ORDER S.P. Khare, J. This is a revision by the non-applicant u/s 23E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') challenging the order by which she has been directed to deliver possession of the suit accommodation to the applicant on his application u/s 23A of the Act. Non-applicant Smt. Nirmala Chhabra is tenant of the applicant in Shop No. 3 of House No. 24, Malviya Nagar, Bhopal. This shop was let out to her in the year 1967. According to the applicant he requires the suit accommodation for carrying on the business by his son Anil Tiwari. The other six shops belonging to the applicant are not vacant. One shop was let out to Khadi Gramodyog in the year 1985-86. One shop is in possession of the applicant's son Vinod Tiwari in which he is carrying on the business of electrical goods. The applicant's son Anil Tiwari has passed M.A. and M. Sc. and he is unemployed. He wants to start the business of General Stores in the suit accommodation. The applicant is a retired Government servant and, therefore, he can file the application u/s 23-A of the Act. The non-applicant has denied that the applicant's alleged need is bona fide. It is pointed out that in case the applicant genuinely required the suit accommodation for the business of his son Anil Tiwari he would not have let out the shop to Khadi Gramodyog in the year 1985-86. The present application has been filed in the year 1993. The Rent Controlling Authority by the impugned order held that the applicant requires the suit accommodation bona fide for the business of General Stores for his son Anil Tiwari and he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city. On this finding the non-applicant has been directed to deliver the possession of the shop to the applicant. In this revision it has been argued that it is not proved that the applicant's requirement is bona fide and that the non-applicant was not given proper opportunity to contest the application of the applicant. As already stated, the application u/s 23-A of the Act was filed in the year 1993 and, therefore, the fact that one of the shops owned by the applicant was let out to Khadi Gramodyog in the year 1985-86 is not very relevant. As already stated, the application u/s 23-A of the Act was filed in the year 1993 and, therefore, the fact that one of the shops owned by the applicant was let out to Khadi Gramodyog in the year 1985-86 is not very relevant. At that time Anil Tiwari was a student. He was a minor. Therefore at that time he could not carry on the business of General Stores. The need of the suit accommodation for Anil Tiwari was felt in the year 1993 after he completed his education and he could not get any employment. He is a young man and if he wants to do the business of General Stores in the suit accommodation there is nothing unreasonable in the predilection shown by him. It is not disputed that the applicant has no other vacant shop to make it available to his son Anil Tiwari for his business of General Stores. Therefore, the need of the applicant's son Anil Tiwari is so patent that it does not require much of evidence. Four witnesses have been examined on behalf of the applicant. L.N. Tiwari (P.W. 1) has deposed that he was a Headmaster in a Government Middle School and he has retired on 31-12-1992. That is not disputed by the non-applicant. Therefore, the applicant comes within the category of the 'landlords' given in Section 23-J of the Act. He has further deposed that the suit accommodation was let out to the non-applicant in the year 1967 and at that time his son Anil Tiwari was aged 2 years. He has now done M.A. and M. Sc. He is unemployed and, therefore, he wants to start the business of General Stores. Anil Tiwari (P.W. 2) has deposed that he wants to start the business of General Stores. According to him, the money for starting this business would be provided by his father. Vinod Tiwari (P.W. 3) has deposed that he is carrying on the business of electrical goods in one of the shops of his father. R.S. Singh (P.W. 4) has stated that he is an employee of Khadi Gramodoyog. One of the shops of the applicant has been taken on rent by Khadi Gramodyog. These witnesses have been cross-examined on behalf of the non-applicant. A perusal of their cross-examination shows that it is of rambling nature. R.S. Singh (P.W. 4) has stated that he is an employee of Khadi Gramodoyog. One of the shops of the applicant has been taken on rent by Khadi Gramodyog. These witnesses have been cross-examined on behalf of the non-applicant. A perusal of their cross-examination shows that it is of rambling nature. The short point was whether the applicant bona fide requires the suit accommodation for the business of his son, but all types of questions have been permitted in the cross-examination of these witnesses. The evidence of the applicant was over in the year 1994. Thereafter the applicant was further cross-examined on 14-3-1997. The non-applicant has also examined one witness. After appreciation of the evidence of these witnesses the Rent Controlling Authority has recorded the finding that the need of the applicant's major son is bona fide. That finding cannot be said to be perverse or unreasonable. It is not open to interference in this revision. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has concentrated more on this aspect that the non-applicant was not given an opportunity to adduce her evidence. The case remained pending before the Rent Controlling Authority for six years. The applicant had closed his evidence in the year 1994. A perusal of the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority shows that the non-applicant was making various applications one after the other simply to prolong the trial of the case. It has been observed by the Rent Controlling Authority in para 4 of the impugned order that the non-applicant was given several opportunities to adduce her evidence but she did not examine herself or any other witness and kept on making applications one after the other. The R.C.A. has observed that 30 such applications were made during the period of four years. This was in spite of the fact that by orders dated 14-8-1996 and 9-10-1996 this Court had directed the R.C.A. to conclude the hearing of this case within two months and pass the order. This order had no effect on the non-applicant. Section 23-A makes a special provision for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement in respect of residential as well as nonresidential accommodations. This order had no effect on the non-applicant. Section 23-A makes a special provision for eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement in respect of residential as well as nonresidential accommodations. Clauses (a) and (b) therein lay down the grounds for eviction on the basis of the landlord's bona fide need in the same manner in which it is provided in Clauses (e) and (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, but it applies to certain categories of landlords which are mentioned in Section 23-J of the Act. It also provides a new forum of the Rent Controlling Authority in place of the Civil Court for passing an order of eviction on these grounds. Section 23-D specifically provides that the R.C.A. shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable and decide the same, as far as may be, within six months of the order of granting of leave to the tenant to contest the application. The practice and procedure of a Small Causes Court for recording the evidence is to be followed in the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority in such matters. The hearing is to be from day to day. Section 23-D(3) further provides for in respect of an application by a landlord it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, the requirement by the landlord with reference to Clause (a) or Clause (b) as the case may be of Section 23-A is bona fide. Thus there is a legislative mandate to decide the application u/s 23-A of Act as early as possible within six months of the filing of such application. That apart there were two orders of this Court dated 14-8-1996 and 9-10-1996 directing the R.C.A. to decide the application within two months. Even in such a situation if the non-applicant does not adduce her evidence she should thank herself. That apart there were two orders of this Court dated 14-8-1996 and 9-10-1996 directing the R.C.A. to decide the application within two months. Even in such a situation if the non-applicant does not adduce her evidence she should thank herself. It appears that in face of the solid and irrefutable evidence of the applicant and the circumstances pointed out by him in his evidence, the non-applicant was left with no defence to rebut the bona fide requirement of the applicant and, therefore, the non-applicant started adopting the delaying tactics and in her efforts to gain time she made as many as 30 applications to prolong the trial of the case during the period of 4 years but she did not enter into the witness box to give her evidence. This was to say the least an abuse of the judicial procedure and it can not be countenanced. The non-applicant cannot make a grievance that she has not been given an opportunity to adduce her evidence. In fact she was given more than reasonable opportunity to give her evidence but she did not deliberately avail of that opportunity. The order of the Rent Controlling Authority is factually and legally correct. The revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed