JUDGMENT: The instant second appeal arises as follows: 2. One Abdul Razack was the original owner of the property. Abdul Razack’s wife was one Ayisha Gani. Abdul Razack had two sons by name TRA Mohammed Salihoo and A.M. Ismail and daughter by name Ummu Salima Beevi. A.M. Ismail son of Abdul Razack instituted a suit in O.S. No.55 of 1973 seeking partition and separate possession of 14/40 share in that suit properties. Abdul Razack died before O.S. No.55 of 1973 was instituted. In O.S. No.55 of 1973 the plaintiff A.M. Ismail arrayed his elder brother Mohammed Salihoo as first defendant, his sister Umma Salima Beevi as second defendant and his mother Ayisha Gani as third defendant. Pending the partition suit, third defendant Ayisha Gani died. Her legal representatives viz, the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 were already on record. Subsequently on 23.9.1980, Mohammed Salihoo died. He had left behind two wives and children through his two wives. Basheera Gani is one of his wives and she was arrayed as 4th defendant and her daughter Kuresha Beevi was impleaded as 6th defendant. Mohammed Salihoo had left behind another wife by name Hazeranan Beevi who was impleaded as 5th defendant and her children were impleaded as defendants 7, 8, 9 and 10. Thus all the legal representatives of the first defendant were brought on record before the trial Court in O.S. No.55 of 1973. It appears that a compromise was entered into between the parties on 19.4.1987. The compromise petition was signed by all the parties and it was presented before the Court on 19.4.1981. The Court recorded the compromise on 29.4.1981. As per the terms of compromise, it was agreed that the defendants should pay Rs.25,000 to the plaintiff in that suit in lieu of his share. It appears the payment was not made and therefore the plaintiff A.M. Ismail instituted final decree proceedings in I.A. No.158 of 1992. The trial Court appointed a Commissioner to divide the properties and after receipt of the Commissioner’s report and after calling for objections from the defendants the trial Court held an enquiry and passed final decree on 30.9.1982. The plaintiff in O.S. No.55 of 1973 had instituted Execution Proceedings in E.P. No.28 of 1984 and according to him he had his share allotted and he had even put up a partition wall. 3. The plaintiff in O.S. No.55 of 1973 had instituted Execution Proceedings in E.P. No.28 of 1984 and according to him he had his share allotted and he had even put up a partition wall. 3. Mohammed Gani and Kuresha Beevi viz., one of the widows of Mohammed Salihoo and his daughter came forward with a suit in O.S. No.59 of 1985 seeking to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that at the time when the compromise was recorded, the plaintiff Basheera Gani was undergoing her Iddat period. According to her during Iddat period of 4 months and 10 days a Muslim woman is not expected to come out of her house and that the compromise memo was recorded behind her back during the Iddat period. She had also pleaded that as per the terms of compromise, the agreed amount of Rs.25,000 was to be paid in two instalments. According to her Rs.10,000 was paid on 5.4.1984 in presence of one Hathi, and Krishnamoorthy and the remaining Rs.15,000 was paid on 15.4.1984 in the presence of one Ramakrishnan. Thus even that condition was satisfied. She had also pleaded that the compromise is not a valid compromise because there was no effective representation for the minor defendants in that suit. The defendants in O.S. No.59 of 1985 have filed a written statement refuting the content of the plaint. According to them though the compromise decree was recorded in her presence and it was given effect to since she had not made any payment as agreed, final decree proceedings were instituted and final decree was passed, in pursuance of which the first defendant had also taken possession of the properties. The trial Court framed 4 issues touching on the validity of recording the compromise. The main issues being whether or not the compromise decree is not binding on the plaintiff and the suit was barred by limitation. After trial, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not proved that the compromise decree was passed behind her back that she came to know only during February, 1984 and accordingly rejected her contentions and dismissed the suit. 4. Aggrieved by the decree and Judgment of the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S. No.105 of 1988 before the District Court, Nagapattinam. The appellate Court agreed with the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 5. 4. Aggrieved by the decree and Judgment of the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S. No.105 of 1988 before the District Court, Nagapattinam. The appellate Court agreed with the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court, the plaintiffs have come forward with the instant appeal. In the appeal the plaintiffs have raised two substantial questions of law. They are: (i) Whether the Courts below are legally justified in holding that the suit is barred by limitation in the light of the assertion of the appellants and the evidence that the first appellant came to know of the decree only in 1984? (ii) Whether the Courts below failed to hold that the compromise entered into by the third defendant on behalf of the minor defendants 4 to 7 would be totally void and not binding on the minors? 6. I have heard both sides and perused the documents. If feel that the first question cannot be considered as a question of law much less a substantial question of law because it is only a question of fact wherein the plaintiff has to prove that she had no knowledge of the degree and she came to know of the decree during 1984. Both the Courts below have referred to various documents. Her claim is that the compromise decree was passed behind her back while she was undergoing Iddat period. In view of the admitted fact that Mohammed Salihoo died on 23.9.1980, the period of 4 month and 10 days would have came to an end on 2.2.1981. Before the trial court, the compromise memo was filed on 19.4.1981 that is well after her Iddat period. Her next contention is that the compromise decree was passed behind her back. The appellant could not produce any documentary or oral evidence to show that the decree was passed behind her back and she had no knowledge of the decree at the time when the compromise decree was passed whereas the learned counsel for the respondent has produced various documents. Ex.B-2 is the certified copy of the compromise memo filed by both the parties before the trial Court. The certified copy of the decree reads that both the appellants herein have subscribed their signatures to the compromise memo. But the original is not produced to verify the signatures. Ex.B-2 is the certified copy of the compromise memo filed by both the parties before the trial Court. The certified copy of the decree reads that both the appellants herein have subscribed their signatures to the compromise memo. But the original is not produced to verify the signatures. The endorsement made by the learned Sub-Judge in the compromise memo is very suggestive. The compromise memo reads: “plaintiffs and the defendants present. Compromise read over and admitted by them to be correct. The counsel for plaintiff and defendants have signed. Compromise is recorded in so far as the parties are concerned.” This would clearly indicate that the appellants were present in the trial Court at the time when the compromise was recorded. Further Ex.B-7 the certified copy of the application filed by Mr.V. Chidambaram, the learned counsel who appeared for the defendants in the earlier suit in O.S. No.55 of 1973, would go to show that as early as on 27.4.1981 the learned counsel had filed an application for grant of certified copy of the compromise memo. It would indicate that the appellants were well aware of the compromise memo. 7. Even at the time of passing of the final decree there had been participation by the appellant as indicated by Ex.P-8, her objections to the Commissioner’s report. When the documents throw much light to show that the compromise was recorded in the presence of the appellant, it is for the appellant to establish that she was not aware of the compromise and the compromise decree was passed behind her back and the appellants came to know only during 1984 that the compromise decree was passed and therefore as per the provisions of O.23, Rule 3, C.P.C. they can seek to extend the period of limitation to file the suit to set aside the compromise decree from the date of knowledge. The documents would amply establish that they had knowledge of the compromise decree as early as 29.4.1981 itself and they had not filed the suit within three years i.e., on or before 29.4.1984 whereas they have filed the suit on 27.3.1985 as indicated in the decree. It is therefore evident that both the Courts have come to the right conclusion that the appellants had knowledge of the compromise decree as on 29.4.1981 and as they have not preferred the suit within three years, the suit is barred by limitation. It is therefore evident that both the Courts have come to the right conclusion that the appellants had knowledge of the compromise decree as on 29.4.1981 and as they have not preferred the suit within three years, the suit is barred by limitation. Absolutely no question of law is involved in this aspect and the concurrent findings of the trial Court cannot also be re-considered as it is well considered by both the Courts. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent cited two authorities before me to stress that so far as compromise decree is concerned, it is not necessary that the party should personally subscribe their signatures and the compromise memo signed by their counsel on their behalf would be sufficient to bind them also. The learned counsel cited the decision reported in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2234 to stress this aspect. The learned counsel also points out that the compromise decree has been passed as early as in 1981 and after passage of long time it cannot be re-opened. Of course in the instant case, I do not find any error in compromise decree but it would be useful to refer the view expressed by the Apex Court which is reflected in paragraph 43 of the decision cited supra wherein their Lordships of the Apex Court have held, "A judgment by consent is intended to stop litigation between the parties just as much as a judgment resulting from a decision of a Court at the end of a long drawn out fight. A compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment." 9. The next point raised by the appellants are that the minor defendants in O.S. No.55 of 1973 were not effectively represented by the legal guardian and therefore the decree is void. I could not subscribe my assent to the point raised because if at all there is any illegality or irregularity regarding passing of a compromise decree on the ground that there was some disability for the minors to enter into the compromise, it is only for the minors or erstwhile minors to question the decree and not for the third party. The appellants herein are the second wife and daughter of Late Mohammed Salihoo. The minors and the erstwhile minors are the children of Mohammed Salihoo through the first wife Hazeranan Beevi. The appellants herein are the second wife and daughter of Late Mohammed Salihoo. The minors and the erstwhile minors are the children of Mohammed Salihoo through the first wife Hazeranan Beevi. Records would show that Hazeranan Beevi had filed a memo which is marked as a document before the trial Court to permit her to enter into compromise for and on behalf of the minors. The learned trial Judge has endorsed in the memo that the compromise is only for the benefit of the minors and they had also accorded permission. Ex.B-3 is the certified copy of the petition and orders passed in the permission petition filed by Hazeranan Beevi. Of course the parties are Muslims. The legal guardians of Muslim minors are their father and in the absence of father, the paternal grand father and in his absence the paternal uncles. There is nothing to show that at the time when O.S. No.55 of 1973 was filed, the paternal grand father of the minors was alive. Maternal grand father was dead and the paternal uncle happened to be the adversary in that he was the plaintiff who has filed the suit against the minors and therefore he cannot act as a guardian for the minors when he had adverse interest. In Kumara Kangaya Gounder v. Arumugha Gounder and others, (1970)1 M.L.J. 286 , M.Natesan, J. has considered this aspect as to who can act as guardian ad litem for the minor. In that decision, the learned Judge has indicated the essential requirements of a guardian and how a guardian be treated, as under: "The essential requirements are that the person who is appointed as guardian must be a major of sound mind and must have no interest adverse to that of the minor. The rules under O.32 of the Code clearly contemplate the appointment of a person, other than the natural guardian, also as guardian ad litem. When once a guardian ad litem has been appointed for a minor defendant and the interest of the minor has been duly looked after in the litigation, mere irregularity in the appointment of the guardian without more, will not render the proceedings nugatory." 10. When once a guardian ad litem has been appointed for a minor defendant and the interest of the minor has been duly looked after in the litigation, mere irregularity in the appointment of the guardian without more, will not render the proceedings nugatory." 10. The learned Judge has also expressed the view that there is nothing in the provisions of O.32, Code of Civil Procedure making it mandatory on the Court to appoint the natural guardian; if necessary any other person may be appointed as a guardian ad litem for the purpose of the suit. 11. Coming to the facts of the instant case when the natural guardians are not available, naturally the mother steps into the shoes of the natural guardian and she was also recognised by the trial Court both in O.S. No.55 of 1973 and also in the instant suit as guardian ad litem as she had no adverse interest against the interest of the minors. In fact in O.S. No.55 of 1973, the mother was permitted to act as guardian by the Court and it cannot be stated that there is any error in appointment of the said guardian. If at all the appointment can be questioned, it can be questioned only by the minors and no other person has any locus standi to question the compromise which has already passed into the decree of the Court. Even the second point raised by the appellant has to be answered in negative. In that view of the matter, I hold that the appeal fails and accordingly the appeal is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment of the first appellate Court with costs of the respondents.