JUDGMENT Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. Admittedly, Ram Swamp Agarwalla was employed in Kuya Colliery, Jharia, of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited as a Cashier. The Manager of the Colliery vide letter dated 8.5.1982 informed him that he was going to retire on 3.11.1982 on completion of sixty years of age. In the records of the colliery, his date of birth stood recorded as 4.11.1922. 2. A reply to the aforesaid letter was sent on 2.9.1982 that his actual date of birth was 25.12.1927 and as such the decision to retire him from 3.11.1982 was absolutely wrong and baseless. Again on 4.10.1982, request was made to the Area Manager of M/s. B.C.C.L Area No. 9 not to retire him from 3.11.1982 and to take early decision in the matter. 3. Plaintiff, Agarwalla filed Title Suit No. 156 of 1982 for a decree of declaration against defendants that their decision to retire him on 3.11.1982 was illegal and without jurisdiction and for a further declaration that he cannot be retired before 25.12.1987 and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants to retire him from 3.11.1982. 4. Defendants contested the suit stating that the plaintiff was an employee of M/s. B.L. Agarwalla Colliery, Jharia, and after nationalisation of the said colliery, he became an employee of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and was posted as a Cashier in Kuya Colliery. He never informed about any horoscope or about his date of birth as 25.12.1927. Such date was never entered in the records. Plaintiff had himself declared his date of birth as 4.11.1922 in his own handwriting and on that basis the said date was recorded in the identity card. According to the defendants, plaintiffs claim of his date of birth as 25.12.1927 was a cok and bull story and his horoscope was a forged and fabricated document. In the records of Coal Mines Provident Fund, his date of birth was not available. 5. Trial Court decreed the suit holding that plaintiff proved his date of birth as 25.12.1927 and defendants tailed to prove his date of birth as 4.11.1922. He cannot be retired before 25.12.1987 and, therefore, order of his retirement from 3.11.1982 was illegal. Defendants were directed to re-appoint him and allow him to continue in service and pay his salary from the date of order.
He cannot be retired before 25.12.1987 and, therefore, order of his retirement from 3.11.1982 was illegal. Defendants were directed to re-appoint him and allow him to continue in service and pay his salary from the date of order. As plaintiff did not work in the colliery after 3.11.1982, he was held to be not entitled to get any pay for the said period. 6. Against the said judgment and decree plaintiff filed Title Appeal No. 1 of 1984 and defendants also filed Title Appeal No. 2 of 1984. Both the appeals were heard together and disposed of by common judgment dated 21.6.1986. It was held that the date of birth of plaintiff was 4.11.1922 and not 25.12.1927 and, thus, he retired on 3.11.1982. It was further held that the suit was not barred under the Industrial Disputes Act or under Sections 14(b) and 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Title Appeal No. 1 of 1984 was dismissed and Title Appeal No. 2 of 1984 was allowed. 7. Present Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law : "in view of absence of pleading that the appellant under a contract was entitled to continue in service till he attains the age of sixty years, whether the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit." 8. I find that when plaintiff had himself declared his date of birth as 4.11.1922, the horoscope, school leaving certificate and Coal Mines Provident Fund Account papers (Exhibits 1. 2 and 5) got no importance and of no help to the plaintiff in any manner. The school leaving certificate was not found to be a genuine paper and horoscope was also not produced earlier before the colliery authorities. The Provident Fund Account papers were also found to be highly suspicious document. Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that Form-B Register of old colliery was not with M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and only for that reason the plaintiff and other employees were invited to submit declaration of their date of birth and, accordingly, plaintiff filed declaration of his date of birth as 4.11.1922. 9. This Second Appeal, in my opinion is concluded by finding of facts recorded by the final Court of fact. There is no reason to interfere with it. 10.
9. This Second Appeal, in my opinion is concluded by finding of facts recorded by the final Court of fact. There is no reason to interfere with it. 10. In such circumstance, it is just academic to go into the question as to whether the present suit was barred under the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. Answer of this question, even if given in affirmative, plaintiff appellant is not going to be benefited by it and. therefore, the aforesaid question need not be answered in this appeal. 11. In the result, I find no merit in this Second Appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs. Let the lower Court records be sent down immediately. Appeal dismissed.