Judgement RAMACHANDRAN, J. :--The Indian Railway Caterers" Association and one of its members, who is functioning as licensee of the Vegetarian Refreshment Stall, Trivandrum were the petitioners in O. P. No. 3107 of 2000, from which W. A. No. 3044 of 2001 arises. The writ petition was filed by them, challenging the proceedings and Circular of the Railway Board (Exts. P3 and P4), revising the rates and licence fee, brought into force from July, 1999. The Association alone is the appellant in the Writ Appeal. During the pendency of the Original Petition, the respondents had brought the attention of the Court to Commercial Circular No. 58/2000 dated 20-10-2000 incorporation the catering policy 2000, along with the counter-affidavit filed. It had not, however, been then subjected to challenge. After the disposal of the Original Petition on 12-7-2001, simultaneously while questioning the correctness of the judgment, the Caterers" Association and the Secretary in his individual name had filed O.P. No. 23352/2001 specifically subjecting to challenge the offending paragraphs of the above catering policy viz., Ext. P1. The learned Senior Counsel Sri M. K, Damodaran had addressed arguments in both the matters. 2. Writ Appeal No. 2913 of 2001 arise from O.P. No. 9037/2000, which again was an Original Petition filed by the second petitioner in O.P. No. 3107 of 2000 referred to earlier. He had not challenged any circulars or policies, but had complained about Exts. P1, P8, P10, P11 and P16 orders, compelling him to make remittances which became payable arising out of periodic revisions in the licence fee. A learned Judge had dismissed the petition. According to Mr. Ramakumar, counsel for the appellant, the learned Judge had overlooked relevant aspects while examining the contentions and maintained that in fact his client was entitled to a reimbursement, as payments had been made in excess of what was legally payable, both before the filing of the Original Petition and during the pendency of the proceedings. But it is seen that the said petitioner had not challenged the 2000 Catering Policy in the said petition. 3. We had also occasion to hear the submissions made by Sri S. M. Prem, counsel appearing on behalf of another licensee, Mammoo Haji, who is engaged in the business of catering through the non-vegetarian outlets at Palakkad and Shoranur Stations. Mr. 3. We had also occasion to hear the submissions made by Sri S. M. Prem, counsel appearing on behalf of another licensee, Mammoo Haji, who is engaged in the business of catering through the non-vegetarian outlets at Palakkad and Shoranur Stations. Mr. Haji had originally filed O.P. No. 19263/99, and had challenged the orders, whereunder the licence fee was increased, complaining that it had been done with retrospective effect and, therefore, without authority of law. The Original Petition was amended from time to time, bringing forth additional documents, and he had incorporated prayers for setting aside such demands, pointing out that they are arbitrary. The challenge did not meet with success, and Writ Appeal No. 1229/2000 came to be filed in this context. The submissions were reagitated. Drawing sustenance from the contentions urged in O.P. No. 23352 of 2001, Mr. Haji, after commencement of the hearing of the batch cases also had filed O. P. No. 30979/2001, and the Standing Counsel for the Railways had taken notice thereof. In the above petition, the petitioner had challenged the validity of Circular No. 16 of the Railway Board dated 24-6-1999 (Ext. P8). The Circular No. 58/2000, incorporating the Catering Policy-2000 and an administrative order (Ext. P9) passed on 29-9-2001, concerning a domestic issue, also had been attacked, but the latter challenge has not been attempted to be substantiated to any extent. 4. We had also heard Sri S. V. S. Iyer, Senior Advocate appearing on instructions in three other Original Petitions, filed by Sri N. B. Krishna Kurup. Of them O.P. No. 21467 of 2000 had been filed as the licensee of Vegetarian Refreshment Room, Palakkad. For long, he was attending to the vegetarian catering at Calicut Railway Station as well. The writ petitions highlighting his grievances pertaining to the said business are O.P. Nos. 25426 of 2001 and 29921 of 2001. In the first Original Petition (O.P. No. 21467/2000), he has challenged Exts. P1, P5 and P6 whereby demands were made in respect of arrears from 1-8-1995, as confirmed by Ext. P5, dated 27-6-2000 and P6, dated 28-7-2000. 5. In O. P. No. 25426 of 2001, Mr. Kurup has challenged a few clauses of Cateruing Policy, 2000, as has been done by his counterparts in O.P. No. 30979/2001 and Association in O.P. No. 23352/2001, referred to earlier. He had also utilised the opportunity to challenge Exts. P5, dated 27-6-2000 and P6, dated 28-7-2000. 5. In O. P. No. 25426 of 2001, Mr. Kurup has challenged a few clauses of Cateruing Policy, 2000, as has been done by his counterparts in O.P. No. 30979/2001 and Association in O.P. No. 23352/2001, referred to earlier. He had also utilised the opportunity to challenge Exts. P5 and P6, dated 25-4-2001, whereunder he had been advised to remit the arrears payable in respect of Palakkad and Calicut as a prior condition for permitting him to renew his licence for the period up to 31-7-2005. O. P. No. 29921 of 2001 came to be filed by him challenging Ext. P1, dated 16-2-1998, revising the licence fee payable for Calicut Stall for five years ending 31-7-2000, and the proposal to cancel the stalls for non-payment of dues. By Ext. P4, dated 18-7-2001, he was advised of the final payments, and the dues were indicated as Rs. 24,79,376/-. Broadly, therefore, there is challenge about the arrears up to the 1999 pPolicy, and imposition of demands leading thereto, on the one hand, and the justification of 1999 and 2000 Policies which drastically changed the existing scenario. Such Original Petitions were referred to be heard by the Division Bench, as the learned Judge was of the opinion that as the connected writ appeals were already boarded, it would be convenient for the Court and parties to consider the matters together as the issues were common. 6. Mr. M. C. Cherian, Standing Counsel for the Railways appeared in the above cases representing the Administration. He has taken pains to file affidavits, elucidating the stand of the Railway Administration, and had also produced at the time of hearing, materials, the authenticity of which were not disputed by the appellants/petitioners. 7. As noticed earlier, the challenge made in the writ appeals (W. A. Nos. 1229/2000 and 2913/2001) and Original Petitions 21467/2000 and 29924/2001 could be grouped as highlighting one set of facts. The rest of the writ petitions and W. A. No. 3044/2001 are essentially against the new Catering Policies or the impact thereof. The background, the close relationship between the cases and the contentions would justify a common decision, as suggested by the parties. But we feel, however, that the facts and reliefs prayed for deserve independent assessments. The rest of the writ petitions and W. A. No. 3044/2001 are essentially against the new Catering Policies or the impact thereof. The background, the close relationship between the cases and the contentions would justify a common decision, as suggested by the parties. But we feel, however, that the facts and reliefs prayed for deserve independent assessments. For convenience, the first four cases, referred to earlier in this paragraph, could be termed as belonging to Group A and the rest as coming in a separate Group as B. 8. Chapter VII of the Indian Railway Code for Traffic (Commercial Department) deals with catering and vending services. The restaurants, refreshment rooms, pantry and dining cars etc., are either worked departmentally or operated through licensees. There are thus static units, mobile units and vending units, intended to cater to the needs of the general public. The petitioners/appellants, according to them, have been functioning as licensees for decades, and in certain cases for generations. To take a typical example, and as a representative case, we may examine the averments and the facts highlighted in O.P. No. 19263/1999 and now by W. A. No. 1229/2000. He had been for years the licensee in respect of three Railway Stations, viz., Shoranur, Palakkad and Tirur. In the Original Petition, as referred to earlier, he had challenged the imposition of the enhanced licence fee, as demanded for the period covering 1-8-1990 to 31-7-2000. In fact this is the gist of the grievances highlighted by Group A, viz., the legitimacy of demands for enhanced licence fee up to and including the period June, 1999. 9. In the case of the petitioner who is the appellant in W. A. No. 1229/2000, the successive contracts were for a period of five years, commencing from Ist day of August in the concerned year. The petitioner submitted that in respect of two of the refreshment rooms, viz. Palakkad and Shoranur respectively, the ruling annual licence fee respectively were Rs.33,830/- and Rs.25,662/- up to 1990. After the expiry of the period of contract in July, 1990 fresh contracts were not signed breaking away from the usual practice, but the extensions given as per the instructions of the Railway Administration, were for short terms. This was of course on the understanding that a revised policy-decision for imposing the fee was in contemplation. After the expiry of the period of contract in July, 1990 fresh contracts were not signed breaking away from the usual practice, but the extensions given as per the instructions of the Railway Administration, were for short terms. This was of course on the understanding that a revised policy-decision for imposing the fee was in contemplation. The petitioner complains that the licence-fee was thereafter provisionally increased, and that too substantially, and direction was issued for making payments. Periodically thereafter, in regular frequency, the Administration took a course whereby the licence-fee was further increased. Referring to Palakkad, it is submitted that the fee had been fixed as Rs. 83,700/- from 1-8-1990 to 31-7-1995 and Rs.1,75,800/- for the period from 1-8-1995 to 31-7-2000. A like increase was insisted for Shoranur as well. The plea in the writ petition was that the revision as above from 1990 and 1995 was bad, as the Administration had no right in law to bring about retrospective revisions, and the demand was, therefore, without authority of law. 10. For the time being, though referred to in the Original Petition, we will confine the examination as to the validity of demands up to July 1999, as the parameters for issue of licence thereafter stood revised, and fresh demands for the period therefrom had been made. The matters inter-connected with the subsequent crop of writ petitions of Group B are separately dealt with. It has only to be ascertained now as to whether the case so projected by the petitioner in the Writ Appeals, the contentions urged by the petitioners in the connected cases, viz. O.P. No. 21467/2000 and O. P. No. 29924/2001 are legally tenable. 11. The plea of the petitioners, at the first blush, may appear to be just as there is allegation of harassment by pressing for a retrospective fee, for food and drinks supplied years back. But we have to observe that the petitioners had not disclosed the entire set of facts while they approached this Court with the said writ petitions. The real position has been highlighted by the counter-affidavit filed by the Railway Administration, and have been substantiated by documents produced in support of their stand. 12. It is admitted that the contract usually were for five year terms. The real position has been highlighted by the counter-affidavit filed by the Railway Administration, and have been substantiated by documents produced in support of their stand. 12. It is admitted that the contract usually were for five year terms. It had been ensured that before the term expired, fresh contracts used to be signed, and the assessment of the fee was on the basis of independent inspection and assessment of the sales of the concerned refreshment room. This was the yardstick, the Standing Counsel submits, which was in vogue in respect of all the refreshment rooms/catering outlet throughout the Indian Railways. 13. After 1-8-1990, pending finalisation of contracts, the petitioner and similarly placed persons had been permitted to continue as licensees for shorter spells and had unambiguously been forewarned that they will be liable to pay the revised fee to be settled by the Administration from 1-8-1990 onwards and other dates. This could be seen from Ext. R1 (A) dated 17-8-1990 (O. P. No. 19263/1999). On 15-5-1992, petitioner had been advised of a revision. However, as the petitioner had appealed to the Railway Board, challenging the proposed revision, on instructions, thereafter for a considerable period, the status quo was being maintained and a reduced fee was being collected from him. This was the case in respect of the rest of the petitioners who had similarly complained to the higher authorities. In the meanwhile, the procedural formalities necessary for quinquennial fixation of licence fee was routainely being conducted, but then also the enhanced licence-fee was not enforced as the initial objections were yet to be resolved by the Railway Board. It is submitted that the contractors had unhesitatingly undertaken that the revised licence fee will be paid if ultimately it was found payable. 14. Not surprisingly, the Railway Board had refused to interfere in the matter. It could be seen from Ext. R1(4) dated 28-8-1996. The contractors were advised to make the payments up to date. The petitioner had requested that instalment facilities may be given to him for making the payments as, by that time, the arrears literally had mounted up and appears to be the situation in respect of the rest of the petitioners as well. As the requests were turned down, recourse were made to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. The petitioner had requested that instalment facilities may be given to him for making the payments as, by that time, the arrears literally had mounted up and appears to be the situation in respect of the rest of the petitioners as well. As the requests were turned down, recourse were made to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. The second petitioner in O.P. No. 3107/2000 (from which W. A. No. 3044/2001 arises) also had urged substantially the self-same contentions. The case was heard along with his O.P. No. 9037/2000. The above cases and connected cases show that three major licensees had been frequently approaching this Court, whenever there were demand for arrears of the licence fee. It had been uniformly averred that the drastic and upward increase in the licence fee is arbitrary and interference of this Court is warranted. 16. Though an objection has been raised by the Administration that the writ petition by an unrecognised association is liable to be rejected, we do not see any substance in the submission. In appropriate instances, in the interest of all parties concerned, it may not be objectionable to hear a representative body which holds a valid registration, and a technical approach will lead not only to multiplicity of proceedings but inconvenience as well. We also overrule yet another submission that the second petitioner had not independently challenged the judgment in O. P. No. 3107 of 2001 and had been satisfied with taking up the matter vis-à-vis O. P. No. 9037/2000 alone, and though a common judgment had resulted, as far as O. P. No. 3107 of 2001 is concerned, he is presumed to have accepted the verdict. The argument is that, therefore, the appeal at his instance is incompetent. Though the contention is formidable, we permit the appeal to be pursued notwithstanding the technical objection, as rejection of the petition will be of no consequence, as the questions have to be attended to in any view of the matter. 17. We may note that as a basic issue, the Administration has projected the arrangements as a case of contract, and according to them the project and proposition can be injected with life only if there is consensus between the parties in respect of basic terms and conditions when the facility is offered. 17. We may note that as a basic issue, the Administration has projected the arrangements as a case of contract, and according to them the project and proposition can be injected with life only if there is consensus between the parties in respect of basic terms and conditions when the facility is offered. If any of the bidders felt that the condition for running the units are cumbersome or uneconomical, they had the option to keep away. Mr. Cherian also relied on observations made by the Division Bench in the connected proceedings which voiced an opinion that monopolies are to be discouraged and the privileges of running refreshment establishments should not be permitted to be cornered in the hands of a few persons and for decades. Experience in a particular line of business, perhaps may give an advantage to the caterers. This of course need not be a case of emancipation of the arrangement as is suggested, though in a feeble way. We are of the view that the attempt should be to strike a balance, and opportunities to others cannot altogether be blocked and the minimum requirement is transparency, and a selection in public interest. It had been pointed out that excepting very few caterers in the Division, almost all the catering contractors, including members of the Association had no problems in the revision, the terms being most realistic, and in fact continued to operate to the advantage of the concerned licensees. The suggestion, therefore, was that the Association as a name lender, was attempting to project private interest and majority of the members had no interest in the outcome of the proceedings. 18. Again dealing with the second petitioner in O. P. No. 3107 of 2001, who is the appellant in W.A. No. 2913/2001, the licence for a five year period had expired by 31-12-1993. It was renewed with licence fee provisionally fixed at Rs. 60,000/- per year, for a five year period. By Ext. P1 dated 16-1-1996 (O.P. No. 9037/2000), it was provisionally refixed at Rs. 2,17,200/- from 1-1-1994. The petitioner had failed to make payments, and further communications came to be issued, demanding payment with arrears. (In respect of the revised Catering Policy, 1999 and 2000, the contentions are not being examined at this juncture and will be dealt with while discussing the issue at a later stage). 19. 2,17,200/- from 1-1-1994. The petitioner had failed to make payments, and further communications came to be issued, demanding payment with arrears. (In respect of the revised Catering Policy, 1999 and 2000, the contentions are not being examined at this juncture and will be dealt with while discussing the issue at a later stage). 19. The Administration had thus joined issue but pointing out that the Original Petition has been filed without bona fides. It is suggested that general orders cover thousands of units throughout India, and the petitioners claim could not be countenanced. It is submitted that licence fee is revised from time to time strictly adhering to the policy prevailing, and it is reiterated that though generally licence fee is fixed for five year term, rights have been reserved to revise the terms, if need arises, in between. 20. We had attempted to state the details of the facts and contentions, so as to instruct ourselves of the scope of the petitions. Taking note of the rival contentions, the learned Judge held that the petitioners have no legal claims to be urged as against the proposed demands. It had been however observed that in case there were disputes, it could have been open for the licensees to press into service the arbitration clause in the agreement. We find that the view taken by the learned single Judge is reasonable. The disputes are purely in the realm of contract, and the circumstances show that the Railway Administration was considerate beyond normally expected of towards the catering contractors. The underpayments for a long period of time might have given a false sense of complacence for the licensees, but we are definite that no principle in law is available for their help, when ultimately the demand for the arrears come. The payments insisted are only in respect of the licence fee assessed as per the computation authorised by the law, practice and procedure. There is no retrospective enhancement of licence fee as claimed, and the objections have hardly any substance. 21. The payments insisted are only in respect of the licence fee assessed as per the computation authorised by the law, practice and procedure. There is no retrospective enhancement of licence fee as claimed, and the objections have hardly any substance. 21. Dealing with the contentions as above, and after examining in detail the materials that had forthcome, the learned single Judge, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, has observed as following : "In this context, it is relevant to note that other licensees at Palghat and Kozhikode Divisions had paid the revised licence fee fixed by the respondents on the same lines after the decision of the Railway Board, evidenced by Ext. R1(H). The petitioner alone is protracting payment of the amounts legitimately due to the respondents without any satisfactory reasons. It must be noted that the delay in the fixation of the revised licence fee for the periods 1990-95 and 1995-2000 is only on account of the pendency of the representation filed by the petitioner before the Railway Board and the further representations made by the petitioner against the revision" It has been found that there is, therefore, no substance in the plea that the fixation was with retrospective effect as contended. The provisional payments were made by the licence holders, fully understanding that there was liability to pay the enhanced fee as finally arrived at. The Administration had also shown that the licence fee was increased after adhering to the regular formalities. The learned single Judge, therefore, had observed that the petitioner perhaps would be entitled to question the quantum of amount as is shown liable as due, but has a right to get the licence reissued only on payment of the demanded sum. In other words, the basic liability was adjudged as indisputable. We find nothing irrational or unjust in the approach of the learned single Judge. The petitioners of course canvassed for the position that on principles of estoppel, acquiescence, and want of jurisdiction, the demands were unethical. But we are afraid such questions have no relevance when the issue is closely examined. There has not been any demand with retrospective effect, as attempted to be canvassed, and the petitioners have deliberately attempted to confuse the position. But we are afraid such questions have no relevance when the issue is closely examined. There has not been any demand with retrospective effect, as attempted to be canvassed, and the petitioners have deliberately attempted to confuse the position. We have no hesitation, therefore, to confirm the judgment as regards the liability for payment of the licence- fee in demand for the period from 1-8-1990 to 30-6-1999, in respect of all the petitioners. 22. Now we may examine the objections that have been raised against the Catering Policies of 1999 and 2000, which have earlier been referred to as Group B petitions. Documents as available in O.P. No. 23352 of 2000 may be referred to as a guidance. Ext. P5 dated 27-5-1999 concerns the catering services in Rajdhani/Shatabdi Express trains. Ext. P6 being the Commercial Circular No. 16 of the Railway Board is on the subject of tariff revision, and it was followed by Ext. P7 dated 1-7-1999. Ext. P1 is the Commercial Circular issued by the Board as 58/2000, notifying the Catering Policy dated 20-10-2000 and these are pointed out as arbitrary and objectionable. Only certain offending paragraphs of Ext. P1 are subjected to specific challenge. tThus the writ petitions and appeals concern the propriety and legality of present policies brought about, in the first stage, in 1999 and revised thereafter in October, 2000. However, it has to be taken notice that though under challenge practically there were no contentions urged as regards the increase brought about in 1999, excepting objection in general terms that the increase was exorbitant. 23. The first of the Original Petition dealing with the above was O.P. No. 3107/2000, filed by the Association, and Mr. Venkates-waran, a member. As we had occasion to point out, the attack was against Exts. P3 and P4, respectively dated 27-5-1999 and 24-6-1999, which could be generally termed as Catering Policy, 1999. Ext. P3 refers to catering services of Rajdhani and Shatabdi Express trains. The communication is issued by the Railway Board, addressed to the General Managers of all Indian Railways. Referring to the report of the Committee set up by the Board to review the menus, apportionment of catering charges in the fares, tariff etc., the Board"s decision had been communicated. The avowed object highlighted therein was to make a "perceptible improvement" in the standards and quality. Referring to the report of the Committee set up by the Board to review the menus, apportionment of catering charges in the fares, tariff etc., the Board"s decision had been communicated. The avowed object highlighted therein was to make a "perceptible improvement" in the standards and quality. On revising the rates (by 25%) the licence fee was also advised to be revised upwards to 15% of the apportionment cost and it is found that new rates were brought into operation with effect from Ist July, 1999. 24. Ext. P4 likewise was the Commercial Circular No. 16 of the Board dealing with revision of Catering tariff for standard meals, tea, coffee and mineral water. The increase was to be effective from 1-7-1999. A more professional approach and sophistication had been exhorted. Clause 5 of Ext. P4 provided inter alia that "the revised rates are applicable, subject to condition that with the revision rates, the licence fee should also be revised to 15% in case of Pantry Cars and 12% of sales turnover in case of refreshment rooms managed by licensees. Sales turnover were to be analysed on yearly basis and in case of static units building/equipment rent also were additionally chargeable. It also showed that concurrence of the Finance Directorate of the Ministry of Railways had also been obtained to the proposed policy arrangements. 25. In the Original Petition, apart from referring to the interference in the fundamental rights of the petitioners, as available under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, it had been submitted that there is no justification in increasing the licence fee. With reference to the age old Ext. P2 (Proforma) agreement, an argument was raised that the Administration was disabled from taking a unilateral decision to enhance the licence fee, during its tenure. Other grounds raised were that it offended the legitimate expectation of the licensees, was in violation of the natural justice and the increase introduced imposed a heavy burden on them. Allegation was that there was non-application of mind. The effect of increase, it was urged would start the set on of a negative trend. 26. By their counter-affidavit dated 1-6-2000, the Deputy Chief Commercial Manager, who was in charge of Catering, justified the changes brought by Exts. P3 and P4. Allegation was that there was non-application of mind. The effect of increase, it was urged would start the set on of a negative trend. 26. By their counter-affidavit dated 1-6-2000, the Deputy Chief Commercial Manager, who was in charge of Catering, justified the changes brought by Exts. P3 and P4. The writ petition was according to them not maintainable, and the policy decisions had long been implemented by the time of filing of the Original Petition. What had been brought in was a policy-decision and the licensees could not have challenged such policies. It was within the right of the Administration to change the policies during the tenure of the contract, as such rights were well reserved. The affidavit further disclosed that "sale turnover in all catering establishments have increased about 10 to 20 times during the past 10 to 15 years". The rates of catering items periodically were being revised, especially in 1994 and 1997. But the licence fee was remaining static at 5%. The margin of profit had increased substantially especially by 1999 revision. As an example, it is shown with reference to Ext. P3 that the same food served in the lower classes are sold at rates 11/2 times more in higher classes, and the margin of profit thereby stood to increase. These were the basic reasons, therefore, to introduce the new rates. There was no attempt to hide that the Railway Administration intended to earn more revenue, and according to the counsel, this could not have been in any way objectionable. The counsel also highlighted that the stipulation in the 1999 policy additionally providing levy towards rent for building/ land had been deleted. By a reply-affidavit, petitioners had refuted the contentions, and also made available by Ext. P13 a chart showing the increase in percentage of some units in the matter of licence fee. 27. One of the cases in Group B is W. A. No. 3044/2001. The other cases are fresh Original Petitions having been referred to the Bench and were thus heard together. 28. After weighing the rival contentions, the learned Judge had held that the Railway Board while issuing Exts. P3 and P4 (in O. P. No. 3107 of 2000) had acted well within their jurisdiction. It was contractual relations, and it ad been noticed that there had been proper application of mind. 28. After weighing the rival contentions, the learned Judge had held that the Railway Board while issuing Exts. P3 and P4 (in O. P. No. 3107 of 2000) had acted well within their jurisdiction. It was contractual relations, and it ad been noticed that there had been proper application of mind. On our part, we too have to endorse the findings as proper and justified. We may also give brief reasons for our concurrence. 29. The challenge by the Association as regards Ext. P3, viz., that concerning Rajdhani and Shatabdi Express trains appears to be too ambitious. The petitioner has not disclosed as to who was the licensee in respect of the above trains, who had undertaken the catering. Apart from generalisation, it is not even averred that one or any of its members had been extended with the contract. The locus standi, therefore, for challenging Ext. P3 has not been explained. Another insurmountable difficulty for the petitioners is the circumstance that they had thought of challenging Exts. P3 and P4 well after six months from the date they were brought into operation. The fares inclusive of catering element had been revised, and had come to existence and is reality. In respect of other trains and services, the price hike had also come to be applied, and the licensees were charging the higher prices as early as from 1-7-1999. If they were serious about the issue, it should have been appropriately taken up, and the delay is fatal, and a reshuffling in any manner at this distance of time would only result in chaos and confusion, and the petitioners gaining benefit from the spoils. Nevertheless, as regards Ext. P4, the contentions could be examined. The first argument is that there is hindrance to fundamental rights envisaged under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. But it had not been substantiated by facts or figures. The contention of the Administration that the contracts gave them right to review the fee structure, during any time during the contract, has not been controverted. The first argument is that there is hindrance to fundamental rights envisaged under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. But it had not been substantiated by facts or figures. The contention of the Administration that the contracts gave them right to review the fee structure, during any time during the contract, has not been controverted. Also the reasons show that there was increase in the price of commodities supplied, and the increase in the licence fee has been fixed taking note of the above circumstance also.The argument that catering is a service and it cannot be utilised as a proposition for making a profit cannot come from a contractor, since the complaints if at all have not come from the persons who might be aggrieved about it. Likewise the principles of legitimate expectations have little place in area of commercial contracts. On the other hand the granting of the reliefs would result in unjust enrichment to the catering contractors and none else. There is also materials to show that the revised policies had come to operation after discussion at the highest levels and has been applied on all India basis. The criticism in the writ appeal (W. A. No. 3044/2001) that the Administration has confused between annual sales turnover and annual profit is misplaced. This is because from the very inception as we see it, the fee had been fixed on the turnover assessed. There has been only an increase in the percentage. It is evident that the basic yardstick remains as such, and unaltered. The submission that the parties to the contract were unequal, and inferences are to be appropriately drawn, also may not be relevant or applicable. We are, for these reasons, not inclined to interfere in the matter and W. A. No. 3044/2001 is hereby dismissed, and catering policy 1999 is upheld. 30. Thereafter, addressing on O. P. No. 23352 of 2001, Mr. Damodaran, Senior Counsel had invited our attention first to clause 14.4, Part B of Ext. P1, which prescribed eligibility criteria for grant of licence. The contention was that the Railway by extending such facilities was rendering a service in favour of the Railway passengers. He argued that forgetting the past, the image built up was attempted to be given a go-by, and the facility was being converted as a proposition for making a profit. P1, which prescribed eligibility criteria for grant of licence. The contention was that the Railway by extending such facilities was rendering a service in favour of the Railway passengers. He argued that forgetting the past, the image built up was attempted to be given a go-by, and the facility was being converted as a proposition for making a profit. Towards this end, drastic changes were being introduced, thus altering the basic character of the service. The policy for the first time, according to him, had introduced a system for awarding the contract by open tender. He first led our attention to the paragraph dealing with eligibility criteria, for qualifying as a participant, as spoken to by Ext. P1, which is the following : "The three member Tender Committee of appropriate level of Commercial , Finance and one from a sister department will scrutinize the technical offers received in Packet "A" to shortlist the eligible candidates. The General Manager of the Railway will decide the level of the Tender Committee. The eligibility criteria for shortlisting the eligible applicants would be as under : (i) The applicant should be a reputed company /firm, and not an individual duly incorporated /registered for catering hospitality business for handling food and beverages. (ii) The applicant must have a minimum of five years of experience in the field of catering /hospitality business. (iii) The applicant should already be having a minimum annual turnover in catering /hospitality and F and B Services related business and the eligibility criterion for different type of units is given below : Rs. 5 crore per annum Mobile catering on Rajdhani/Shatabdi Express trains Rs. 5 crore per annum Multi outlet food plazas or food courts Rs. 3 crore per annum Mobile catering on other mail/express trains Rs. 1 crore per annum Restaurants/refreshment rooms at Class "A" stations Rs. 1 crore per annum Single outlet fast food centres (iv) Reputation/ business standing of the applicant. (v) Sound financial standing of the applicant. (vi) The applicant should have sufficient number of qualified personnel with at least three years" diploma from a recognised catering institution in food and hospitality (hotel management) in its regular employment. (vii) The applicant should also have catering establishments /base kitchens with modern equipment and gadgets and should have in-house hygiene and food safety arrangements and must follow good management practices. (vii) The applicant should also have catering establishments /base kitchens with modern equipment and gadgets and should have in-house hygiene and food safety arrangements and must follow good management practices. Its establishments/base kitchens etc., should be available for inspection of the Tender Committee or any other agency as notified by Railways. (viii) The applicant should be an imcome-tax payee. Any other criteria considered relevant by the zonal railway to be notified in Packet "A"." Referring to the second part of the tender which comprised of the stipulations regarding the financial bid, he elaborated on the unprecedented hike of rates suggested therein. For easy reference this also could be extracted as hereinbelow : "14.5 Financial Bid : (i) Packet-B, which is the financial offer, will be opened only after shortlisting of eligible applicants on the basis of Packet "A" and will contain the financial bid only and no other document. (ii) The financial bid will be in terms of a percentage commission on sales turnover, which will be payable by the licensee to the railways. The offer should be conspicuously in terms of both in figure and in words. Any overwriting, correction or insertion will not be accepted. The financial bid would be in terms of percentage commission on sales turnover, subject to a minimum of lump sum amount to be indicated in the tender document by the Railway, which shall be claculated as per following guidelines : Rajdhani/Shatabdi Express trains *15% of estimated annual sales turnover based on average occupancy figures. Other Mail/Express trains *12% of estimated annual sales turnover All other static units *12% of estimated annual sales turnover *Or any other percentage commission on sales as notified from time to time (iii) Assessment of Sales Turn Over : (a) In the case of Rajdhani/Shatabdi Express trains sales turnover for the realisation of licence fee will be based on the actual occupancy in each trip as certified by Train Superintendent. (b) In case of mobile units, other than Rajdhani /Shatabdi services, a minimum number of 200 meals for superfast trains and 150 meals for other mail /express trains on each occasion of servicing lunch/dinner or both, as per train timing, may be taken into account while assessing sales turn-over. (b) In case of mobile units, other than Rajdhani /Shatabdi services, a minimum number of 200 meals for superfast trains and 150 meals for other mail /express trains on each occasion of servicing lunch/dinner or both, as per train timing, may be taken into account while assessing sales turn-over. In case of static units, the sales turn-over may be assessed based on location of the unit, number of passengers dealt, the type and price of items sold, number of vendors on the unit, previous record of sale of a similar unit (in case of new units) and any other such related criteria. Assessment of sales must also be done through a surprise physical check by a committee comprising of Inspectors from Commercial and Finance Departments for a period of three days with scrutiny of sales records. Such assessment will be approved by a gazetted officer of the Commercial Department with concurrence of associate finance. (d) Railway should keep a constant watch on the sale of various units to ensure that there is no loss of revenue. Railway should also introduce progressive systems utilizing advanced technology, computerized billing etc. to bring transparency in assessment of sales. Audited statement of accounts in case of major units should also be insisted upon. In case of Rajdhani/Shatabdi Express trains sales turnover is on actual occupancy basis as certified by Train Superintendent. (iv) Applicants will be asked to bid over and above the minimum percentage commission notified from time to time by Railway Board. Licence will normally be awarded to the highest bidder. However Tender Committee will ensure that licence fee offered by the highest bidder is realistic and workable in order to maintain the standard of catering services expected to be maintained by the service provider. Under no circumstances the quality of services be compromised. (v) Licence fee payable by the licensee is in the form of percentage of annual sales turnover. No other operational charges like haulage /maintenance/detention etc., in case of mobile services will be recoverable from the licensees. In the case of static units also there will be no separate charges payable towards rent for building /land, vendor"s fee and conservancy charges etc. No other operational charges like haulage /maintenance/detention etc., in case of mobile services will be recoverable from the licensees. In the case of static units also there will be no separate charges payable towards rent for building /land, vendor"s fee and conservancy charges etc. except electricity and water charges, which will be based on actual consumption." The learned counsel pointed out that a participant was obliged to satisfy about minimum turnover, standing, and status and the services hitherto rendered by members of the Association was totally forgotten. Individuals were sought to be driven away from participating for the major catering works. Also the minimum percentage commission on sales turnover, at 15% for the notified trains, and 12% for other trains and static units was the base for the quotations. Such changes brought about according to him originated basically from an erroneous approach, unwarranted and beyond the powers conferred on the Railway Administration. 31. While dealing with the 1999 policy, we had occasion to examine the increase brought about in the rate of licence fee proposed and levied, effective from 1-7-1999. The concerned petitioners had not been able to bring out any single circumstance to effectively point out that the change of policy suffered from any irregularity or illegality. We had also occasion to observe that from the records produced, at least from 1980 the practice was to link the licence fee with the turnover. The Standing Counsel had referred to the stand of the railway, vis-à-vis the 2000 Policy, and had pointed out that they were sound in every respect, and it was in tune with the change in time, and took care of the needs of the travelling public, and also the fresh look that had been made in such matters. A number of decisions had been cited by both sides in support of their respective contentions, and we may examine their relevance. 32. The learned counsel had formulated the attack with reference to the following aspects : 1. Fixation of eligibility criteria - Ext. P1 seeks to exclude individuals - Which perpetuates in violation of fundamental rights. Financial capability and experience are fixed at unreliable levels for ordinary persons to attempt to enter/continue in the field. 2. Being a service, and a statutory obligation, the shift in the policy to make it a profit venture was unauthorised. 3. Fixation of eligibility criteria - Ext. P1 seeks to exclude individuals - Which perpetuates in violation of fundamental rights. Financial capability and experience are fixed at unreliable levels for ordinary persons to attempt to enter/continue in the field. 2. Being a service, and a statutory obligation, the shift in the policy to make it a profit venture was unauthorised. 3. Legitimate expectation of existing licensees to continue in business is drastically affected. 4. The policy will encourage monopolistic tendencies, and opposed to public interest. 5. The imposition of conditions are one sided, and between unequal parties, and unconscionable terms are incorporated, which is per se unenforceable. 6. The licence fee should correlate to the principle for fixing a regulatory fee, and the unilateral increase is beyond the administrative powers and unconstitutional. In his Original Petition (O.P. No. 30979/2001), Mr. Mammoo Haji also substantially endorsed the contentions voiced by Sri Damodaran. He challenged Ext. P6, viz., 1999 policy as well, but we are not dealing with the above, since we have already held that interference is not warranted, especially at this distance of time. Ext. P8 in the O. P. is policy of 2000 and under attack. Challenge against Ext. P9 had not been pursued. 33. In the writ petition of Mr. Krishna Kurup, viz., O. P. No. 21467/2000, the validity of the policies as such have not been questioned. The grievances are about the consequential orders which have come to be issued. Mr. S. V. S. Iyer, senior counsel had appeared on behalf of the petitioner, and had made available charts for our perusal, which translated the policies while they were in action. The increase in the licence fee presently demanded are indeed high, when compared with the previous figures. Mr. Iyer had endorsed the submissions made by Mr. Damodaran. 34. Clause 14.4 of Ext. P-1 deals with the eligibility criteria. Clause (i) stipulates that applicants should be a reputed company/firm and not an individual; that he should have five years experience, and his turnover should be at prescribed levels. It is submitted that the above conditions can have no relevance to the object sought. An enterprising individual has been thereby debarred from entering the array of competition and his fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution are thereby choked. It is submitted that the above conditions can have no relevance to the object sought. An enterprising individual has been thereby debarred from entering the array of competition and his fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution are thereby choked. The minimum experience of five years is likely to bar entry of otherwise eligible candidates, and the minimum turnover for the different types of outlets are unworkable, and difficult to be achieved. On the whole, the counsel pleaded that exclusion of a sizable sector of businessmen were highly arbitrary, and in any case unreasonable, and offended rights envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The arguments were stoutly opposed by Mr. Cherian. 35. In support of his submissions, Mr. Damodaran had also referred to certain decisions, which according to him were sufficient to clinch the issue. Reference was made to Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, AIR 1950 SC 163 and Chintamanrao v. State of M. P., AIR 1951 SC 118 for highlighting the principles of reasonable restrictions in the State action. But going through the relevant paragraphs, we fail to see that the observations in any way advance the case of the petitioners as highlighted in the origional petition. The first of them was a case where the restriction operated a citizen from conducting a trade in a Municipal area. In Chintamanrao"s case, restrictions were held permissible, but just adequate to meet a given situation. So also the case cited viz., Pathumma v. State of Kerala, 1978 (2) SCC 1 : (AIR 1978 SC 771) in fact permits a classification in appropriate circumstances. It is laid down that (at Page 777 of AIR) : "What is required is that the Legislature takes intelligent care and deliberation in choosing a course which is dictated by reason and good conscience so as to strike a just balance between the freedom contained in Article 19(1) and the social control permitted by clauses (5) and (6) of Article 19." 36. A Constitution Bench in the decision reported in AIR 1952 SC 146 : (1952 Cri LJ 966), State of Madras v. V. G. Row had cautioned that the Court is to examine the nature of rights alleged as infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction, and the prevailing conditions, before striking down the violations complained. A Constitution Bench in the decision reported in AIR 1952 SC 146 : (1952 Cri LJ 966), State of Madras v. V. G. Row had cautioned that the Court is to examine the nature of rights alleged as infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction, and the prevailing conditions, before striking down the violations complained. Yet another decision cited was 1994 (6) SCC 651 : (AIR 1996 SC 11), Tata Cellular v. Union of India and especially paragraphs 70 to 77 and 80 to 82. The Court observed that judicial review could apply to exercise of contractual powers by Government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness and favouritism. We had opportunity to examine the facts, and have not been able to find that there has been any arbitrary approach as far as the present case is concerned. Apart from loosely contending that there is likelihood of developing monopolistic tendencies, the petitioner has not pointed out that the all India policy was actuated by any motive for favouritism. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Om Kumar v. Union of India, 2001 (2) SCC 386 : (AIR 2000 SC 3689) regarding the science of classification have no scope for application as far as the case at hand is concerned as it dealt with a case of service law. 37. Reliance placed on the decision reported in Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. V. State of W. B., AIR 1975 SC 266 which laid down principles of black listing a person from entering into contracts, and in the matter of setting minimum standards of eligibility, can have no application to the present issues. The disability is not created, but we have to notice that Ext. P-1 deals with a case of a totally different issue, and is a case where the standards have not been attained by an intending tenderer. It is also noticed that in another case cited, reported in Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council, AIR 1969 SC 829, the majority of the Judges had held that restriction for a non-tribal to carry on business in a tribal area was unreasonable. But the discussions therein do show that the principle is confined to the facts of the said case, and not applicable herein as a general rule for guidance. 38. Mr. But the discussions therein do show that the principle is confined to the facts of the said case, and not applicable herein as a general rule for guidance. 38. Mr. Damodoaran had next cited International Air Port Authority case, AIR 1979 SC 1628 urging that when arbitrary and capricious standards are fixed, the proposals per se are colourable exercise of power, and therefore unfair and this Court has a duty to interfere. But the principle is that if it is shown that the classification is based on some valid principles, the Court seldom interferes in the contractual matters. The Administration, at their discretion and after extensive feed back have classified certain units as belonging to a separate class, the management of which could be entrusted with personnel who have proven track record. It indeed may not be possible for a novice to conduct a large cafeteria or a pantry car, and so long as it has not been able to be established that the objective was sinister, the Courts will be extremely reluctant to impose themselves so as to jeopardise the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. 39. The observations in paragraphs 7, 9, 11 and 12 of the decision reported in 1993 (3) SCC 499 : (AIR 1994 SC 988), Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation was next cited in support of the contentions made on similar lines. The decision pertained to the principles to be borne in mind in the matter of Government contracts. It is laid down that in the matters of tenders, reservations and restrictions should not be arbitrary. One cannot take exception to the law so laid down. Referring to an earlier decision, it had been reiterated that the attempt always should be for ultimate public benefit. Of course concentration of wealth is looked down upon. But in the present original petitions nothing has been brought on record to establish that the policy in any manner contributes to such a vice. In fact the principles enunciated in Kasturi Lal"s case, 1980 (4) SCC 1 : (AIR 1980 SC 1992) has been reiterated by the Court. As suggested by the Standing Counsel for the Railways, the decisions in LIC case, AIR 1995 SC 1181 which laid down that a classification between salaried class from others for the purpose of certain life insurance policies cited by the petitioner has no application to the present facts. As suggested by the Standing Counsel for the Railways, the decisions in LIC case, AIR 1995 SC 1181 which laid down that a classification between salaried class from others for the purpose of certain life insurance policies cited by the petitioner has no application to the present facts. We are of opinion that the decision reported in D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 : (1983 Lab IC 1) which was also cited is authority for principles unconnected with the present set of facts. 40. State of Kerala had been read over. But thSeveral passages in the decision reported in 1973 (4) SCC 225 : (AIR 1973 SC 1461), Kesavananda Bharati v. e essential question that has to be resolved in these group of petitions pertain to the realm of contracts where a Governmental body is attempted to evoke response for making available specified service to general public with whom it is their business to deal with. Abstract principles may have little application in the above background. 41. We may at this stage refer to one more point urged by the counsel that the nature of the contracting parties had to be appreciated, and as the principles laid down in Central Inland Water Transport case, 1986 (3) SCC 170 : (AIR 1986 SC 1571) the position has to be viewed. But the principle can find no place in these matters. There is no compulsion for entering into any contract whatever, and extension of the theory will always be impractical as the State is obliged to enter into contracts very often with a variety of parties in the course of administration. 42. On the other hand, the Railway Administration has supported the policy, pointing out that the stipulations were brought about in public interest, and for efficient management of the units. It is pointed out that it is general practices among large public sector enterprises to enter into contracts with firms and corporations rather than individuals. Attempt is made to establish that the objections of the petitioners are more imaginary than real. The minimum experience is insisted with public interest in view, and the minimum turnover is for ensuring that only persons with proper track records and adequate experience come up to discharge the responsibility, with satisfaction. 43. The objectionable clause 14, referred to earlier, is in Part B of Ext. P-1, dealing with licensing policy. The minimum experience is insisted with public interest in view, and the minimum turnover is for ensuring that only persons with proper track records and adequate experience come up to discharge the responsibility, with satisfaction. 43. The objectionable clause 14, referred to earlier, is in Part B of Ext. P-1, dealing with licensing policy. It is clear that the decision is to allot licences under different parameters, separately for major and small units. The stipulation regarding "firms", experience and turnover are confined to major units alone. It is evident that the petitioners are aware of the minimum standards and expertise to be possessed by a major player. Clauses v, vi, vii and viii which in fact are hall-marks of a large catering contractor have been left unchallenged, which shows that tacitly the stipulations are understood as unobjectionable. The average turnover prescribed, Mr. Cherian submits, is well on realistic figures. For instance, in Rajadhani Express, for about one thousand passengers, the catering proposal round the day and through the year is not something that can be shouldered by a novice with limited resources. The generalisation attempted also is on a mistaken impression, since the higher capabilities stipulated as appearing in paragraph 14 are concerning the major units and prestigious trains. In respect of the large majority of units, such conditions have not been sought to be introduced. 44. The "tenure assurance" spoken to by clause 14.6 and the application of new policy to the existing licences, as pointed out by the Railway Administration is sufficient to cast away any apprehensions as regards members of the petitioner association who are already in the business. Clause 14.10 could be relevant to be specially highlighted which reads as following : "New Catering Policy will take effect from the date of issue of this policy in case of all new catering/vending licences. This will also apply in case of award of fresh licence in the event of termination, non-renewal, vacation etc., of the existing licences. However, in the case of existing licences, which continue to provide satisfactory services, the licensees will be allowed to complete their present term subject to application of all other policy directives issued from time to time. Thereafter licences of such existing licensees shall be renewable for such periods so that the total period of operation from the date of issue of New Catering Policy is five years on uniform basis. Thereafter licences of such existing licensees shall be renewable for such periods so that the total period of operation from the date of issue of New Catering Policy is five years on uniform basis. For instance in case of an existing licence which is expiring, say in October, 2001, the licence shall be renewable for a further period of 4 years beyond October, 2001 i.e. up to October, 2005. If a licence is expiring, say in October 2003, the same shall be renewable for a further period of 2 years i.e. up to October, 2005. However, such renewals should not be automatic and railways will ensure continuous monitoring of performance as per provisions contained in para 14.6.2 and para 14.6.4. All existing licensees may be advised in this regard." Thus practically the existing contractors also get an opportunity to continue up to October, 2005, and the period for revamping and equipping themselves have been adequately provided. We, therefore, find that challenge on those lines are not impressive. The discussions as above also will dispose of the objections highlighted, regarding the legitimate expectations harboured by the existing contractors. Though not taken as a specific ground, the learned counsel also referred to the expropriatory nature of the provisions contained in sub-clause (x) speaking about security deposit. When a vital function is entrusted with a contractor, the principal has to get an assurance of satisfactory execution of the job. When the term of the contract is generally for a five year term, deposit of 5% of annual turnover does not appear to be unduly oppressive or an extraordinary hazard. We have to bear in mind that it is a term of a commercial contract, and this Court may not be the best Judge in the assessment of the minimum security which a principal insists. The objections deserve to be overruled. 45. Now we are left with the other major contentions urged in some of the original petitions, that the increase in the licence fee, as proposed is arbitrary and excessive. Though it turned out to be a principal contention, we note the submission of the Standing Counsel that as far as pleadings are concerned, there is very little materials supplied. In the whole of O.F. No. 23352 of 2001, only in one place, there is at least a semblance of a challenge, and that too in a general manner. Though it turned out to be a principal contention, we note the submission of the Standing Counsel that as far as pleadings are concerned, there is very little materials supplied. In the whole of O.F. No. 23352 of 2001, only in one place, there is at least a semblance of a challenge, and that too in a general manner. We may extract the above said ground M as herein below: "The flat rate of 15% of Rules Turnover in the case of Refreshment Rooms managed by the licensees, in respect of all contracts is unconscionable. Such fixation of flat rates in respect of contracts, in respect of the routes where there is no profit to the licensee would defeat the very object of providing catering service to the passengers." 46. In O.P. No. 30979/2001, the grounds incorporating the challenge are F, G and J, which accuse to increase as exorbitant, violating Article 13 of the Constitution, and run counter to Government policy. It is suggested that the Railway Administration has to act fairly, and the revision of licence fee is impermissible. 47. During the course of the arguments, a contention was developed that what is charged and chargeable by the Railway Administration is a fee, in contradistinction to a tax. The petitioners, taking note of the special conditions prevailing, were prepared to admit that on the facts, it would be well admissible to levy a regulatory fee, but only at a realistic level. Referring to the conditions which existed in the 1980"s it had been attempted to establish that the licence fee was levied between 3 to 5% of the turnover calculated per year. It was a lump sum figure, and for a five year block period. But the changes after 1990 are alleged to be drastic. 48. The argument is that if such percentage was acceptable at such times, it should continue to be the governing rates now as well, as it is the same industry and same pattern. But having appraised of the background, the submissions is only to be rejected as thoroughly being of a pedestrian approach. 49. As referred to just now, the argument is that it has the characteristic of a fee, and the principles of quid pro quo should eminently apply. Mr. But having appraised of the background, the submissions is only to be rejected as thoroughly being of a pedestrian approach. 49. As referred to just now, the argument is that it has the characteristic of a fee, and the principles of quid pro quo should eminently apply. Mr. Damodaran invited our attention to Section 144 of the Railways Act, 1989, which according to him was the authority for the Railways to bring on restrictions in certain activities being carried on in the railway carriage or any part of the railway. As reference thereto may be required, we may extract the above provision hereunder : "144. Prohibition on hawking, etc., and begging.- (1) If any person canvasses for any custom or hawks or exposes for sale any article whatsoever in any railway carriage or upon any part of a railway, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted by the railway administration in this behalf, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both : Provided that, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the Court, such punishment shall not be less than a fine of one thousand rupees. (2) If any person begs in any railway carriage or upon a railway station, he shall be liable for punishment as provided under sub-section (1). (3) Any person referred to in sub-section (2) may be removed from the railway carriage or any part of the railway or railway station, as the case may be, by any railway servant authorised in this behalf or by any other person whom such railway servant may call to his aid." The plea is that only a licensed person can attend to hawking or sale in the Railway premises, and what is offered is the above licence. 50. We have to straight away point out that as far as Rajadhani and Shatabdi Express trains are concerned, the activity of a sale by the caterers do not come at all. The ticket charges include the cost of food and drinks and the arrangement is only an apportionment. 50. We have to straight away point out that as far as Rajadhani and Shatabdi Express trains are concerned, the activity of a sale by the caterers do not come at all. The ticket charges include the cost of food and drinks and the arrangement is only an apportionment. We have to take judicial notice that even before the introduction of Section 144 in the Railways Act, 1989 the system of catering had been carried on in a most well organised manner and petitioners were parties to such contract. An examination reveals that always the system was a payment on the basis of turnover suggested from time to time. In our opinion, Section 144 is an enabling provision, which authorises the Railway Administration to prohibit hawking, and unauthorised sales, and also to curb the menace of begging to which the passengers are exposed. It does not deal with modalities of licensing or terms of licensing which were separately being governed by administrative instructions and Railway Board orders, which are law, and issued from time to time. In this view, it may not be therefore required to go to the legislative competence of the entry, or the finer distinction between a tax and a fee, as the arrangements from the very inception were something different and already formulated in accepted lines. 51. The learned counsel had nevertheless referred to a large number of decisions which according to him were sufficient to give finality to the issue. The first two decisions cited were those of two Full Benches of this Court, reported in AIR 1969 Ker 99, Calicut Corporation v. T. Sadasivan and AIR 1969 Ker 109, Tellicherry Municipal Council v. Ramesh. In the first case, it was held that a levy for soaking pits for coconut husks in the owner"s property was not warranted, since no service had been rendered by the Corporation to the businessman. In the latter, it was laid down that a levy of fee in the nature of tax had no legal sanction. The counsel also invited our attention to the decision in Govt. of A. P. v. Hindustan Machine Tool, AIR 1975 SC 2037, wherein the Supreme Court indicated that fee can only be levied by an authority for service rendered by it to the person from whom levy is extracted. The counsel also invited our attention to the decision in Govt. of A. P. v. Hindustan Machine Tool, AIR 1975 SC 2037, wherein the Supreme Court indicated that fee can only be levied by an authority for service rendered by it to the person from whom levy is extracted. The decision reported in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 also had been cited. But we have to observe that those do not advance in any manner the case of the petitioner as the relationship of the parties is altogether different. 52. Mr. Damodaran had thereafter heavily relied on the observations of Chief Justice Ahmadi in Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U. P., 1997 (2) SCC 715, and especially paragraph 18 thereof. Even if not a special fee, and this could be characterised as a regulatory fee, the rates imposed, according to him, was onerous and exorbitant. Therefore, the Court had approved the view of the High Court that in the case of regulatory fee, like the licence fee, existence of quid pro quo is not necessary, although the fee imposed must not be in the circumstances of the case, excessive. For the same purpose, our attention had been invited to the decision in A. P. Paper Mills Ltd. v. Govt. ofA. P., 2000 (8) SCC 167 : (AIR 2000 SC 3290) where the Court found that enhancement of licence fee of the factory from Rs. 10,000/- to Rupees 18 lakhs was unsupportable. But these decisions as well do not advance the case of the petitioners. Before we classify a levy as a tax or a fee, we have to see whether they do have the general characteristics of any of such levies. Of course what is levied is never a tax. Therefore, we can safely settle for the position that it is a fee. A fee can be for a special service rendered to a person, and the Courts have settled the position that in such instances, it should roughly compare with the expenses for service so rendered. The petitioners appear to be labouring on the ground that there is only one other classification of fee, viz., a regulatory fee. A fee can be for a special service rendered to a person, and the Courts have settled the position that in such instances, it should roughly compare with the expenses for service so rendered. The petitioners appear to be labouring on the ground that there is only one other classification of fee, viz., a regulatory fee. As gatherable from the trend of decisions, a regulatory fee may arise, where it may not be possible to identify the extent and scope of service that are specifically extended, but the community or class of persons may be generally the beneficiaries because of the levy of fee collected under this head. 53. But we find that it is possible to conceive a third variety of fee, as well, as might be possible to identify in the case at hand. It is neither the fee charged for the specific service extended, nor a regulatory fee. It is in the nature of a payment for extending a privilege which is not at all uncommon existing right from the Central Government up to the Grama Panchayats. The Railway Administration owns extensive properties, including real estate and rolling stock. Unless authorised, a person is not permitted access to any such properties, and for specified privileges. One such purpose where a permission is given to third parties is for providing entry so as to engage a catering service. It is one of the business activities of the railways. They may do it themselves or can authorise a third person to attend to such function, may carry on the activity on "no profit no loss basis", or can make a profit out of the arrangements. Even if it makes a profit, it is beyond dispute that such profits go to the statutory body, and not to any private hands. If a third person is chosen for the job, a special status is conferred on him, in the nature of a privilege. He gets right of entry, and occupation to the extent the parmit authorises. For the said privilege, the Administration has a right to insist that he pays a premium, and it is the settled practice that premium is proportionate to the earnings made in the endeavour. It cannot be equated with a fee charged for services rendered. The Administration renders no service to the catering contractor other than supervision in public interest. For the said privilege, the Administration has a right to insist that he pays a premium, and it is the settled practice that premium is proportionate to the earnings made in the endeavour. It cannot be equated with a fee charged for services rendered. The Administration renders no service to the catering contractor other than supervision in public interest. For the said practice reason, the levy need not bear the characteristics of a regulatory fee. Thus it can safely be stated that this cannot be termed as an instance for compensatory fee or regulatory fee, since as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L. T. Swamiyar, AIR 1954 SC 282 it does not have the characteristics of any positive work for the benefit of the person and money is taken as a return for the work done or services rendered. As pointed out by the learned Judges, fees confer a special capacity although the special advantage, as for example, in the case of registration fee for document or marriage licences as secondary to the primary motive or regulation in the public interest. The Administration lays down stipulations and yardsticks, which the privilege holder is to scrupulously follow. It is not disputed that on the revenue generated, a fixed percentage is to be remitted to the principal as a premium. It goes to the general fund. If we view the argument in the above perspective, it may not be necessary for us to resolve the question whether it is a tax or a fee, and if a fee, whether there is quid pro quo or it is of a regulatory nature. The parameters to be applied are wholly different. 54. Mr. Cherian had also referred to the fundamental changes that had been proposed in the matter of catering policy. Of course the Railway Board orders from very early days categorises earning from the catering service as a revenue. He had also referred to the speech made by the Minister when the budget for the relevant years were introduced in the Parliament. It may also be interesting to note the phraseology used when the issue is dealt with in Ext. P-1, in the caption "Financial Bid" (Para 14.5). He had also referred to the speech made by the Minister when the budget for the relevant years were introduced in the Parliament. It may also be interesting to note the phraseology used when the issue is dealt with in Ext. P-1, in the caption "Financial Bid" (Para 14.5). The response is referred to as the "Financial Bid" which will be in terms of a percentage commission on sales turnover and which will be payable by the licensee to the railways. Thus it was noted as a percentage of sales on sales turnover. It had been indicated as a sum, the minimum of which was indicated in the tender and shall be calculated as per the guidelines. 55. The licence fee was always determinable on the turnover. The Court of catering services have been substantially increased, and the licence fee has only been proportionately given a hike. If such increase is not there, the result would be that the contractors would be reaping a harvest, unmerited. No Court can countenance a contention which gives an opportunity to persons for unjust enrichment. It has been pointed out by the Standing Counsel that Ext. P-1 policy has been successfully implemented. It is also emphasised that in respect of several major stations minimum quotation had been prescribed as 12% of the turnover, but offers received show that contractors have expressed willingness to quote for the privilege even at as high as 25% of the income derived. 56. In the changing life style and global economy, so as to be in the business, drastic policy decisions have to be conceived and implemented and at times it may appear to be unconventional. As the Supreme Court said in Government of India v. HDC, 1993 (3) SCC 499, change in policy does not by itself vitiate the action taken pursuant thereto, if they are reasonable and rational. The view has been reiterated in M. V. Al Quamar v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd., 2000 (3) SCC 278 : (AIR 2000 SC 2826). It will be wholly irregular to doubt the wisdom of the Administration, and for the only reason that it may not be agreeable to one"s conventional views. The additional income does not go to private hands, and is pumped back to the system, to make it more healthy, and utlimately caters to better public interest. It will be wholly irregular to doubt the wisdom of the Administration, and for the only reason that it may not be agreeable to one"s conventional views. The additional income does not go to private hands, and is pumped back to the system, to make it more healthy, and utlimately caters to better public interest. In this view, the Court is constrained to adopt a realistic attitude. The Railway Board, it appears have bestowed thought to revamp the organisation, and are introducing policies to cope up with the changing situation. The petitioners have therefore to adapt themselves to the changes, and cannot insist them to stick on to the old patterns. 57. We uphold the revised policies as reasonable and valid. Consequently, the writ appeals and original petitions are dismissed. The parties will suffer their respective costs. Order accordingly.