JUDGMENT : B.K. Rathi, J.—This is a revision u/s 115, CPC against the order dated 8.4.96 passed in Suit No. 188 of 1992 by Civil Judge, Senior Division, Muzaffarnagar. 2. The facts giving rise to the revision are as follows: The opposite party No. 1 filed a suit for recovery of money against the applicant and opposite party Nos. 2 and 3. The suit was contested by all the defendants. One of the pleas raised by the applicant before the trial court was that the court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in view of Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. On this plea, issue No. 5 was framed by the learned trial court and after hearing the parties, it decided the issue against the defendant revisionist and has held that it has the jurisdiction to try the suit. Aggrieved by that, the present revision has been preferred. 3. I have heard Mr. Govind Saran, the learned counsel for the revisionist, Mr. B. Dayal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. P.K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 and I have also gone through the entire record. 4. The copy of the plaint has been filed, according to which the plaintiff opposite party No. 1 consigned 960 bags of sugar through the Railways to Jhalarapatin, out agency to be delivered to opposite party No. 3. That the plaintiff was consignor as well as the consignee. That the papers were sent through the bank, respondent No. 2. That the employees of the Railways, i.e., revisionist in collusion with the opposite party No. 3 delivered sugar to opposite party No. 3 though the opposite party No. 1 was the consignee. That the bank should not have cleared the papers without the payment. That sugar have been taken by the opposite party No. 3, but the payment has not been made. The plaintiff, therefore, requested for recovery of the amount from the applicant as well as from the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3. 5. It is contended by Mr. Govind Saran, learned counsel for the revisionist that the dispute in this case is covered by Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, the relevant portion of which is as follows: 13. 2 and 3. 5. It is contended by Mr. Govind Saran, learned counsel for the revisionist that the dispute in this case is covered by Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, the relevant portion of which is as follows: 13. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal.-(1) The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any civil court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act,- (a) relating to the responsibility of the railway administrations as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of claims for- (i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway; (ii) compensation payable u/s 82-A of the Railways Act or the rules made thereunder; and (b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway. xxx xxx xxx 6. That in cases where the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of other courts is barred u/s 15 of the Act. In support of the argument the learned counsel for the revisionist has also referred to A.A. Haja Muniuddian Vs. Indian Railways, Reference has been made on certain observations made in para 5 of the judgment, which is as follows: It will be seen from the scheme of the Act that on its coming into force from the appointed day, all suits pending in the civil court would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal if the cause of action of the suit would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal after the appointed day. Therefore, even a suit filed under the provisions of Order XXXIII would stand transferred to the Claims Tribunal and the Claims Tribunal would be required to dispose it of as such. That is because Section 13 specifically provides that the Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on or from the appointed day, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any civil court provided the same relates to the recovery of compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of goods entrusted to the Railways for carriage by railway. Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain and try such suits on and from the appointed day. In other words, after the appointed day the Claims Tribunal alone would have jurisdiction to entertain and try claims referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. 7. There is no doubt that after the enforcement of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, the suit for compensation due to the non-delivery of goods is exclusively triable by the Railway Claims Tribunal. In the present case, the allegations, as above, clearly show that the claim has been made against the applicant, which is Railways and also against the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3. The plaint shows that the recovery has been sought from all the three of them. It is nowhere alleged that the revisionist is only responsible to pay the claim. On the other hand, the liability to pay money by all the three defendants is alleged and the amount has been claimed from all of them. 8. The suit against the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 is not maintainable before the Railway Claims Tribunal. 9. In view of the above, the civil court alone has the jurisdiction and the claim cannot be filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal. 10. I, therefore, do not find any illegality in the impugned order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Muzaffarnagar. 11. The revision is, therefore, without merits and is hereby dismissed.