Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. This appeal is filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge whereby the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. The facts are rather interesting. The management of Bhavanji Mills ran a textile mill. It was established somewhere in the year 1982. The provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, hereinafter referred to as E.S.I. Act, were extended to that area by a notification dated March 27, 1986. One B. Srinivasan joined this factory on December 7, 1987. Unfortunately, on December 17, 1987 he died in an accident. Before his death, however, the authorities under the E.S.I. Act had issued a notice on February 24, 1987 by which it was informed to the mill that the said establishment is covered under the E.S.I. Act with effect from April 1, 1986 and even a code number was allotted, it being 512852-11. After B. Srinivasan died, his father, the second respondent herein, filed an application under the Workmen's Compensation Act on January 12, 1988. He claimed a sum of Rs. 53, 760 towards compensation for the death of his son. This was opposed by the present appellant on the ground that the said B. Srinivasan was actually covered and was an 'insured person' under the E.S.I. Act and, therefore, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act would be excluded and would not be applicable. This plea was obviously raised in view of Sections 53 and 61 of the E.S.I. Act. It seems that before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, the tenability of the application was also questioned by way of a preliminary Objection. However, the Commissioner held that, that issue could be gone into only along with the merits, when the matters are decided finally. A writ petition came to be filed against that order but, even that failed, as the same was dismissed on November 10, 1989. Afterwards enquiry proceeded before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The Commissioner ultimately, by his order dated August 24, 1992, held that he had the necessary jurisdiction. He also held that the deceased was not an 'insured person' within the meaning of the E.S.I. Act and, therefore, there was no question of applicability of that Act; that there was no question of bar under Section 53 of the E.S.I. Act. He, accordingly, allowed the application and awarded compensation of Rs. 54, 053 with 6% interest. He also held that the deceased was not an 'insured person' within the meaning of the E.S.I. Act and, therefore, there was no question of applicability of that Act; that there was no question of bar under Section 53 of the E.S.I. Act. He, accordingly, allowed the application and awarded compensation of Rs. 54, 053 with 6% interest. This order was clearly appealable under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. However, appeal was not filed by the petitioner. Instead the management mills chose to file a writ petition before this Court. The writ petition which was filed in 1992 eventually came to be decided in the year 2000 and a learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition. He upheld the finding that the said B. Srinivasan could not be said to be an 'insured person' under the provisions of the E.S.I. Act. The learned single Judge has also made reference to number of rulings firstly to suggest that the matter would lie only under the realms of the Workmen's Compensation Act. There is also a reference to a ruling suggesting that a writ petition cannot be an appropriate remedy against the orders passed under the Workmen's Compensation Act.The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Mr. Vijay Narayan points out that a similar question regarding the applicability of the E.S.I. Act in the situation like this is pending before the Apex Court. He points out that the learned single Judge has relied upon the Division Bench judgment dated December 15, 1999 passed by the Division Bench consisting of K. G. BALAKRISHNAN, Chief Justice as his Lordship then was and K. P. SIVASUBRAMIANIAM, JJ. He points out that in that judgment, it has been held that the only appropriate Act applicable to the facts in that case would be the Workmen's Compensation Act and not the E.S.I. Act and further that the S.L.P. against judgment is pending, having been admitted by Apex Court. The learned senior counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent however pointed out that it is not necessary for us to go into the correctness or otherwise of the earlier Division Bench judgment referred to above as in fact the writ petition in this case was itself not maintainable. The learned senior counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent however pointed out that it is not necessary for us to go into the correctness or otherwise of the earlier Division Bench judgment referred to above as in fact the writ petition in this case was itself not maintainable. The learned senior counsel argues and, in our opinion rightly, that the writ petition itself could not be entertained particularly when the appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act was available to the petitioner appellant. The learned senior counsel points out that there is a provision under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and it says, "Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause A shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against." Learned senior counsel says that perhaps it is in order to avoid this liability that the writ petition was chosen to be filed and that too after the period of limitation for the appeal was over. Learned Senior Counsel therefore says that the writ petition itself was without any bona fides.The learned counsel for the appellant however, tried to meet this argument by saying that in reality the tenability of the writ petition was never in challenge and in view of the fact that the petitioner has disclosed the circumstances under which the writ petition came to be filed and further in view of the legal question involved regarding the applicability of the E.S.I. Act, the writ petition could have been entertained. The learned counsel further argues that the existence of the statutory appeal may not necessarily bar the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Considering the rival contentions, it must be first said that this is a most pathetic case where a father who was trying to get the compensation for the death of his only son, which was ordered in the year 1992, is still not able to get a farthing of the compensation till today. Be that as it may, the question is whether the writ petition could be entertained. The sine qua non for the entertainment of the writ petition is that it must be a bona fide exercise on the part of the petitioner. Be that as it may, the question is whether the writ petition could be entertained. The sine qua non for the entertainment of the writ petition is that it must be a bona fide exercise on the part of the petitioner. If the appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act could not be filed unless the ordered compensation was paid then, obviously it has to be presumed that the writ petition was filed only to avoid the payment of compensation. The appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act has a special significance. It is not like an ordinary appeal under the taxing statutes where the parties are required to pay taxes. The appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act is on an entirely different footing because there someone is dead and that someone is a workman. Therefore, this salutary provision of the payment of the compensation first has been made as a sine qua non for the entertainment of an appeal. Now, if such an appeal was not filed and instead a writ petition was chosen to be filed, in our opinion even if the writ petitioner explained as to why the writ petition was filed and raised substantial question of law, the writ petition would still be without any bona fides. After all, by filling of the writ petition the employer avoided his liability to make the payment of compensation which was a compensation for the death of a labourer who was the only son. In that view, we do not wish to go into the other aspects of the matter. In our opinion, since the writ petition itself was not maintainable, there is no question of deciding any further question as to whether the person concerned was an insured person or not. In that view, we dismiss this appeal and direct the appellant to make the payment of compensation. In the circumstances we inflict cost of Rs. 5, 000 against the appellant.