Judgment :- K. Balakrishnan Nair, J. The grievance raised by the writ petitioners in this Original Petition is that Central Administrative Tribunal while hearing the grievance of Incometax Officer regarding the adverse entries in his confidential reports, acted as an appellate authority and expunged them. According to the petitioners, in doing so, the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the Original Petition are the following: 2. The applicant before the tribunal is an Incometax officer who was aggrieved by certain adverse remarks in his confidential reports which stood in the way of his getting promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Incometax (junior scale). The applicant was informed of the adverse remarks by Annexure A1 dated 28.4.1993 produced along with Ext.P1, the copy of the Original application. The said remarks related to the period 1992-93. The applicant made a representation before the second petitioner, the Chief Commissioner of Incometax seeking to expunge those remarks. The said Officer expunged one of those remarks entered in column 20 and declined to interfere with other remarks. The said decision was intimated to the applicant by Annexure A3 dated 6.4.1994. The applicant made a futher representation to the third petitioner-Chairman, Central Board of Taxes. That was rejected by the said officer and the intimation in this regard was served on the applicant by Annexure A6 dated 16.5.1995. The applicant attempted a review petition before the third petitioner which also stood rejected as evident from Annexure A8 to Ext.P1. 3. The applicant approached the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. No.1374/96 challenging Annexures A1, A3, A6 and A8 attached to Ext.P1. The applicant submitted that the adverse remarks were entered without following the mandatory procedure governing recording of confidential reports. The applicant contended that the decisions of the higher authorities are bald and cryptic and do not contain any reasons. The respondents in the O.A. who are the writ petitioners herein filed Ext.P2 reply statement controverting the allegations of the applicant. 4.The Tribunal which heard the Original Application, allowed the same by Ext.P3 order dated 4.8.1999. 5. After the expunging of the adverse entries in column 20 by the 2nd petitioner, what remained for consideration were those under columns 14,15 and 18, which are extracted here in below for convenient reference: "Col.14. 4.The Tribunal which heard the Original Application, allowed the same by Ext.P3 order dated 4.8.1999. 5. After the expunging of the adverse entries in column 20 by the 2nd petitioner, what remained for consideration were those under columns 14,15 and 18, which are extracted here in below for convenient reference: "Col.14. The I.T.O.could complete only 61 scrutiny assessments as he was on leave for 138 days on medical ground. He has completed all arrear summary assessments. Collection target has been exceeded but ITO's contribution in achieving the same is negligible. In other areas of action plan, there is shortfall because he was on leave for 138 days in the year". Col.15. The addition made in the case of M/s Bajaj House is quite reasonable. The additions in all other cases is on estimate basis and will not stand the test of appeal. None of the assessments including that of M/s. Bajaj House can be categorized as outstanding or a quality assessment. Col.18; (1) (b);Other qualities -Decision making-Soundness:- "Inadequate." In the cae of Shri K.P. Antony for the asst. year 1981-82 for which assessment proceeding were started on the basis of a revenue audit objection, the assessment was passed without analying or understanding the issue. (4) Investigating capability:- Inadequate. The quality of assessment orders passed in the case of K.P.Antony for 1981-82, C. Jayapraksh for 92-93, M/s Hotel Buhari for 90-91 and M/s, Haseena Timbers for 90-91, are of poor quality. 6. The tribunal found that adverse comments contained in column 14 were unjustified because at the relevant time, the applicant was on medical leave for a fairly long period. All the higher authorities lost sight of his crucial fact and affirmed the finding of the Reporting Officer under this column. Counsel for the petitioners also fairly submitted that the view taken by the tribunal on this aspect is a plausible view and he trained his guns on the findings of the tribunal regarding the comments under columns 15 and 18. He submitted that even if the orders of the higher authorities were bad for any of the reason, urged, the proper course should have been to quash those orders and remit them to the departmental authorities for fresh determination in accordance with. 7. He submitted that even if the orders of the higher authorities were bad for any of the reason, urged, the proper course should have been to quash those orders and remit them to the departmental authorities for fresh determination in accordance with. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant/respondent contended that even if the proper course would have been to remit the matter for fresh determination, it made no difference as to the end result. According to him, if the orders of the higher authorties are quashed, its legal effect is that his representation against the entries will pending before the first higher authority. According to him, adverse reports against which representation is pending cannot be acted upon to deny promotion. In support of that contention, the counsel relied on the decision of the apex court in Brij Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SCC 948). The said contention was resisted by the counsel for the petitioners relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Badrinath v. Government of T.N. (2000(8) SCC 395)wherein the Supreme Court has observed that even uncommunicated adverse remarks could be relied upon for compulsorily retiring a government servant. We are not inclined to examine this controversy as the same is premature now. 8. The orders passed by the higher authorities not contain any reason for rejecting the contentions rasied by the applicant. They are non-speaking orders. So, we agree with the finding of the tribunal that Annexures A3, A6 and A8 to Ext.P1 are liable to be quashed, though for different reasons. We uphold the order of the tribunal to the above extent. But we find considerable force in he contention of the writ petitioners that the tribunal should have remitted the matter to the competent authorities to take decision in accordance with law. In a democracy like ours, it is one of the fundamental consitutional limitations that all executive functions shall normally be discharged by those who are answerable to legislature. The courts may judicially review those administrative decisions, which power is subject to well-known limitations. 9. In a democracy like ours, it is one of the fundamental consitutional limitations that all executive functions shall normally be discharged by those who are answerable to legislature. The courts may judicially review those administrative decisions, which power is subject to well-known limitations. 9. In administrative Law (Eighth Edition ( by H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth), the learned Authors at Pages 364-365 comment: " The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with no less important doctrine that the court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonbleness is the area in which deciding authority has genuinely free discretion, If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. When a Divisional Court yielded to that temptation by invalidating a Secretary of State's decision to postpone publication of a report by company inspectors, the House of Lords held that the judgments 'illustrate the danger of judges wrongly though unconsciously substituting their own views for the views of the decision-maker who alone is charged and authorized by Parliament to exercise a discretaion," (Emphasis Supplied) This principle has been quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council ( AIR 1991 SC 1153). 10. In service matters, the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against the tendency of Courts to substitute their decisions for that of the Administrator, especially in the matter of dispute regarding promotions. Some of the earlier decisions are in State of Mysore v. Sayed Mehamood (AIR 1968 SC 1113), State of Mysore v. E.N. Nanjundiah(1969 (3) SCC 633) and State of Mysore v. C.R. Sheshadri (1974 (4) SCC 308 ), In the last of the above decisions, the Supreme Court has explained the principle that the Courts should not venture to usurp the powers of the Administrator. The Court held as follows: "In our constitutional scheme, a broad three-fold division exists. The power to promote an officer belongs to the Executive and the judicial power may control or review government action but cannot extend to acting as if it were the Executive. The Court may issue directions but leave it to the executive. The Court may issue directions but leave it to the Executive to carry it out. The power to promote an officer belongs to the Executive and the judicial power may control or review government action but cannot extend to acting as if it were the Executive. The Court may issue directions but leave it to the executive. The Court may issue directions but leave it to the Executive to carry it out. The judiciary cannot promote or demote officials but may demolish a bad order of Governemnt or order reconsideration on correct principles……….While we agree that the High Court has been impelled by a right judicial instinct to undo injustice to an individual, we feel that a finer perception of the limits of judicial review would have forbidden it from going beyond directing the Executive to reconsider and doing it on its own venturing into an area of surmise and speculation I regard to the possibilities of escalation in service of the appellant. Judicial expansionism, like allowing the judicial sword to rust in its armoury where it needs to be used, can upset the constitutional sysmmetry and damage the constitutional design of our founding document." 11. The above principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court will also squarely apply to the decision regarding the review of confidential reports by superior officers. Therefore, we are of the view that the tribunal ought not have acted as an appellate or revisional authority over the decision of the reporting officer contained in Annexure A1. While laying down the above principle, we are not unmindful of the decision of the Supreme Court in Controller & Auditor General v. K.S. Jagannathan ( AIR 1987 SC 537). In the said decision, the apex court held: "There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the government or a public authority has failed to exerice or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Governement or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring usch discretion has been conferred. In all such discretion has been conferred. In all such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or giver directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly an lawfully exercised its discretion." (Emphasis Supplied) 12. The distinction is drawn as to the cases in which this Court may itself take a decision which the Administrator ought to have taken, had be exercised his power lawfully, basing on the nature of the decision is to be taken objectively on the basis of evidence of materials, like the decision of an Industrial Tribunal or that of a statutory appellate authority, this Court will be justified in taking a decision for itself to avoid the agony of a remand and consequential delay. But, where the decision to be arrived at is to be on the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the Administrator and especially where a discretion is conferred on him to choose him from among various alternatives like in the case of imposition of penalty in a disciplinary proceedings, the matter must definitely go to the Administrator for a decision in accordance with law. In the case at hand, the subject matter relates to the exercise of disposal of a representation filed against the adverse comments made by the reporting officer in the confidential reports. The superior officers armed with their rich experience in the department are pre-eminently suited for reviewing those adverse comments. The tribunal should have stoppd at directing them to take a decision in accordance with law. Therefore, we are of the view that the matter requires reconsideration at the hands of the departmental authorities. 13. The superior officers armed with their rich experience in the department are pre-eminently suited for reviewing those adverse comments. The tribunal should have stoppd at directing them to take a decision in accordance with law. Therefore, we are of the view that the matter requires reconsideration at the hands of the departmental authorities. 13. After the closing of the arguments and a day after, the counsel for the writ petitioners, with out permission, cited a few decisions of the Supreme Court to contend that when the appellate or revisional authority is agreeing with the findings of the original authority, they need not pass speaking orders. The said decisions do not absolve the appellate or revisional authority from considerting independently the grounds raised in the representation against the findings of the original authority. Of course, the appellate or revisional authority need not analyze the evidence on record in detail and record separate findings on the points to be decided, if they after going through the evidence and materials agree with the findsings of original authority. But they must give reasons for rejecting the contentions/grounds raised by the employee. 14. Therefore, we hold that the tribunal has quashed Annexures A3, A6 & A8 to Ext.P1 correctly. The tribunal's order to the extent it quashes Annexures A1 is set aside. So, the second petitioner shall reconsider Annexure A2 representation made against Annexure A1 within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The second respondent/ applicant if he so desires, may file supplementary represention, if any, before the second petitioner within three weeks from today. The Original Petition is disposed of as above.