Judgment ( 1. ) THIS appeal is preferred by the Bhopat Development Authority (for short "the Authority") assailing the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition challenging the order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. ( 2. ) RESPONDENT No. 3 applied for allotment of a flat situate at Ankur Complex, Shivajinagar, Bhopal. The Authority delayed the delivery of possession. The possession of the flat was supposed to be delivered on 1-1-1991; it was delivered on 17th March, 1992. The dispute arose as to the demand of escalated cost. The respondent No. 3 demanded compensation for late delivery of the possession. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (for short "the District Forum") negatived the claim on the ground of limitation though it found that there was deficiency of service. An appeal was taken to the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short "the State Commission" ). The State Commission allowed the appeal and granted interest at the rate of 16. 5% on the principal amount deposited by her with effect from 1-1-1991 till delivery of possession. The aspiration of the cost was held to be justified upto 20%. Aggrieved by the order passed by the State Commission, a revision was preferred before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short "the National Commission") which was dismissed on December, 1st 2000; hence the writ petition was filed before the Single Judge. ( 3. ) THE Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition affirming the order passed by the National Commission; hence the present letters patent appeal. ( 4. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant raised only one submission that the complaint filed by the respondent No. 3 8-1-1994 before the District Forum was barred by limitation. The Slate Commission erred in treating the complaint within limitation. Learned counsel submits that Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short "the Act of 1986") was inserted in the statute on 18-6-1993. Section 24-A of the Act provides the period oflimitation to be two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen. Learned counsel submits that Section 24-A of the Act prescribed period of limitation to be two years which has retrospective effect and has to be applied even for those complaints for which the cause of action had arisen earlier. Learned counsel submits that Section 24-A of the Act prescribed period of limitation to be two years which has retrospective effect and has to be applied even for those complaints for which the cause of action had arisen earlier. Such complaints should have been filed within the period of two years from the accrual of the cause of action. ( 5. ) IN France B. Martins and Anr. v. Mrs. Mafalda Maria Teresa Rodrigues, (1999) 6 SCC 627 , in the factual matrix the appellants, promoters/ developers of Perpetual Apartments, agreed to sell a fiat; the price was to be paid on or before September, 1985. The possession of flat is stated to have been delivered to respondent in September, 1985 on payment of the whole of the agreed amount. The sale deed was not executed by the promoters/ developers which deprived the complainant from efficacious enjoyment of the property for which she is stated to have paid the price. The petition filed on 19-6-1992 was dismissed by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Goa on the ground oflimitation. The appeal preferred by the respondent was accepted and the matter was remitted to the District Forum. Matter again travelled to the State Commission in appeal and then in revision to National Commission. The question came for consideration was whether the complaint filed was barred by time. It was urged that before insertion of Section 24-A in the Act, the period of limitation for preferring a claim was such period as is prescribed under the Limitation Act and as according to him the complaint was filed by the respondent after seven years, the same deserves dismissal. The Apex Court held that since no period of limitation had been prescribed in the Act before insertion of Section 24-A vide amendment made with effect from 18-6-1993, Section 24-A of the Act, for the first time prescribes that the District Forum shall not admit a complaint unless the same was filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action arose. Sub-section (2) of Section 24-A of the Act authorises the Commission to entertain a complaint even after the period of limitation on the existence of sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the statutory period by recording its reasons for condoning the delay. Sub-section (2) of Section 24-A of the Act authorises the Commission to entertain a complaint even after the period of limitation on the existence of sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the statutory period by recording its reasons for condoning the delay. It was considered before the Supreme Court that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 have not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings under the Act, The Supreme Court held that when the legislature in its wisdom thought it appropriate not to prescribe the period of limitation for proceedings under the Act, the Courts cannot apply the provisions of Limitation Act by implication. It has to be kept in mind that the Act was made to protect the interest of the consumers and to make provisions for the establishment of Consumer Councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumer disputes and matters connected therewith. The Supreme Court further held that "the addition of Section 24-A in the Act reflects the mind of the legislature that they had initially not intended to prescribe any period of limitation for filing the complaints under the Act". It was further held that "we are, however, clear that prior to its amendment, the Act had not prescribed any period of limitation for filing the complaints by the consumers". ( 6. ) COMING to the facts of the instant case, possession was required to he delivered up to 31-12-90. There was delay in delivering the possession with effect from 1-1-1991 to 17-3-1992. The complaint was filed before the District Forum on 8-1-1994. In the meantime on 18th of June, 1993 Section 24-A was inserted in the Act. ( 7. ) IN our opinion, the cause of action which accrued owing to delay was recurring in nature and has to be reckoned from the date of delivery of possession Le. , 17th March, 1992. Though the provisions of Section 24-A of the Act are not to apply with retrospective effect. The cause of action accrued on 17-3-92, the complaint was filed on 8-1-1994. It was within the period of two years. Thus, the same cannot be held to be barred by limitation. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the limitation should be counted with effect from 1-1-1991 is not acceptable. The cause of action accrued on 17-3-92, the complaint was filed on 8-1-1994. It was within the period of two years. Thus, the same cannot be held to be barred by limitation. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the limitation should be counted with effect from 1-1-1991 is not acceptable. Even otherwise as held by the Supreme Court in the case of France B. Martins (supra) that before insertion of Section 24-A of the Act no period of limitation was prescribed; hence the application presented within seven months of the insertion of Section 24-A in the Act cannot be said to be barred by limitation. ( 8. ) IN view of the decision of France B. Martins (supra) as earlier no period of limitation was prescribed, Section 24-A cannot be said to have taken away, the right of filing an application which cannot suddenly extinguish by providing a shorter period of limitation. Now in the instant case, the application was filed well within the time prescribed under Section 24-A of the Act. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra ( AIR 1976 SC 237 ), it was observed that:- " even though by and large the law of limitation has been held to be a procedural law there are exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of commencement of the action governs it, but there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive the dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish vested rights of action by providing a shorter period of limitation. " ( 9. ) SUB-SECTION (2) of Section 24-A also gives a right to the District Forum, State Commission/national Commission to accept the application for adjudication even after two years which is the prescribed limit. ( 10. ) WE find no jurisdictional error warranting interference in the writ jurisdiction by this Court. Resultantly we find no merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed.