JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. (Oral) - Haryana Financial Corporation is the petitioner. It prays that the orders dated May 15, 1997 and August 22, 1997, passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, be quashed. Copies of these orders have been produced on record as Annexures P6 and P7, respectively. 2. Vide order dated May 15, 1997 the Tribunal had decided the petitioners application. In this application it was prayed by the petitioner that the auction of the plant, machinery and building of respondent No. 5 (M/s. B.G. Finance & Industries Limited) be stayed and that the Corporation be given permission to conduct auction. In the alternative it was prayed that the outstanding due to the Financial Corporation shall be the first charge on the auction money. The matter was considered by the Tribunal. It was held that the Corporation had the first charge over the property mentioned at serial No. 1. So far as the prayer for allowing the Corporation to sell the property through the Collector, Sirsa, under the provisions of Haryana Public Money (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1979, is concerned, the prayer was declined. The auctioneer was directed to sell the property. In pursuance to the above-mentioned order passed by the Tribunal, the auction was actually held on May 20, 1997. The petitioner as also other parties filed objections. The matter was considered by the Tribunal. Vide order dated August 22, 1997, the auction was set aside. 3. The petitioner alleges that the Debt Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the State Financial Corporations as these are governed by the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. Consequently, it prays that the orders passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal for auction of the property be quashed. 4. The prayer made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by the respondents by filing separate written statements. Counsel for the parties have been heard. 5. Mr. Sehgal, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the Delhi High Court has erred in issuing an injunction against the petitioner and restraining the Collector, Sirsa, from conducting the auction. He further submits that the Debt Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to get the property auctioned. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by Mr. Dharam Vir Sharma, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 and 4. No one has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 5. He further submits that the Debt Recovery Tribunal has no jurisdiction to get the property auctioned. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by Mr. Dharam Vir Sharma, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 and 4. No one has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 5. So far as the injunction order passed by the Delhi High Court is concerned, there is no prayer in the present petition. Still further, this Court cannot interfere with the order passed by their Lordships of the Delhi High Court. Consequently, the contention, as sought to be raised by the counsel for the petitioner, cannot be accepted. This brings us to the question as to whether or not the Tribunal has erred in passing the orders dated May 15, 1997 and August 22, 1997. Admittedly, the petitioner as well as the respondent-Bank have to recover their dues from respondent No. 5. It is in the interest of all concerned that the public funds are expeditiously recovered. The Tribunal had ordered the plant, machinery and land etc. to be auctioned. On May 20, 1997 the auction had actually taken place. However, in view of the objections raised by the parties, the auction was set aside by the order dated August 22, 1997. No infirmity has been pointed out in the order by which a direction for the auction was given or in the order by which the objections were accepted. Still further, it has been held by the Tribunal that the petitioner-Corporation is still aggrieved and wants the order to be set aside. No reason for such an attitude has been given. As for the second order passed by the Tribunal on August 22, 1997, it deserves notice that the objections filed by the petitioner and other parties were accepted. Why is the petitioner aggrieved ? Learned counsel has not been able to advance any reason. Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, we find no infirmity in the orders. It may be mentioned that on account of the pendency of this writ petition for a fairly long period of more than three years in this Court, the interests of all the concerned have suffered. It is only in the fitness of things that the Tribunal proceeds to auction the unit, so that the public funds are recovered. It may be mentioned that on account of the pendency of this writ petition for a fairly long period of more than three years in this Court, the interests of all the concerned have suffered. It is only in the fitness of things that the Tribunal proceeds to auction the unit, so that the public funds are recovered. It is the petitioners own case that it has got the property assessed and that it has a value of at least Rs. 1,14,70,000/- Mr. Sehgal states that this valuation report was given by the Valuer on 19th January, 2001. The Tribunal shall keep this fact in view while fixing the reserve price for auction of the property. However, we have no doubt that the auction shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible. As for the averment made in para 28 of the petition that the petitioner-Corporation was not a financial institution as contemplated under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, we may only notice the notification dated March 28, 1995 issued by the Central Government, wherein the Corporation has been included as one of the financial institutions. Faced with this situation, Mr. Sehgal contends that the Corporation had the jurisdiction to proceed under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Thus, the order of the Tribunal is vitiated. 6. We are unable to accept this contention. Admittedly, the Corporation has taken no steps under Section 29 of the 1951 Act. No such grievance has been made in the petition. That being the position, the action of the Tribunal in proceeding to auction the unit cannot be said to be in violation of any provision of law. 7. No other point has been raised. 8. We find no merit in this petition. It is, consequently, dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.