Judgment : 1. The unsuccessful defendants 2 to 4 in O.S.No.118 of 1988, the unsuccessful D-2 and D-3 in O.S.No.500 of 1988 and the unsuccessful plaintiffs in O.S.No.138 of 1996 on the file of the Additional District Munsif No. Thiruvannamalai, preferred A.S.No.94 of 1998, A.S.No.95 of 1998 and A.S.No.93 of 1998 respectively and all the three appeals were dismissed on 25.3.1999 confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court and aggrieved against this, they have come forward with the present second appeals. 2. Thecase in brief for disposal of all the appeals is as follows: The plaintiffs in O.S.No. 118 of 1998 filed a suit for declaration of title and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their men from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The Schedule mentioned property originally belonged to D-l. The adjoined house on the eastern side bearing door No. 13-A originally constituted one single house bearing door No. 13. D-l had 2 sons namely Kuppusamy and Subramani (D-2). The 1st plaintiff is the legally wedded wife of Kuppusamy and the plaintiffs 2 to 5 were born to them out of the wedlock. Even during the lifetime of Kuppusamy and Subramani, there was family arrangement since Kuppusamy married the first plaintiff belonging to a different community. The house property was divided into 2 equal shares and the eastern half to the 2nd defendant and they were also put in possession of their respective shares and in fact a partition wall was also put up in 1981. Subsequently, the assessment of the property for the western half bearing door No.l2-A was assessed in the name of Kuppusamy and the eastern half bearing door No. 13 was assessed in the name of D-2. Similarly, separate demand notices were sent for electricity as well as water charges. D-l was cordially living with each one of his sons and daughters. Kuppusamy died interstate on 2.2.1985 and on his death the plaintiffs succeeded to the property detailed in the schedule. D-l started taking hostile attitude towards the plaintiffs after the death of Kuppusamy. D-2 instigated D-l to execute a settlement deed in favour of his minor children D-3 and D-4 and accordingly D-l who had no manner of right, interest or title over the suit property executed a settlement deed in favour of D-3 and D-4 and it is not valid and binding. D-2 instigated D-l to execute a settlement deed in favour of his minor children D-3 and D-4 and accordingly D-l who had no manner of right, interest or title over the suit property executed a settlement deed in favour of D-3 and D-4 and it is not valid and binding. The defendants are openly asserting that the plaintiffs have no title in the property and hence, the suit was filed. 3. The defendants resisted the suit and disputed the family arrangement. The relationship of D-1 with his sons are admitted. There was no valid marriage between the first plaintiff and Kuppusamy and as such she is not the legally wedded wife. The suit property is the separated and self-acquired property of D-l and his sons had no right. D-l never divided the house property into 2 halves and did not allot any property either to Kuppusamy or to D-2. He also did not part with the possession of the property. D-l has been separately living in the house till 1981 and his son was living in a different house. Similarly, D-2 was employed outside as the house became dilapidated, D-l wanted to effect repairs and at that time Kuppusamy approached D-1 that he would supervise the repair work and accordingly he was permitted to look after the repairs. In the mean time, D-l became sick and got himself admitted in the Government Hospital, Madras for a period of 4 months and after repair Kuppusamy wanted to occupy the house as a tenant and taking pity on him, D-1 permitted him to occupy a portion of the house on a monthly rent of Rs.100. Taking advantage of this, it appears that Kuppusamy had changed the Municipal Registry in his name as well as the water taxes. The electricity service still stand in the name of D-l. D-l subsequently settled the suit property and other properties in favour of his grandsons D-3 and D-4 and registered a settlement deed on 27.11.1987 and put D-2 in possession of the same. D-l had also accepted the settlement deed on behalf of the minors and took possession of the properties. Hence, the suit property belong to D-2 and D-4 and the settlement deed is valid and binding on the plaintiffs also. 4. D-l had also accepted the settlement deed on behalf of the minors and took possession of the properties. Hence, the suit property belong to D-2 and D-4 and the settlement deed is valid and binding on the plaintiffs also. 4. D-1 died during the pendency of the suit on 13.9.1996 and in view of the settlement deed, the plaintiffs are not the legal heirs and D-3 and D-4 are already on record. In pursuance of the settlement deed only, the Municipal tax was transferred in the name of D-2 on behalf of D-3 and D-4 by the Municipality in its order dated 23.2.1997. He has been paying the property tax and as such the suit filed by the plaintiffs ought to be dismissed. 5. The plaintiffs also filed O.S.No.500 of 1983 for altering the entry in the property tax register maintained by Thiruvannamalai Municipality in respect of Door No.l3-A, Vettavalam Road, Thiruvannamalai in the name of the plaintiffs after cancelling the present entry in the said register. The plaintiffs have reiterated the very same averments raised by them in the previous suit and as such it is not necessary to reproduce the said averments. Thiruvannamalai Municipality had not issued any notice to the plaintiffs before effecting transfer the assessment and no enquiry was conducted. The plaintiffs sent a legal notice dated 11.4.1988 calling upon the Municipality to change the assessment in the name of the plaintiffs or in the alternative to hold an enquiry giving an opportunity to the plaintiffs to substantiate their claim. 6. The Municipality filed a statement contending that they are prepared to transfer the assessment if and when an order is passed by this Court. The other defendants raised the very same contentions raised by them in the earlier suit and as such it is not necessary to reproduce the same. 7. Thedefendants 2 and 3 in O.S.No.118 of 1988 filed a separate suit in O.S.No.138 of 1996 for a declaration that they have got title to the suit property and also for recovery of possession. The plaintiffs in O.S.No. 118 of 1988 are the defendants in O.S.No. 138 of 1996. Since the parties in O.S.No. 138 of 1996 have raised the very same averments raised by them in O.S.No. 118 of 1988, it is unnecessary to reproduce the same. 8. The plaintiffs in O.S.No. 118 of 1988 are the defendants in O.S.No. 138 of 1996. Since the parties in O.S.No. 138 of 1996 have raised the very same averments raised by them in O.S.No. 118 of 1988, it is unnecessary to reproduce the same. 8. Thetrial Court framed separate issue in such suit and the oral and documentary evidence were recorded in O.S.No.118 of 1988 and it was treated as evidence in the order two suits. The plaintiffs examined as P.W.I and P.W.2 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-57 and on the side of the defendants D.W.I and D.W.2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-53 were marked. On the basis of the evidence and the documents, the trial Court decreed O.S.No.118 of 1988 and O.S.No.500 of 1988 and dismissed O.S.No.138 of 1996. Aggrieved against this, the defendants in first two suits, who are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.138 of 1996 preferred three separate appeals before the District Court, Thiruvannamalai and the learned District Judge, after hearing the parties and on the basis of the documents, dismissed all the three appeals and aggrieved against this, the aforesaid 3 second appeals are preferred by the aggrieved defendants in the first 2 suits and the plaintiffs in O.S.No.138 of 1996. 9. The disputes involved between the parties relate to same subject matter and the parties are also one and the same and as such a common judgment is pronounced in the second appeals, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as they are described in O.S.No.118 of 1988 to avoid confusion. 10. The appellants have raised the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether in law have not the Courts below failed to see that a marriage between a Christian and Hindu is no marriage in the eye of law and Secs.4 and 5 of Christian Marriage Act contemplate solemnisation of marriage and not written contract. (ii) Whether in law have not the Courts below overlooked that even assuming that the plaintiffs in O.S .No. 118 of 1988 are legal heirs of the deceased Kuppusamy they are disqualified from inheriting the property vide Secs.26 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act? (iii) Whether in law have not Courts below erred in believing the oral family arrangement instead of registered settlement deed? (iv) Whether in law after finding that the settlement is true, are the Courts below right in ignoring the same? (iii) Whether in law have not Courts below erred in believing the oral family arrangement instead of registered settlement deed? (iv) Whether in law after finding that the settlement is true, are the Courts below right in ignoring the same? (v) Whether in law are not the Courts below wrong in ordering change of assessment when the plaintiffs in O.S.No.1 18 of 1988 are not entitled to any relief. (vi) Whether in law have not Courts below entitled to see that the plaintiffs in O.S.No.138 of 1996 have established their title? 11. The points that arise for consideration in all the second appeal are: (i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of title and for consequential permanent injunction relating to the suit property? (ii) Whether the family arrangement pleaded by the plaintiffs is true? (iii) Whether the Thiruvannamalai Municipality had arbitrarily changed the assessment in respect of door No. 13A in favour of D-l without complying the procedure? (iv) Whether D-l had any right to execute the settlement deed dated 27.11.1987 and whether it is valid and binding on the plaintiff? (v) Whether D-2 and D-3 are entitled to the relief of declaration as well as recovery of possession of the property? (vi) Whether the first plaintiff is the legally wedded wife of Kup-pusamy and whether the plaintiffs have got right in the property? (vii) To what relief? 12. Points: There is no dispute that the property originally belonged to D-l and he had 2 sons namely Kuppusamy and Subramaniam. It is the case of the plaintiffs that even during life time of D-l, Kuppusamy married the first plaintiff belonging to Christian Community and in 1981, there was a family arrangement by which the properties were divided into 2 halves and the western half was given to Kuppusamy and the eastern half was given to the 2nd defendant. Thereafter, both of them have applied for transfer of assessment and accordingly door No. 13-A was assessed in the name of D-2. Accordingly, they were paying the property tax as well as water charges separately. The plaintiffs 2 to 5 are children born to Kuppusamy through the 1st plaintiff. The said Kuppusamy died on 2.2.1985. Even thereafter the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property. Accordingly, they were paying the property tax as well as water charges separately. The plaintiffs 2 to 5 are children born to Kuppusamy through the 1st plaintiff. The said Kuppusamy died on 2.2.1985. Even thereafter the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property. After the demise of Kuppusamy D-2 using influence on D-1 had obtained a settlement deed in respect of the suit property in favour of D-3 and D-4 on 27.11.1987. It appears that by virtue of the settlement deed, the assessment for the property was also transferred in the name of D-2 without any notice to the plaintiffs or without any enquiry. Since the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property they have sought for declaration of the title as well as consequential permanent injunction and also sought a direction to Thiruvannamalai Municipality to transfer the assessment in relation to the suit property in their name or give a direction to hold an enquiry relating to the manner and circumstance in which the assessment was transferred and suitable orders can be passed subsequently. 13. Per contra, the defendants disputed the family arrangement pleaded by the plaintiffs in 1981 and also the division of the properties into 2 halves. They also disputed the validity of the marriage of the first plaintiff with Kuppusamy since the first plaintiff belongs to Christian Community, her children plaintiffs 2 to 5 are not entitled to inherit, the properties under the Hindu Succession Act. The property was the self-acquired property by D-1 and he has got every right to execute the settlement deed and accordingly he executed the same in favour of his grand sons namely D-3 and D-4 and their father D-2 took possession also. They further contended that D-1 wanted to effect repairs to the family house and at that time Kuppusamy promised to look after the repairs and as D-1 was not keeping good health, he was admitted in the General hospital, Chennai for a period of four months. After the repairs, Kuppusamy wanted to reside in the property on a monthly rent of Rs. After the repairs, Kuppusamy wanted to reside in the property on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 and the assessment of the property stood only in the name of D-l. After the execution of the settlement deed on 27.11.1987 since the plaintiffs have neither paid the rent nor vacated the premises D-2 and D-3 were constrained to file a suit in O.S.No. 138 of 1996 for declaration of their title based on the settlement deed and also for recovery of possession of the property from the plaintiffs. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that there was no valid marriage between the deceased Kuppusamy and the first plaintiff and as such the plaintiffs 2 to 5 are also not entitled to inherit any share in the property. The burden is only upon the plaintiff to show that there was a valid marriage and as a result of that marriage only, the plaintiffs 2 to 5 were born out of the said wedlock. In order to prove the marriage, P.W.2 was examined and according to him, the marriage between the deceased Kuppusamy and the first plaintiff took place in the house of D-1 and the marriage was performed according to Hindu Form of Marriage. P.W.2 is aged about 70 years and therefore, both the Courts below came to the conclusion that there is a possibility for him to witness the said marriage. The learned counsel for the appellants raised on Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh , 1994 (1) L. W. 38, wherein it was held that mere distribution of sugar or gur would not constitute a valid marriage. Mere living as husband and wife does not confer status of wife and husband. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents drew the attention of the Court to Page 53 N.R.Raghavachariar’s Hindu Law, wherein it is stated that it has been recognised that a marriage between a Hindu and a non-Hindu under Hindu rites may not be open to objection under Hindu Law. The Court always presume in favour of the legality of the marriage, where it has been shown to have been performed, and apply the rules of justice, equity and good conscience in cases of marriage between persons belonging to differe nt religions. 16. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied on Pathima Sultan Ammal v. S.Hameed Oli , 1998 (3) LW. 16. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied on Pathima Sultan Ammal v. S.Hameed Oli , 1998 (3) LW. 314 at 323, wherein it was held that the mere fact that there was no form of marriage gone through would not by any stretch of imagination disprove the factum of marriage. In view of the aforesaid position of law and based on the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiffs, both the Courts below came to the conclusion that there was a valid marriage between the deceased Kuppusamy and the first plaintiff. 17. The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon Sec.5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, but it has no application for the simple reason that if a marriage is solemnised between any 2 Hindus, then only Sec.5 will be attracted. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied on Secs.26 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act. Secs.26 and 27 read as follows: “Section 26: Where before or after the commencement of this Act, a Hindu has ceased or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion, children born to him or her after such conversion and their descendants shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of any of their Hindu relatives, unless such children or descendant are Hindus at the time when the succession opens”. Section 27: If any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under the Act, it shall devolve as if such person had died before the interstate.” 18. A careful reading of Sec.26 would only establish that a Hindu ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion the children born to him or her after such conversion shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of any of their Hindu relatives. It does not mean that the plaintiffs 2 to 5 are not entitled to inherit the property of their father and as such Sec.26 has no application and under the circumstances, when the Sec.26 is not applicable, automatically Sec.27 also cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. I am of the view that there is no force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants. 19. I am of the view that there is no force in the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants. 19. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied on Commissioner of Wealth tax, Madras v. Late R.Sridharan , 1976 (4) S.C.C. 489 , wherein it is observed that under the codifying Acts namely the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the orthodox concept of the term ‘Hindu’ has undergone a radical change and it has been given an extended meaning. These Acts apply not only to Hindus by birth or religion i.e., converts to Hinduism, but also to a large number of other persons. Any child, legitimate or illegitimate one of whose parents is a Hindu by religion and who is brought up as a Hindu is a Hindu. Hence legitimate children of a Hindu father by a Christian mother who are brought up as Hindus would be governed by Hindu Law. There is no dispute about this principle. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied on Muthuswami Mudaliar v. Masilamani , 20 M.L.J. 49:1.L.R. 33 Mad 342, that a marriage contracted according to Hindu rites by a Hindu with a Christian woman who before marriage, is converted to Hinduism is valid when such marriages are common among and recognised as valid by the custom of the caste to which the man belongs, although such marriage may not be in strict accordance with orthodox Hindu religion. Where a caste accepts a marriage as valid and treats the parties thereto as members of the caste, the Court will not declare such a marriage null and void. This decision is applicable to the case on hand. 21. Reliance is also placed on Kemmechy Sigamani v. Kimuba Gnanaseedi Prema , 2000 (1) L.W.878, wherein it is stated that decree passed and affirmed on appeal as to marriage of 1st plaintiff with 1st defendant and that 2nd plaintiff was born on that marriage. Mere existence of substantial question of law does not follow that there should be interference in second appeal if the interference with amount to miscarriage of justice and concealment of truth. Mere existence of substantial question of law does not follow that there should be interference in second appeal if the interference with amount to miscarriage of justice and concealment of truth. This decision is also applicable to the case on hand for the simple reason that both the Courts below based on the evidence and documents came to the conclusion that there was a valid marriage between them. 22. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the family arrangement pleaded by the plaintiffs could not be true. It has been categorically stated by the plaintiffs that family arrangement took place in 1981, by which the western half was allotted to the deceased Kuppusamy and the eastern half was allotted to D-2. By virtue of this, the property tax has been transferred so far as the suit property is concerned in the name of Kuppusamy and in respect of other property at door No. 13, it was transferred in the name of D-2. No doubt mere transfer of assessment of mutation of names will not cover any title to the respective parties. But, I am of the view that it is a vital circumstance to consider and probabilise the case of the plaintiffs. If the assessment had been transferred only in the name of the deceased Kuppusamy, then it may not have much force. But, now admitted for door No.l3-A the assessment of tax as well as water charges were transferred in the name of the deceased Kuppusamy and for door No. 13 it was transferred in the name of D-2, thereby establishing that only because of the family arrangement, both of them could have applied to the public authorities and the assessment has been accordingly transferred. For the purpose of proving the alleged family arrangement, P.W.2 and P. W.3 were examined and they stated about the said arrangement. P.W.3 is a close relation of the defendants and both the Courts below did not find any reason to discard that testimony. Exs.A-1 to A-8 and Exs.A-31 to A-32 are the house tax receipts and demand notices standing in the name of the deceased Kuppusamy right from the year 1983. Similarly Ex.A-9 to Ex.A-14 are the water tax receipts standing in the name of the deceased Kuppusamy from 1983. Exs.A-1 to A-8 and Exs.A-31 to A-32 are the house tax receipts and demand notices standing in the name of the deceased Kuppusamy right from the year 1983. Similarly Ex.A-9 to Ex.A-14 are the water tax receipts standing in the name of the deceased Kuppusamy from 1983. Likewise Ex.B-9 to B-18 are the property tax receipts standing in the name of D-2 since 1983 and Ex.B-19 and B-20 are the water tax receipts and Ex.B-11 to B-33 are the property tax receipts and demand notices standing in the name of D-2 right from 1983. In view of the overwhelming documentary evidence, it is clearly established that there was a family arrangement as early as 1981. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents also relied on Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 807, wherein it was observed that Courts lean strongly in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in family and do justice to its various member and also relied on S. Shanmughan Pillai v. K.Shanmugham Pillai , A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2069, that in order to maintain peace after bringing about harmony in a family such a family arrangement can be effected. 24. The learned counsel for the appellants drew the attention of the Court to page 331 -Hindu Law by S.V.Gupta, wherein it is stated that a person who has ceased to be a Hindu cannot possibly remain within the family. Merely because Kuppusamy had become a Christian prior to family arrangement, it cannot be said that there was any disruption of the status of Kuppusamy as the son of D-l. 25. Reliance is also placed on Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation , A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 807 and according to para 17, it is stated that the word ‘family’ in the context of family arrangement is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession of having a claim to a share in the property of dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangement. 26. It has been held in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation , A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 807, that the family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangement. 26. It has been held in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation , A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 807, that the family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary. The registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Even if the family arrangements was not registered it could be used for a collateral purpose, namely for the purpose of showing the nature and character of possession of the parties in pursuance of the family settlement. 27. It is therefore evidently clear from the afore-said decisions as well as the family arrangement proved by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were rightly granted the relief of declaration in relation to the suit property and the defendants have no right whatsoever to interfere in the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs. However, learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the assessment for the property had been subsequently changed after 1977 in the name of D-2 by Thiruvannamalai Municipality without any notice or without conducting any enquiry and as such it has to be cancelled and transferred in the name of the plaintiffs. It is necessary to state that after the family arrangements in 1991 there was transfer of assessment. Not only the property tax but also the water tax documents have been filed on either side to prove the same and it has not been explained by the defendants in respect of the documents standing in their names separately. But, D-2 some how managed to get a settlement deed from D-1 in favour of D-3 and D-l In November, 1997. It is only when D-l has got valid right, title and interest in the property, then alone he can convey the property. There was already a family arrangement between the parties, by which the deceased Kuppusamy and D-2 were enjoying the properties separately and the assessment has also been transferred in their respective names. When this being the position for a year long time, I am of the view that D-l has no right whatsoever to convey the property by way of settlement in the name of his grandson i.e., D-3 and D-l, sons of D-2. When this being the position for a year long time, I am of the view that D-l has no right whatsoever to convey the property by way of settlement in the name of his grandson i.e., D-3 and D-l, sons of D-2. The defendants came forward with a claim as if the deceased Kuppusamy was put in possession of the property as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 but there is no scrap of paper to support the same. When the plaintiffs have established that they have got absolute right and interest in the property, the house tax and other assessments should be transferred only in the name of the plaintiffs, who are the legal heirs of the deceased Kuppusamy. The Municipality has not filed any record to show that any notice was issued to the plaintiffs prior to alteration of the entries and under the circumstances both the Courts below rightly held that the Municipality is bound to make necessary entry in the property tax register in respect of the suit property in the name of the plaintiffs after cancelling the present entry and rightly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.500 of 1988 and there is no reason to interfere in the same. 28. The defendants 2 and 3 filed a separate suit in O.S.No.138 of 1996 claiming the relief of declaration relating to the suit property and also for recovery of possession of the property from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs already filed a suit in O.S.No.118 of 1988 for declaration of title relating to the property and this being so there was no necessity for D-2 and D-3 to file a separate suit. However, for getting recovery of possession, it appears that D-2 and D-3 have filed a separate suit. Both the Courts below concurrently gave finding that there was a family arrangement in 1981 and by which the deceased Kuppusamy was allotted the suit property and they continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the same. This being so D-l had no right whatsoever to execute any settlement deed relating to the very same property in 1987. It is only when D-2 and D-3 are able to establish that there was no family arrangement, then only the settlement deed can be acted upon. No doubt one of the attestors to the settlement deed has been examined. This being so D-l had no right whatsoever to execute any settlement deed relating to the very same property in 1987. It is only when D-2 and D-3 are able to establish that there was no family arrangement, then only the settlement deed can be acted upon. No doubt one of the attestors to the settlement deed has been examined. But, only when D-l had any right in the property, then alone he can execute the settlement deed. When the Courts came to the conclusion that D-l had no right and title in the property, the settlement deed dated 27.11.1987 is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs. Hence, Ex.B-41 will not confer any right on D-2 and D-3. Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the evidence as well as the documents in the proper perspective. There is no illegality or infirmity in the judgments of the Courts below calling for interference. Both on facts and law, both the Courts below have rightly considered the matter. I find no reason to interfere in any of the findings. The points are answered accordingly. 29. For the reasons stated above, all the second appeals fail and accordingly are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.Ps. are also dismissed.