JUDGMENT - P.V. HARDAS, J.:---By consent of parties, this revision is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 2. The applicant in this revision is the original accused in Criminal Case No. 179/N/1997/D which was filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class at Margao by the present respondent No. 1, for an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The complaint had been filed by respondent No. 1 on the ground that from time to time, he had given to the present applicant a loan totalling Rs. 11,20,000-00 (Rupees Eleven Lakhs Twenty Thousand only) and the present applicant towards the discharge of his liability to pay the aforesaid amount of loan had issued him seven cheques drawn on two banks. On presentation of the said cheques, the cheques were returned back unpaid to the respondent No. 1 because of insufficiency of funds. 3. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Margao, explained the particulars of the offence to which the present respondent No. 1 pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During the trial, the applicant examined himself in support of his case. The applicant/original accused examined himself and two other defence witnesses. The defence of the applicant/original accused was that the respondent No. 1 had represented that he was dealing with petroleum business in which there was huge profits. The respondent No. 1 had requested the applicant to sign the cheques, which were blank and without date and amount for the business of respondent No. 1. The applicant had stated that he had not received any loan from respondent No. 1 and had obtained the said cheques from the applicant when the applicant was in an intoxicated condition after having consumed alcohol. 4. The learned trial Magistrate found that the applicant/original accused had failed to rebut the presumption which was raised under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and, therefore, convicted the applicant and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months and to pay compensation of Rs. 12,00,000/- to the respondent No. 1 within 3 months or in default of payment of compensation to undergo further 3 months simple imprisonment. The present applicant being aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned trial Magistrate filed Criminal Appeal No. 32/2000 before the Additional Sessions Judge, South Goa, Margao. 12,00,000/- to the respondent No. 1 within 3 months or in default of payment of compensation to undergo further 3 months simple imprisonment. The present applicant being aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned trial Magistrate filed Criminal Appeal No. 32/2000 before the Additional Sessions Judge, South Goa, Margao. The learned Appellate Court by its judgment dated 31st July, 2001, partly allowed the appeal. The learned Appellate Court maintained the conviction and sentence as well as the order awarding compensation of Rs. 12,00,000/- to the respondent No. 1 but set aside the sentence imposed by the trial Magistrate in default of payment of compensation. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Court upholding the conviction and sentence and awarding of compensation, the applicant has filed the present revision. 5. I have heard Mr. A.F. Diniz, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant. I have also heard Mr. S.G. Bhobe, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1/Original Complainant and Mr. A.P. Lawande, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State/respondent No. 2. 6. Mr. A.F. Diniz, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant has contended before me that the two courts below have not taken into consideration certain circumstances which can be pressed into aid along with the testimony of the applicant and the other two defence witnesses for rebutting the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. According to him, the circumstances are :- (i) The respondent No. 1 admits to have advanced the loan of Rs. 11,20,000/- to the applicant in cash on various dates. According to him, therefore, this itself appears to be improbable. (ii) The respondent No. 1 had advanced loan and had obtained a cheque from the applicant as a security for the repayment of loan and despite having obtained the said cheque, the respondent No. 1 continued advancing loan to the applicant on various dates thereafter. (iii) The last cheque which was dated 5th February, 1997, was presented within two days after the said date whereas respondent No. 1 had admitted in his evidence that the loan was to be repaid within a period of 3 to 4 months. (iv) The respondent No. 1 admits to have given the loan to the applicant for a share in the business profits. (iv) The respondent No. 1 admits to have given the loan to the applicant for a share in the business profits. (v) In the re-examination, the respondent No. 1 had produced a Cash Book, Balance Sheet and Capital Ledger Account book and the said Account Book does not reflect the applicant as a debtor. (vi) The respondent No. 1 admits that the accused has used this loan amount to clear the dues of the Bicholim Bank and to purchase the truck. 7. The two courts below have concurrently found the applicant guilty. I have perused the judgment of the learned trial Magistrate and the learned Appellate Court. Both the courts below have appreciated the evidence. The Revisional Court did not re-appreciate the evidence. However, concurrence is no insurance against the charge of perversity. The courts would be perfectly justified when interfering with the concurrent findings, if the applicant succeeds on the charge of perversity. In the present case, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant has stated that the circumstances enumerated above have not been taken into consideration by the courts below and, therefore, with the assistance of the learned Advocates, I have perused the evidence. The circumstances, though admittedly have not been considered by the courts in so many word, the courts below have appreciated the evidence of both, the complainant, the accused and the two defence witnesses. Merely, the fact that a loan of Rs. 11,20,000/- was given by the respondent No. 1 from time to time is not a circumstance which creates doubt. All the other circumstances relied upon by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant relate to the appreciation of evidence. According to me, the circumstances even if taken together do not either individually or collectively raise any doubt regarding the transaction of giving loan to the applicant. What has to be seen is whether these circumstances together with the evidence of the applicant rebut the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The applicant has examined himself as the witness and he states as under :- "The complainant had represented to me that he is dealing in petroleum business for which there were huge profits. He requested me to sign the cheques which were blank without date and figure for his said business. The applicant has examined himself as the witness and he states as under :- "The complainant had represented to me that he is dealing in petroleum business for which there were huge profits. He requested me to sign the cheques which were blank without date and figure for his said business. Despite the fact that I was not having a large balance in my respective bank account. I agreed to his request and issued blank cheques to the complainant duly signed by me in good faith. The complainant did not advance me any amounts towards the said cheques. The complainant had obtained the said cheques from me when I was intoxicated and had consumed alcohol. I had handed over all the blank cheques duly signed by me at one time to the complainant." D.W. 2 Baboi Gomes states as under :- "I visit the said bar frequently till today. I had seen the complainant coming to the said bar on several occasions in the year 1996 and after that also. I have seen the complainant with the accused at the said bar on one occasion when I was in the process of paying my bill to the accused, the accused requested me to wait while he was issuing 7 blank cheques to the complainant. The accused had signed the 7 cheques which were blank in Marathi language. I did not see the complainant handing over any money to the accused on taking the said cheques. On the said day when the accused had handed over the said cheques to the complainant, the accused had consumed whisky namely Royal Stag Brand or Green Label." D.W. 3 Babal Chari, states as under :- "About 4 years ago the accused had signed some cheques in Marathi on the counter of his bar at Gogol, and handed over the same to the complainant. Besides signing the said cheques nothing else was written on the said cheques. I did not see the complainant handing over any cash to the accused, on receipt of the said cheques." 8. It is true that for rebutting the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is not necessary for the accused to rebut it by proof beyond reasonable doubt. I did not see the complainant handing over any cash to the accused, on receipt of the said cheques." 8. It is true that for rebutting the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is not necessary for the accused to rebut it by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The accused can rebut the said presumption either by leading evidence himself or by relying upon admissions and circumstances as appearing in the evidence of the prosecution. The accused is required to rebut the presumption by preponderance of probabilities. In other words, the accused is required to probablise his defence. In the present case, the circumstances and the evidence according to me do not even remotely probablise the defence. During the cross-examination of the applicant, the applicant was confronted with a complaint addressed by him to the police which was marked as Exh. D.W. 1/P-1. The applicant had admitted that it bears his signature. The said complaint was in respect of harassment by one Hemant Kadadi and the present respondent No. 1 for the return of the loan advanced to the applicant. The complaint in terms admits that the applicant was indebted to the said Hemant Kadadi and the present respondent No. 1, who were harassing him for repayment of their respective loans. The complaint also states that the applicant had no desire to cheat both of them of their money but for the time being the applicant was not in a position to pay back their money. The applicant stated that his complaint was typed by P.I. Tari of Margao Police Station and had obtained the signature of the applicant and had threatened the applicant that in case he does not sign the complaint he would be arrested and put in Jail. Such an explanation is coming before the Court for the first time. Nothing had prevented the applicant from reporting the matter to the superiors or making a grievance regarding P.I. Tari for obtaining his signature under duress. This explanation according to me is an after thought to get over the lodging of the complaint which speaks of the applicant being indebted to respondent No. 1 and another person. Both the courts below have rightly, according to me, spurned the explanation preferred by the applicant. This explanation according to me is an after thought to get over the lodging of the complaint which speaks of the applicant being indebted to respondent No. 1 and another person. Both the courts below have rightly, according to me, spurned the explanation preferred by the applicant. No amount of oral evidence can be led to circumvent the admissions given by the applicant in the said complaint marked as D.W. 1/P-1. According to me, this complaint really clinches the issue. Both the courts below have appreciated the evidence of the applicant and the two defence witnesses. They have also considered and appreciated the evidence of the applicant and on perusal of the said testimony have arrived at a conclusion that the applicant has failed to discharge the burden of rebutting the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. No perversity in the reasonings of the two courts below has pointed out to me, apart from the fact that the two courts below have not considered certain circumstances. I have considered the circumstances and I find that these circumstances do not in any manner further the applicant's case in arriving at a conclusion that the presumption stands rebutted if these circumstances are taken into consideration. In the absence of material for sustaining a charge of perversity, it is extremely hazardous for a Revisional Court to interfere with the concurrent views of the two courts below. As has been held by me, there is no perversity in the reasoning of the two courts below and, therefore, according to me, the submission of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant has no merit. 9. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant pointed out to me that as per the provisions of section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act, the applicant could not have advanced cash loan in excess of Rs. 20,000/-. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant also pointed out from the evidence of respondent No. 1 that the respondent No. 1 was aware about this provision. According to the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant, therefore, the loan said to have been given by the respondent No. 1 is, therefore, an unenforceable debt. 10. Mr. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant also pointed out from the evidence of respondent No. 1 that the respondent No. 1 was aware about this provision. According to the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant, therefore, the loan said to have been given by the respondent No. 1 is, therefore, an unenforceable debt. 10. Mr. S.G. Bhobe, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the first respondent pointed out that what is prohibited under section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act is the taking or receiving of the cash loan in excess of Rs. 20,000/-. According to Mr. S.G. Bhobe, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, he claims that loans in excess of Rs. 20,000/- have to be taken by an Account Payable Cheque. The person who takes or receives the loan is made liable by virtue of section 271-D of the Income Tax Act. In other words, the person who receives the loan or takes the loan is subjected to certain penalty under section 271-D of the Income Tax Act. If the loan was then repaid in cash, the person who had advanced the loan would also render himself liable under section 271-D of the Income Tax Act. A loan advanced in cash in contravention under section 269-SS of the Income Tax Act is not an illegal transaction and is thus not a debt which is unenforceable in law. The mode of payment may render the person who receives it liable for certain punishment but that does not make the transaction illegal making the debt unenforceable in law. This point according to the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant, though was urged before the two courts below was not considered by the courts below and, therefore, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant is permitted to agitate this point in review. 11. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant submitted before me that the sentence of 3 months imprisonment is extremely harsh taking into consideration the age of the applicant which is said to be 75 years. The sentence of 3 months simple imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court is not disproportionate to the value of the cheques which is said to be Rs. 11,20,000/-. 12. The sentence of 3 months simple imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court is not disproportionate to the value of the cheques which is said to be Rs. 11,20,000/-. 12. I see no reason for interfering with the sentence awarded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned Appellate Court. In the result, I see no merit in this revision and the same is dismissed. The Bail Bonds shall stand cancelled. The applicant shall surrender within a period of 10 weeks from today. Revision dismissed. -----