JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J. 1. While M.A.T. Nos. 1831 of 2001 and 1870 of 2001 have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 4th December, 2000, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 19410 (W) of 2000, M.A.T. No. 1898 of 2001 and A.P.O.T. No. 363 of 2001 have been preferred against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 7373(W) of 2001 and in W.P. No. 850 of 2001 on 12th June, 2001, and 21st May, 2001, respectively. While the first three appeals were filed on the Appellate Side, the fourth appeal was filed on the Original Side, but as common questions of fact and law were involved in all the four appeals they were all taken up for hearing and disposal together. 2. The appellants in M.A.T. No. 1831 of 2001, MAT. No. 1870 of 2001 and M.A.T. No. 1898 of 2001 are all Modified Ration Dealers (hereinafter referred to as M.R. Dealers) and the appellants in A.P.O.T. No. 363 of 2001 are the West Bengal M.R. Dealers' Association and its office bearers. They are all aggrieved by the order dated 6th April, 2001, issued by the Food Commissioner and Principal Secretary, Food and Supplies Department, Government of West Bengal. In order to appreciate the reason for such grievance, it will be necessary to briefly indicate the facts leading to the passing of the aforesaid order. 3. In addition to their M.R. Dealership business, the appellants have also been carrying on business as dealers in Kerosene Oil for about fifteen years under licence granted under paragraph 6 of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order 1968, promulgated in terms of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 4. In keeping with the policy of the State Government for the convenience of customers, kerosene was supplied to ration-card holders through the M.R. shops and for the said purpose agreements were entered into between the State Government and M.R. Dealers and licences were separately issued under paragraph 6 of the aforesaid Control Order. In pursuance of the aforesaid policy ration-card holders were tagged with respective M.R. Dealers to ensure smooth distribution of M.R. articles and kerosene oil from the same place against ration cards. 5. In pursuance of the aforesaid policy ration-card holders were tagged with respective M.R. Dealers to ensure smooth distribution of M.R. articles and kerosene oil from the same place against ration cards. 5. There was another set of dealers in Kerosene Oil who were also engaged in the distribution of kerosene under valid licences granted under paragraph 6 of the aforesaid Control Order. In 1965 the State Government took a decision to regulate sale of kerosene oil against ration cards only and issued a Memorandum to that effect on 7th August, 1995. Aggrieved by the said decision, kerosene oil dealers who were not M.R. Dealers and were adversely affected by the said Memorandum challenged the same in three separate writ petitions, being C.O. No. 16011(W) of 1995, C.O. No. 19035(W) of 1995 and C.O. No.13544(W) of 1990, which were all heard together and disposed of by a common judgment on 21st May, 1999. While, inter alia, observing that it was open to the State Government to decide as to whether in the public interest essential commodities including kerosene should be supplied to consumers through Modified Ration Dealers, the learned Single Judge observed further that it could not act in a manner so as to take away the fundamental right of the petitioners to carryon business by refusing to supply kerosene to them. The learned Judge observed that the respondents were bound to arrange the distribution of kerosene oil to consumers both through M.R. Dealers and Kerosene Dealers in such a manner that more or less similar quantities of kerosene were supplied to Kerosene Dealers who would also be entitled to sell kerosene to ration card holders or otherwise. 6. The learned Judge observed that the respondents were bound to arrange the distribution of kerosene oil to consumers both through M.R. Dealers and Kerosene Dealers in such a manner that more or less similar quantities of kerosene were supplied to Kerosene Dealers who would also be entitled to sell kerosene to ration card holders or otherwise. 6. The writ petitions were disposed of with the following directions: "All the present writ petitions therefore are disposed of by directing the Secretary, Department of Food & Supply, West Bengal to frame a guideline after hearing the writ petitioners, the private respondents as also the Sub-Divisional Controller of Food and Supply, Krishnanagar as to the manner in which the existing Kerosene Dealers having valid licence under paragraph 6 of the Kerosene Control Order as' also the M.R. Dealers who are being allowed to sell kerosene to the consumers will be supplied kerosene oil and they will sell the same to the consumers so that both such Kerosene Dealers and M.R. Dealers receive more or less similar quantity of kerosene oil for distribution and the existing kerosene dealers after receipt of such supply can carryon their business by selling the same to the consumers in the light of the present judgment." Till the framing of such guidelines certain interim directions were given for continuance of supply to both categories of Kerosene Oil Dealers. 7. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the Food Commissioner gave a hearing to all concerned and in his order dated 15th November, 1999, he declined to accept the suggestion made on behalf of the Kerosene Oil Dealers that tagging of ration cards to retailers of kerosene was not necessary and that consumers should be permitted to purchase kerosene from more than one retailer. Kerosene being a highly subsidised commodity made available in limited quantities through the public distribution system, it was felt that any further liberal system of distribution could lead to diversion to the open market, black-marketing and other mal-practices. It was also felt that since redistribution and/or reallocation of quotas among M.R. Dealers also acting as kerosene retailers and retail dealers only of kerosene, would take some time, the District Magistrate/ District Controller, Food & Supplies and the Sub-Divisional Officers/Sub-Divisional Controllers, Food and Supplies, would undertake an exercise on a time-bound basis in this regard, and, in the meantime, the system as prevailing should continue. 8. 8. The aforesaid order of the Food Commissioner was followed by a meeting held in the chamber of the Minister-in-Charge, Food and Supplies, West Bengal, on 7th April, 2000, with regard to the functioning of the Sub-Divisional Controllers and Field Level Inspecting staff attached to the office of the District Controller, Food and Supplies and the Sub-Divisional Controller, Food and Supplies. The said meeting was chaired by the Minister-in-Charge, Food and Supplies Department and was attended by the Food Commissioner, the Director of Consumer Goods, West Bengal, the Deputy Director and the Assistant Director of Consumer Goods, the District Controllers of various districts and Sub-Divisional Controllers of different sub-divisions in the different districts. One of the decisions arrived at the meeting was as follows : "4) New vacancies in respect of S.K. Oil dealership shall be filled up by the persons who are dealing exclusively in Kerosene Oil. Existing M.R. Dealers who are acting as K. Oil dealers may also opt for continuation as M.R. Dealer or for grant of exclusive S.K. Oil Dealership Licence." 9. After the aforesaid meeting some Kerosene Oil dealers who were dealing exclusively in kerosene, filed a writ application, being W.P. No. 19410(W) of 2000, complaining that the aforesaid decision taken at the meeting held on 7th April, 2000, was not being implemented and praying for a direction on the State Government to implement such decision. The said writ application came up for consideration before Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000, and the learned Judge after referring to the earlier judgment dated 21st May, 1999, and the decision taken at the meeting held on 7th April, 2000, directed the State Government to issue necessary directions to the Director, Food and Supplies, for implementing the decision of the Government dated 7th April, 2000 within 4 weeks from the date of communication of the order. 10. On 18th December, the Commissioner, Food and Principal Secretary, Department of Food and Supplies, Government of West Bengal, issued an order in relation to distribution of Superfine Kerosene Oil (SKO) to consumers under the Public Distribution System. 10. On 18th December, the Commissioner, Food and Principal Secretary, Department of Food and Supplies, Government of West Bengal, issued an order in relation to distribution of Superfine Kerosene Oil (SKO) to consumers under the Public Distribution System. It was indicated in the said order that the existing system of distribution of S.K.O. to consumer through both M.R. Dealers and S.K.O. Dealers would continue in the M.R. areas, but in case of any new or resultant vacancy in the districts, preference would be given to those who agreed to deal exclusively in S.K.O. There was a further stipulation that existing M.R. Dealers could also opt to apply against such vacancies, but they would have to surrender their M.R. dealership, if selected. Certain other conditions were also mentioned in the said order. 11. The aforesaid order was, however, withdrawn on 7th March, 2001, and on 6th April, 2001, a fresh order was passed by the Commissioner, Food and Principal Secretary, Food and Supplies Department, Government of West Bengal, to the following effect : Government of West Bengal Food and Supplies Department 11A, Mirza Galib Street, Kolkata-700 087 No. 1346 F.S. Date 06.04.2001 FS/Sectt/Sup/4M -30/2000 ORDER With a view to streamlining the distribution of S.K.O. through S.K.O. Dealers in the M.R. Areas in the districts and the selection of new S.K.O. Dealers there to deal exclusively in S.K.O. and in compliance to the order passed by the Hon'ble Justice Basudeva Panigrahi on 04-12-2000 in W.P. No. 19410(W) of 2000, the guidelines, below, in respect of the selection and distribution of S.K.O. in the M.R. areas in the district shall henceforth be strictly followed. (1) All the existing M.R. Dealers who have been also engaged as S.K.O. Dealers, shall exercise their option either to act as S.K.O. Dealers or to deal with M.R. Articles within 30-06-2001. In case, they opt for M.R. Dealers, they shall not be engaged any, longer as S.K. Oil Dealer and they will have to surrender their S.K.O. Dealership within the said period. (2) In case any new or resultant vacancy of S.K.O. Dealership is declared in the district, preference shall be given to those candidates only who agree and affirm through affidavit to deal exclusively in S.K.O. Existing M.R. Dealers without having S.K.O. licence may also opt to apply against such vacancies but they will have to surrender their M.R. Dealerships, if selected for the S.K.O. licence. (3) A S.K.O. Consumer under P.D.S. can draw his allotted quota of kerosene only from the S.K.O. shop where his Ration Card has been tagged. Sd/- Ajoy Sinha, Commissioner, Food & Principal Secretary. 12. As the appellants in M.A.T. Nos. 1831 and 1870 of 2000 had not been made parties in W.P. No. 19410 (W) of 2000 but were adversely affected by the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001, pursuant to the order passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000, they made applications for leave to appeal against the said order of the learned Single Judge and such leave was duly granted on 20th June, 2001. 13. The appellants in M.A.T. No. 1898 of 2001, who were similarly affected by the order of the Food Commissioner dated 6th April, 2001, challenged the same by way of a writ petition, being W.P. No. 7373(W) of 2001, which was dismissed by Ronojit Kumar Mitra, J. on 12th June, 2001, upon holding that the same was not maintainable as the Food Commissioner had merely complied with the order of the Court dated 4th December, 2000, which was valid and subsisting and could not be disturbed by a Judge sitting in coordinate jurisdiction. M.A.T. No. 1898 of 2001 has been filed against the said judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 14. A.P.O.T. No. 363 of 2001 is directed against the judgment and order dated 21st May, 2001, dismissing the writ application (W.P. No. 850 of 2001) filed by the appellants upon holding that the same was not maintainable. 15. Appearing for the appellants in MAT. No. 1831 of 2001 and A.P.O.T. No. 363 of 2001, Mr. Soumen Ghosh firstly contended that a decision having been taken by the Food Commissioner on 15th November, 1999, pursuant to the directions contained in the judgment and order dated 21st May, 1999, passed by Samaresh Banerjea, J. the subsequent resolutions purportedly adopted at the meeting chaired by the Minister-in-Charge, Food and Supplies Department, on 7th April, 2000, were merely in the nature of executive instructions which could not supersede the policy decision of the State Government as reflected and expressed in the order of the Food Commissioner dated 15th November, 1999. Mr. Mr. Ghosh submitted that Basudev Panigrahi, J. had been led into believing that the resolutions purportedly adopted on 7th April, 2000, in the chamber of the concerned Minister was pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. which prompted the learned Judge to direct the State Government to implement the said resolutions without taking into account the Food Commissioner's order dated 15th November, 1999. 16. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in yet another writ petition filed by one Sujit Kumar Munshi & Ors., being W.P. No. 3431(W) of 2000, questioning the Government's policy decision regarding distribution of kerosene, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta had by his order dated 14th March, 2000, directed the parties to maintain status quo, which order was still subsisting. Mr. Ghosh submitted that having regard to the interim order of status quo, it was not open to the Minister-in-Charge in pursuance of his executive authority to alter the policy decision of the State Government, as reflected in the Food Commissioner's order dated 15th November, 1999, and for the directions to be given in W.P. No. 19410(W) of 2000 directing implementation of the resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the order of status quo had not been brought to the notice of the learned Judge and the directions in the order of 4th December, 2000, were given in ignorance of the earlier order of status quo and must, therefore, be held to be per incuriam as was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. And Anr., [1991(4) SCC page 139] and were liable to be avoided. 17. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Parukutty Mannadissiar vs. State of Kerala, (AIR 1990 SC page 817). Mr. Ghosh urged that the direction of this Court could not be altered by the State Government by passing an administrative order. 18. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the submissions made on behalf of the State had lost much of its credibility because of the shifting stand taken at different points of time. Mr. Mr. Ghosh urged that the direction of this Court could not be altered by the State Government by passing an administrative order. 18. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the submissions made on behalf of the State had lost much of its credibility because of the shifting stand taken at different points of time. Mr. Ghosh submitted that while before Basudev Panigrahi, J. it was contended that the resolutions taken in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, were taken in the public interest, before Ronojit Kumar Mitra, J. it was urged that the writ petition was not maintainable as the said resolutions had been taken pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. Mr. Ghosh urged that the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001 not being of a statutory character, the same could not be given effect to as it was contrary to the provisions of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968. 19. It was then argued that under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, for the reasons indicated therein, the Central Government could by order provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity and could delegate such powers in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified to a State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government. It was urged that the State Government cannot itself further delegate its powers to a subordinate officer and it has to exercise its powers within the sphere of delegation. Mr. Ghosh submitted that, inasmuch as, the resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber were administrative in nature, the same did not reflect the policy decision of the State Government and could not, therefore, be given effect to being beyond the field of delegation. 20. Mr. Ghosh contended that the M.R. Dealership of the appellants were governed by an agreement executed between the State and the M.R. Dealer concerned and could not be terminated except in the manner indicated in the agreement. 21. Mr. 20. Mr. Ghosh contended that the M.R. Dealership of the appellants were governed by an agreement executed between the State and the M.R. Dealer concerned and could not be terminated except in the manner indicated in the agreement. 21. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000 and the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001, were arbitrary, and, the same could not terminate the M.R. agreements with the appellants, and, in any event, such resolutions could not be acted upon as they were not expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor as required under Article 166 of the Constitution. Mr. Ghosh submitted that all executive action of the Government of a State, flowing from a Ministerial decision, had to be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor and the order of the Food Commissioner dated 6th April, 2001, also not being in conformity with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution was incompetent and could not be given effect to since it had not also been communicated to the appellants who were amongst those who were mainly affected by it. 22. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Ghosh referred to a Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (AIR 1963 SC page 395) wherein it was held that before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 of the Constitution and then it has to be communicated. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to observe that constitutionally speaking the Minister is no more than an adviser and the Governor as the Head of State is required to act with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore, until such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the Minister or Council of Ministers may say in regard to a particular matter does not become the action of the State until the advice of the Council of Ministers is accepted or deemed to be accepted by the Head of the State. 23. In this regard reference was also made to another decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Bahl vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 23. In this regard reference was also made to another decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Bahl vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (AIR 1979 SC page 220) wherein in the context of an order of the Chief Minister confirming a public servant, it was held that such order does not create any right in favour of the public servant concerned when it is not expressed in the name of the Governor and is not communicated to the employee. 24. Reliance was also placed on another decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar vs. Kripalu Shankar (AIR 1987 SC page 1554) where relying on Bachhittar Singh's case (supra) similar views were expressed. 25. It was also urged that the writ application of Krishna Gopal Pramanick and others (W.P. No. 19410 (W) of 2000) which was disposed of by Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000, was not maintainable as the resolutions purported to have been adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, were mere administrative instructions which could not be enforced in writ jurisdiction. Reference was made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of G.J. Fernandez vs. The State of Mysore (AIR 1967 SC page 1753) where the said principle was considered and explained. 26. Mr. Ghosh submitted that besides being arbitrary the directions contained in the Order of 6th April, 2001, were also discriminatory and tended to create a special class, which practice had been deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mannalal Jain vs. State of Assam & Ors. (AIR 1962 SC page 386). It was submitted that the option contained in the said order was not in the nature of a regulatory measure and so long as the appellants had valid licences granted to them under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968, they had the fundamental right to carryon business as distributors of kerosene oil. 27. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the 1968 Order would prevail over the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2000, purportedly in compliance with the order passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000. 28. Mr. 27. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the 1968 Order would prevail over the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2000, purportedly in compliance with the order passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000. 28. Mr. Ghosh lastly submitted that since the appellants had not been made parties in the proceedings before Basudev Panigrahi, J. but were adversely affected by the directions given in the order of 4th December, 2000, the appellants were entitled to pray for review of the said order and the learned Single Judge erred in holding in A.P.O.T. No. 363 of 2001 that the same could not be questioned before a learned Single Judge sitting in co-ordinate jurisdiction. Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabodh Verma vs. Dal Chand(AIR 1985 SC page 167), Mr. Ghosh urged that the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 19410(W) of 2000 ought not to have proceeded with the writ petition without ensuring that all parties who were likely to be affected by any order passed therein to their detriment and disadvantage were made parties to the writ petition and were given an opportunity of stating their respective cases. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in a situation such as this, the appellants were competent to challenge the said decision in a fresh writ petition and the learned Single Judge erred in holding otherwise and dismissing the same. 29. Appearing for one group of intervenors in M.A.T. No. 1831 of 2001, Mr. Kashi Kanto Maitra, learned Senior Counsel, reiterated Mr. Ghosh's submission and added that the intervenors, who were similarly circumstanced as the appellants, were equally affected by the order passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. and the order passed thereupon by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001. Mr. Maitra submitted that since the aforesaid orders had adverse civil consequences and seriously prejudiced the intervenors and their right to carry on business under licences granted to them under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968, they should have been given an opportunity of hearing before the same were passed. Mr. Mr. Maitra submitted that since the aforesaid orders had adverse civil consequences and seriously prejudiced the intervenors and their right to carry on business under licences granted to them under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968, they should have been given an opportunity of hearing before the same were passed. Mr. Maitra submitted that neither the resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, nor the order of the Food Commissioner dated 6th April, 2001, could be said to be a reflection of the policy decision of the State Government and by trying to implement the same the respondents were acting not only in violation of the principles of natural justice and administrative fairplay, but also in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 30. In this regard, Mr. Maitra firstly referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.I. Shephard & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. [1987(4) SCC page 431] wherein it was, inter alia, observed that even in emergent situations, compliance with at least the minimum requirement of natural justice is a condition precedent to taking any action which has adverse civil consequences such as loss of livelihood. Although delivered in the context of service jurisprudence, the judgment also took note of the fact that in such cases, post-decisional hearing was insufficient. 31. Mr. Maitra urged that the right to carryon business was a right to property within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution and the same could not be taken away except by due process of law. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. North Bihar Agency & Ors. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (AIR 1981 SC page 1758) Mr. Maitra submitted that in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed certain orders which were passed cancelling drug licences, without giving a proper opportunity of hearing to licence holders, holding the same to be in violation of the principles of natural justice. 32. Mr. Maitra also referred to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jilubhai Nanhhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. 32. Mr. Maitra also referred to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jilubhai Nanhhai Khachar vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (AIR 1995 SC page 142) wherein while considering the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution it was observed that deprivation of the right to property must be by an Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature, rule or statutory order having the force of law. 33. Regarding the resolution adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, Mr. Maitra referred to an early decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harla vs. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1951 SC page 467) where the principle of promulgation and publication was considered and it was held that the mere passing of a resolution by a Council of Ministers purporting to enact a law, without promulgation or publication in the Gazette or other means to make the Act known to the public is not sufficient to make it law. 34. Mr. Maitra then urged that although grant of licence was not in the contractual field, having regard to the M.R. agreement entered into between the State and an M.R. Dealer, even if the same was held to be covered by a contract, even then the Court could interfere if the decision to refuse to grant or renew a licence was arbitrary or opposed to public policy. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case or Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [1991(1) SCC 'page 212] wherein it was held, inter alia, that even in matters pertaining to the policy decision of the State in respect of State's contracts with private parties, the policy must satisfy the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and fair play must be the basis of the policy. 35. The next branch of Mr. Maitra's submission was that since licences had been granted to the intervenors under the 1968 Control Order they had a legitimate expectation to continue their business of kerosene oil dealership as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India vs. M/s. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries [1993 (1) SCC page 71] and a decision in the matter was open to judicial review to satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness. 36. Mr. 36. Mr. Maitra submitted that the said principle was further extended in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Gyan Devi & Ors. [1995(2) SCC page 326] as being applicable where although a person had no enforceable right, he was affected or likely to be affected by an order passed by a public authority. 37. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rashid Ahmed vs. The Municipal Board, Kairana (1950 SCR page 566) Mr. Maitra 'urged that no doubt the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) of the Constitution were subject to reasonable restrictions, but if such restrictions were unreasonable, the Courts could always step in and declare the same to be unreasonable in exercise of its powers in the writ jurisdiction. 38. Certain other decisions were also referred to in the above regard which only have repetitive value. 39. Mr. Maitra concluded on the note that an acquired right could not be taken away by an executive fiat and consequently the resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000 and the direction given by the learned Single Judge on the basis thereof, as also the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001, could not also be given effect to. 40. Mr. Hirak Mitra who appeared for some of the other intervenors, adopted the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and by Mr. Maitra. Referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in District Collector, Hyderabad vs. Ibrahim & Co. (AIR 1970 SC page 1275) rendered in the context of Article 301 of the Constitution, Mr. Mitra reiterated the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and by Mr. Maitra that rights guaranteed under the Constitution could not taken away by executive action. 41. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in M.A.T. No. 1870 of 2001 and the other intervenors adopted the submissions made by Mr. Ghosh, Mr. Maitra and Mr. Hirak Mitra and urged that the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001, was without authority of law and was liable to be quashed. 42. The last set of appellants in M.A.T. No. 1898 of 2001 are M.R. Dealers of various villages under Karimpur Police Station in the District of Naida. Appearing on their behalf, Mr. Hirak Mitra and urged that the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001, was without authority of law and was liable to be quashed. 42. The last set of appellants in M.A.T. No. 1898 of 2001 are M.R. Dealers of various villages under Karimpur Police Station in the District of Naida. Appearing on their behalf, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the question relating to allotment of kerosene oil to M.R. Dealers had been decided much earlier by this Court in C.O. No. 557(W) of 1986. The said writ petition had been brought by some M.R. Dealers who were being supplied less kerosene oil than other M.R. Dealers and some to whom supply was completely discontinued. The same was disposed of on 23rd June, 1987, by the learned Single Judge with a direction to the respondents to resume supply of usual quota of kerosene to the writ petitioners in the said writ petition. 43. Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that aggrieved by the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 15th November, 1999, the appellants had filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 3431(W) of 2000 wherein an order of status quo was passed by Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J. on 14th March, 2000 and despite the subsistence of such order, the Food Commissioner passed the subsequent orders on 18th December, 2000 and 6th April, 2001. Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that in view of the subsisting order of status quo, the subsequent orders passed by the Food Commissioner must be deemed to be non est in the eye of law. 44. Adverting to the decision of Samaresh Banerjea J. and the directions given therein, Mr. Bhattacharya raised the question as to whether the writ court could have at all directed the State to change its policy regarding distribution of kerosene oil both through M.R. Dealers and dealers dealing only in supply of kerosene oil. 45. Appearing for the State and the State respondents, Mr. L.C. Behani submitted that as would appear from the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 15th November, 1999, pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999, the same was not conclusive as no guidelines had been framed in terms of the said directions. Mr. 45. Appearing for the State and the State respondents, Mr. L.C. Behani submitted that as would appear from the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 15th November, 1999, pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999, the same was not conclusive as no guidelines had been framed in terms of the said directions. Mr. Eehani submitted that it was categorically indicated in the order itself that since the process of redistribution and reallocation of quotas among M.R. Dealers and retail dealers only of kerosene and the equitable re-tagging of ration cards among both categories of retail dealers of kerosene was likely to take some time, the district and sub-divisional authorities would undertake a time-bound exercise in that regard and in the meantime the existing system would continue. Mr. Behani urged that it could not, therefore, be contended, as has been done on behalf of the appellants, that the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 15th November, 1999, contained the policy decision of the State Government arrived at pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999. Mr. Behani urged that the said order of the Food Commissioner was at best the initial stage of the process commenced in compliance with the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. and continued in the decisions arrived at in the Minister's chamber by a High Power Committee on 7th April, 2000, and culminated in the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001. 46. Mr. Behani submitted that the scheme for distribution of Kerosene Oil had been formulated by the State Government not under any provision of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968, or the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, but in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution which is co-extensive with its legislative powers under Chapter 3 of Part VI of the Constitution. Mr. Behani also urged that the provisions of Article 166 were only directory and not mandatory in nature. 47. In support of his submissions Mr. Behani referred to and relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh, Tehsil Bemetra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Mr. Behani also urged that the provisions of Article 166 were only directory and not mandatory in nature. 47. In support of his submissions Mr. Behani referred to and relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh, Tehsil Bemetra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (AIR 1981 SC page 2030) wherein having regard to Article 162 of the Constitution and Entry 33 (b) of the Concurrent List it was held that the State Government was competent in exercise of its executive powers to frame a scheme for distribution of foodstuffs which was not in exercise of any delegated power under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 48. Mr. Behani also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. and Anr. vs. Kumari Nivedita Jain & Ors. (AIR 1981 SC page 2045) where it was held that in the absence of express legislation, the State in exercise of its executive powers under Article 162 of the Constitution could pass executive orders relating to admission of candidates to medical colleges. 49. It was then urged that obviously the Courts did not interfere with policy decisions of the Government unless it could be shown that any such decision was either arbitrary, was opposed to public interest or unreasonable or was mala fide and motivated. Mr. Behani submitted that the policy decision of the State Government as reflected in the resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber was in the public interest in order to ensure smooth and uninterrupted supply of kerosene to the public. It was not also the case of the appellants that such decision was either motivated or taken with any mala fide intention. 50. In this connection Mr. Behani firstly referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. U.P. University Colleges Pensioners' Association (AIR 1994 SC page 2311) where in connection with a scheme framed by the State Government in connection with liberalisation of pension policy it was observed that it was not open to any Court to interfere with the same, as the policy contained in the scheme could not be said to be either unreasonable or against public interest, which were the only grounds available to the Court to interfere with a policy matter while reviewing the same judicially. 51. Mr. 51. Mr. Behani then referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar Maheshwari vs. Union of India & Ors. [1990 (Suppl.) SCC page 440] wherein with reference to guidelines required to be issued by the Governments and statutory authorities in particular situations it was observed that a Court would be reluctant to interfere simply because one or more of the guidelines had not been adhered to even when there are substantial deviations, unless such deviations are, by nature and extent such as to prejudice the interests of the public. 52. Reference was lastly made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education & Anr. vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth & Ors. [1984(4) SCC page 27] where after an elaborate discussion the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature and the subordinate regulation-making body unless the same could be shown to suffer from any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation making power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitation imposed by the Constitution. 53. Mr. Behani submitted that in the absence of any of the abovementioned limitations, the policy as evolved in the meeting held in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, was beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. 54. Mr. Behani then referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sher Singh vs. Union of India[1995(6) SCC page 515] wherein it was held that a policy decision of the Government which was neither unfair nor mala fide would not be subject to judicial review. 55. Reference was then made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh (AIR 1982 SC page 1234) and State of Orissa vs. Radheshyam Meher [1995(1) SCC page 652] wherein it was observed that the Government has the right to change its policy from time to time according to the demands of the time and situation and in the public interest and the High Court erred in interfering with the administrative decision of the Government taken in public interest. A somewhat similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tejram Parashramji Bombhate [1991 (3) SCC page 11] wherein it was observed that no court or tribunal could compel the Government to change its policy which puts a financial burden on it. 56. Mr. Behani also referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1) State of Punjab vs. Ram Lubhaya Bagga & Ors. [1998(4) SCC page 117] and 2) Sales Tax Officer & Ors. vs. Shree Durga Oil Mills & Anr., [1998(1) SCC page 572], where similar views have been expressed. 57. On the extent of the Courts' powers of judicial review, Mr. Behani relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India [1994(6) SCC page 651] wherein it was explained in detail that while the court could not interfere with the Government's freedom to contract and invite tenders and to refuse to accept any tender, it could consider whether such decision or action taken was vitiated by arbitrariness, unfairness, illegality or irrationality. The Supreme Court observed that the test is whether the wrong is of such a nature as required the intervention of the Court to set right the decision-making process. 58. Regarding Mr. Ghosh's submissions on the freedom to carryon any trade or business guaranteed under Article 19(1) of the Constitution, Mr. Behani urged that under Article 19(6) the Government could always impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest. In other words, the public interest would outweigh individual considerations in certain circumstances. In this regard, Mr. Behani placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnan Kakkanth vs. Government of Kerala & Ors. [1997(9) SCC page 495] where the said question fell for consideration and it was, inter alia, observed that reasonable restrictions were to be determined from the standpoint of public interest and circumstances relating to the trade or business in question and not from the standpoint of interest of the person on whom the restriction was imposed, even if such restriction operated harshly on him. 59. In this connection, reliance was also placed on another decision of the Supreme Court in M.R.F. Ltd vs. Inspector, Kerala Government & Ors. [1998(8) SCC page 227] where the principles relating to reasonable restrictions were restated. 60. Mr. 59. In this connection, reliance was also placed on another decision of the Supreme Court in M.R.F. Ltd vs. Inspector, Kerala Government & Ors. [1998(8) SCC page 227] where the principles relating to reasonable restrictions were restated. 60. Mr. Behani concluded his submissions by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in P.T.R. Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. [1996(5) SCC page 268] and submitting that the doctrine of legitimate expectation canvassed by Mr. Kashi Kanta Maitra would not apply to the facts of the case which singularly related to the policy decision of the State Government regarding equitable distribution of kerosene oil to subserve the public interest. Mr. Behani contended that legitimate expectation would be subject to change in Government policy in the public interest. 61. Mr. Behani urged that the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001, was the culmination of the process begun in terms of the judgment and order passed by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999, and reflected the policy decision of the State Government taken at the meeting in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000. 62. Mr. Malay Basu, who appeared for the respondent Nos. 1 to 79, the writ petitioners before Basudev Panigrahi, J., adopted Mr. Behani's submissions and urged that his clients were interested in ensuring that they were given regular supply of kerosene oil so as to enable them to carryon their kerosene dealership business as per the licences granted to them under the provisions of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968. 63. Mr. Basu submitted that his clients were compelled to move the writ court as the decision taken in the Minister's chamber regarding equi-distribution of kerosene oil was not being implemented and the learned Single Judge merely directed the authorities to implement the said decision. 64. Replying to Mr. Behani's submissions Mr. Ghosh submitted that kerosene was an essential commodity and was included in the Schedule to the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. In view of the provisions of section 5 of the said Act, a delegatee could not act beyond its delegated authority. Referring to section 6 of the Act, Mr. 64. Replying to Mr. Behani's submissions Mr. Ghosh submitted that kerosene was an essential commodity and was included in the Schedule to the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. In view of the provisions of section 5 of the said Act, a delegatee could not act beyond its delegated authority. Referring to section 6 of the Act, Mr. Ghosh also submitted that the provisions of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968, would prevail over executive instructions even if issued under Article 162 of the Constitution, particularly as the decision taken in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, did not culminate in an order issued in the name of the Governor. 65. As indicated hereinabove, two sets of orders are under appeal in these four appeals. The first order is that of the learned Single Judge dated 4th December, 2000, in W.P. No. 19410 (W) of 2000, directing implementation of the resolutions adopted in the chamber of the Minister-in-Charge, Food and Supplies Department, Government of West Bengal, on 7th April, 2000. The second set of orders are those passed by the learned Single Judge declining to interfere with the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 6th April, 2001, having regard to the earlier order passed on 4th December, 2000. 66. The central question which, therefore, falls for decision in these appeals is whether the resolutions arrived at in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, can be given effect to notwithstanding the judgment delivered by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999, the directions given earlier by Susanta Chatterjee, J. on 23rd June, 1987 and the order of status quo passed by Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J. on 14th March, 2000, in W.P. No. 3431(W) of 2000. 67. As will appear from the order passed by Susanta Chatterjee, J. on 23rd June, 1987, no issue as such involving the two sets of kerosene oil dealers was decided therein, and the writ petition was disposed of only with a direction not to discriminate between two sets of M.R. Dealers and to see that both sets received the equal quantity of kerosene for distribution. 68. 68. The question regarding supply of kerosene oil to two sets of dealers, one dealing exclusively in kerosene oil and the other also dealing in M.R. articles along with kerosene oil, fell for consideration for the first time before Samaresh Banerjea, J. in several writ petitions filed by persons dealing exclusively in kerosene. After considering the matter at length, the learned Judge was of the view that since the writ petitioners held valid licences under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968, they had the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carryon their business as dealers of kerosene oil and such right could not be taken away either directly or by refusing to supply kerosene to them. The learned Judge, however, observed that such right was subject to reasonable restrictions which the State could impose under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. While giving directions to the State to ensure distribution of kerosene to the public both through M.R. Dealers and those dealing exclusively in kerosene, the learned Judge also directed the Secretary, Department of Food and Supplies, Government of West Bengal, to frame a guideline regarding supply of kerosene to all dealers, including M.R. Dealers having valid licences under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968. 69. Despite Mr. Ghosh's strenuous efforts to convince us otherwise, the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 15th November, 1999, pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. cannot be said to be in final compliance of such directions. As will appear from the order itself a separate exercise was required to be undertaken at the district and sub-divisional level throughout the State so as to ensure equi-distribution between M.R. Dealers and other retail dealers in kerosene for sale to consumers per ration card per week. 70. The subsequent decisions taken at the meeting in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, is at variance with the context of the said order of the Food Commissioner and the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. While disposing of the writ petition filed by the respondent Nos. 70. The subsequent decisions taken at the meeting in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, is at variance with the context of the said order of the Food Commissioner and the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. While disposing of the writ petition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 79 in M.A.T. No. 1831 of 2001, being W.P. No. 19410(W) of 2000, Basudev Panigrahi, J. does not appear to have taken into consideration the order passed by the Food Commissioner on 15th November, 1999, and the learned Judge proceeded on the basis that the decisions arrived at in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, were in consequence of the direction given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999. 71. The system involving distribution of kerosene as prevailing on 7th April, 2000, provided for such distribution both through M.R. Dealers and those dealing exclusively in kerosene. A change was sought to be introduced by the decisions arrived at in the Minister's chamber on the said date. As per the said decisions, notwithstanding the fact that they had valid licences under the 1968 Kerosene Control Order, M.R. Dealers would no longer be entitled to carryon business both as M.R. Dealers and dealers in kerosene oil. They would have to opt in favour of carrying on any one of the two businesses. 72. It has been strenuously urged by Mr. Behani that ordinarily the Courts are reluctant to interfere with policy decisions of the Government. That no doubt, is generally followed as a rule, but there are exceptions when the Government either acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or in excess of authority vested by Statute or contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. In such cases, the Courts can judicially review the decision-making process. 73. We are not, however, inclined to extend the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the cases under appeal, since it is the right of licence holders under the 1968 Order to carryon business as dealers in kerosene oil, unless circumscribed by any valid regulatory measure. 74. While we agree with Mr. 73. We are not, however, inclined to extend the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the cases under appeal, since it is the right of licence holders under the 1968 Order to carryon business as dealers in kerosene oil, unless circumscribed by any valid regulatory measure. 74. While we agree with Mr. Behani that the State Government is entitled to alter its policies in keeping with the circumstances and in the public interest, we-fail to understand how the decision not to allow M.R. Dealers to function as kerosene oil dealers under licences granted under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order, 1968, can be said to be a regulatory measure or reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution. A reasonable restriction imposed under the said provision of the Constitution must have a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The right to deal in kerosene oil is an independent right under the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order and is in no way circumscribed by any other trade or business that the licence holder may be carrying on. It would have been different if a restriction had been imposed in the 1968 Order itself not to grant licences to those who were carrying on other trades or businesses. In the absence of any such regulatory measure in the said Order and licences having been issued thereunder, the decision taken in the meeting in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, and the Food Commissioner's order dated 6th April, 2001, based thereupon, must be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable and an invasion of the rights of M.R. Dealers to carryon any trade or business as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 75. The other point taken on behalf of the appellants that neither the decisions taken in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, nor the Food Commissioner's order dated 6th April, 2001, were in consonance with Article 166 of the Constitution cannot also be brushed aside. 75. The other point taken on behalf of the appellants that neither the decisions taken in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, nor the Food Commissioner's order dated 6th April, 2001, were in consonance with Article 166 of the Constitution cannot also be brushed aside. While the State represented by the Minister-in-Charge of the Department of Food and Supplies, Government of West Bengal, may have been competent to take a policy decision on the distribution and supply of kerosene oil under authority delegated under section 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, such decision would have to be accepted or deemed to have been accepted by the Governor and the Food Commissioner's order passed on 6th April, 2001, on the basis thereof should have been expressed to have been taken in the name of the Governor. The Minister's decision is not translated into an action of the State in the absence of acceptance by the Governor. The position has been explained at length in Bachhittar Singh's case (supra) and in Kedar Nath Bahl's case (supra) cited by Mr. Soumen Ghosh. 76. There is also another important aspect of the matter which has to be taken into consideration and in respect whereof we are inclined to accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and the intervenors. We are of the view that since their M.R. Dealerships are governed by separate and individual agreements between them and the State, such relationship could not be terminated by a Ministerial decision compelling them in terrorem to surrender their M.R. Dealership if they wished to apply for new kerosene oil dealership or to continue their existing dealership in kerosene oil exclusively. 77. We are inclined to allow the appeals preferred against the judgment passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000, in W.P. No. 19410(W) of 2000, since, in our view. neither the decisions arrived at in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, nor the Food Commissioner's order dated 6th April, 2001, can be said to be the policy decision of the State Government in the absence of compliance with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution, which, in our view, gives legitimacy to all State action. 78. neither the decisions arrived at in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, nor the Food Commissioner's order dated 6th April, 2001, can be said to be the policy decision of the State Government in the absence of compliance with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution, which, in our view, gives legitimacy to all State action. 78. As far as the other appeals are concerned, having regard to the prayers in the writ petitions, the learned Single Judge apparently proceeded on the basis that the decisions arrived at in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, were taken in terms of the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999, and that the order passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000, was only to give effect to such decisions taken pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. and that consequently the prayer to declare the order passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. was not maintainable. 79. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted except for the fact that the decisions arrived at in the meeting held in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, was not in consequence of the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. on 21st May, 1999. The said directions were given to the Secretary, Department of Food and Supplies, Government of West Bengal, who passed all order on the basis thereof on 15th November, 1999. By the said order a process was initiated to frame a guideline for distribution of kerosene oil both through M.R. Dealers and dealers of kerosene only as directed by Samaresh Banerjea, J. in the order of 21st May, 1999. As submitted by Mr. Behani, it was not a final order, but part of a process. The resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, were contrary to the judgment delivered by Samaresh Banerjea, J. and the directions contained therein and could not be said to be in continuation of the process initiated by the Food Commissioner and Principal Secretary, Department of Food and Supplies. The resolutions adopted in the Minister's chamber on 7th April, 2000, were contrary to the judgment delivered by Samaresh Banerjea, J. and the directions contained therein and could not be said to be in continuation of the process initiated by the Food Commissioner and Principal Secretary, Department of Food and Supplies. The learned Single Judge was clearly under a misapprehension that the said resolutions had been adopted pursuant to the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. and proceeded on such supposition to hold that the writ applications questioning the propriety of the order passed by Basudev Panigrahi, J. could not be maintained before another Single Judge sitting in co-ordinate jurisdiction. 80. While we respect the sentiments expressed by the learned Single Judge, we are inclined to hold that the learned Single Judge proceeded on an erroneous presumption of fact. 81. We have already indicated hereinbefore our reasons for interfering with the directions given by Basudev Panigrahi, J. on 4th December, 2000. The Food Commissioner's order dated 6th April, 2001, having been passed on the basis thereof, the said reasons hold good for these two appeals as well. 82. All the four appeals are accordingly allowed. The orders of the learned Single Judge dated 21st May, 2001, and 12th June, 2001 passed in W.P. No. 850 of 2001 and W.P. No. 7373(W) of 2001, are set aside, together with the judgment and order dated 4th December, 2000, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 19410(W) of 2000. The respondents are directed to act in accordance with the directions given by Samaresh Banerjea, J. in His Lordship's judgment and order dated 21st May, 1999. This will not, however, prevent the State Government and its authorities to take any further policy decision in the matter of distribution and supply of kerosene oil 'in accordance with law and the provisions of the Constitution. 83. Having regard to the facts involved, the parties will bear their own costs in these appeals. 84. If an urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment is applied for, the same is to be supplied to the applicant expeditiously, subject to compliance with all the required formalities. Alok Kumar Basu, J.: I agree. Appeals allowed.