ORDER: These revisions have been filed by the accused in C.C. Nos.542 and 544 of 1999 on the file of XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, against the orders in the respective cases declining to discharge them of an offence under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, passed in Crl.M.P.Nos.889 and 888 of 1999. 2. Heard Thiru C. Rajagopalan for the petitioner. Though notice had been served on the respondent/ complainant, there is no representation on their behalf. However, in view of the petitioner being ready, I consider it necessary to hear him and it is only when this Court feels that the order is likely to be reversed, it is necessary to hear the respondent. In view of the above, I heard the learned counsel Mr.C. Rajagopalan. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that the complainant Arjun Amravathi Chit Funds (P) Ltd., Chennai-4 represented by its Managing Director, Mr.K. Radhakrishnan, had filed a complaint against the petitioners stating that A-1 is the partner of M/s. Sathyapriya Metals and A-2 is the firm M/s. Sathyapriya Metals represented by its partner A-1, were the customer to their clients and was the successful bidder to the auction amount. According to the terms and agreement they have to pay the monthly instalments as scheduled. But however, they did not pay the said instalments. After several attempts and demands the cheques had been issued on behalf of A-2 the firm signed by partner A-1 for various amounts, to the tune of Rs. 2,10,000. It may not be necessary to go into the facts of the case as they are not being disputed or challenged now. 4. Suffice it to state that the cheques in question were dishonoured on the ground of ‘insuffiency of funds’. The memo of “Exceeds Arrangements” was received on 13.5.1998 from the complainant’s Bank and a lawyer’s notice was issued on 19.5.1998 within 15 days contemplated under Act. The accused received the notice on 29.5.98. However, they did not pay the amount and hence the complaint has been filed after waiting for 15 days grace period to enable them to pay the money. Hence, the complaint. 5. It is against this complaint, the petitioner had filed a preliminary objection before the Court below, raising various grounds. The accused received the notice on 29.5.98. However, they did not pay the amount and hence the complaint has been filed after waiting for 15 days grace period to enable them to pay the money. Hence, the complaint. 5. It is against this complaint, the petitioner had filed a preliminary objection before the Court below, raising various grounds. The first ground according to the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when a partnership firm is an accused, as per Sec. 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the partnership firm should be the accused followed by the partners who are incharge of the business. Accordingly, his contention is that the second accused in the present case, which is a partnership firm should be shown as the first accused in the cause title and the accused shown in the cause title namely Pandi Selvam should be shown as the second accused in the complaint. I am unable to see the logic of this contention. 6. The order of the accused mentioned in the cause title in my opinion would by no stretch of imagination affect the prosecution case as such. As contemplated under Sec. 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the firm and the person who is incharge, namely Pandi Selvam, who is a signatory of the cheque had been made an accused and that would suffice for the purpose of taking cognizance. Whether the firm has been arrayed as A-1 or A-2 is immaterial. So long as the firm is an accused that itself would suffice for the purpose of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the same. In a criminal case, the Seriatim in which the respective accused figures, is immaterial. What the Courts are concerned, is the averment relating to the accused. If the averment discloses the commission of offence, it would suffice for cognizance being taken. Therefore, as far as the first argument namely that the cause title is not in consonance with law does not, in my opinion appear to be sound and reasonable. 7. What the Courts are concerned, is the averment relating to the accused. If the averment discloses the commission of offence, it would suffice for cognizance being taken. Therefore, as far as the first argument namely that the cause title is not in consonance with law does not, in my opinion appear to be sound and reasonable. 7. The second ground raised by the learned counsel is that the exact role played by the first accused has not been placed in the complaint; in other words, according to him as per Sec. 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, whenever a firm is an accused, the person incharge has to be made liable and in the present case, it has not been averred that A-1 is the person incharge of the firm. I am afraid that this argument also has to be discounted, for the following reason. May be in a case where there are several accused representing the firm, the exact role played by each of the accused has to be mentioned. But in the present case, there is only person who represents the firm and it has been averred in more than one place in the complaint that he, representing the firm had issued the cheques and signed the cheques. In addition to the same, a notice had also been issued to him alone and he has not replied for the same. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that he is the person authorised to operate accounts of the firm namely, Sathyapriya Metals. In such a case, merely because the exact words found in the Act namely that the accused is incharge of the day to day affairs has not been incorporated in the complaint would not in my opinion affect the case, when there are enough materials to show that he is the concerned person who has acted on behalf of the firm by issuing the cheques. However, in view of the presumption contemplated under Sec. 139 of the State Act, the accused may at the time of the trial rebut such presumption by showing that he is not the authorised person to issue cheques. Even in the said petition before this Court, the petitioner has not averred that he is not in charge of the firm or that he is not the person concerned to issue the cheque. Even in the said petition before this Court, the petitioner has not averred that he is not in charge of the firm or that he is not the person concerned to issue the cheque. In this connection, I would like to place reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in Rajneesh Agarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla, 2001 S.C.C. (Crl.) 229 at 233 as follows: Mere dishonour of a cheque would not raise to a cause of action unless the payee makes a demand in writing to the drawer of the cheque for the payment and the drawer fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee. The cheques had been issued by M/s. Bhalla Techtran Industries Limited, through its Director Shri Amit Bhalla. The appellant had issued notice to said Shri Amit J. Bhalla. Director of M/s. Bhalla Techtran Industries Limited. Notwithstanding the service of the notice, the amount in question was not paid. The object of issuing notice indicating the factum of dishonour of the cheques is to give an opportunity to the drawer to make the payment within 15 days, so that it will not be necessary for the payee to proceed against in any criminal action, even though the bank dishonoured the cheques. It is Amit Bhalla, who had signed the cheques as the Director of M/s. Bhalla Techtran industries Limited. When the notice was issued to said Shri Amit Bhalla, Director of M/ s. Bhalla Techtran Industries Limited, it was incumbent upon Shri Bhalla to see that the payments are made within the stipulated period of 15 days. It is not disputed (sic. alleged) that Shri Bhalla has not signed the cheques, nor is it disputed (sic. alleged) that Shri Bhalla was not the director of the company. Bearing in mind the object of issuance of such notice, it must be held that the notices cannot be construed in a narrow technical way without examining the substance of the matter. We really fail to understand as to why the judgment of this Court in Bilakchand Gyanchand Co. will have no application. In that case also criminal proceedings had been initiated against A. Chinnaswami, who was the Managing Director of the company and the cheques in question had been signed by him. We really fail to understand as to why the judgment of this Court in Bilakchand Gyanchand Co. will have no application. In that case also criminal proceedings had been initiated against A. Chinnaswami, who was the Managing Director of the company and the cheques in question had been signed by him. In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court committed error in recording a finding that there was no notice to the drawer of the cheque, as required under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In our opinion, after the cheques were dishonoured by the bank the payee had served due notice and yet there was failure on the part of the accused to pay the money, who had signed the cheques, as the Director of the company. The impugned order of the High Court, therefore is liable to be quashed. In view of the abovesaid decision, I have no hesitation to reject this argument. 8. The third contention is that the notice contemplated under the Act has not been issued to the firm as such, but has been issued only to the accused. I am afraid that this contention may not hold water, since the Supreme Court has now clearly laid down in Rajneesh Agarwal v. Amit J. Bhalla, 2001 S.C.C. (Crl.) 229 at 233, that the issuance of the notice cannot be construed in a narrow technical way without examining the substance of the matter. Therefore, when notice has been issued to the person representing the firm by issuing the cheque, it would be superfluous to issue a notice to the firm, which again would be placed only to the cheque issuing authority, namely A-1 in the present case. 9. The last contention raised by the learned counsel is that the complainant has claimed Advocate’s fees also in the complaint, which is contrary to the spirit of the law. I am afraid that such argument is not only devoid of merits, but on the other hand goes against the very principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Needless to say that the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the provisions contemplated under Sec. 357 of Crl.P.C. should be freely applied. I am afraid that such argument is not only devoid of merits, but on the other hand goes against the very principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Needless to say that the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the provisions contemplated under Sec. 357 of Crl.P.C. should be freely applied. A reading of Sec.357 makes it abundantly clear that the Court, while passing judgment, order compensation to be given to the complainant, who has suffered a loss or injury by reason of the act or in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution. Therefore, the lawyers fees comes under one such category of expenses properly incurred in the prosecution and consequently, it is not illegal for the complainant to ask for the same. Even otherwise, just because the complainant has referred or asked for a consequential order, which may in the eye of law, does not have any sanction, the Court is only bound to reject it at the end of the trial. But that does not in any way make the complaint itself an illegal one, thereby requiring it to be quashed. 10. On going through the order of the learned Magistrate, I see that the learned Magistrate has only observed that all the points raised by the petitioner can be agitated during the course of the trial, and there does not appear to be any illegality which calls for an interference by the Court sitting in the revisional jurisdiction. 11. In the above said circumstances, I hold that the prosecution is perfectly valid in law and consequently, both the revisions are dismissed. Consequently, connected Crl.M.Ps. are closed.