P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) THE civil revision petition is filed against the order dated 12-6-1988 made by the learned Principal District Judge at nalgonda, in IA No. 615 of 1996 in AS no. 62 of 1993. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief are that an application IA No. 615 of 1996 was filed by the respondent herein, under Order 23, rule 3 read with Section 151 CPC seeking to set aside the compromise decree dated 31-3-1995 on the ground that the Court cannot act upon the compromise memo filed by the Counsel as he had never instructed about the compromise and he never agreed for any terms of the compromise and that it has been done without his knowledge and the compromise decree is illegal and fraudulent. ( 3 ) THE revision petitioner herein i. e. , respondent before the Court below, had filed a counter opposing the same. It was stated that the compromise stated supra was arrived at with his consent and on instructions from the respondent herein. It was further stated that he had mentioned the fact of compromise in the affidavit filed along with the application at the time of withdrawing of costs of Rs. 2,500/- which was in deposit in EP No. 60 of 1993. It was further averred that the disposal of the appeal in terms of the compromise was also mentioned in the affidavit. It was further stated that he had filed full satisfaction memo after withdrawing the money and he has got knowledge of the compromise and the application was filed only with a view to put him into trouble. It was further stated that in terms of the compromise in the appeal, a demand draft was taken for the balance and the xerox copy was also filed into the Court. In the meanwhile, the petitioner (respondent in the present civil revision petition) has got issued a notice demanding the payment of money by 26-12-1995 for registration and thereupon a reply was given and these aspects go to show that the respondent herein has got full knowledge of the compromise and disposal of the appeal in terms of the compromise and hence the application is not bona fide one and it is liable to be dismissed. ( 4 ) IN order to substantiate their respective claims, PW1 was examined on behalf of the petitioner and RW1 was examined on behalf of the respondent and got marked Exs. B1 to B6. The Court below after considering the evidence and the facts and circumstances of the case had passed the following order:"in the result, the compromise is ordered to be set aside on condition of the petitioner paying Rs. 2,500/- along with interest at 12% from 2-11-1995 till 12-6-1998 to the respondent herein and also on a condition of payment of costs of Rs. 200/- within 10 days failing which the petition shall stand dismissed. " ( 5 ) IT is brought to my notice that the conditions imposed in the order have been complied with. Sri P. Venugopal Rao, learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner had strenuously contended that the Court below had totally erred in allowing the application on technical ground that the compromise memo was not signed by the parties and had drawn my attention to the discussion made by the court below at page 4 of the order, which reads as under:"a close scrutiny of the record discloses that the compromise was not signed by the parties. It was signed by the advocates. It is clear on the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision and also from the provisions of cpc from Order 23, Rule 3 the Court cannot act upon the compromise unless it is signed by the parties. It is also clear that the party was not present on the date of compromise and the passing of the decree and he was not aware of the same. P. W. 1 admits that he came to know about the compromise subsequently. This is a case where he has withdrawn some amounts from the lower court by filing cheque petition in the lower court. He had made a mention about the compromise as can be seen from Ex. B-3 affidavit. He has withdrew Rs. 2,500/ -. He has also not received the demand draft for rs. 31,000/ -. It is clear that on the date of compromise no consent of the petitioner was obtained to entertain the compromise. The court cannot act upon the memo signed by the Counsel in respect of the compromise. Subsequent issue of notice cannot give validity to an illegal thing. He has also not received the demand draft for rs. 31,000/ -. It is clear that on the date of compromise no consent of the petitioner was obtained to entertain the compromise. The court cannot act upon the memo signed by the Counsel in respect of the compromise. Subsequent issue of notice cannot give validity to an illegal thing. That act cannot by itself make the act as legal one. On the date of compromise the Court has no right to pass a decree acting on the compromise since the parties have not signed on the same and they are not present. There was no concluded agreement in between the parties in order to act upon the compromise. It is rightly contended by the petitioners counsel that the Court cannot act upon the compromise. The subsequent acts if any cannot make the compromise a valid compromise. Moreover the compromise memo filed is not in accordance with CPC and against the statutory rules. If any benefit is received by the petitioner due to compromise it is liable to be restored back to the respondent. " ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel also drew my attention to several facts and circumstances which clearly go to show that the party had full knowledge about the compromise and for the reasons best known to him he wants to go back on the compromise and now at this point of time he cannot be allowed to say otherwise, since it will amount to approbate and reprobate which is not permissible in law. ( 7 ) SRI Rajamalla Reddy, learned counsel representing the respondent had contended that Order 23, Rule 3 of CPC specifically contemplates that the compromise memo shall be signed by the parties and in the absence of the parties signing the compromise, it cannot be said that it is a valid compromise. It is his further contention that unless this statutory requirement is complied with, the compromise is not valid in the eye of law. ( 8 ) AS far as the several facts and circumstances which had been narrated above there is no serious dispute. ( 9 ) NOW the point for consideration is whether the order of the Court below setting aside the compromise between the parties on the ground that that the compromise memo was not signed by the parties, is liable to be interfered with or not. ( 9 ) NOW the point for consideration is whether the order of the Court below setting aside the compromise between the parties on the ground that that the compromise memo was not signed by the parties, is liable to be interfered with or not. At this juncture, it may be appropriate to look into order 23, Rule 3 CPC, which reads as under:"3. Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass the decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit: provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. " ( 10 ) THE words "in writing and signed by the parties" clearly go to show that there is a statutory requirement that the parties shall also sign the compromise memo for the purpose of recording the compromise. This is an essential statutory requirement. In K. Raghuram v. N. Vasundara, AIR 1983 AP 32, it was held as under:"a compromise memo filed before the Court and signed by the advocates of both the parties concerned without being signed by the parties cannot be acted upon. It is quite manifest from the provisions enacted under order 23, Rule 3 and in particular the words added to Rule 3 by virtue of an amendment brought in by the Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1. 2. 1977. "in writing and signed by the parties", any lawful agreement or compromise before it is given effect to by the Court by way of a recording the memo must be initiated by the parties. 2. 1977. "in writing and signed by the parties", any lawful agreement or compromise before it is given effect to by the Court by way of a recording the memo must be initiated by the parties. " ( 11 ) COUNSEL representing the parties had brought to my notice three decisions of the apex Court (i) Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur bhuj Gael, AIR 1988 SC 400 , (ii) Byram pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, air 1991 SC 2234 and (iii) Banwari Lal v. Smt. Chando Devi through LR, AIR 1993 sc 1139 . The Apex Court in Gurpreet singh s case (supra) was pleased to observe as under:"the plea that the words "in writing and signed by the parties" qualify the words "any lawful agreement or compromise" appearing in the first part of the Rule which refers to an adjustment or settlement of the claim in suit by a lawful agreement or compromise outside the Court, meaning thereby that where the parties make a statement before the Court that the dispute between them has been settled on certain, terms and the statements so made form part of the proceedings of the Court, there is no legal requirement to have an agreement in writing embodying the terms of the compromise, cannot be accepted. There is no justification on confine the applicability of the first part of Order 23, Rule 3 to a compromise effected out of Court. " ( 12 ) FURTHER, the Apex Court in Byram pestonji s case (supra) observed as under:"the words in writing and signed by the parties , inserted in Order 23, Rule 3, C. P. C. by the C. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 necessarily mean and include duly authorized representative and Counsel. Thus a compromise in writing and signed by counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person, is valid and binding on the parties and is executable even if the compromise relates to matters concerning the parties, but extending beyond the subject matter of the suit. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of the court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment. " ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court further in banwari Lal s (supra) has held as under:"the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent took a stand that the High court was justified in taking the view that the suit had been simply withdrawn by the plaintiff-appellant under Rule 1 of Order 23 and it had not been compromised in terms of rule 3 of the said Order 23; as such there was no occasion for the appellant to file an application for recall of the said order and for restoration of the suit in question for being heard on merit. From the copy of the petition which was filed on 27. 2. 1991 it appears that the terms and conditions of settlement and agreement had been mentioned saying that both parties had entered into a compromise because of which the plaintiff-appellant had thereafter no connection with the disputed land and defendant-respondent shall be deemed to be in possession and the owner of the said disputed land. The prayer made in the said petition also says that the compromise may be ordered to be accepted On basis of that petition, as already mentioned above, the court passed an order saying that the compromise had been accepted. In the order it has been mentioned that the suit of the plaintiff be "dismissed as per compromise deed Ex. C". In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is difficult to hold that by order dated 27-2-1991 the Court allowed the suit to be withdrawn in terms of Rule 1 of Order 23. The order on face of it purported to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff on basis of the terms and conditions mentioned in the petition of compromise". As such, the validity of that order has to be judged treating it to be an order deemed to have been passed in purported exercise of the power conferred on the Court by Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. As such, the validity of that order has to be judged treating it to be an order deemed to have been passed in purported exercise of the power conferred on the Court by Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. The learned subordinate Judge should not have accepted the said petition of compromise even it had no knowledge of the fraud alleged to have been practiced on the appellant by his counsel, because admittedly the petition of compromise had not been signed either by the respondent or his Counsel. This fact should have been discovered by the Court. In the case of Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj goel, AIR 1988 SC 400 , it has been said (para. 10):"under Rule 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The Court must therefore insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing. " ( 14 ) "the requirement of the petition of compromise being signed by the parties concerned has been considered also in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union bank of India, AIR 1991 SC 2234 =1991 air SCW 2567. It appears the attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid case of this Court in Gurpreet singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel (supra ). " ( 15 ) ADMITTEDLY, the law laid down in gurpreet Singh s case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges in Byram Pestonji s case (supra ). ( 16 ) EVEN the later view of the Apex Court as laid down in Banwari Lal s case (supra) is to the effect that the statutory requirement of the parties signing the compromise memo for the purpose of recording the compromise has to be followed for having a valid compromise recorded by the Court. ( 16 ) EVEN the later view of the Apex Court as laid down in Banwari Lal s case (supra) is to the effect that the statutory requirement of the parties signing the compromise memo for the purpose of recording the compromise has to be followed for having a valid compromise recorded by the Court. ( 17 ) IN the light of the above legal position and also in the light the words employed in Order 23, Rule 3 CPC, I am of the clear opinion that for the purpose of recording a valid compromise by the Court, the compromise memo shall be signed even by the parties. In fact, it is a more precautionary measure since a compromise will be recorded by the Court at the instance of the parties, the Court should be careful to see that the parties are entering into compromise with free will and consent and the compromise has to be recorded by the Court on the voluntary wish of the parties and not otherwise. That being, so, there cannot be a forced compromise and atleast to show that th6 compromise is voluntary, it is always better and safe that parties hall sign the compromise memo and unless the parties sign compromise memo, the Courts shall not record compromise. ( 18 ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion, in as much as even on equity, the Court below had passed justifiable order. I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the Court below. The civil revision petition is devoid of merits, it is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances, each party to bear their own costs.