Judgment Radha Mohan Prasad, J. 1. As in the writ applications the questions involved are common, with consent of the parties, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In both the writ petitions the respective petitioners have assailed the validity of the order dated 13.09.1989, passed by the respondent-the Assessment Sub-Committee of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Barn purporting to be in terms of the provisions contained in Section 27A of the Bihar State Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the order passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional Authority affirming the aforementioned original order. 3. It is admitted case of the parties that the assessment of market fee in both cases relates to 1980-81 to 1983-84. It is contended by Mr. Verma that under Section 27AA of the Act, the Assessment Sub-Committee has been vested with the power to make assessment of market fee if upon an information it is satisfied that reasonable ground exists to believe that any amount of transaction of sale or purchase of a trader in respect of any period has for any reason, escaped assessment, or a trader assessed under Section 27A has been under assessed or any deduction therefrom has been wrongly made. However, such power can exercised only within six years of the expiry of such period where it has reason to believe that the trader has concealed, omitted or failed to disclose fully the particulars of his total amount of transaction of sale or purchase or has furnished incorrect particulars of his transaction and thereby has given figures below the real amount Otherwise, limitation for exercise of such power is within four years of the expiry of such period. It is submitted that the admittedly the notice in both the cases for exercise of such power was issued on 1.9.1989 (Annexure-1). As such according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Assessment Sub-Committee in no case had the power to issue notice for impugned assessment of the period, prior to 1.9.1989, as it was beyond the period of the six years. As such according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Assessment Sub-Committee in no case had the power to issue notice for impugned assessment of the period, prior to 1.9.1989, as it was beyond the period of the six years. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, in the facts and circumstances even the period of assessment after 1.9.1983 is barred as according to him the limitation of six years applies only where the trader has concealed, ommitted or failed to disclose fully the particulars of his total amount of transaction of sale or purchase or has furnished incorrect particulars of his transaction and thereby has given figures below the real amount otherwise the period of limitation of four years, as provided in sub-ciause (b) of Section 27 AA of the Act would apply. It is submitted by Mr. Verma that in the present case, it is neither alleged that the petitioners ever concealed, omitted or failed to disclose fully the particulars of his total amount of transaction of sale or purchase nor it is a case of respondents that the petitioners furnished incorrect particulars of their transaction and thereby has given figures below the real amount. Under such circumstances, according to Mr. Verma in the present matter the limitation on exercise of power will be governed by sub-clause (b) of Section 27 AA which is four years. 4. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand has submitted that the present case will be governed by sub-clause (a) of Section 27AA of the Act which provides that such power can be exercised within six years of the expiry of such period. However, he has fairly conceded that in view of the specific provision, contained in Section 27AA, the impugned notice/ assessment for the period, prior to 1.9.1983 was barred, and thus fairly submitted that as the notice as well as the assessment order in both cases is a composite one covering the entire period 1980-81 to 1983-84 the same are to be quashed and the matter is to be remitted back to the concerned authority for issuance of appropriate notice for the period after 1.9,1983. 5. 5. In view of the tact that the impugned orders which are composite one and cover the entire period from 1980-81 to 1983-84 and are to be quashed on the ground that the notice nor the period prior to 1.9.1983 was barred, learned counsel for the parties fairly agreed that if respondents decide to issue notice for the remaining period the petitioners may be given liberty to raise all such objections including the objection regarding the applicability of sub-ciause (b) in their show-cause which can be considered by the authorities and disposed of by a reasoned order. However, Mr. Verma submitted that if the petitioners still feel aggrieved may be given liberty to challenge the validity of the said order before the appropriate forum. 6. In view of the fair approach of the learned counsel for the parties, these writ applications are allowed and the impugned orders contained in annexure-2 . are quashed. The matters are remitted back to the Assessment Sub-Committee for issuing modified notice accordingly for the period after 1.9.1983. The petitioners will be at liberty to raise all objections in response to the said notice including on the question of the period of limitation, as provided in sub-clause (b) of Section 27AA of the Act which shall be considered and disposed of by a reasoned order afresh in accordance with law. It is needless to say that if any of the petitioners feel aggrieved by the said decision of the Assessment Committee, they will be at liberty to move the appropriate forum against the same.