S. B. SINHA, J, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner herein has inter alia questioned the validity of Section 3 (1) (d) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to the 1986 Act ) as also prayed for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings in M. C. No. 38 of 1995, c. C. No. 916 of 1995 and C. C. No. 62 of 1997 on the file of XXII Metropolitan Magistrate- cum-Mahila Court, Hyderabad as violative of Chapter XVII-B of Criminal Procedure code under Sections 218 to 224 and also section 26 of General Clauses Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner married respondent no. 4 on 16-4-1994. She was divorced by the petitioner on 28-8-1995. She also allegedly received Mehr and Iddat period amount of rs. 19,985/- from Qazi Office and gave receipt therefor. ( 3 ) SHE filed an application in September, 1995 purported to be under Section 3 of the 1986 Act before the second respondent which was marked as M. C. No. 38 of 1995. Subsequently, cognizance of the offence was taken in the said case. A miscellaneous petition was filed in the said proceedings. A complaint under Sections 498-A, 500 and 501 of Indian Penal Code read with sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition act, 1976 was also filed which was marked as C. C. No. 916 of 1995 before the xxii Metropolitan Magistrate-cum-Mahila court, Hyderabad. A judgment of conviction and sentence was passed on 17-2-2000 whereby and whereunder the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two years and fine of rs. 2,000/- for offence under Section 4 of dowry Prohibition Act and also a fine of rs. 1,000/- under Section 6 of the Dowry prohibition Act. Yet again, another complaint in C. C. No. 62 of 1997 was filed for offence under Section 406 of Indian Penal code which is still pending. ( 4 ) SRI T. Mohan Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner raised number of contentions in support of the application. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel, item 1 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution vis-a-vis Entry 5 thereof being overlapping, the Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the said law. ( 4 ) SRI T. Mohan Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner raised number of contentions in support of the application. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel, item 1 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution vis-a-vis Entry 5 thereof being overlapping, the Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the said law. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 220 of the Criminal procedure Code, the three cases were not maintainable. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 26 of the general Clauses Act. Mr. Rao urged that the gifts given at the time of marriage cannot be said to be dowry. A distinction according to the learned Counsel, exists between gift to the bride and dowry. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel would further contend that the cause of action for all these three cases being same viz. , divorce of the respondent by the petitioner, different cases were not maintainable. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel. ( 8 ) IT is not a case where in relation to same cause of action, more than one case has been filed under the Special Law as also general Law. ( 9 ) THE fourth respondent has filed three different cases which involve three different causes of action. None of the criminal cases is inter-related with the other. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act or for that matter article 20 of the Constitution of India will thus, have no role to play. ( 10 ) SECTION 71 of the Indian Penal Code provides for limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences. None of the criminal cases is inter-related with the other. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act or for that matter article 20 of the Constitution of India will thus, have no role to play. ( 10 ) SECTION 71 of the Indian Penal Code provides for limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences. Said provision reads thus:where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender, shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences, unless it to be so expressly provided: where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences. ( 11 ) YET again, the said provision cannot be said to have any application in the fact of the case. Section 71 has three parts. The first part is where anything which is an offence, is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences. The second part is where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any of such offences. The third part is where several acts, of which one or more would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tires him could award for any one of such offences. ( 12 ) THE said provision cannot be brought in aid for the purpose of quashing of the cases pending before the Courts particularly when in one of the aforementioned cases the petitioner has already been punished. ( 13 ) SECTION 300 of Cr. P. C. whereupon mr. Rao has relied upon again has no application in the instant case. ( 12 ) THE said provision cannot be brought in aid for the purpose of quashing of the cases pending before the Courts particularly when in one of the aforementioned cases the petitioner has already been punished. ( 13 ) SECTION 300 of Cr. P. C. whereupon mr. Rao has relied upon again has no application in the instant case. ( 14 ) IT is not a case where the petitioner is being tried again for the same offence or on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge was made under section 221 of Cr. P. C. Section 221 (1) of the code reads thus:where it is doubtful what offence has been committed:- (1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. ( 15 ) FOR the purpose of invoking the said provision, it must be shown that series of acts of the accused are made in the same transaction. In any event, even in such a case, the offender may be charged with for every such offence where one trial would take place or several. In the facts and circumstances of the case, whether section 220 can be taken recourse to, would be a matter which would fall for consideration before the Criminal Court. For the self same reason, recourse to sections 221, 222 and 223 would fall for consideration before the Court. ( 16 ) LET us now examine the provisions of section 3 (1) of the 1986 Act. The Act was enacted to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by, or have obtained divorce from their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 3 (1) of the said Act reads thus:3. ( 16 ) LET us now examine the provisions of section 3 (1) of the 1986 Act. The Act was enacted to protect the rights of Muslim women who have been divorced by, or have obtained divorce from their husbands and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 3 (1) of the said Act reads thus:3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in foce, a divorced woman shall be entitled to (a) a reasonable and fair provisioned maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband; (b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children; (c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at her time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to muslim law; and (d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after the marriage by her relatives or friends or the husbands or any relatives of the husbands or his friends. ( 17 ) THE question which has been raised herein came up for consideration before a full Bench of this Court in Usman Khan bahamani v. Fathimunnisa Begum. Sardar Ali khan. J. speaking for the majority, after referring to various texts of Mohammedan law, Quran, Hedaya, opined thus:the sum and substance of the above discussion is that there is no difference of opinion among the authorities - sunnis or Shias, that a divorced muslim woman is entitled to maintenance from her husband only during the period of Iddat. Section 3 of the Act of 1986, therefore, reaffirms the same principle insofar as it provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced wife is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the Iddat period by her former husband. Section 3 of the Act of 1986, therefore, reaffirms the same principle insofar as it provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced wife is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the Iddat period by her former husband. ( 18 ) AS regards the question whether a divorced Muslim woman can be left in the lurch was tested on the touchstone of clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of section 3. It was held:the words used in this clause are "all the properties" which include moveable as well as immoveable properties. The divorced woman will, therefore, be entitled to lay claim for return of all the moveable and immoveable properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or thereafter, by her relatives or by her husband or by the relatives of her husband or friends. All this clearly shows that under Section 3 of the Act of 1986, the divorced woman is looked after well even after the dissolution of the marital tie. Insofar as the financial aspect of the matter is concerned, it cannot be said that a woman is left without any consideration for her future well-being because as stated above, she is entitled to claim all the benefits which have been mentioned above. ( 19 ) UPON consideration of the clauses mentioned, the learned Judge relied upon mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum wherein it was held that the provision and maintenance have the same meaning. It was held therein:therefore, to hold that while maintenance may be payable for and during the period of Iddat, a fair and reasonable provision shall be made by her husband forecasting her future needs, would amount to negation of the very object for which Act of 1986 has been promulgated. It would give rise to a new concept of liability on the part of the husband which would be difficult to be translated in concrete terms as it would be almost impossible to visualize the future needs of a divorced Muslim woman which would be depending upon several factors like her remarriage, change in the circumstances or in the life style etc. ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In any case, the liability of the husband to provide a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is limited for the period of Iddat only. Therefore, in regard to the second question as to whether the maintenance contemplated under section 3 (l) (a) of the Act of 1986 is restricted only for the period of Iddat or a fair and reasonable provision has to be made for future also within the period of Iddat, we are of the opinion that the liability to pay reasonable and fair provision and maintenance on the part of the former husband is confined only for and fair provision is to be made separately from that of maintenance to be given to the wife, such reasonable and fair provision is confined only of the period of Iddat, as defined in Section 2 of the Act. ( 20 ) WE are bound by the said decision, however, it is interesting to note the Article"shah Bano, The Muslim Women (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act and Muslim Woman s right to Mataa; Bangladesh shows way out of imbroglio" published in the journal of the indian Law Institute, wherein it was stated: even assuming (without conceding) that the maintenance referred to in sec. 3 (1) (a) is confined to maintenance for the period of Iddaht, there still remains the question of provision . This provision (mataa) is neither defined by the Act nor subjected to a statutory maximum. The determination of what constitutes, on the facts of any given case, reasonable and fair provision rests completely in the discretion of the Magistrate. Section 3 (3) of the Act instructs the magistrate to determine what would constitute reasonable and fair provision and the husband, and the standard of life the woman enjoyed during the marriage. . . The question of mataa has been constantly present throughout the debates over the terms of Sections 125 and 127 of the new Code of Criminal procedure, the Shah Bano case, and the muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act but it has been more or less on the sidelines. To be sure, the precise provisions of one or other personal law are irrelevant to a consideration of Section 125 of the cr. To be sure, the precise provisions of one or other personal law are irrelevant to a consideration of Section 125 of the cr. P. C. but "personal law" was (needlessly, irrelevantly and ambiguously) brought into the picture by the amendment of Section 127 of the Code. And, of course, the Muslim women Act explicitly purports to codify the Muslim Personal Law on (inter alia) the matter of the economic rights of the divorced Muslim woman. The Bangladesh decision with its unambiguous interpretation of mataa and its equally unambiguous endorsement of mataa as the right of the divorced Muslim Women, is certainly relevant to the reconsideration of the terms of section 127 of India s new Code of criminal Procedure the Shah Bano case, and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Perhaps, the Supreme Court of India will be fortified by the Dhaka decision when it faces - as it eventually must the conflicting judgments emanating from the various High Courts require resolution and fundamental constitutional questions must be answered - the task of interpreting the muslim Women Act. Perhaps so fortified, the Indian Supreme Court will see its way clear to preserve that part of the Muslim Women Act which, by means of an enlightened approach, can be construed so as to confer a real boon on Muslim women. " ( 21 ) YET again, it is also interesting to note that Calcutta High Court in Shakila Parveen v. Haider Ali following several decisions opined. If different phrase used in Sec. 3 (1) (a), 3 (1) (b), 3 (3) and Section 4 as well as section 5 of the Act are read together, it would be clear that the Parliament wanted to provide that the divorced woman is fully protected if she does not remarry and she gets adequate provision and maintenance from her former husband and/or maintenance from her relatives or Wakf Board in case of necessity. Taking into consideration the objects and reasons for enacting the Muslim women (Protection of Rights of divorce) Act as well as preamble and the plain language of Section 3, it cannot be said that Muslim Women act in any way adversely affects the personal rights of a Muslim divorced woman. Nowhere, in the Act, it is provided that the rights which are conferred upon a Muslim divorced wife under personal Law are abrogated, restricted or repealed. Nowhere, in the Act, it is provided that the rights which are conferred upon a Muslim divorced wife under personal Law are abrogated, restricted or repealed. It is presumed that the Act is enacted with deliberation and full knowledge of existing law on the object. In view of the preamble, the Act is enacted to protect the rights of Muslim Women who have been divorced by or have obtained divorce from. their husbands. In simplest language the Parliament has stated that the Act is for protecting the rights of Muslim Women. It does not provide that it is enacted for taking away some rights which a Muslim woman was having either under the personal Law or under the general law i. e. , Sections 125 to 128 of the Cr. P. C. By the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, the order passed by Magistrate under Section 125 of Cr. P. C. ordering muslim husbands to pay maintenance to his divorced wife would not be non est. There is no section hi the Act which nullifies the orders passed by the Magistrate under Section 125 of the cr. P. C. Further, once the order under section 125 of the Cr. P. C. granting maintenance to the divorced woman is passed, then her rights are crystallized and she gets vested right to recover maintenance from her former husband. That vested right is not taken away by the Parliament by providing any provision in the Act. Under Section 5 an option is given to the parties to be governed by the provision of Sections 125 to 128 of the cr. P. C. This section also indicate that the Parliament never intended to take away the vested right of Muslim divorced woman which was crystallized before the passing of the act. There is no inconsistency between the provisions of Act and the provisions of Sections 125 and 128 of the Cr. P. C. on the contrary, the provisions of Muslim Women Act grant more relief to the divorced woman depending upon the financial position of her former husband. There is no inconsistency between the provisions of Act and the provisions of Sections 125 and 128 of the Cr. P. C. on the contrary, the provisions of Muslim Women Act grant more relief to the divorced woman depending upon the financial position of her former husband. ( 22 ) THE learned Judge also referred to in extenso the decision of the Gujarat High court in Arab Ahemadhia Abdnlla v. Arab Bail mohimnna Shiyadbhi wherein it was held: a divorced Muslim Woman is entitled to maintenance after contemplating her future needs and the maintenance is not limited only upto Iddat period. The phrase used in Section 3 (1) (a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is "reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and to be paid to her" by which the Parliament intended to see that the divorced woman gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce and that she does not become destitute or is not thrown on the streets without a roof over her head and without any means of sustaining herself and her children. The word provision itself indicates that something is provided in advance of meeting some needs. This means that at the time of giving divorce the muslim husband is required to visualize or contemplate the extent of the future needs and make preparatory arrangement in advance for meeting the same. May be that the provision can be made that every month a particular amount be paid to the wife; may be that residential accommodation for her can be provided; may be that some property be reserved for her so that she can purchase article for livelihood. Reasonable and fair provision may include provision for her residence, provision for her food, provision for her clothes and other articles. The husband may visualize provide and for residential accommodation till her remarriage. That means a provision for residential accommodation is made. Apart from the residential accommodation for clothes, food and also for other articles some fixed amount may be paid or he may agree to pay it by instalments. That would also be a provision. Therefore, the provision itself contemplates future needs of divorced woman. If the husband is rich enough, he may provide separate residential accommodation and that can be said to be a provision for residential accommodation. That would also be a provision. Therefore, the provision itself contemplates future needs of divorced woman. If the husband is rich enough, he may provide separate residential accommodation and that can be said to be a provision for residential accommodation. Therefore, it cannot be said that under Section 3 (1) (a) divorced woman is entitled to provision and maintenance only for iddat period. ( 23 ) YET in an article published recently in the TIME OF INDIA dated 21st June, 2001 titled now WE SHALL SPEAK the author - Syeda Saiyidain Hameed who is a founder member of the Muslim Women s forum refers to an unfortunate case of zuleikha Bi of Shahdol who upon remarriage of her husband had refused to live with him. Maintenance was granted only at the rate of Rs. 400. 00 per month. An application was filed before the Supreme court wherein the practice of polygamy and triple talaq was questioned. ( 24 ) HERE we may consider a principle of muslim law which confers a right on the widow to retain the immovable property of her late husband in her possession in lieu of payment of Mehr till the same is paid off. Possibly the same principle may be extended having regard to the rationale behind the said principle to cases where the divorced wife is in possession of a house of the husband or in regard to the matrimonial home where she is residing. She may be entitled to retain possession of the house of the husband who divorced her till the same is paid off. Possibly the same principle may be extended having regard to the rationale behind the said principle to cases where the divorcee wife is in possession of a house of the husband or in regard to the matrimonial home where she is residing. She may be entitled to retain possession of the house of the Husband who divorced her till the Mehr amount is paid to her by him. Even after marriage, a woman retains her individual personality and is entitled to decide matters concerning herself and her properties. She may be entitled to retain possession of the house of the Husband who divorced her till the Mehr amount is paid to her by him. Even after marriage, a woman retains her individual personality and is entitled to decide matters concerning herself and her properties. ( 25 ) IT is not therefore correct to contend that the provisions of the 1986 Act are unconstitutional, further, it is trite that for quashing the FIR by a writ Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution, it would not convert itself into a criminal Court, nor it shall go into the question of justifiability or otherwise of a conviction. It is also well settled that recourse to the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution can be taken only when the fir does not disclose a cognizable offence and/or when the investigation is mala fide. We may refer to the decision in Ajit Kumar chakroborthy v. State of West Bengal. ( 26 ) WE may notice that in several decisions the Apex Court has held that refusal to return the Stridhan a property is a continuing offence and a criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of Indian Penal code. We may refer to the decision in Bairo prasad v. Laxmibai Pateria wherein it is observed:no doubt, for purposes of criminal law, for proving the case against the accused, the ingredients of entrustment with property, having domain over it, and the same having been misappropriated or converted to his own use by the accused person, are required to be proved before a charge for the defence punishable under section 406, IPC is established. In the instant case, the complaint, as has been filed, prima facie discloses the offence alleged as discussed above and, therefore, it is not a case of civil nature. ( 27 ) WE may also refer to the decision in renu v. State of Haryana. ( 28 ) WE are therefore of the opinion that there is no merit in this writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed.