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2001 DIGILAW 736 (JHR)

R. K. Budhia & Company v. Union Of India

2001-10-15

VINOD KUMAR GUPTA

body2001
JUDGMENT V.K. Gupta, C.J. 1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the order dated 1.10.2001 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge I, Ranchi, in a temporary injunction matter arising out of Title Suit No. 218 of 2001 pending in that Court. 2. It appears that the appellant has filed the aforesaid Title Suit No. 218 of 2001 for specific performance of a so-called contract with respect to a building called as Atma Ram Bhawan situated in the Main Road. Ranchi, for opening of a Computerised Reservation Centre of the South Eastern Railway. The appellant mainly relied upon the "minutes of the negotiations" stated to have been held between some officials of the South Eastern Railway and the appellant. These minutes appear to have been signed by those persons on 11.11.1999. It also appears that having entertained some apprehensions earlier also in this matter, the appellant had a writ application in this Court, being CWJC No. 3217 of 2000 (R), but a learned Single Judge of this Court had disposed of the aforesaid writ application vide his order dated 19.9.2000, based on the observations and his finding that since the issues involved in the writ application were purely contractual in nature, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court could not be permitted to be invoked. However, liberty was given to the appellant to file a representation. The representation having been filed has, however, been rejected. 3. It appears that the respondents, however, did not take the premises of the appellant-plaintiff on rent and opted for some other building. The appellant- plaintiff claims that the respondents-defendants, based on the aforesaid "negotiations" held between the parties and on the basis of other material, were bound under law to take the building of the appellant on rent, specially in view of the fact that the appellant had altered its position and based on the assurance of the respondents has spent huge amount of money in carrying out modifications and improvements of the premises in question, for use as a Computerised Reservation Office. According to the appellant, therefore, the respondents being bound should not be permitted to back out from their promise and to take another building on rent. The appellant also prayed for grant of temporary injunction, inter alia, restraining the respondents from opening and inaugurating the Computerised Reservation Office elsewhere in any other building. 4. According to the appellant, therefore, the respondents being bound should not be permitted to back out from their promise and to take another building on rent. The appellant also prayed for grant of temporary injunction, inter alia, restraining the respondents from opening and inaugurating the Computerised Reservation Office elsewhere in any other building. 4. The learned trial Court by the impugned order rejected the prayer of the appellant for grant of temporary injunction; hence the present appeal. 5. The learned trial Court was absolutely justified in rejecting the prayer of the appellant for grant of temporary injunction. The appellant was not entitled to any relief in so far as it concerned the grant of temporary injunction in any manner or in any form. First of all, what we find is that there is no concluded contract in existence between the parties. The subject matter of the suit being immovable property and the contention of the appellant that a right had stood accrued in its favour with respect to such property relating to it being taken on lease by the respondents had to be supported at least by a valid existing contract between the parties. This contract could be in the shape of a properly executed lease deed or at least an agreement to lease. None of these were ever brought into existence. 6. Existence or non-existence of a contract or an agreement between the parties notwithstanding. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is a clear bar in the appellant even claiming the basic, primary and plenary relief of specific performance of the contract or the enforceability of such a contract, what to talk of grant of temporary injunction. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act clearly lays down that a contract for the non-formance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief cannot be specifically enforced. This is but stressed by a reading of Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act which clearly lays down that the specific performance of a contract, in the discretion of the Court, may be enforced when the act agreed to be done is such that compensation in money for its non-performance would not offer adequate relief to the party praying for the specific performance of such a contract. 7. 7. Based on the facts of this case, even if a contract had stood executed between the parties and even if the basis of the claim of the appellant was the existence of such a contract, on a combined reading of Sections 10 and 14 of the Specific Relief Act, such a contract was not capable of being enforced through its specific performance because undoubtedly the appellant- plaintiff could claim the relief of compensation adequately and efficaciously. The non- performance of such a contract would not result or is not capable of resulting into a situation where compensation in money cannot be termed as an adequate relief. 8. Viewed from any angle, therefore, the non-existence of any contract between the parties, and the hypothetical existence of a contract also, the appellant-plaintiff being not entitled even to the basic relief of specific performance of such a non-existent contract, there was no question of his being entitled to any relief of grant of temporary injunction against the respondents restraining them from opening the Computerised Reservation Office elsewhere. 9. Under Order XXXIX. Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Court is called upon to consider the question of grant of a temporary injunction or even a Court exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code has to first of all satisfy itself that a strong prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiff in his favour and only on reaching such a satisfaction, would the Court proceed to consider about other two important parameters, namely, the balance of convenience between the plaintiff and the defendant and as to whether the refusal to grant temporary injunction is likely to result in an irreparable loss or injury to the plaintiff which cannot be compensated by any means. In the present case, what is patently apparent is that the plaintiff miserably, totally and absolutely failed to establish any prima facie case, much less any strong prima Jade case in its favour in so far as the grant of basic relief in the suit relating to the performance of any contract is concerned. The plaintiff totally failed to establish in the suit itself that it was entitled, even remotely, for any decree that the Court may pass against defendants compelling them to perform any contract. The plaintiff totally failed to establish in the suit itself that it was entitled, even remotely, for any decree that the Court may pass against defendants compelling them to perform any contract. In other words, the basic thing that the plaintiff was not establish in the court was that both in law as well as in contract, the defendants were under a statutory and contractual obligation to take on lease (or on whatever other form or contract) the building of the plaintiff and flowing from this statutory and contractual obligation, correspondingly the defendants were not permitted and could not be allowed to take any other place on lease or otherwise for opening the Computerised Reservation Centre. This was the very basic thing which the plaintiff had to establish: this was the bare minimum that the plaintiff had to traverse in order to cross over to the periphery of the arena bordering the grant of temporary injunction of the type that it had prayed in the court below. There is no doubt whatsoever that, looking from any angle, the plaintiff failed to establish any prima facie case in its favour. The learned Court below, therefore, was fully justified in refusing the relief of temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff. This appeal, therefore, has no merit. 10. The appeal, thus, being wholly misconceived, deserves to be dismissed. The Appeal, accordingly, is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 5000/- (five thousand) to be deposited in the Legal Aid Fund. 11. Appeal dismissed.