Judgment S.K.Katriar, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court has been preferred against the order dated July 20, 2000, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 10919 of 1999 (Braj Kishore Singh V/s. State of Bihar 2000 (4) Pat. LJR 411), whereby the order dated October 30, 1998 (Annexure 6) dismissing the petitioner from services of the Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), and the order dated September 29, 1999 (Annexure 7) of the appellate authority, have been set aside, and the writ petitioner has been directed to be reinstated with entire arrears of salary within three months. The annexure numbers stated herein are those stated in the writ petition. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a shift guard in the services of the Board on July 24, 1978. Raid was conducted in the official quarter No. EF/13, allotted and in possession of respondent No. 1 herein, in his presence along with one Surendra Singh, and arms and ammunitions were recovered. Properties snatched in dacoity in a house and other incriminating materials were also recovered. FIR was lodged against the petitioner and he was taken into custody. The Board placed him under suspension vide Office Order No. 57, with effect from March 14, 1985, which was later on revoked without prejudice to initiation of departmental proceeding. He was, however, acquitted by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur by judgment dated February 29, 1996 (Annexure 1), passed in Sessions Trial No. 57 of 1997 corresponding to Muzaffarpur Town PS Case No. 105/85. Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was initiated against him, vide Office Order No. 337, dated September 30, 1997. Sri Ram Jiwan Mehta was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who submitted his report dated August 18, 1998 (Annexure 3), wherein he held that the charges were not proved against the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer and issued show cause notice to respondent No. 1, vide Office Order No. 2652, dated June 23, 1998, as to why he be not discharged from the services assigning therein the reasons for disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the conclusion of the Enquiry Officer and issued show cause notice to respondent No. 1, vide Office Order No. 2652, dated June 23, 1998, as to why he be not discharged from the services assigning therein the reasons for disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Respondent No. 1 herein had show cause and on appropriate consideration the same was found to be unsatisfactory, and the aforesaid order dated September 30, 1998 (Annexure 6), was passed whereby he was discharged from the services of the Board and was disentitled from the salary for the period of suspension except the subsistence allowance. However, the period of suspension was treated to be period of duty. The petitioner preferred appeal before the Chairman of the Board who rejected the same by aforesaid order dated September 29, 1999 (Annexure 7). 3. Respondent No. 1 herein challenged the aforesaid orders dated September 30, 1998 (Annexure 6), and September 29, 1999 (Annexure 7), by preferring CWJC No. 10919 of 1999 which has been allowed. The orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority have been set aside, and he has been directed to be reinstated in service with entire arrears of salary together with all allowances from the date of suspension within a period of three months. The learned single Judge has held that proper procedure in cases of such disagreement on the part of the Disciplinary Authority with the findings of the enquiry report has not been followed, as has been indicated by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in Punjab National Bank V/s. Kunj Bihari Mishra AIR 1998 SC 2713 : 1998 (7) SCC 84 : 1998-II-LLJ-809. In other words, the Disciplinary Authority should have recorded its tentative reasons for such disagreement which ought to have been conveyed to the delinquent employee, afforded him opportunity to represent before him, and then record its findings. Not having afforded such an opportunity, the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the appellate authority are vitiated in law and, therefore, have been set aside. He has further held that in view of the fact that the delinquent employee is undergoing agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted in the criminal trial in February, 1996, it is inexpedient to direct a fresh departmental enquiry and to allow the same to go on any further. He has further held that in view of the fact that the delinquent employee is undergoing agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted in the criminal trial in February, 1996, it is inexpedient to direct a fresh departmental enquiry and to allow the same to go on any further. Hence the present appeal at the instance of the Board. 4. Learned counsel for the Board has submitted that law is well settled that a criminal case and a departmental proceeding on same or similar charges can go hand in hand. Therefore, in his submission, the learned single Judge should not have completely closed the matter, and should have instead remitted the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority to continue the proceeding in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has submitted that the learned single Judge has passed the impugned order exactly in tune with the Judgment of the Supreme Court M. Paul Anthony V/s. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 1416 : 1999 (3) SCC 679 : 1999-I-LU- 1094. 6. Having considered the rival submissions, we agree with the first part of the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge whereby he has held that the Disciplinary Authority did not follow the procedure prescribed in case of Punjab National Bank V/s. Kunj Bihari Mishra (supra). After the Disciplinary Authority found himself in disagreement with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, he should have recorded his tentative grounds of disagreement which ought to have conveyed to the delinquent employee and he ought to have been allowed to represent against those. In that view of the matter, we agree with this part of the impugned order, and hold that the orders dated October 30, 1998 (Annexure 6), passed by the Disciplinary Authority, and that of the appellate authority dated September 29, 1999 (Annexure 7), have been rightly set aside. 7. Passing on to the next aspect of the matter, we find ourselves in disagreement with the views of the learned single Judge. Law is well settled by a long line of cases of high authority that the nature of a criminal case is very different from those of a departmental proceeding, and an order of acquittal cannot therefore, conclude the departmental proceeding. Law is well settled by a long line of cases of high authority that the nature of a criminal case is very different from those of a departmental proceeding, and an order of acquittal cannot therefore, conclude the departmental proceeding. It was so held by a Bench of three Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court Nelson Motis V/s. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1984 : 1992 (4) SCC 711 : 1992- II-LLJ-744. It was, held that in the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices V/s. A. Gopalan AIR 1999 SC 1514 : 1997 (11) SCC 239 : 1999-I-LLJ-1313, that a departmental proceeding and a criminal trial can go on simultaneously on the same charges. Acquittal in a criminal trial on account of benefit of doubt is no bar to imposition of penalty in departmental proceeding. The Supreme Court has held in its judgment Paul Anthony V/s. Bharat Gold Mine Ltd. (supra) as follows in 1999-I-LLJ-1094 at p. 1100 : "22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceeding and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the chargesheet. (iv) The facts mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceeding but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (iv) The facts mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceeding but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest." Relying on the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (NAGENDRA RAI, J.) was a member, held that a departmental proceeding and a criminal proceeding can proceed concurrently on same set of facts as there is no legal bar in their continuance simultaneously. The standard of proof required in the two proceedings are quite different. Whereas the standard of proof required in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities, the charges in a criminal trial must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts. Whereas former is quasi-judicial in nature where the law of evidence is not applicable, the latter is a legal proceeding to be conducted strictly in conformity with the law laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act and other special laws governing the trial. It was also held by one of us (NAGENDRA RAI, J.) in the judgment Subhranshu Bhushan Singh V/s. State of Bihar 2000 (13) Pat LJR 39 that the fact that the delinquent employee was exonerated in departmental proceeding cannot be a ground for quashing the criminal prosecution on the same allegations. The mode of enquiry, standard of proof, and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are different in both the proceedings. It was further held that the ingredients of misconduct may be different from the ingredients of the offence alleged in the prosecution. It is thus manifest that it is settled law by decisions of high authority that a departmental proceeding and criminal trial can go on simultaneously with respect to the same allegations. Success of the delinquent employee in one cannot be a ground for dropping the other proceeding. It is thus manifest that it is settled law by decisions of high authority that a departmental proceeding and criminal trial can go on simultaneously with respect to the same allegations. Success of the delinquent employee in one cannot be a ground for dropping the other proceeding. 8 I must at this stage notice the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 M. Paul Anthony V/s. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (supra). That judgment proceeded on a different footing, namely, it was held by the Supreme Court therein that non-payment of subsistence allowance is violative of fundamental right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. On account of non-payment of subsistence allowance, the delinquent employee was reduced to state of penury as a result of which he was unable to undertake the journey to attend departmental proceeding which, therefore, stood vitiated. It was mainly in that background that a fresh departmental proceeding was not allowed to be initiated. In that view of the matter, the judgment of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 stood on a different footing and is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. No allegation whatsoever has been levelled in the present case that respondent No. 1 herein was not paid his subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. The same was lifted long time ago, in fact before the departmental proceeding commenced, and was in force for a short duration. Furthermore, the question of initiation of a fresh departmental proceeding does not arise in the present case. It shall now be taken up afresh from the stage of disagreement expressed by the disciplinary authority. We, therefore, express our disagreement with the views of the learned single Judge in so far as the second aspect of matter is concerned. 9. Consequently, the order dated October 30, 1998 (Annexure 6) passed by the disciplinary authority, and the order dated September 29, 1999 (Annexure 7) passed by the appellate authority are hereby set aside. However, with respect we disagree with the second part of the order recorded by the learned single Judge. 9. Consequently, the order dated October 30, 1998 (Annexure 6) passed by the disciplinary authority, and the order dated September 29, 1999 (Annexure 7) passed by the appellate authority are hereby set aside. However, with respect we disagree with the second part of the order recorded by the learned single Judge. We instead give liberty to the disciplinary authority to proceed in the matter in accordance with law from the stage of disagreement expressed by the disciplinary authority and shall proceed against respondent No. 1 herein, inter alia, in accordance with the procedure indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank V/s. Kunj Bihari Mishra (supra). 10. In the result, this appeal is allowed, and the Order dated July 20, 2000, passed by the learned single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 10919 of 1999 Braj Kishore Singh V/s. State of Bihar is modified in the aforesaid manner.