Judgment : 1. In this writ petition, the petitioners pray for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the first respondent dated 12.12.1997 and of the second respondent dated 31.12.1997 and consequently, direct the respondents to forbear from denying the permanent status already conferred on the petitioners by the order of the second respondent dated 28.7.1997. 2. The petitioners claim that they are all workmen employed by the society as Salesman. They have put in services ranging from 2 to 15 years as per the details given in paragraph No. 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. They were all demanding the second respondent society to regularise their services and to give proper scale of pay, Dearness Allowance, and House Rent Allowance. Their repeated demands were of no avail. They demanded that they should have been made permanent as per the provisions of Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). They have put more than 480 days of continuous service. It is further stated that the Inspector of Labour conducted an enquiry and after perusing the Attendance records found that all of them were employed for more than 480 days within a period of two years and hence, he directed the second respondent to regularise the services of the petitioners. The Board of Directors also decided to confirm the services of the petitioners. While so, the petitioners were issued orders dated 31.12.1997 by the President of the Society informing that the earlier order dated 7.8.1997 confirming them from 1.7.1997 was cancelled with effect from 1.1.1998. This was because of the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 12.12.1997 that confirmation of the services of the petitioners was without prior approval of the Co-operative Department and therefore, was illegal. Hence, the above writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that by order dated 24.10.1995 the appropriate Authority under the Act had specifically directed the Society to confirm the services of 28 named individuals considering that they have worked for more than 480 days in two years. The order of confirmation by the Society was passed only in compliance of the said statutory order. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that by order dated 24.10.1995 the appropriate Authority under the Act had specifically directed the Society to confirm the services of 28 named individuals considering that they have worked for more than 480 days in two years. The order of confirmation by the Society was passed only in compliance of the said statutory order. Now by virtue of an order which appears to have passed by the Deputy Director of Milk, the order of confirmation in favour of the petitioners is sought to be cancelled. Learned counsel also took me through the provisions of the Act and contended that the Act is applicable notwithstanding any other provisions or any other Act or law as prevailed. He also relies on the judgment of N.V. Balasubramanian, J. in M. Irudhayanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1997 (3) L.L.N. 544 and also that of P.D. Dinakaran.J. in T.N.C.S. Corpn. Modern Rice Mill Engg. Section Employoees etc. Union v. T.N.C.S. Corpn. (1998 Writ L.R. 514). Learned counsel relies on the above two judgments in support of his contention that the provisions of the Act are applicable to the Co-operative Societies and that the provisions of the Act are mandatory and when once the employees satisfied the requirement as prescribed under the Act, there is a mandatory duty on the part of the employer to regularise the services of the employee. 4. I have also heard learned counsel for the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the writ petition is not maintainable as the relief is directed against the Co-operative Societies and therefore, in terms of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court, no writ petition is maintainable against the Co-operative Societies. 5. In this context, I am unable to uphold the objections of the learned counsel for the respondents that the order which is sought to be quashed, is not only the order of the Co-operative Society, but also the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Milk. The order passed by the Co-operative Societies is only consequential on the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Milk. It cannot be disputed that the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Milk, dated 12.12.1997 is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Hence, there is no basis for the said objection. Learned counsel for the respondents further contends that the Act will not apply for casual labourers. It cannot be disputed that the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Milk, dated 12.12.1997 is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Hence, there is no basis for the said objection. Learned counsel for the respondents further contends that the Act will not apply for casual labourers. In support of his contention learned counsel relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Workers Union v. T.N. Civil Supplies Corpn., 1997 (3) C.T.C. 535. 6. I have considered the submissions of both sides in the contest of the enforceability of the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 12.12.1997. 7. A perusal of the provisions of the Act discloses that they are mandatory and would apply to Co-operative Societies also. It applies to every industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character) in which not less than fifty workmen are employed. The provisions of the Act are applicable notwithstanding anything contained in the Act for the time being in force, every workman who is in continuous service for a period of four hundred and eighty days in a period of twenty four calendar months in an industrial establishment, shall be made permanent. Therefore, there is no difficulty in holding that the order of the competent authority dated 24.10.1996 directing the named 28 persons to be made permanent is enforceable and the said order cannot be ignored merely by a direction by the first respondent holding that the amendments have been made in violation of the bye laws and therefore, the employees cannot be made permanent. The impugned order dated 12.12.1997 totally overlooks the mandatory character of the provisions of the Act as well as the order of the competent authority dated 24.10.1995. 8. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners on the basis of the judgment of this Court in 1997 (3) C.T.C. 535, supra, cannot also be accepted. That was a case which considered the claim of seasonal employees whose services were required for a particular season. A perusal of Section 1(3) of the Act discloses that the Act does not apply to establishment of the seasonal character in which the work was being performed only intermittently. 9. That was a case which considered the claim of seasonal employees whose services were required for a particular season. A perusal of Section 1(3) of the Act discloses that the Act does not apply to establishment of the seasonal character in which the work was being performed only intermittently. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents however refers to paragraph Nos.14 and 15 of the judgment and contends that the judgment would apply even in respect of casual or temporary employees and that mere continuance on the completion of 480 days of service cannot entitle the employee a claim for the permanent post till they are duly selected and appointed and their appointment is also made in accordance with the Rules. As stated earlier the said judgment deals with only seasonal employees. Therefore, the said judgment cannot govern the position relating to the casual or temporary employees. 9-A. If casual or temporary employees are excluded from the applicability of the Act, then the Act itself would become meaningless. The very provisions of the Act are contemplated only in the context of the unhealthy practice of the management of employing persons in temporary capacity for a prolonged period without any security of the service. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the contention that the provisions of the Act will not apply to the causual or temporary employee. 10. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and both the orders of the first respondent dated 12.12.1997 and of the second respondent dated 31.12.1997 are quashed and there will be a direction to the respondents to implement the order of the competent authority under the Act, dated 24.10.1996 forthwith. No costs.