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2001 DIGILAW 700 (PAT)

Staish Chandra Kiran v. Bihar State Electricity Board

2001-08-06

R.M.PRASAD

body2001
Judgment R.M.Prasad, J. 1. Initially, the writ petition was filed for quashing Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5-1999, which has later been brought on record as Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit, initiating departmental proceeding against the petitioner and also the second show-cause notice, contained in Resolution No. 1595 dated 30th June, 2000 (Annexure-8), issued relating to the said proceeding. Later, by filing an interlocutory application the petitioner has also prayed for quashing Resolution No. 2350 dated 11 -10-2000 of the Board, which was brought on record as Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit awarding punishment forfeiting his pension and ordering for recovery of Rs. 1,97,937.00 from his admissible dues and directing that he shall not be paid anything other than the subsistence allowance received by him during the period of suspension. 2. In short, the case of the petitioner is that he was posted as Account Assistant in the Officer of the Electric Supply Sub-Division, Dhaka under the Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), vide Office Order No. 493 dated 19-4-1989. On being transferred from there, he joined in the Office of the Electric Supply Division, Muzaffarpur (Urban), vide Office Order No. 711 dated 17-11- 1995. He was placed under suspension, vide Office Order No. 112 dated 12-2-1996 (Annexure-1) in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. Subsequently, a First Information Report was lodged on the basis of the written report submitted on 13-2- 1996. However, the petitioner ultimately retired from the service on 31-5-1998 till when he was not served with any charges in the departmental proceeding. 3. The petitioner challenged the validity of the continuance of the order of suspension in this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 4483 of 1998. In the said writ petition the grievance of the petitioner was that the order of suspension ceased to have any operation and the petitioner was entitled for salary from the date of his suspension till the date of retirement as he had already superannuated on 31-5-1988. In the said writ petition the grievance of the petitioner was that the order of suspension ceased to have any operation and the petitioner was entitled for salary from the date of his suspension till the date of retirement as he had already superannuated on 31-5-1988. this Court, having found that till the retirement of the petitioner in the year 1998 no such proceeding was initiated and as such he has made a grievance that he had not been paid his due amount, vide order dated 15-4-1999 (Annexure-2), held that the order of suspension had no force in the eye of law as the same has ceased to have any effect and, accordingly, allowed the writ petition and quashed the said order. The Court also held that the petitioners is entitled to get the salary for the period during which he was suspended till he retired from service and directed the Board to pay the same within two months. 4. According to the petitioner, later vide Office Order No, 2064 dated 10-5-1999, the departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner which he never received and could only know about it though the notice published in the daily newspaper "Aaz" on 26-3-2000, true copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-3. However, in the meanwhile, he received Letter No. 268 dated 27-1-2000 (Annexure-4) intimating him about the date of hearing on 6-3-2000 at 11 a.m., but without mentioning about the proceeding in which he had to appear for hearing. It may be mentioned here that earlier also a departmental proceeding was initiated against him and had not concluded till then. Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was busy with the treatment of his wife, who was bedridden, he sent an application addressed to the Director Departmental Proceeding-Cum-Enquiry Officer through his son on 2-4-2000. It is stated that his son appeared before the Enquiry Officer on 5-4-2000 at 11 a.m., but he declined to entertain the same. In support of this, a photo copy of the visitors slip has been annexed as Annexure-5. Later, the application was sent through registered cover, a photo copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure 7. In the said application, he mentioned about the publication of notice in the "Aaz" and also that the said order dated 10-5-1999 was never received by him and that he had already superannuated from service on 31st May, 1998. Later, the application was sent through registered cover, a photo copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure 7. In the said application, he mentioned about the publication of notice in the "Aaz" and also that the said order dated 10-5-1999 was never received by him and that he had already superannuated from service on 31st May, 1998. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, a departmental proceeding is deemed to be instituted only when the charge framed against an employee is served before the retirement of the petitioner, which has not been complied in the present case and thus in the absence of compliance of the said requirement, the impugned resolution dated 30th June, 2000 (Annexure-8) passed after his retirement is ultra vires Rule 43 of the Bihar Pension Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), which apply mutatis mutandis to the employees of the Board. 5. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents in which it is contended that the writ petition has become infructuous as final orders have been passed in the departmental proceeding, vide Annexure-A. According to the respondents, Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5-1999 (Annexure-B) was forwarded to the petitioner along with the charge-sheet, memo of evidence and list of witnesses. It is stated that the enquiry officer also informed the petitioner for appearance before him and the Joint Secretary of the Board, vide Annexure-4, has informed about the date of hearing, but the petitioner did not participate in the enquiry. It is also stated that the petitioner received the second show-cause notice dated 30th June, 2000, but he failed to either participate in the departmental enquiry or give reply to the second show-cause notice and, thus, according to the respondents, the petitioner always evaded the said proceeding. According to them, the provisions, contained in Rule 43(b) of the Rules is not attracted because the petitioner had been placed under suspension merely before his retirement and First Information Report concerning the embezzlement of the fund of the Board had also been drawn and registered on 19-2-1996, bearing Dhaka P.S. Case No. 12/96, in which charge-sheet has been submitted on 10-12-1996. Thus, in terms of Rule 43(b) of the Rules, the departmental proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded on the date when the petitioner was suspended and in the present case, even the judicial proceeding will be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which charge-sheet has been submitted to the Criminal Court. With respect to the other departmental proceeding, it is stated that the final order has been passed on 6-4-2001, a photo copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-C. By the said order, the Board has directed for deduction of 5% of pension and further recovery of the embezzled amount of Rs. 2299.38 from the amount of gratuity payable to him and finally in view of the earlier order for forfeiture of entire pension, it is stated that the deduction of 5% of pension is not required. 6. The petitioner in reply affidavit has reiterated that Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5-1999 along with charge-sheet and other papers were served upon him along with notice dated 30th June, 2000 on 15-7-2000 for submission of second show-cause. With respect to the receipt of letter dated 27-1 -2000 (Annexure-4), it is stated that it was with respect to the departmental proceeding but without any reference to the proceeding initiated against him pursuant to Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-2-1999. Incidentally, the petitioner appeared in the departmental proceeding initiated against him pursuant to Office Order No. 316 dated 15-10-1987 and in response to Annexure-4 he replied through registered letter dated 2-3-2000 as he was unable to attend due to his own illness and his wifes treatment of cancer. It is contended that it is incorrect to say that the departmental proceeding shall be deemed to have been initiated on the date the petitioner was placed under suspension in terms of Rule 43(b) of the Rules. It is stated that the alleged misconduct for which the so-called departmental proceeding is said to have been initiated relates to for the period 18-7-1993 to 10-10-1995 as shown in the second show-cause notice and the charge, in fact, was served on 15-7-2000 along with the second show-cause notice. However, at best it can be said on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner got knowledge about the proceeding on 26th March, 2000 when the notice in the newspaper was published. 7. However, at best it can be said on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner got knowledge about the proceeding on 26th March, 2000 when the notice in the newspaper was published. 7. As noticed above, the petitioner filed I.A. seeking quashing of Resolution No. 2350 dated 11-10-2000, which has been brought on record by respondents in the counter-affidavit. In the first supplemenatry counter-affidavit the Board has denied that the petitioner had no knowledge about the departmental proceeding prior to 26-3-2000 or that the memo of charge dated 10-5-1999 were never served upon him. In this regard, two applications filed by the petitioner dated 11-11-1999 and 2-3-2000 have been brought on record by way of Annexures-D and E. this Court fails to appreciate as to how Annexures-D and E are of any help to show that the petitioner had knowledge about the proceeding initiated vide Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5-1999 before 26-3-2000. 8. In the second supplementary counter-affidavit, the respondent Board has brought the memo of evidence said to be enclosure of Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5-1999 as Annexure-F and photo copy of the relevant extract of the issue register for issuance of Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5-1999 as Annexure G. In the third suplementary counter-affidavit the respondents have stated that Office Order dated 10-5-1999 was issued and subsequently many notices were issued to him. Some of the notices have been annexed as Annexure H series. According to the respondents, confusion with respect to the notice (Annexure 4) admittedly served on him, about which the petitioner thought it to be with regard to other departmental proceeding, is baseless and absolutely incorrect. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the facts are not in dispute and it is neither the case of the respondent Board nor anything has been brought on record to show that Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5-1999 initiating departmental proceeding in which the final order has been passed on 11-10-2000 (Annexure A) was ever served upon the petitioner before his retirement on 31-5- 1998, It is contended that the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Warehousing Corporation V/s. Vijay Narayan, reported in A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 840, has held that a regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge-sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latters explanation is obtained. It is thus contended that in the present case, the proceeding, vide Office Order No. 2064 dated 10-5- 1999, can at best be said to have been initiated by publication of the notice on 26-3- 2000, vide Annexure 3. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, as the charges relate to the period beyond four years, the final order passed in the proceeding, contained in Annexure A, is in the teeth of the rider Clause as provided in Clause (ii) of Proviso (a) to Rule 43 (b) of the Rules. However, he has not been able to assail the validity of the final order passed in the other proceeding, contained in Annexure-A in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shambhu Saran V/s. The State of Bihar reported in 2000(1) PLJR 665 . 10. Mr. Jha, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent Board, on the other hand, has submitted that the Explanation to Rule 43 of the Rules itself is quite clear that the departmental proceeding shall be deemed to have been instituted when the charges framed, against the pensioner are issued to him or, if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date. According to him, in the present case, it cannot be disputed that the charges were issued to the petitioner before his retirement as is evident from Annexure-G to the second supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Board and moreover, the petitioner was admittedly placed under suspension before his retirement and thus, in any view of the matter, the proceeding would be deemed to have been initiated on the date when the petitioner was placed under suspension and thus rider of four years will not be attracted in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of Shambhu Saran V/s. The State of Bihar (supra). 11. It is true that in the case of Shambhu Saran V/s. The State of Bihar (supra), the Full Bench has held that if the proceeding is initiated before retirement, the same can continue and final order can be passed even after retirement. In view of the Supreme Court decision, the correctness of the same has been doubted in the case of Laxman Prasad Tiwary V/s. The State of Bihar reported in 2000(1) PUR 1061, and has been referred to for consideration by a Larger Bench. In view of the Supreme Court decision, the correctness of the same has been doubted in the case of Laxman Prasad Tiwary V/s. The State of Bihar reported in 2000(1) PUR 1061, and has been referred to for consideration by a Larger Bench. this Court even otherwise finds it difficult to accept the said submission of Mr. Jha. The Explanation is only for the purpose of the Rule and Clause (a) of the said Explanation is only to test the validity of the institution of a departmental proceeding under proviso to Rule 43(b) of the Rules and if a Government servant is placed under suspension from an earlier date, then the said proceeding is to relate back from the date of the order of suspension. The Apex Court in the case of U.P. Warehousing Corporation V/s. Vijay Narayan (supra) has held that a regular departmental proceeding takes place only after the charge-sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latters and the explanation is obtained. 12. In the present case, undisputedly, the charge-sheet was not served upon the petitioner till 15-7-2000. At best it can be said that by issuing notice on 26-3-2000, contained in Annexure 3, the petitioner got knowledge about the initiation of the proceeding. However, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of U.P., Ware Housing Corporation V/s. Vijay Narayan (supra), it is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Jha that by merely issuing charges without serving upon the petitioner, the proceeding can be held to be instituted. Moreover, this Court finds it to be absurd proposition that a proceeding can be said to be instituted merely by issuance of charges. In fact, the word issue in Clause (a) of the said Explanation would include service of the same upon the delinquent, otherwise it will be in the teeth of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. Warehousing Corporation V/s. Vijay Narayan (supra). 13. With respect to the latter part of the submission that the departmental proceeding is deemed to have been instituted on the date when the petitioner was placed under suspension, this Court equally finds it difficult to accept the said submission of Mr. Jha. 13. With respect to the latter part of the submission that the departmental proceeding is deemed to have been instituted on the date when the petitioner was placed under suspension, this Court equally finds it difficult to accept the said submission of Mr. Jha. The High Court after noticing that no departmental proceeding was initiated held that after his retirement in the year 1988 the order of suspension has no force in the eye of law as that same has ceased to have any effect and allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and quashed the order of suspension. Further, this Court held that the petitioner is entitled to get the salary for the period during which he was suspended till he retired from service and, accordingly, directed the Board to pay the same within two months. It is not the case of the respondents that the said order of this Court was ever set aside. Under such circumstances, the respondents cannot take any help from Clause (a) of the explanation which provides that the departmental proceeding shall be deemed to have been instituted if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date. 14. Moreover, this Court finds that the respondents have committed gross error in passing the impugned order that the petitioner shall not be entitled for anything other than the subsistence allowance paid during the period of suspension despite the aforesaid order of this Court. In fact, in my opinion, this amounts to contempt. Thus, this Court finds that the impugned final order, contained in Annexure A, is not sustainable and it is, accordingly, quashed. However, in view of the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Shambhu Saran v. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra), this Court does not find any infirmity in the subsequent order passed in the earlier proceeding, contained in Annexure-C to the counter-affidavit, to the extent whereby the order for punishment of deduction of 5% of pension of the petitioner and for recovery of alleged embezzled amount of Rs. 2299.38 from the amount payable as gratuity has been passed. 15. (supra), this Court does not find any infirmity in the subsequent order passed in the earlier proceeding, contained in Annexure-C to the counter-affidavit, to the extent whereby the order for punishment of deduction of 5% of pension of the petitioner and for recovery of alleged embezzled amount of Rs. 2299.38 from the amount payable as gratuity has been passed. 15. However, in view of the pendency of the judicial proceeding on the charge of embezzlement against the petitioner, this Court directs the respondents to pay the petitioner provisional pension in the light of the Rule, if any, or Government instruction in that regard, subject to final outcome of the judicial proceeding and appropriate order passed in terms of Rule 43 of the Rules. 16. In the result, the writ application is allowed to the above extent, but without costs.