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2001 DIGILAW 743 (AP)

Subrata Dam v. INDIAN RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED

2001-07-19

S.B.SINHA, V.V.S.RAO

body2001
S. B. SINHA, CJ, J. ( 1 ) IN this appeal the appellants herein questioned the order dated 25. 4. 2001 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by them was dismissed. In the said writ petition a prayer was made which is to the following effect: for the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit, the petitioners herein pray that this hon ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents herein to treat the petitioners herein as regular employees with all consequential benefits from the date of their initial appointments and further direct the respondents to promote the petitioners herein to higher posts and pass such other order or orders as are deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. ( 2 ) THE short question which arose for consideration before the learned single Judge was as to whether the writ petitioners - appellants had specifically prayed for appointment for Ramagundam project or not. ( 3 ) THE appellants were employed by the 1st respondent-company on casual/ad hoc basis for construction of Merry-Go-Round railway track at Ramagundam Super Thermal power Station and the order of their appointment ordains them to work anywhere in India. After completion of the project they were sought to be removed. Prior to completion of the project some of the workmen approached this Court by way of writ petitions which were later dismissed. The appellants herein also filed the present writ petition seeking regularisation of their services and for consequential promotion to the higher posts. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition observing thus:. . . . . . In view of the same, it cannot be said that they were appointed by the 1st respondent in clear vacancies merely because in the orders it is mentioned that they are liable to be transferred to any other place in india or abroad where the 1st respondent undertakes project. It is a fact that the petitioners were specifically appointed for ramagundam Project, which clearly shows that their appointment is co-terminous with the completion of the project. When the respondents completed the project, it is open for them to close down the project as provided under Section 25-O (l) by issuing a notification. It is a fact that the petitioners were specifically appointed for ramagundam Project, which clearly shows that their appointment is co-terminous with the completion of the project. When the respondents completed the project, it is open for them to close down the project as provided under Section 25-O (l) by issuing a notification. The only right available to the petitioners is that they are entitled to compensation as contemplated under Section 25-FFF of the I. D. Act. In view of the same, the petitioners are not entitled to the relief claimed by them for regularisation of their services and for promotion to the higher posts. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants inter alia submitted that the learned single Judge erred in proceeding on the basis that the appellants had been appointed only for Ramagundam project and not by the company itself. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to various offers of appointment which reads thus: you are hereby offered appointment on a casual ad hoc basis on a consolidated monthly emoluments of Rs. 400/- (Rupees four hundred only ). You are directed to report to the Project Manager, IRCON at NTPC complex, P. O. Ramagundam (A. P. ). In this connection the following instructions are issued:1. Your training period will be for a period of 12 months after you report for duty;2. On satisfactory completion of the training, you will be required to pass a written and oral examination;3. On passing your above examination, you will be brought in grade of Rs. 260-4-/ -. You will also be eligible for payment of all allowances as per the rules of the company;4. You regular appointment in the company will be governed by the Recruitment rules of the company. 5. You are liable to be posted any where in india in IRCON s projects. 6. During your training period, you will be entitled to an additional monthly emoluments of Rs. 50/- if you are posted in Delhi, Bombay or Calcutta. 7. The above appointment is subject to verification of your age, qualifications for which you should produce original documents while reporting. ( 5 ) A bare perusal of the said offer of appointment would clearly show that the concerned persons were appointed on casual/ ad hoc basis. 50/- if you are posted in Delhi, Bombay or Calcutta. 7. The above appointment is subject to verification of your age, qualifications for which you should produce original documents while reporting. ( 5 ) A bare perusal of the said offer of appointment would clearly show that the concerned persons were appointed on casual/ ad hoc basis. It may be true that in the said offer of appointment it has not been specifically stated that they were appointed for the aforementioned project but it is evident that the appointees were asked to report to the Project manager, IRCON at ntpc complex, Ramagundam. In the absence of any rule the writ petitioners- appellants are not entitle to any regularization. ( 6 ) IT is also not in dispute that the aforementioned project is closed. It is now a well settled principle by reason of various decisions of this Court that regularization is not a mode of appointment. 2002 (2) FR-F-38 ( 7 ) IN Secretary, A. P. Social Welfare residential Educational Institutions Society v. P. Venkata Kumari, 2001 (3) ALT 366 , it has been held:. . . having regard to the mode of appointment, the requirements thereof, absence of sanctioned posts, non-observance of the statutory rules the part-time employees, ad hoc employees and NMRs did not derive any legal right whatsoever to continue in service. . . . . It is now well settled principle that by reason of a catena of decisions of the High Court as also of the Supreme court of India a prolonged service would not ripen into permanence nor by reason thereof the status of employee can be changed. ( 8 ) IT is not the case of the appellants that they were appointed upon compliance of the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. A prolonged or continuous service does not give rise to a claim for regularisation. In arum Kumar Rout v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998sc 1477, it was held: it may also be stated that such salaries had been paid to these appellants after a departmental inquiry indicating that even though there were irregularities in the appointment but the appellants has requisite qualifications for the respective post to which they were appointed. Although the appellants had not been appointed by following the due procedure and, therefore, they cannot claim regularization as a matter of course. Although the appellants had not been appointed by following the due procedure and, therefore, they cannot claim regularization as a matter of course. But considering the fact that they had satisfactorily served the department even without getting any salary for a long time and they were not guilty of any fraud or sharp practice and also did not lack in requisite qualification and they had been appointed against sanctioned posts, we feel that the appellants deserve sympathetic consideration in getting appointment against such sanctioned posts on human consideration. Considering the special facts of this appeal it appears to us that it will be just, proper and consistent with ends of justice to direct that 50 per cent of the sanctioned posts which were held by these appellants should be filled from amongst the appellants on the basis of their inter se merit position by taking into account their academic qualifications by waiving question of age bar if any and usual procedures for such appointment. ( 9 ) THE above decision was distinguished by a Division Bench of the calcutta High Court in Sairindhri Dolui v. State of West Bengal and others, 2000 (1) slr 803, wherein it has been noticed: although in the matter of getting appointment in the Government service, the procedure required to be followed for such appointment cannot be by-passed and if the initial appointment was illegal on account of not following the procedure for appointment, the incumbent obtaining appointment without following the procedure cannot claim as a matter of right to be regularised. This Court, however, has looked with sympathy when question of regularization came for consideration in cases of temporary or ad hoc appointment, even made improperly if the incumbents had been allowed to continue for a long time because of the human problem involved in such continued service. In the said decision the Apex Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India has been directed that the 50 per cent of the sanctioned posts which were held by these appellants should be filled from amongst the appellants on the basis of their inter se merit position by taking into account their academic qualifications by waiving question of age bar if any and usual procedures for such appointment. Thus, illegal appointments even in that case had not been and could not be set aside evidently in view of the decision of the Apex Court in various decisions. ( 10 ) FURTHERMORE, it is a well settled principle of law that there can be no estoppel against statute. In Dr. Ashok Kumar maheswari v. State of U. P. and another, air 1998 SC 966 = 1998 (2) SLR 291 (SC), it has been laid down: whether a promissory estoppel, which is based on a promise contrary to law can be invoked has already been considered by this Court in Kasinka Trading v. Union of india, (1995) 1 SCC 274 , as also in Shabi construction Co. v. City and Industrial development Corporation, (1995) 4 SCC 301 , wherein it is laid down that the Rule of promissory Estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise or a declaration which is contrary to law or outside the authority or power of the Government or the person making that promise. Applying the above principles to the instant case, even if it is accepted that the State government of the Director, Medical education and Training assured the appellant or any of his colleagues that they would be promoted to the posts of Lecturer, such a promise cannot be enforced against the respondents as the avenue of promotion for demonstrators to the post of lecturers was not provided either under the statute or any executive instruction. Moreover, if the post of lecturer was filled up by promotion of demonstrator, it would defeat the existing mode for recruitment, namely that it can be filled up by direct recruitment only and not by promotion. It may also be stated that the appellant did not make any clear, sound and positive averment as to which officer of the Government, when and in what manner gave the assurance to the appellant or any of his colleagues that they would be promoted to Lecturers. It was also not stated that the appellant had, at any time, acting upon the promise, altered his position, in any manner, specially to his detriment. Said pleadings cannot be made the foundation for invoking the Doctrine of Promissory estoppel. It was also not stated that the appellant had, at any time, acting upon the promise, altered his position, in any manner, specially to his detriment. Said pleadings cannot be made the foundation for invoking the Doctrine of Promissory estoppel. ( 11 ) IN Suraj Praakash Gupta v. State of Jandk, 2000 (4) SLR 486 , the Apex Court observed: the decision of this Court have recently been requiring strict conformity with the recruitment Rules for both direct recruits and promotees. The view is that there can be no relaxation of the basic or Fundamental rules of Recruitment. In Keshab Chandra joshi v. Union of India, 1992 (Supp) 1 scc 272 = 1998 (7) SLR 469 (SC), the rule permitted relaxation of conditions of service and it was held by the three Judge bench that the Rule did not permit relaxation of Recruitment Rules. The words may consult the PSC were, it was observed, to be read as shall consult PSC and the rule was treated mandatory. In Syed Khalid rizvi v. Union of India, 1993 (Supp) 3 SCC 575 at 603 ; 1993 (1) SLR 89 (SC), decided by a three Judge Bench, a similar strict principle was laid down. The relevant Rule - Rule 3 of the Residuary Rules (see p. 603) (para 33) in that case did permit relaxation of rule . Even so, this Court refused to imply relaxation of Recruitment Rules and observed: the condition precedent, therefore, is that there should be appointment to the service in accordance with Rules and by operation of the Rule, undue hardship has been caused. . . . . . It is already held that condition of recruitment and conditions of service are distinct and the latter is preceded by an appointment according to Rules. The former cannot be relaxed. similarly, in State of Orissa v. Sukanti mahaptra, 1993 (2) SCC 486 = 1992 (2) slr 321 (SC), it was held that though the power of relaxation stated in the Rule was in regard to any of the provisions of the rules , this did not permit relaxation of the rule of direct recruitment without consulting the Commission and the entire ad hoc service of direct recruit could not be treated as regular service. Similarly, in Dr. Similarly, in Dr. M. A. Hague v. Union of India, 1993 (3) SCC 213 = 1993 (2) SLR 1 (SC), it was held that for direct recruitment, the Rules relating to recruitment through the Public Service Commission could not be relaxed. In Jammu and Kashmir Public service Commission v. Narinder Mohan, 1994 (2) SCC 630 = 1994 (1) SLR 264 (SC), it was held that the provision of the jandk Medical Recruitment Rules could not be relaxed for direct recruitment. Backdoor direct recruitments, could not be permitted. See also Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar v. State of Maharastra, 1994 (Supp) 3 scc 380 = 1994 (5) SLR 234 (SC ). In dr. Surinder Singh Jamal and another v. State of Jandk, 1996 (9) SCC 619 this Court direct the direct recruits to go before the public Service Commission. ( 12 ) RECENTLY in State of West Bengal v. Krishna Kumar Majumdar, 2001 (2) chn 31, after noticing the aforementioned decisions, it was held:. . . . . an appointment on regular post must be made in terms of the Recruitment Rules having regard to the principles adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, as indicated hereinbefore, neither any appointment has been made nor any averment has been made by the writ petitioner that such appointment has been made in accordance with the Recruitment Rules or in consonance with the principle laid down under articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of india. Such appointment, therefore, cannot be encouraged. Furthermore, a finding of fact has been arrived at by the competent authority that the writ petitioners were appointment on contractual basis and that too for a period 2 years at one point of time. ( 13 ) IT is now well settled principle of law that a High Court would not convert itself into an Industrial Court. In bhuneshwar Mallah v. Central Coalfields ltd. , 1995 (1) PLJR 43, it has been held: further, even if it be found that the action of the Management is mala fide, the remedy of the petitioner is to raise an Industrial Dispute as in our view, this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India cannot convert itself into an industrial dispute Court. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 sc 1260 . ( 14 ) THIS aspect of the matter has also been considered in Thakur Majhi v. Easter coalfields, 1995 (2) Cal. LJ 127, Mohini v. G. M. , Syndicate Bank, 69 FLR 1061, Tapas mondal v. Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. , 1995 lab. I. C. 1433, and Arindam Chatterjee v. Coal India Ltd. and others, 1996 LIC 416. ( 15 ) THE question as to whether the appellants had been appointed in relation to a particular scheme or not, apart from the offer of appointment can be found out from the other contemporaneous documents. In the counter affidavit filed before the learned single Judge the respondents have clearly stated: (i) It is respectfully submitted that the respondent is engaged in construction works in the capacity of a contracting company. It has been executing contracts at the establishment of its clients for laying rail track for and on behalf of the client NTPC in the establishment and place of work of its client. In the course of its business it undertakes constructions works wherever awarded and does a given work as per terms and scope of the contract and on completion of work it winds up its temporary establishment particularly since number of local persons have to be and are appointed for such construction work in the projects. (ii) This project for the construction of private captive rail track for the NTPC was accordingly undertaken at Ramagundam and singareni Colliery against an LOI No. 01/cc/01-918, dated 27. 12. 1979 in the shape of contract awarded by the NTPC to the company as per terms and conditions of contract, placed at annexure CA-1. The said works for laying track in the project was completed and handed over to the client ntpc for carrying coal from the Singareni colliery to thermal power station of NTPC at Ramagundam as per handing/taking over certificate. ( 16 ) IN any event, such a disputed question of fact cannot be gone into in a writ proceedings. The said works for laying track in the project was completed and handed over to the client ntpc for carrying coal from the Singareni colliery to thermal power station of NTPC at Ramagundam as per handing/taking over certificate. ( 16 ) IN any event, such a disputed question of fact cannot be gone into in a writ proceedings. Having regard to the purport and object of enactment of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it must be held that except in a case where there has been a clear violation of the provisions of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, a writ Court would not entertain an industrial dispute and would ordinarily relegate the parties to avail the remedy under the special statue. ( 17 ) FURTHERMORE, the question as to whether even assuming that the appellants herein were appointed by the Corporation and not by the project, was required to be taken into consideration. In Lal Mohammad and others v. Indian Railway Construction co. Ltd. and others, 1998 (9) Supreme 288 , whereupon strong reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the appellants the apex Court formulated the following questions: (i) Whether Anpara Riband Nagar project is subjected to a factual closure as mentioned in the impugned notices of March, 1998 or whether the project is not still completed. (ii) In the light of the answer to the aforesaid question a further question would arise whether impugned notices of March, 1998 were in fact and in law closure notices as per section 25-O read with Section 25-FFF of the Act or whether they still remain retrenchment notices and hence would be violative of Section 25-N of the Act. (iii) Even if it is held that the Anpara Riband nagar project is in fact closed down whether the 25 appellants were employed in the project or they were employees of the respondent company entitling them to be absorbed in any other project of the company and consequently whether the impugned notices have not effected any snapping of employer-employee relationship between the appellants on the one hand and the respondent company on the other. (iv) Even apart from the aforesaid questions whether the impugned notices are violative of the guarantee of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the termination of services of the 25 appellants was arbitrary and discriminatory, respondent company being a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. ( 18 ) QUESTIONS (i) and (ii) have no application in the instant case. In relation to question (iii) it was observed: as the appellants are out of service after the order of Division Bench, we deem it fit to observe that the remanded writ petitions may be placed for disposal before a Division bench to avoid delay due to further tiers of appellate proceedings. The remanded writ petitions may be disposed of by the appropriate Division Bench to which the writ petitions may be assigned by the Hon ble chief Justice of the High Court as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months from the receipt of the copy of this order at the High Court s end. The office shall send a copy of this order to the registrar of the High Court at the earliest for being placed before the Hon ble Chief Justice of that High Court for doing the needful in this connection. ( 19 ) IN the instant case the said question has been decided by this Court keeping in view the fact situation obtaining herein. ( 20 ) IT is not in dispute that the appellants establishment is closed. The matter is, therefore, covered by Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act wherefor the provisions of Section 25-O subject to the proviso appended to Section 25-O (l) are required to be complied with. ( 21 ) THE questions posed in this appeal, therefore, can in a better manner be dealt with by way of an industrial adjudication. ( 22 ) HAVING regard to the fact that according to the respondents there is no clear vacancy, any directions as regards their claim of regularisation cannot be granted. ( 23 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.