Judgment :- 1. The defendant is the appellant. 2. The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of money on promissory notes. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by that, the respondent/plaintiff filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court, which, in turn, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and allowed the appeal. Hence, the present Second Appeal by the defendant. 3. The case of the plaintiff/respondent is as follows: “The defendant received a sum of Rs. 8,000/- on 13.3.1989 and executed Ex.A-1 promissory note. Again on 10.4.1989, he received a further sum of Rs. 2,000/- and separately executed another promissory note (Ex.A-2). Despite the repeated demands, the promissory note amounts were not paid. Hence, the suit was filed.” 4. The case of the defendant is this: — “There is a running transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. Earlier, the defendant received a loan of Rs. 17,000/- and repaid the same along with interest. While receiving the loan, the plaintiff obtained signatures in the unfilled forms as security for the interest amount and the said forms were filled up later and a false claim has been made by filing the suit. Furthermore, there is a material alteration in Ex.A-2 promissory note executed for Rs. 2,000/-. In the said promissory note, originally, the month was mentioned as ‘March’, but the same was struck off and altered as ‘April’ and as such, there is material alteration.” 5. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the said promissory note cannot be said to be a genuine one, as there was a material alteration in Ex.A-2. Being aggrieved by that, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court, which, in turn, accepted the case of the plaintiff and decreed the suit in his favour. Hence, this Second Appeal by the defendant. 6. Mr. Raghavachari, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, would mainly attack the judgment of the lower appellate Court by making the following submissions: — “Ex.A-2 had been materially altered. When there is a material alteration, the said document is void ab initio, as per Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This Court in Verco Pvt. Ltd. v. Newandram Naraindas, A.I.R. 1974 Mad. When there is a material alteration, the said document is void ab initio, as per Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This Court in Verco Pvt. Ltd. v. Newandram Naraindas, A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 4, would hold that when words relating to ‘rate of interest’ and ‘per month’ were inserted after the execution of the promissory note, it was held that the said promissory note is void and inoperative by virtue of Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The lower appellate Court did not consider the said point and merely relied upon the decision in Kandasami Mudaliar v. Muthukrishna Moorthy and another, (1993) 1 M.L.J. 672 , concluded in favour of the plaintiff, even though the facts of that case would not apply to the facts of the present case.” 7. Mr. K. Kannan, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, in justification of the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, would contend that there is no material alteration, since the alteration of the month from ‘March’ to ‘April’ would not affect the rights, liabilities or legal position of the parties or the legal effect of the said promissory note, as in this case, no prejudice could be pleaded.” 8. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the Counsel for both parties and perused the records. 9. In the case on hand, two promissory notes were marked. Ex.A-1 is dated 13.3.1989 and Ex.A-2 is dated 10.4.1989. Though it is contended by the defendant that the unfilled forms signed by the defendant had been misused by the plaintiff seeking the false claim, no argument has been advanced before this Court in respect of the same, as the main attack would be only in relation to the alleged material alteration as found in Ex.A-2. 10. In regard to Ex.A-1, the lower appellate Court has correctly concluded that the defence projected by the defendant cannot be true, in view of the fact that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff by examining two witnesses is reliable, in the light of the failure on the part of the defendant to send a reply to the notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant demanding the amount of the promissory notes before filing the suit. 11. 11. In regard to Ex.A-2, it is vehemently contended that when there is an alteration in the month from ‘March’ to ‘April’, the said document became void, as per Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the light of the decision rendered by this Court reported in A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 4 (supra). 12. The said decision would not apply to the facts of the present case, as in that case, the alteration was in the rate of interest without the consent of the defendant. But, in this case there is alteration in the month and the same had been initialed by the defendant. 13. But, even assuming that there is alteration without consent, whether such an alteration could be considered to be a material alteration is the question to be decided in this case. 14. As held by the Supreme Court in Loonkaran Sethia v. Ivan E. John, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 336, the material alteration is one which varies the rights, liabilities or legal position of the parties, as ascertained by the deed in its original state, or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainly some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void, or which may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed. 15. This observation would make it clear that it cannot be said that every alteration in month is always material, irrespective of its effect upon the rights, liabilities or legal position of the parties. 16. In this case, the suit had been filed on 10.3.1992. Therefore, even assuming that the month ‘March’ has been altered as ‘April’ it cannot be stated that it is a material alteration, since the suit had been filed within three years from the month of ‘March’, which was the month originally mentioned in Ex.A-2 promissory note. 17. Under those circumstances, I do not find any merit in this Second Appeal. 18. Therefore, the Second Appeal is dismissed with costs, confirming the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court.