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2001 DIGILAW 722 (GUJ)

MANGALBHAI SANABHAI PATEL v. KASHIBEN KANTABEN WIFE OF MANGALBHAI DHANJIBHAI DECEASED

2001-09-27

H.K.RATHOD

body2001
H. K. RATHOD, J. ( 1 ) SHRI K. M. Patel, learned advocate is appearing for the original petitioners Shri Kanubhai Maganbhai Patel and Niranjanbhai Maganbhai Patel. Shri N. K. Majmudar, learned advocate is appearing for the original respondents namely Shri Maganbhai Shanabhai Patel and Kantibhai Shanabhai Patel. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. D. S. Pandit and Mr. R. M. Chauhan have appeared on behalf of the respondent authorities in these matters. Brief facts of special civil application No. 892 of 1983 are as under : according to the petitioners, they are the owners of the following lands : @@@ Name of the block No. A. G. Assessment -- Ghamand 511 0. 7 1. 00 510 0. 7 1. 00 540 3. 4 14. 75 553 4. 26 21. 12 589 17. 4 92/05 total 25. 8 120. 82 ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the suit lands were advertised for sale in the year 1972 and the petitioners sold the said lands to Shri Chunibhai and Parshottam, who are the maternal uncle of the respondent No. 1. The agreement for sale of the said lands was executed on 18. 6. 1972 and it was attested by the first respondent and from the next day, purchaser Shri Chunibhai and Parshottambhai are in actual possession of the said lands. Six years thereafter, the respondents applied to the Mamlatdar for tenancy rights. The Mamlatdar registered the said case as Tenancy Appeal and held an inquiry and as a result of the said inquiry, he held that the respondents were not the tenants of the said lands on the basis of the documents produced before him. Being aggrieved by the order of the Mamlatdar, Amod in tenancy case no. 2639 of 1978, the respondents preferred an appeal before the Collector wherein the matter was remanded by the Collector by order dated 19. 2. 1982. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Collector, the petitioners preferred revision appeal no. TEN. BA. 327/1980 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the tribunal, vide its order dated 3. 2. 1981, remanded the matter to the Collector, Bharuch to decide the appeal a fresh. Thereafter, in view of the directions issued by the tribunal, the Deputy Collector, Bharuch allowed the parties to produce documentary as well as oral evidence and after hearing the parties, the learned Collector, Bharuch passed order on 1. 4. 2. 1981, remanded the matter to the Collector, Bharuch to decide the appeal a fresh. Thereafter, in view of the directions issued by the tribunal, the Deputy Collector, Bharuch allowed the parties to produce documentary as well as oral evidence and after hearing the parties, the learned Collector, Bharuch passed order on 1. 4. 1982 holding that the respondents were cultivating the said lands in dispute and the respondents are the tenants of the said lands. Against the said order of the Collector dated 1. 4. 1982, the petitioners preferred revision appeal no. Ten. BA> 1133 of 1982 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was dismissed by the tribunal by judgment and order dated 5. 1. 1983 and, thereafter, being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the tribunal dated 5. 1. 1983 in Revision appeal NO. 1133 of 1982, the petitioners filed special civil application no. 892 of 1983 before this court. Facts of special civil application no. 893 of 1983 are as under in brief : ( 3 ) SAID petition was filed by Kanubhai Maganbhai Patel, Sarlaben Maganbhai Patel, Niranjan alias Sureshbhai Maganbhai Patel as heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Kashiben alias Kantaben wife of Maganbhai Dhanjibhai of village Nar, Taluka : Petlad and by Jagdishbhai Dabhai Patel against the respondent namely Mangalbhai Shanabhai Patel challenging the very same order dated 5th January, 1983 passed by the tribunal in revision appeal no. 1132 of 1982. The tribunal has decided two revision applications no. 1132 of 1982 and 1133 of 1982 by common order dated 5. 1. 1983 on the same set of facts and, therefore, thus, two petitions were filed as aforesaid and in both the petitions, rule was issued by this court initially by making it returnable in 3rd week of June, 1983 and meanwhile, status quo was granted by order dated 2nd March, 1983. 1. 1983 on the same set of facts and, therefore, thus, two petitions were filed as aforesaid and in both the petitions, rule was issued by this court initially by making it returnable in 3rd week of June, 1983 and meanwhile, status quo was granted by order dated 2nd March, 1983. ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of both the said petitions, the petitioner as well as the respondents had entered into settlement dated 8th February, 1984 which was signed by Parshottamdas Shankarbhai Patel, Mangalbhai Shanabhai and on the basis of the said settlement, it was agreed between the parties that in respect of the provisions under section 70 (b) of the Tenancy Act, whatever proceedings were initiated and pending as regards the land in question as mentioned in both the petitions were required to be withdrawn by the respective parties and whatever orders passed in both the proceedings are required to be set aside with the consent of both the parties and that the civil suits which were filed in the Civil Court at Bharuch by Parshottambhai and Chunibhai in respect of the lands in question were also required to be withdrawn and as regards the amount of Rs. 40,000. 00 which was deposited by said Parshottambhai and Chunibhai before the Civil Court at Bharuch, they were entitled to withdraw the same and for that, Mangalbhai Shanabhai was not having any objection. It was also agreed between the parties unanimously that in respect of the lands in question mentioned in both the petition, between Parshottambhai Shankarbhai Patel and the heirs and legal representatives of Chunibhai Shankarbhai and Mangalbhai Shanabhai Patel, they appointed one Shri R. P. Patel as the sole arbitrator and whatever decision will be given by the said arbitrator will be binding to the respective parties. In view of the conditions of the said settlement, the parties were agree to consider any decision in respect of the proceedings under section 70 (b) of the Tenancy Act in respect of the lands in question are required to be treated as cancelled. This settlement was signed by the learned advocate Mr. Bharat A. Surati and Mr. J. M. Patel on 8th February, 1984. This settlement was signed by the learned advocate Mr. Bharat A. Surati and Mr. J. M. Patel on 8th February, 1984. This settlement was placed before this Court by the respective parties with their signatures and the signatures of their respective advocates and considering the said settlement, this court has passed an order to the effect that the parties to the proceedings have arrived at mutual settlement, terms whereof have been reduced to writing and produced on record of the case; it appears that the proceedings under section 70 (b) are pending as well as some other litigations are also going on in the Civil Court at Bharuch and the parties have agreed that all the proceedings shall be withdrawn forthwith. The Court further observed that the parties have also agreed that their disputes shall be referred to the arbitrator Shri R. P. Patel, Advocate of Nadiad and whatever decision given by Shri R. P. Patel in the said dispute will be binding to the parties. The Court also observed that in that view of the matter, the question involved in the petition shall be referred to the said R. P. Patel. In view of the compromise arrived at between the parties and recorded by the court in its order as aforesaid, the matter was disposed of by the Court as withdrawn with no order as to costs. Rs. 40,000. 00 deposited in the Court of the learned Civil Judge,s. D. , Bharuch was permitted to be withdrawn by Shri Parshottamdas S. Patel. above order was passed by this court on 8th February, 1984 and both the petitions were disposed of as withdrawn in view of the said settlement arrived at between the parties on 8th February, 1984. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, Mangalbhai Shanabhai and Kantibhai Shanabhai, original respondents filed miscellaneous civil application no. 237 of 1984 in special civil application no. 892 of 1983 with a prayer to set aside the compromise between the parties and also to set aside the order dated 8th February, 1984 passed in the special civil application and to restore the special civil application on the files of this court and to rehear the matter again. Initially, rule was issued by this on 18th April, 1984 and it was made returnable on 28th April, 1984. Thereafter, no orders have been passed in the said miscellaneous civil application. Similarly, misc. civil application no. Initially, rule was issued by this on 18th April, 1984 and it was made returnable on 28th April, 1984. Thereafter, no orders have been passed in the said miscellaneous civil application. Similarly, misc. civil application no. 236 of 1984 was filed in special civil application no. 893 of 1983 by the original respondent in the said petition with the same prayer wherein rule was issued and it was made returnable on 28th April, 1984 by order dated 18th April, 1984. looking to the record of this misc. civil application, on 8th September, 1992, this Court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia,j.) has passed the following order : "restored. Rule made absolute ( 6 ) THEREAFTER, this matter has till remained pending and similar order has not been passed in misc. civil application no. 237 of 1984. It is necessary to be noted that one order was passed by this Court (Coram : D. C. Gheewala,j.) in both the misc. civil applications on 23rd April, 1984 which reads as under :"the parties had mutually agreed to refer the disputes between themselves to Advocate Shri R. P. Patel of Nadiad. However, the allegations in the present petition seems to be that the opponent no. 3 though often called and informed, has not gone before the arbitrator and on the top of it, taking advantage of the settlement entered into between the parties, before this court, he has withdrawn Rs. 40,000. 00. It therefore, appears that he had taken advantage under the compromise pursis but has failed to carry out his part of the settlement and in that view of the matter, respondent No. 3 is directed to once again deposit the said amount of Rs. 40,000. 00 in this court within a period of one week from today. Mr. J. M. Patel, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has undertaken to serve the copy of this order directly to respondent No. 3. " ( 7 ) SPECIAL civil application No. 12695 of 1993 was filed by one Prakash Chunilal Patel and other heirs of late Chunilal and Shankarbhai Patel against Mangalbhai Shanabhai Patel. Mr. J. M. Patel, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has undertaken to serve the copy of this order directly to respondent No. 3. " ( 7 ) SPECIAL civil application No. 12695 of 1993 was filed by one Prakash Chunilal Patel and other heirs of late Chunilal and Shankarbhai Patel against Mangalbhai Shanabhai Patel. The settlement which was arrived at between the parties on 8th February, 1984 was not implemented between the parties inspite of the fact that the order was passed by this court pursuant to the said settlement and the same was recorded by this court and therefore, in the result, the parties had approached the respective authorities for further litigations and the proceedings which were continued had proceeded further again and thereafter, the Deputy Collector, Bharuch passed an order on 31st March, 1986 deciding the purchase price of the land in question under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act as a consequence of the earlier proceedings in which the respondent was held to be the tenant by the Deputy Collector which decision came to be confirmed by the revenue Tribunal. In the proceedings relating to the record of rights, the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department by order dated 27th January, 1988 held that the name of the respondents cannot be shown as tenant in view of the order of the High Court. In view of the order dated 27th January, 1988 passed by the Additional Chief Secretary, the Mamlatdar initiated proceedings for review of his earlier order with regard to purchase price and passed an order on 28th January, 1991 that his earlier order dated 31st March, 1986 fixing purchase price of the land in question was withdrawn. Therefore, the the respondents tenants preferred appeal before the Deputy Collector which was dismissed on 27th September, 1991 which order was challenged before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by filing revision application at the instance of the tenants. The revenue tribunal passed on order on 7th April, 1993 in absence of the petitioner land lord and allowed the revision application preferred by the respondent tenant and set aside the orders of the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector dated 28. 1. 1991 and 27th September, 1991. Thereafter, review application was filed by the petitioner being review application no. 30 of 1993. Meanwhile, special civil application no. 1. 1991 and 27th September, 1991. Thereafter, review application was filed by the petitioner being review application no. 30 of 1993. Meanwhile, special civil application no. 5446 of 1993 was also filed challenging the order of the tribunal dated 7th April, 1993 wherein notice was issued and interim stay was granted. However, ultimately, that petition was dismissed by order dated 23rd July, 1993 and the review application was pending. Said review application was ultimately rejected on 1. 10. 1993 and that order is under challenge in special civil application no. 12695 of 1993 filed by the land lord. In the said petition, rule was issued by this court on 21. 6. 1994 and ad interim relief was granted and it was directed to continue. In the present special civil application, civil application no. 1095 of 1996 was filed by the respondent tenant for interim relief with a prayer to permit the present applicant-tenant to cultivate the land in question and also direct the opponent not to cause any obstruction to the applicant in entering the land in question for the purpose of cultivation. Said civil application no. 1095 of 1996 was ordered to be heard alongwith the main matter i. e. special civil application no. 12695 of 1993 and except that, no order has been passed by this court in the said civil application. Brief facts of special civil application NO. 586 of 1994 filed by the land lord Prakash Chunilal and other heirs and legal heirs of deceased Shankarbhai Patel are as under: ( 8 ) THE petitioners in the said petition had preferred revision application no. 844 and 845 of 1986 against the order dated 5. 8. 1986 of the Deputy Collector dismissing their appeals preferred against the order of the Mamlatdar dated 31. 3. 1986 fixing purchase price of the land in question. Said revision applications were dismissed by the tribunal by common order dated 29. 10. 1993 on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the revision application against the order relating to fixation of the price under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act in view of the provisions of section 76 of the Tenancy Act. Thus, during the pendency of special civil application no. 12695 of 1993, this was the subsequent development and pursuant to such development, the landlord has filed the special civil application no. Thus, during the pendency of special civil application no. 12695 of 1993, this was the subsequent development and pursuant to such development, the landlord has filed the special civil application no. 586 of 1994 challenging the order passed by the tribunal dated 29th October, 1993 wherein rule was issued by this court on 21. 6. 1994 and the following order was passed :"rule returnable on July 26, 1994. To be heard with special civil application No. 12695 of 1993 ( 9 ) IN the present petition namely special civil application no. 586 of 1994, the landlord has filed the civil application no. 6387 of 1999 on the basis of the fact that the respondent No. 2 Kantibhai Shanabhai has passed away on 6th November, 1989 and therefore, for bringing his heirs and legal representatives on the record, the said civil application was filed. In the said civil application, no orders have been passed by this court and the same is pending till this date. ( 10 ) CIVIL Application No. 2428 of 2000 in special civil application no. 893 of 1983 was filed by the landlord for joining the heirs and legal representative of petitioner No. 1 Kanubhai Maganbhai Patel who has expired on 17. 9. 1998 and also for joining heirs and legal representatives of petitioner No. 2 Jagdish Dabhai who expired on 6. 9. 1986. Thus, for joining the heirs and legal representatives of petitioner NO. 1 Kanubhai M. Patel and petitioner No. 2 Jagdishbhai, civil application no. 2428 of 2000 which civil application was ordered to be heard with special civil application no. 893 of 1983 on 10th July, 2000 and except that, no orders were passed by this court in the said civil application. ( 11 ) SIMILARLY, civil application no. 2429 of 2000 was filed in special civil application no. 892 of 1983 for bringing the heirs and legal representatives of the petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 who have died on 17th September, 1998 and 6th November, 1989 respectively. The said civil application was also ordered to be heard with special civil application no. 893 of 1983 and except that, no orders have been passed by this court in the said civil application. ( 12 ) BRIEF facts of unnumbered misc. The said civil application was also ordered to be heard with special civil application no. 893 of 1983 and except that, no orders have been passed by this court in the said civil application. ( 12 ) BRIEF facts of unnumbered misc. civil application of 1994 which has been pointed out by the learned advocate Shri N. K. Majmudar at the time of hearing and office copy thereof was placed on record which civil application was filed in special civil application no. 12695 of 1993 by the respondent tenant with a prayer to review and revoke the order of admission passed in special civil application no. 12695 of 1993. According to Mr. Majmudar, said misc. civil application was filed on 8th July, 1994. According to Mr. Majmudar, said misc. civil application is pending before this Court. However, Mr. Majmudar has not been able to give number of the said application. ( 13 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Majmudar appearing on behalf of the tenant has submitted in misc. civil application no. 236 1984 and 237 of 1984 has submitted that the settlement has not been implemented by the respective parties and, therefore, both the main special civil applications are required to be restored and reheard and the compromise and the order dated 8th February, 1984 passed pursuant thereto are required to be quashed and set aside. He has further submitted that in Misc. Civil Application No. 236 of 1984, this Court (Coram : 4h. Bhairavia,j.) has passed the order and has thereby restored the matter and rule was made absolute and, therefore, both the present misc. civil applications are required to be allowed by restoring the main petitions for rehearing on merits. According to him, the order passed in one misc. civil application is also applicable to the other misc. civil application since the facts are common and the compromise as well as the order dated 8th February, 1984 is also common. He has also submitted that the settlement arrived at between the parties is contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the said settlement has failed and the arbitrator has not acted on the settlement. According to him, the order passed by the various authorities under the provisions of the Tenancy Act cannot be set aside with the consent of the parties. According to him, the order passed by the various authorities under the provisions of the Tenancy Act cannot be set aside with the consent of the parties. He has also submitted that the right which is arising in favour of the tenant cannot be set aside with the consent of the parties, otherwise, it would amount to an agreement against the statutory provisions and, therefore, such settlement is void. He has also submitted that the settlement is not legal and valid and it has failed and, therefore, it cannot be acted upon and cannot be given effect to and there cannot be estoppel against the statutory provisions. He has further submitted that the parties might have agreed for the settlement and the Court has passed the orders on the basis of the settlement but it is the duty of the Court to see whether the settlement is legal and valid or not. According to him, the parties cannot be compelled to act on an illegal settlement. According to Mr. Majmudar, the concession which was given by the parties in the said settlement was contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, such settlement cannot be acted upon and the same is not valid and therefore, not binding to the parties. He has also submitted that it is the duty of the Court to protect the interests and rights of the tenants and if the tenants rights are jeopardized, when the tenant has raised the grievance, then, this court should exercise the extraordinary powers vested in it and should restore the matter for rehearing. He has also submitted that once in one misc. civil application, this court passed order of restoration and the rule was made absolute, then, this court would become functus officio and, therefore, this court cannot act contrary to the provisions of law and orders passed by this court. He has also submitted that one matter was restored by this Court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia, J.) and, therefore, second matter is also required to be restored and both the main matters are required to be restored and heard on merits. He has also submitted that such a settlement is bad in law, contrary to the provisions of law and in the proceedings under the Tenancy Act, private arbitration is not permissible and, therefore, the settlement ought not to have been recorded by this court. He has also submitted that such a settlement is bad in law, contrary to the provisions of law and in the proceedings under the Tenancy Act, private arbitration is not permissible and, therefore, the settlement ought not to have been recorded by this court. He has further submitted that in recording the settlement, the High Court has committed irregularity and, therefore, same is required to be corrected by restoring the main matters. He has submitted that this court can exercise suo motu powers to recall for protecting the interests of the tenant and therefore, both the matters are required to be restored and reheard by this court on merits. ( 14 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. K. M. Patel appearing for the landlord original petitioners has submitted that the settlement arrived at between the parties was based on free consent of the parties and, therefore, it is legal and as per the said settlement based on free consent of the parties, it was agreed that the orders passed by the different authorities and the Courts in the different proceedings shall be treated as cancelled and it was agreed that the entire dispute shall be referred to the sole arbitrator Shri R. P. Patel and, therefore, same cannot be considered to be contrary to law or bad in law because according to him, still the rights of the parties are required to be determined by the arbitrator and, therefore, such settlement cannot be considered to be contrary to law, illegal, null and void. He has submitted that the settlement was taken by the Court on record and on the basis of the said settlement, the court has disposed of the petitions which were filed by the original petitioners and not the original respondents tenants. He has submitted that the petitions filed by the petitioners were disposed of as having been withdrawn in view of the settlement and, therefore, the tenant original respondent is not having such right for restoration of the main matters which were filed by the petitioners. According to him, it is the right of the petitioners to file such an application for restoration but it is not the right of the tenant who is the respondent in the proceedings and, therefore, both the present misc. civil applications are required to be dismissed with costs. According to him, it is the right of the petitioners to file such an application for restoration but it is not the right of the tenant who is the respondent in the proceedings and, therefore, both the present misc. civil applications are required to be dismissed with costs. He has further submitted that when the entire dispute between the parties has amicably been resolved with free consent and with the signatures of the parties and also with the signatures of their respective advocates, when it was agreed that the entire dispute will be resolved arbitration of the sole arbitrator Shri R. P. Patel, and pending proceedings were agreed to be withdrawn from the Courts and the authorities, now the respondents cannot be allowed to take plea that such a settlement was contrary to the provisions of law and therefore, the present misc. civil applications are required to be rejected. According to him, in any law, settlement is always well come and if such disputes are amicably resolved in private arbitration by way of agreed formula, then, no provisions of law will come in the way of such settlement between the parties. According to him, intention of the legislature is to have the settlements in respect of the claim of the respective parties and, therefore, there was nothing contrary to the statute which was agreed between the parties by way of settlement dated 8. 2. 1984. This court has rightly taken the settlement on record and rightly passed the orders to dispose of the petitions as having been withdrawn. According to Mr. Patel, once the petition has been disposed of by this court as withdrawn by the original petitioners, pursuant to the said settlement, then, it was not within the rights of the respondent tenant to file such an application for restoration of the matter and for cancellation of the settlement. Therefore, according to him, the present misc. civil applications for restoration of the main matters are not maintainable. He has submitted that the petitions which were disposed of by the court as withdrawn by the petitioners and, therefore, there is no question of restoration of the said petitions and, therefore, if any order of restoration has been passed by this Court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia,j.) in one of the misc. He has submitted that the petitions which were disposed of by the court as withdrawn by the petitioners and, therefore, there is no question of restoration of the said petitions and, therefore, if any order of restoration has been passed by this Court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia,j.) in one of the misc. civil applications, same is not having any legal effect and such orders can be ignored by this court because it is an ineffective order having no consequences. He has also submitted that if any orders are passed by this court, such orders must have legal effect but looking to the facts of the present case, he has vehemently submitted that both the petitions have been disposed of by this court as having been withdrawn by the petitioners and such petition withdrawn by the petitioners cannot be restored by the Court at the instance of the respondents. Therefore, he has submitted that by inadvertence or through over sight, if any orders of restoration are passed, then, it is having no legal effect, then the respondents are entitled to challenge the same before the appropriate forum by appropriate proceedings. According to him, initiation of the proceedings in the form of present miscellaneous civil application for restoration of the main matters cannot be considered to be appropriate proceedings. He further submitted that the settlement was arrived at between the parties on the basis of the free consent given by the parties and there are also signatures of the advocates for the respective parties on the said settlement and, therefore, there was no question of fraud or coercion against the landlord. According to him, it is also not the case of the respondents tenants that there was any misrepresentation or inducement or coercion which has led them to sign the said settlement. According to him, even if such contentions are there on behalf of the respondents, then, same would be the questions of fact which cannot appropriately be dealt with and decided by this court in these misc. civil applications. Therefore, this court should rejected the present misc. civil applications. According to him, since the settlement which was signed by the parties and their respective advocates was recorded by this court, question of fraud, misrepresentation or coercion was out of place and, therefore, this court should not entertain the present misc. civil applications. civil applications. Therefore, this court should rejected the present misc. civil applications. According to him, since the settlement which was signed by the parties and their respective advocates was recorded by this court, question of fraud, misrepresentation or coercion was out of place and, therefore, this court should not entertain the present misc. civil applications. According to him, merely because the settlement has not been acted upon between the parties, without going into the fact as to who has committed fault in not implementing the settlement, the settlement cannot be set aside in the present misc. civil applications. He has submitted that since the settlement was recorded by this court and the orders were passed by this court on the basis of the said settlement, it has merged with the order of the court and once the order has been passed by this court recording the settlement and once it has been recorded by the court and the petition has been disposed of as having been withdrawn by the petitioners, then, it becomes an order of the court and such orders were passed with the consent of the parties, then, such orders by such misc. civil applications, cannot be set aside and, therefore, both the present applications are required to be dismissed. ( 15 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. K. M. Patel appearing for the original petitioners landlord has relied upon the recent decision of the apex court in case of Salkia Businessmens Association and others versus Howrah Municipal Corporation reported in 2001 0 AIR (SCW) 2922 and has submitted that in the said decision, the apex Court has taken view that the terms of compromise becomes part of the order of the court and, therefore, the court should strictly enforce the terms. He has submitted that it was observed by the apex court in the said decision that when the writ petition was finally disposed of in terms of the compromise reached between the parties notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the same in the order; while so, it is beyond ones comprehension as to how any violation of terms of compromise could have been viewed by the Court as a matter of mere contract between the parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the responsibility to enforce it, except by doling violence to the terms thereof in letter and spirit. In the said decision, the apex court has gone to observe to the extent that if the courts are not to honour and implement their own orders and encourage the party to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go bye to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under the orders of the Court, the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the process, a costly consequence to be jealously averred by all and at any rate by the highest Courts in States in the country. Thus, relying on the aforesaid decision of the apex court, he has submitted that once the court has recorded the settlement, accepted the settlement and considering the terms thereof, disposed of the petition filed by the petitioner as withdrawn, then, it is the duty of the court to see that the settlement which has merged with the order of the Court must be complied with by the parties and any subsequent litigation to the settlement have to be condemned. ( 16 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. K. M. Patel has pointed out from the order passed by this court in Appeal from Order No. 327 of 1985 which was arising out of the same proceedings in respect of special civil suit no. 169 of 1984 filed by the tenant before the Civil Court at Bharuch that this Court (Coram : D. C. Gheewala, J.) has recorded the settlement and passed order in both the petitions on 8th February, 1984. He submitted that the same court (Coram : D. C. Gheewala,j.) has passed orders in Appeal from Order No. 237 of 1985 filed by the tenant before this Court. He has submitted that this Court has made following orders in its order :"it may be noted at the inception that the prayer of injunction is a request to the court to grant a discretionary relief and it is a settled position of law that one who approaches the Court for discretionary or equitable relief must approach the court with clean hands. The learned Trial Judge,in para 3 of his judgment, has summarized the contentions raised by the plaintiffs in that particular application which he preferred for getting injunction. The learned Trial Judge,in para 3 of his judgment, has summarized the contentions raised by the plaintiffs in that particular application which he preferred for getting injunction. Inter alia, he has averred therein that the compromise was not binding to him, namely the compromise which was entered into between the parties before this court and he also went to the length of stating that he had not signed the same. He had also stated therein that he was coerced to enter into the compromise. Mr. J. M. Patel, the learned advocate for the appellants was also their advocate in the Special Civil Application in which compromise was arrived at. When Mr. Patel was specifically asked a pointed question whether his client was coerced to enter into compromise or as to whether the said compromise pursis did not bear the signature of the appellant plaintiffs, Mr. Patel had to categorically answer the quarry in the negative ( 17 ) IN light of these observations made by this Court in aforesaid order passed in Appeal from Order No. 237 of 1985 which was arising out of the order passed in the same subject matter, learned advocate Mr. Patel has submitted that this court while recording the settlement, has decided the appeal from order and same question was raised and considered by this court whether the compromise arrived at between the parties was coercive or not and whether the same was bearing the signature of the tenant or not and the answer given to such question by the learned advocate Mr. J. M. Patel who was then appearing for the tenants was in the negative and, therefore, according to Mr. Patel, the settlement is legal and valid settlement which has rightly been accepted and recorded by this court and on that basis, the petitions were disposed of by this court as having been withdrawn by the petitioners and, therefore, now there remains no independent settlement in the eye of law but it has merged with the order of the court and now it becomes the order of the court and, therefore, there is no question of violation of any of the provisions of the Tenancy Act or such orders cannot be considered to be null and void and, therefore, both the applications are required to be rejected with costs. ( 18 ) I have considered the submissions of Mr. ( 18 ) I have considered the submissions of Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the original petitioners and Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the respondents tenants. The matter was argued at length by Mr. Majmudar and all possible efforts were made by Mr. Majmujdar and all contentions available in law were raised by Mr. Majmudar. It is necessary to note that at the time when the settlement was placed before this court, no such contentions were raised by the tenant that the settlement is contrary to law, not binding to the tenant. No such submissions were made. On the contrary, the settlement was placed before the court by the parties and with the consent of both the parties, it was recorded and taken on record and upon joint request made by the parties, order dated 8th February, 1984 was passed in the main two petitions and on that basis, the main petitions were withdrawn by the petitioners. In view of these facts, it becomes now the order of the Court since it has merged in the order of the Court. According to my view, it is not having any separate entity in the eyes of law and therefore, challenge to such settlement should not be encouraged and entertained by this court because if this is encouraged and such applications are entertained, then, every party will raise such contentions and it will become easy for every party to disturb the order of the court while submitting that the settlement is void and contrary to law. I am, therefore, of the view that the respondents tenants cannot be permitted to raise such contentions because the settlement was considered by the court on the basis of the joint request made by both the parties which has been bearing signatures of the parties and also the signatures of their respective advocates and thereafter the court has passed the order and has recorded the settlement. Merely because the settlement has failed and has not been acted upon by the parties and thereafter such application has been filed by the tenant challenging the terms of the settlement as well as the order of this court, I am of the opinion that such challenge cannot be encouraged and entertained by this court otherwise it would become difficult for the court to record any settlement relying upon the request made by the parties and also relying upon the free consent given by the parties for recording such settlement. If the settlement has failed, then, the course open for the tenant is to take appropriate steps but only because the settlement has failed, such prayer cannot be made to set aside the settlement and the order based on such settlement and to restore the matter. As per my view, therefore, such application at the instance of the respondents cannot be entertained. According to my view, it is the duty of the court to see that the order passed by the court on the basis of the settlement are honored and implemented by the parties. I am of the view that the Court should give respect to its own order and enforce the same, otherwise, there will be no sanctity of the orders passed by the Court. Relying upon the joint request made by the parties and in view of the joint request and settlement court has recorded the settlement and disposed of the petition as having been withdrawn. Therefore, such an application cannot be entertained and such compromise or order of the court cannot be set aside. I have considered the order passed by this court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia,j.) in one of the misc. civil application wherein the matter was restored and rule was made absolute. According to my view, such orders have no legal effect because the petition which was disposed of as having been withdrawn was the petition filed by the petitioner and same was withdrawn by the petitioner in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties and in absence of the application from the petitioner, application moved by the respondents cannot be entertained and the petition which was disposed of as having been withdrawn cannot be ordered to be restored at the instance of the respondents tenants. Therefore, Mr. Therefore, Mr. Patel has rightly pointed out that through some inadvertence or through some over sight, said order has been transcribed in the misc. civil application. However, according to my opinion, the petition which was disposed of as withdrawn by the petitioner is not required to be restored at the instance of the respondents. Therefore, order passed by this Court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia,j.) have no legal effect in the eye of law and such order can be recalled by this Court as it was mistake. It is also necessary that the petition which was filed by the petitioners was withdrawn by the petitioners in view of the settlement arrived at by and between the parties which was reduced in writing and recorded by this Court as per order dated 8th February, 1984. Such an application moved by the respondent cannot be entertained but it is the right of the petitioners to file such application for restoration of the main matters. In the instant case, the petitioners have come out with a case that the settlement has rightly been recorded by the court and it was based on free consent of the parties and it was also signed by the parties and their respective advocates and on that basis, the petitions filed by the petitioners were withdrawn. IN view of these facts, according to my view, present applications are not required to be entertained. It is also necessary to note that in the order passed by this court in appeal from order no. 237 of 1985 dated 19. 8. 1985, signature of the original respondents tenants and their free consent has been accepted by their learned advocate Mr. J. M. Patel before this Court (Coram : D. C. Gheewala,j.) and this Court (Coram : D. C. Gheewala, J.) on the basis of the acceptance by Learned advocate Mr. J. M. Patel, negatived challenge to the settlement in question and, therefore, challenge against the settlement made by the tenant cannot be accepted. Such a challenge to the agreement based on free consent cannot be entertained and accepted. I am of the opinion that if the parties have inter se decided to treat the various orders of different authorities as set aside between the parties, then there is nothing wrong in agreeing with such terms and condition for better resolution of the disputes between the parties. I am of the opinion that if the parties have inter se decided to treat the various orders of different authorities as set aside between the parties, then there is nothing wrong in agreeing with such terms and condition for better resolution of the disputes between the parties. As stated earlier, the orders passed by this Court in one of the present two misc. to restore the matter is not having any legal effect in the eye of law and therefore, such orders are required to be ignored as the same is recalled while passing orders in accordance with law in the interest of justice. Therefore, according to my opinion, earlier, when the petitions were disposed of by this Court as withdrawn by the petitioners in view of the settlement based on free consent and when this Court has recorded the settlement considering the settlement, now challenge to such settlement in the present misc. civil applications cannot be entertained. Further, the very same settlement which is under challenge in these two misc. civil applications was earlier also challenged in the proceedings of appeal from order no. 237 of 1985 before this court and the contentions raised against the settlement were negatived by this court as stated earlier. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Majmudar that this court has become functus officio after the order passed by this court on 8th September, 1992 is not acceptable in view of the fact that the said order was not having any legal effect and this Court is always having powers and discretion to rectify the mistake and to recall the same by exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction and this court can always pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after considering the facts and circumstances of each case. The contentions raised by Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the applicants tenants cannot be accepted and entertained in view of the conduct of the respondents. If such a challenge is entertained, then, there will be no end of the proceedings and there will also not be sanctity of the orders passed by the courts on the basis of the settlement based on free consent of the parties. ( 19 ) IDENTICAL situation arose before the Honble Supreme Court in case of Salkia Businessmens Association v/s. Howrah Muni. Corporation 2001 AIR SCW 2922. ( 19 ) IDENTICAL situation arose before the Honble Supreme Court in case of Salkia Businessmens Association v/s. Howrah Muni. Corporation 2001 AIR SCW 2922. The apex Court, in para 8 and 9 of the said decision, has observed as under :"8. WE have carefully considered the submissions of the learned senior counsel on either side. The learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court have not only over simplified the matter but seems to have gone on an errand, carried away by some need to balance hypothetical public interest, when the real and only question to be considered was as to whether the respondent authorities are bound by the orders passed by the Court on the basis of the compromise memorandum, and whether the proposed move on their part did not constitute flagrant violation of the orders of Court - very much binding on both parties. The High Court failed to do justice to its own orders. If Courts are not to honour and implement their own orders, and encourage party litigants - be they public authorities, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go bye to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under the orders of the court - the rule of law will certainly become a casualty in the process a costly consequence to be jealously averted by all and at any rate by the highest courts in the States in the Country. It does not, in our view, require any extraordinary exercise to hold that the memorandum and the terms of the compromise in this case became part of the orders of the High Court itself when the earlier writ petition was finally disposed of on 13. 2. 1991 in the terms noticed supra notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the same in the order. The orders passed in this regard admits of no doubt or give any scope for controversy. While so, it is beyond ones comprehension as to how, it could have been viewed as a matter of mere contract between parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms thereof in the letter and spirit. As long as the earlier order dated 13. 2. While so, it is beyond ones comprehension as to how, it could have been viewed as a matter of mere contract between parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms thereof in the letter and spirit. As long as the earlier order dated 13. 2. 91 stood, it was not permissible to go behind the same to ascertain the substance of it or nature of compliance when the manner, mode and place of compliance had already been stipulated with meticulous care and detail in the order itself. The said decision was also not made to depend upon any contingencies beyond the control of parties in the earlier proceedings. 9. The division bench of the High Court equally fell into the same error and went, in our view, aside and beside the real issue and point before them. The orders of the High Court under challenge are set aside. The respondents are obliged and as public authorities are bound to comply with the orders dated 13. 2. 91 particularly clause/paragraph (viii) of it, relating to the place or site of allotment of alternative sites and other stipulations, in letter and spirit giving the said order full effect. The appeal shall stand allowed, accordingly. No costs ( 20 ) IN the present case also, same is the situation. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid observations made by the apex court, and in light of the facts of the present case, the challenge to the settlement cannot be entertained. In the instant case also, the said settlement was, in terms, recorded in the order passed by this court and in view of that, the petitions were disposed of as withdrawn by the petitioners. The settlement was providing the manner, mode and place of compliance with due care and detail as stated earlier. therefore, it is the duty of the court to see that the order passed by it is complied with and respected by the parties and enforced in accordance with law. Therefore, according to my opinion, there is no substance in the present two misc. civil applications seeking restoration of the main petitions, moved by the respondents tenants and, therefore, both the misc. Therefore, according to my opinion, there is no substance in the present two misc. civil applications seeking restoration of the main petitions, moved by the respondents tenants and, therefore, both the misc. civil applications are required to be dismissed as there is no need to disturb the orders passed by this court in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties based on free consent of the parties and, therefore, both the said misc. civil applications are dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule issued in both the Misc. Civil Applications shall stand discharged. . ( 21 ) IN view of the aforesaid observations made by the Apex Court and since the aforesaid two misc. civil applications seeking restoration of the order dated 8th February, 1984 passed in special civil application No. 892 of 1983 and 893 of 1983 have been ordered to be dismissed by this court, according to my opinion, the settlement arrived at between the parties has prevailed is binding to the parties and, therefore, subsequent challenge made by the respective parties before the revenue authorities does not survive in view of the settlement recorded by this court in aforesaid two petitions by order dated 8th February, 1984 and, therefore, in that view of the matter, according to my view, since the settlement has been upheld as binding to the parties and the order dated 8th February, 1984 has not been disturbed by this court which was passed on the basis of the settlement, special civil applications no. 12695 of 1993 and 586 of 1994 shall also not survive and shall accordingly stand disposed of with no order as to costs. Rule issued in the special civil application no. 12695 of 1983 and 586 of 1994 each is made absolute accordingly. Civil application No. 6387 of 1999 in special civil application no. 586 of 1994 shall also not survive and the same is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. Civil application no. 2428 of 2000 in special civil application no. 893 of 1983 and civil application no. 2429 of 2000 in special civil application no. 892 of 1983 for joining the heirs and legal representatives of the respective parties died during the pendency of the proceedings are disposed off as not surviving. There shall be no order as to costs. 2428 of 2000 in special civil application no. 893 of 1983 and civil application no. 2429 of 2000 in special civil application no. 892 of 1983 for joining the heirs and legal representatives of the respective parties died during the pendency of the proceedings are disposed off as not surviving. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 22 ) CIVIL Application No. 1095 of 1996 in special civil application no. 12695 of 1993 shall not survive in view of the orders passed by this court in these proceedings. Same is, therefore, disposed of accordingly. Similarly, unnumbered miscellaneous civil application of 1994 dated 8th July, 1994 in special civil application no. 12695 of 1993 also does not survive and the same is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. .