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2001 DIGILAW 744 (MP)

GOPAL KRISHNA AWARDHU v. NAGAR PANCHAYAT, NARWAR

2001-10-12

N.G.KARAMBELKAR, S.P.SRIVASTAVA

body2001
S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) FEELING aggrieved by the order passed by the Labour Court No. 1 whereby holding the termination of the service of Gopal Krishna awardhu, the appellant in L. P. A. No. 60/2001 to be illegal, granting him the benefit of Section 25-F and G of the Industrial Disputes Act it had directed the Mukhya Karyapalan Adhikari, vishesh Kshetra Vikas Pradhikaran, Narwar, district Shivpuri to reinstate him in service and pay all the arrears of salary to him, the Nagar panchayat, Narwar, the appellant in L. P. A. No. 70/2001 filed a writ petition being W. P. No. 1954/1998 praying for the quashing of the said order as it was sought to be enforced against it in view of the provisions contained in the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh adhiniyam, 1973 even though the petitioner, the local authority had not been impleaded as a party respondent in the proceedings before the labour Court. ( 2 ) THE aforesaid writ petition was heard and disposed of by a learned single Judge of this Court vide the judgment and order dated February 15, 2001 whereunder the order passed by the Labour court was quashed with a direction to it to decide the dispute after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. ( 3 ) NOT only the Nagar Panchayat, Narwar but the employee, Gopal Krishna Awardhu also felt aggrieved by the order passed by the learned single Judge and both of them have challenged the same by means of the present separate Letters Patent Appeals. ( 4 ) TAKING into consideration the nature of the controversy raised in the appeals and the identical questions arising therein, both the appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. ( 5 ) THE facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of these appeals lie in a narrow compass. The appellant in L. P. A. No. 60/2001 had approached the Labour Court raising a plea that he was a workman employed in the Special Area Development Authority, narwar (for short, the "sada") and his service was terminated without complying with the provision contained in Section 25-F of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He was as such entitled to the benefit secured under Section 25-F of the aforesaid Act. He claimed his reinstatement in service with back wages. He was as such entitled to the benefit secured under Section 25-F of the aforesaid Act. He claimed his reinstatement in service with back wages. ( 6 ) THE State Government had made a reference vide its order dated May 28, 1987 requiring the Labour Court to decide the validity of the termination of the service of the appellant in L. P. A. No. 60/2001 and to decide as to what relief he was entitled to in the circumstances of the case. ( 7 ) IT may be noticed that the employer in the present case at the time of reference was the special Area Development Authority as envisaged under Section 76 of the Madhya pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh adhiniyam, 1973. However during the pendency of the case vide notification dated june 22, 1995, the Special Area Development authority was dissolved with effect from the date of the publication of the notification in the madhya Pradesh Gazette providing however that all the assets and liabilities of the SADA as on the date of the dissolution shall stand transferred to and vested in the Nagar panchayat, Narwar. ( 8 ) IT may also be noticed at this stage that the provisions contained in Section 76 of the madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh adhiniyam, 1973 stipulate the securing of the power in the State Government for dissolution of any authority as enumerated in Section 76-A of the said Act which includes the SADA. It is provided in Section 76 (2) (b) of the said Act that from the date of dissolution of such authority any proceeding pending to which the authority was a party shall be continued as if the municipality was a party thereof in lieu of the authority. ( 9 ) THE legislative intent and the purpose for which the aforesaid provision was brought in the statute book clearly appears to prevent a situation where in view of the dissolution of the authority envisaged under Section 76-A of the act, the pending proceedings in which the concerned authority was a party may not ipso facto terminate or abate especially when the assets and liabilities of that authority were to stand transferred to and vested in the successor authority. ( 10 ) IN the aforesaid view of the matter, the appellant in L. P. A. No. 70/2001 which was the successor authority and the entire assets of the SADA stood transferred in its favour and the liabilities of the SADA stood fastened upon it, the proceedings pending before the Labour court, by a statutory fiction had to be continued as if the successor authority was a party in that proceeding in view of the fact that the authority which had been impleaded as a party respondent stood dissolved subject to the terms and conditions as indicated in the notification issued by the State Government dated June 22, 1995 giving effect to the provision contained in section 76 (2) (b) of the said Act. ( 11 ) THE dissolution of the employer, the predecessor in interest of the appellant in l. P. A. No. 70/2001 became effective from june 22, 1995. Before the Labour Court, the dissolved authority had come up with the case that in fact it stood dissolved and no relief as claimed by the petitioner could be granted as against the dissolved authority. It was also brought to the notice of the Labour Court that the successor authority had not been impleaded by the employee. ( 12 ) THE Labour Court however rejected the contention of the dissolved authority proceeding on the assumption that since in the referring order, there was no mention of the successor authority, it had no jurisdiction at all to implead the successor authority or to proceed against it. ( 13 ) THE view of the Labour Court in the aforesaid connection appears to be not at all sustainable in law as the implications arising under Section 76 (2) (b) of the aforesaid Act which were clearly attracted were entirely overlooked resulting in manifestly erroneous conclusions. ( 14 ) HOWEVER, taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the learned single Judge has directed, under the impugned order that the successor authority may be afforded an opportunity of hearing in the matter. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the successor authority in L. P. A. No. 70/2001 has urged that the scope of the opportunity had not been clarified by the learned single Judge. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the successor authority in L. P. A. No. 70/2001 has urged that the scope of the opportunity had not been clarified by the learned single Judge. The contention is that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the successor authority was entitled to contest the case of the employee from the stage of filing of the written statement by the sada. The submission in essence is that the successor authority was entitled to contest the case from the very beginning which obviously amounts to a de novo trial. ( 16 ) IHE learned counsel tor the appellant in L. P. A. No. 60/2001 however contends that since the dissolution had taken place in the year 1995, whatever had been done by the SADA had to be accepted by the successor authority and it can only step into the shoes of SADA, the dissolved authority and had no right to put the clock back. ( 17 ) IN support of his submission, the learned counsel for the employee has placed reliance on the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Shri Bhagwan Dass Chopra v. United bank of India and others, reported in AIR 1988 sc 215 wherein while considering the case that involved an identical situation as in the present case, it had been indicated that all the proceedings that had gone on till the date on which the new party had been impleaded could be continued in the same way in which they operate against a person on whom any interest had devolved in any of the ways mentioned in Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 subject of course, to any terms in the contract of merger or transfer or other relevant legal provision governing the transaction under which the transferee had become the successor in interest of the transferor. It was also indicated that the successor authority could take part in the proceedings in the same capacity in which the earlier authority had been contesting and the successor authority was bound by all the proceedings which had taken place till then. The apex Court had amply clarified that the successor i authority in such cases could be taken to have only stepped into the shoes of the predecessor. The apex Court had amply clarified that the successor i authority in such cases could be taken to have only stepped into the shoes of the predecessor. It was also indicated that it is only in exceptional cases that the successor could be permitted to raise any new plea and that too only for avoiding multiplicity of the proceedings. Generally speaking such a successor cannot set up a case inconsistent with the one put forward by the predecessor. ( 18 ) THE aforesaid position in law is clearly attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case in view of the clear stipulation contained in Section 76 (2) (b) of the Madhya pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh adhimyam, 1973. The aforesaid provision is to the following effect:" (B) any proceeding pending to which the authority was a party shall be continued as if the Municipality was a party thereof in lieu of the authority. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 19 ) A perusal of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for doubt that the successor authority in the present case was to be taken as to have stepped into the shoes of the dissolved authority as in view of the statutory fiction, the successor authority was to be deemed to be a party in the case in lieu of the dissolved authority. ( 20 ) IN the aforesaid view of the matter, no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for any interference in the order passed by the learned single Judge. ( 21 ) HOWEVER, the opportunity of hearing to which the appellant in L. P. A. No. 70/2001 is entitled shall be in accordance with what has been indicated hereinabove. ( 22 ) THE Labour Court has therefore to proceed to dispose of the case after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant in l. P. A. No. 70/2001 in accordance with law. ( 23 ) SINCE the reference itself dates back to the year 1987, the Labour Court shall ensure that the case is finally disposed of expeditiously within a period not later than three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before it. ( 24 ) THESE appeals shall stand disposed of accordingly. ( 25 ) THERE shall however be no order as to costs. .