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2001 DIGILAW 747 (RAJ)

Murari Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2001-04-30

SHASHI KANT SHARMA

body2001
Honble SHARMA, J.–This revision filed by petitioner Murari Lal is directed against the order dated 7.6.1994, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Bayana setting-aside the order dated 11.2.1993, passed by learned A.C.J.M., Bayana, and remanding the case for trial. (2). Record was called for and arguments were heard. (3). Brief facts relating to this Criminal Revision are that a complaint was filed by the Food Inspector on 11th September 1984 , against the petitioner for offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the `Act), mentioning therein that the petitioner was selling ice-cream (`Kulfi) at the Railway Station, Bayana, on 28.4.1984. The complainant purchased 900 Grams of ice-cream and sent the same for testing to the Laboratory , which was found to be adulterated. After trial, learned A.C.J.M. Bayana convicted the petitioner for offence under Section 7/16 of the Act and sentenced him for one years R.I. and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. Against that judgment, petitioner filed an appeal, which was ultimately decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bayana, vide impugned order. Learned Additional Sessions Judge in his judgment held that according to the Act, there should have been summary trial. The procedure prescribed for summary trial was not adopted by the trial court, therefore, the judgment of the trial court was set~aside by the first appellate court and the case was remanded back for fresh trial. Hence this revision. (4). Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the learned Additional Sessions Judge should not have passed the order for de- novo trial. In this case, the petitioner has been facing the trial since 11.09.1984. Therefore, the Lower Court has erred in passing such order.It is argued that right of speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Art. 21 of the Constitution. If an accused is not tried speedly and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated. (5). If an accused is not tried speedly and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated. (5). In support of his arguments, counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Prahlad vs. State of Rajasthan (1), Hemraj vs. State of Rajasthan (2), Darshan Lal vs. The State of Rajasthan (3) and Brij Pal vs. State of Haryana (4), and urged that since the accused petitioner is facing trial for a very long time, therefore, the order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge for de novo trial should be quashed. (6). On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor has argued that the order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bayana, for de novo trial is legal one. It is a case of food adulteration, therefore, under such circumstances, it should not be quashed. (7). In support of his arguments, Mr. Alvi, learned Public Prosecutor has placed reliance on Kailash Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan (5). (8). In reply to the arguments advanced by learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the authority cited by learned Public Prosecutor in Kailash Chandras case (supra) is not applicable in the present matter, because in the present matter, petitioner has not filed a petition for quashing the charge but it is a matter where trial court has concluded the trial and convicted the petitioner. (9). I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for both the parties. (10). The short question for consideration before me is as to whether in such matters proceedings should be quashed on the ground of protracted trial or order of de novo trial should not be passed. (11). In Kailash Chandras case (supra), this Court has elaborately discussed this question and has referred so many important judgments of Hon. Supreme Court. Hon. Justice Gupta (the then) has also referred the judgment of this Court in Hem Rajs case (supra), on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner. The same problem was before Hon. Gupta, J. In that matter also incident was very old. Hon. Justice Gupta (the then) has also referred the judgment of this Court in Hem Rajs case (supra), on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner. The same problem was before Hon. Gupta, J. In that matter also incident was very old. Sample was taken in July 1984, accused was facing trial for a long period and on that ground, accused filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a prayer to quash the trial on the ground that he has suffered a lot during the period of 18 years and his right of speedy trial has been violated. Justice Gupta has discussed this question and found that in the matter of Food Adulteration Act , on the ground of infringement of right to speedy trial, proceedings should not be quashed because such offence is against the society. In this judgment, Justice Gupta has referred the judgment of Hon. Supreme Court reported in Antullay vs. R.S. Nayak (6), and quoted the following lines from the judgment of the Apex Court:- ``85. Another question seriously canvassed before us related to the consequence flowing -from an infringement of right to speedy trial. Counsel for accused argued on the basis of the observations in Sheela Barse ( AIR 1986 SC 1773 ) and Strunk (1973(37) Law Ed. 2d 56), that the only consequence is quashing of charges and/or conviction, as the case may be. Normally, it may be so.But we do not think that, that is the only order open to Court. In a given case, the facts-including the nature of offence- may be such that quashing of charges may not be in the interest of justice. After all, every offence more so economic offences, those relating to public officials and food adulterations is an offence against society, it is really the society the State that prosecutes the offender. We may in this connection recall the observations of this Court in Champa Lal Punjaji Shah ( AIR 1981 SC 1675 ). In cases, where quashing of charges/convictions may not be in the interest of justice, it shall be open to the Court to pass such appropriate orders as may be deemed just in the circumstances of the case. We may in this connection recall the observations of this Court in Champa Lal Punjaji Shah ( AIR 1981 SC 1675 ). In cases, where quashing of charges/convictions may not be in the interest of justice, it shall be open to the Court to pass such appropriate orders as may be deemed just in the circumstances of the case. Such orders may, for example, take the shape of order for expedition of trial and its conclusion within a particular prescribed period, reduction of sentence where the matter comes up after conclusion of trial and conviction, and so on . (12). Out of the four judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner as stated above, one judgment of Hem Raj (supra), has also been referred by Hon. Mr. Justice G.L. Gupta in his judgment and found that judgments of Apex Court had not been brought to the notice of this Court in Hem Rajs case. (13). I have gone through the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner and am of the view that the Judgment of Hon. Supreme Court passed in Antullays case (supra) would not have been brought to the notice of Hon. Judges. Therefore, these judgments are not of much help for me in deciding the present matter. (14). After going through the judgment of Hon. Supreme Court in Antullays case (supra), Rajdeo Sharma vs. State of Bihar (7) and `Common Cause A registered Society vs. Union of India (8) and other judgments, it becomes clear that where there is an infringement of right to speedy trial, normally the charges should be quashed or if the accused was convicted the conviction should be set-aside but such a course can not be adopted where the offence is against the society, specially in the case of Food Adulteration Act or cases of economic offences. As the present matter is related to Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, therefore, in the present matter, order of de novo trial should not be quashed only on the ground of infringement of right to speedy trial but in such matter I should direct the trial court for expeditious trial. As the present matter is related to Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, therefore, in the present matter, order of de novo trial should not be quashed only on the ground of infringement of right to speedy trial but in such matter I should direct the trial court for expeditious trial. In my view, it makes no difference whether request of accused is for quashing the charge or where it is a matter in which Sessions Judge has passed an order for de novo trial because in both the cases, the question comes about the right of speedy trial under Article 21. Therefore, the arguments advanced by counsel for the petitioner that the present matter is relating to order of de novo trial, therefore, the judgment of Kailash Chandra (supra) is not applicable, this judgment is not tenable. I am of the confirmed view that the order passed by learned Sessions Judge for de novo trial is not illegal at all. (15). Consequently, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However, it is directed that the trial of the case be held expeditiously and should be completed as far as possible within a period of one year from the date a copy of this order is placed before the learned C.J.M.