aggrieved party in the event of granting extension of time. The learned Counsel also had relied upon a decision reported in cheruku Venkat Rao v. Balagangadar Sharma and had submitted that the scope and object of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 had been well explained by the Division bench of this Court and the Court below had totally ignored the decision rendered by the Division Bench. It is appropriate to note the relevant paras in the above decision wherein it is observed as follows:"we may point out at the outset that the filing of an execution petition by the plaintiff for directing defendants 1 and 2 to execute a sale deed was really unnecessary. No execution petition was such is necessary for the said purpose after the coming into force of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Subsection (3) of Section 28 empowers the court to direct not only the execution of sale deed in pursuance of a decree for specific performance, but also to direct delivery of possession, and to pass all other necessary and ancillary orders in the same suit. Sub-section (3) of Section 28 reads as follows: (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in subsection (1) the Court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely: (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor; (b) the delivery of possession or partition and separate possession of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. " sub-section (4) of Section 28 bars a suit for obtaining the reliefs mentioned in sub-section (3 ). It is true that even after the coming into force of the Specific relief Act. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of order XXICPC has been retained and continued. " sub-section (4) of Section 28 bars a suit for obtaining the reliefs mentioned in sub-section (3 ). It is true that even after the coming into force of the Specific relief Act. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of order XXICPC has been retained and continued. It has been left untouched even while effecting extensive amendments in 1976-and for that reason, an execution petition cannot be said to be not maintainable/ yet ordinarily speaking, the procedure provided by sub-section (3) of Sec. 28 may be said to be more convenient. The idea behind sub-section (3) of section 28 evidently is to see that all the reliefs which the parties are entitled to in a suit for specific performance are worked out in the same suit. The suit does not come to end with the passing of the decree directing specific performance, it continues and subsists until all the directions made in the decree are complied with. In this sense the decree directing specific performance can be likened to a preliminary decree. Thereafter, if the purchaser does not deposit, the vendor can apply for rescission under sub-section (1) and for other incidental directions under sub-section (2 ). If, however, the purchaser complies with the directions but the vendor fails to perform his obligations the purchaser can apply under sub-section (3) for all such reliefs as he is entitled to including execution of sale deed and delivery of possession. These are very salutary provisions designed to obviate multiplicity of proceedings. In the present case, however, it does not matter whether the application filed by the purchaser (petitioner) is treated as an execution petition or as an application under sub-section (3) of section 28, as we shall presently show: if we treat it as an execution petition, it is within limitation, having been filed within twelve years of the decree. We are not able to appreciate how the E. P. could have been dismissed by the court below as barred by time, in view of Art. 136 of the Limitation Act which provides a period of twelve years for filing an execution petition. It is not disputed before us that Art. 137 of the limitation Act has absolutely no application to such an execution petition. Now if we treat it as an application under Section 28 (3) no question of limitation arises since it does not prescribe any such. It is not disputed before us that Art. 137 of the limitation Act has absolutely no application to such an execution petition. Now if we treat it as an application under Section 28 (3) no question of limitation arises since it does not prescribe any such. " ( 5 ) SRI Nagabhushan Rao, representing the respondent plaintiff contends that the first defendant against whom the decree was obtained is not agitating the matter and the second defendant subsequent purchaser alone has been carrying on with the litigation only with a view to delay the matter. It was also contended that the orders which had been passed extending time had not been questioned and after a delay of about three years the present application was thought of Further it was stated by the learned Counsel for the respondent that as directed by the Court below the amount had already been deposited. It was also contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the extension of time which can be granted by the Court under Section 28 of the Specific relief Act, 1963 is discretionary and hence under Section 115 C. P. C. such an order does not warrant any interference. Further, the learned Counsel for the respondent also had relied upon the decision reported in chinnammal v. Chidambara Kothanar relating to the deposit amount deducting costs and submitted that the deposit also was made in accordance with law. ( 6 ) AFTER hearing both the Counsel, I am of the opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error for the reasons which i am referring to infra. Section 28 of the specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as follows:"rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed. Section 28 of the specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as follows:"rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed. (1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree of such further period as the Court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the Court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1) the Court (a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and (b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract. (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in subsection (1), the Court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely: (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor; (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be. (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be. (5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the Court. It is well settled law. that the exercise of power under Section 28 of the Specific relief Act, 1963 is discretionary. In Bisun prasad u. Kamlakant it was observed that even if the trial Court s order extending time after its expiry for making deposit under the decree for specific performance was without jurisdiction extension would be valid unless such an order was se t aside. Apart from it, for convincing reasons which have been recorded by the Court below since the extension had been granted and the said orders were not questioned, I am not inclined to disturb the order of the court below at this distant point of time. ( 7 ) EVERT otherwise in my considered opinion the impugned order if allowed to stand will not occasion in any failure of justice and unless that additional condition is also specified the revisional Court need not exercise its jurisdiction under section 115 C. P. C. ( 8 ) FOR the foregoing reasons I do not find any jurisdictional error involved in this i matter and hence the civil revision petition. . fails and accordingly it is dismissed but in the circumstances no order as to costs.