DEBIPRASAD SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application is directed against the judgment and order dated 12-8-92 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Midnapore in Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1991 thereby affirming the judgment and order dated 27-2-91 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Midnapore in U. R. Case No. 254 of 1982 (T. R. 269/83) convicting the accused petitioners under Section 3 (a) of Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act and sentencing each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. ( 2 ) THE case of the prosecution is that on 15-8-82 at about 16. 30 hours P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 held an ambush, when they found accused Gurucharan Pasi and Nikhil Chandra Pramanick to carry one brake-beam and to enter into an incomplete structure of bricks having no roof. They followed them and caught red-handed with the said brake beam. Entering into the said structure they found another person named Shib Charan Pasi handling with railway materials. On being asked none of those persons could produce any valid document in support of their possession of such railway materials. All the three accused were arrested and the railway materials were seized under proper seizure list. On further interrogation the said accused persons disclosed that they were paid employees of accused Santosh Karmakar and they were working on his behalf. After completion of enquiry a complaint was filed against all the aforesaid four accused persons alleging commission of offence under Section 3 (a) of R. P. (U. P.) Act. ( 3 ) THE order of conviction and sentence was challenged in the lower appellate Court on various grounds, which have been successfully dealt with by the lower appellate Court and the same does not require any repetition. In the present revisional application mainly three points have been raised by Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners. The first point raised by Mr. Mukherjee is that search was conducted in this case in violation of Section 10 of the R. P. (U. P.) Act. No search warrant was obtained before conducting search and seizure. But I am unable to accept such contention made by Mr. Mukherjee. Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners. The first point raised by Mr. Mukherjee is that search was conducted in this case in violation of Section 10 of the R. P. (U. P.) Act. No search warrant was obtained before conducting search and seizure. But I am unable to accept such contention made by Mr. Mukherjee. Section 8 (1) of the Act provides that the R. P. F. officers start an enquiry under Section 8 (1) of the R. P. (U. P.) Act when any person has been arrested under Section 6 of the said Act by an officer of the Force or he has been arrested by any other member of the Force under Section 7 and is forwarded to the R. P. F. officer. Such arrest can be made by either of them when any person has committed or is reasonably suspected to have committed an offence under Section 3 (a) of the R. P. (U. P.) Act. ( 4 ) SECTION 165, Cr. P. C. provides the circumstances in which the officer in-charge of a Police Station or the Investigating Officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector can conduct the house search without a search warrant during the investigation of any case. This section has been made applicable to the R. P. F. officers also during an enquiry under the R. P. (U. P.) Act by virtue of Section 8 (2) of the said Act. The officer of the Force can also conduct a house search during an enquiry under the Act without a search warrant under certain conditions laid down under Section 165, Cr. P. C. In my considered view Section 10 of the R. P. (U. P.) Act empowers an officer of the Railway Protection Force to conduct a search and recover railway property from any premises of other person prior to registration and enquiry of the case under the R. P. (U. P.) Act. ( 5 ) THE next argument advanced by Mr. Mukherjee is that conviction in the present case is based on the confessional statements of the accused persons which were not recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that the officers of the R. P. F. failed to administer any caution or warning to the person making confessional statement. Non-compliance of such revision renders the statements so recorded, inadmissible in evidence. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that the officers of the R. P. F. failed to administer any caution or warning to the person making confessional statement. Non-compliance of such revision renders the statements so recorded, inadmissible in evidence. In support of his contention Mr. Mukherjee relies on a judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 1992 Cri LJ 1888 (N. S. R. Krishna Prasad v. Directorate of Enforcement ). In a case under the Customs Act it was held by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court as follows :-"a plain reading of S. 108 of the Customs Act, makes it clear that it does not enable the empowered authority to record a confessional statement from a person summoned thereunder. In the absence of any such power conferred u/s. 108 of the Customs Act, the empowered authority can only fall back upon S. 164, Cr. P. C. to record a statement of confessional nature from the person summoned. As already stated, Section 164 (2), Cr. P. C. enacts that the Magistrate while recording a confessional statement, must administer the warning or caution to the person making the confessional statement, that the same would be used against him. The same caution or warning, it follows, must also be administered to the person summoned, u/s. 108 of the Customs Act by the empowering authority. Non-compliance with the mandatory provisions contained in S. 164 (2), Cr. P. C. is not curable u/s. 463, Cr. P. C. and renders the statement so recorded, inadmissible in evidence. " ( 6 ) I have gone through the judgment referred to above and in my considered opinion the said judgment does not have any manner of application in the present case. In cases under the R. P. (U. P.) Act Section 164, Cr. P. C. has no application. Section 9 of the Act makes the proceeding judicial and the R. P. F. officers being non-police officers can record a confessional statement of an accused which will not be hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. In cases under the R. P. (U. P.) Act Section 164, Cr. P. C. has no application. Section 9 of the Act makes the proceeding judicial and the R. P. F. officers being non-police officers can record a confessional statement of an accused which will not be hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. This was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported in 1975 Cri LJ 423 : ( AIR 1975 SC 393 ) (Srilal Shaw v. State of W. B.), wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if a statement of accused is recorded during the course of investigation under the Act of 1966, that itself can be relied upon by the prosecution in order to establish the charge that the accused was in lawful possession of the railway property. The question is whether such confessional statement was recorded under compulsion or coercion. If it is found from the evidence on record that the accused was forcibly taken to the R. P. F. post where he was forced to make confessional statement and the accused later on denied the confession, no reliance can be placed on such confession to convict him. ( 7 ) IN the present case the accused persons namely Gurucharan, Nikhil and Shibcharan made statement before P. W. 12 that they are paid employees of accused Santosh Karmakar. In cross-examination of P. W. 12 a suggestion was put that those statements were not made voluntarily and were made under compulsion. But the accused persons in their examination under Section 313, Cr. P. C. did not take the plea that such statements were obtained under compulsion though specific question was put to them. From the evidence of P. W. 1 it is further seen that the accused made confessional statements that accused Santosh is the owner of the said structure and materials. There is no cross-examination on such point that no such statement was made by the accused persons. The evidence of P. W. 5 also goes to show that accused persons confessed that they are the paid labourers of Santosh Karmakar. In view of such evidence on record the learned Court below rightly held that the accused persons made voluntary statements confessing their guilt. ( 8 ) MR. The evidence of P. W. 5 also goes to show that accused persons confessed that they are the paid labourers of Santosh Karmakar. In view of such evidence on record the learned Court below rightly held that the accused persons made voluntary statements confessing their guilt. ( 8 ) MR. Mukherjee relies on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 379 : (1980 Cri LJ 1424) (Balkishan A. Devidayal v. State of Maharashtra ). In the said judgment it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that officer of R. P. F. making enquiry in respect of offence under Section 3 of R. P. (U. P.) Act, 1966 is not a Police officer. Therefore any confessional statement recorded by him in course of an enquiry under Section 8 (1) of the Act of 1966, cannot be excluded from evidence under Section 25 of the Evidence Act. It was further held in the said judgment that when a person is arrested under Section 6 of the R. P. (U. P.) Act and incriminating statements were made by him during enquiry under Section 8 of the said Act, protection under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India is not available to such accused. When during enquiry under Section 8 of the Act, no formal complaint is filed in Court or any FIR is lodged with the Police, it cannot be said that the author of the self-incriminating statement has fulfilled the character of a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. I have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above and I am of the view that the said judgment has no manner of application in the present case. These are all settled principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as also by other High Courts. ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee next relies on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1995) 1 Crimes 138 : ( AIR 1995 SC 980 ) (Shivappa v. State of Karnataka ). From a reading of the said judgment it appears that the appellant was convicted under Section 302, I. P. C. by the trial Court, which was upheld by the High Court. Conviction of the appellant was mainly based on the confessional statement made by the accused-appellant. From a reading of the said judgment it appears that the appellant was convicted under Section 302, I. P. C. by the trial Court, which was upheld by the High Court. Conviction of the appellant was mainly based on the confessional statement made by the accused-appellant. Since there was a failure of the learned Magistrate to make a real endeavour to ascertain the voluntary nature of the confessional statement and since the confessional statement was the only place of evidence relied upon by the prosecution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that such order of conviction cannot be sustained. Accordingly the order of conviction and sentence was set aside. In my consideredopinion the judgment referred to above has no manner of application in the present case. There is absolutely no evidence in the present case that confession was obtained by compulsion or coercien. The accused persons in their examination under Section 313, Cr. P. C. did not take any plea that such statements were obtained under compulsion though specific question was put to them on that point. ( 10 ) THE next point raised by Mr. Mukherjee is that prosecution failed to prove that the materials were seized from a godown owned by accused Santosh Karmakar. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that although the licence issued by the Municipal authority contains an address, in the seizure list nothing has been mentioned. This point was also very efficiently dealt with by the learned trial Magistrate as also by the lower appellate Court. I do not find anything wrong with such finding of the learned Court below. From the evidence on record it is clear that seizure was made from the godown of accused Santosh Karmakar. It is true that in the seizure list the plot number has not been mentioned. But that was subsequently rectified by obtaining the document, namely, the licence issued by the Municipal authority in favour of accused Santosh Karmakar. During trial accused Santosh never tried to dispute that he did not possess any licence for making structure within the Municipality. I do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence on record on this point. ( 11 ) THE jurisdiction of High Court in Criminal revision application is very much restricted, and it should not embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence. I do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence on record on this point. ( 11 ) THE jurisdiction of High Court in Criminal revision application is very much restricted, and it should not embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence. Where the learned Magistrate trying a case and the learned Additional Sessions Judge hearing an appeal arrived, on a full appreciation of evidence, at a concurrent finding of fact, it will not be proper for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence once again for the purpose of determining whether the concurrent findings of fact by both the Courts below are correct or not. I have carefully gone through the judgments of both the Courts below and I do not find any reason to interfere with the same and to hold otherwise. ( 12 ) THE present revisional application accordingly fails and the same is dismissed. The accused petitioners are directed to surrender before the trial Court within a fortnight. Let urgent xerox certified copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the respective parties at an early date. Petition dismissed.