JUDGMENT - A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated April 25, 1990 of the Civil Judge, S.D., Satara in Special Civil Suit No. 55 of 1990. 2. Briefly stated, the respondent original plaintiff is a transport Contractor. The appellant-defendant Zilla Parishad had invited tenders for the contract of transport of goods pertaining to its various departments. The respondent was one of the participant, who submitted his tenders which were accepted by the appellant. For the present, suffice it to mention that the respondent-plaintiff carried out work of transport as agreed in the tender; and consequent thereto raised bills of the work of transport done by him during the relevant periods, for which claimed total sum of Rs. 14,54,988-80. However, the appellant, acting on the basis of audit objections, decided to withhold the said bills submitted by the respondent. In the circumstances, the respondent filed subject suit against the appellant for recovery of the amounts under the said bills submitted by him for a total sum of Rs. 14,54,988-80 along with interest thereon. According to the respondent, the objections raised on behalf of the appellant for withholding the said bills were inappropriate; and, therefore, such action was unjust and has caused serious miscarriage of justice. The appellant resisted the said suit by filing written statement. It needs to be pointed out that the appellant has admitted that the respondent has executed the work of transport as per the tender. The appellant, however, denied its liability to pay the sum of Rs. 14,54,988-80 as claimed by the respondent towards the said outstanding bills. According to the appellant, as per the audit objections, amount due from the respondent under the sanctioned bills have been adjusted and that they did not withhold any bills as alleged. According to the appellant, the audit objections were essentially that: (a) that the respondent was not entitled to claim any charges for transporting goods for any distance between 0-0 km. to 100.00 kms. having regard to the terms prescribed for the mileages slab wise rate for internal transport; (b) that the respondent transported cement from Ratnagiri to Satara via Kolhapur route instead of via Chiplun, which route was of shorter distance by atleast 20 km. (c) about the excess mileage of destinations to and from as indicated in Schedule 3 to Exhibit 37. having regard to the terms prescribed for the mileages slab wise rate for internal transport; (b) that the respondent transported cement from Ratnagiri to Satara via Kolhapur route instead of via Chiplun, which route was of shorter distance by atleast 20 km. (c) about the excess mileage of destinations to and from as indicated in Schedule 3 to Exhibit 37. The appellant, asserted that audit objection taken by the A.G., Bombay and Local Funds' Auditor, Satara were correct, for which reason the appellant was justified in insisting upon adjustment towards the said heads. The appellant further asserted that the bills submitted by the respondent were only for a sum of Rs. 11,89,541-86 and not as claimed by the respondent being Rs. 15,81,420-55. On the basis of the rival pleadings the trial Court framed 10 issues which read thus:--- “1. Whether the claim of the plaintiff for transport from Ratnagiri to Satara viz. Kolhapur is legal and valid? 2. Whether the claim for transporting goods for a distance of 00-00 to 100 kms. is legal and valid? 3. Whether plaintiff has shown correct distance of destinations to and from and consequently whether the claims of the plaintiff are correct? 4. Whether the plaintiff can claim loading charges from defendant? 5. Whether the claim for unscrutinised bills can be adjudicated? 6. What is the exact claim due to the plaintiff? 7. Whether the defendant is estopped from challenging the claim of the plaintiff? 8. Whether the objections of Auditor are within limitation? 9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount adjudged due to him from the defendant? 10. What decree and order?” 3. It is relevant to point out that both the parties decided not to lead oral evidence and agreed for the disposal of the suit on the basis of documentary evidence already produced on record. In this view of the matter, the trial Court disposed of the suit within the record time of two months, by the impugned order dated April 25, 1990, inasmuch as the suit was presented only in the month of February, 1990. The trial Court after analysing the rival claims, recorded the following findings with regard to the aforesaid issues. “1. In the affirmative. 2. In the affirmative. 3. Yes, (except cases coming within the purview of objection No. 1 and the objections of the Auditor vide Exhibit 37). 4. In the affirmative. The trial Court after analysing the rival claims, recorded the following findings with regard to the aforesaid issues. “1. In the affirmative. 2. In the affirmative. 3. Yes, (except cases coming within the purview of objection No. 1 and the objections of the Auditor vide Exhibit 37). 4. In the affirmative. 5. In the affirmative. 6. As per the final order. 7. Yes, (except cases coming within the purview of objection No. 1 of the Auditor vide Exhibit 37). 8. In the affirmative. 9. Yes, (please see the final order). 10. As per the final order.” Consistent with the above said findings, the trial Court passed the following order: “ORDER 1. The suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed as follows:—- 2. The defendants Satara Zilla Parishad do pay to the plaintiff the amounts of all the bills submitted by the plaintiff to them for the work of transport, done by the plaintiff after deducting therefrom a sum of Rs. 42,954-66 paise as detailed in Schedule 3 in view of objection No. 1 of the objections of the Auditor (vide Exhibit 37). 3. The defendant Satara Zilla Parishad do scrutinize the pending bills of the plaintiff and pay the same to the plaintiff after deducting the amount, coming in the purview of objection No. 1 of the objections of the Auditor (vide Exhibit 37). 4. The defendant Satara Zilla Parishad do pay to the plaintiff interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the amounts of bills mentioned above from the date of the suit till the payment. 5. The defendant do co-operate with the plaintiff to receive a sum of Rs. 38,325 on account of fixed deposit and do refund the earnest money of Rs. 8,000/- after settlement of the bills payable to the plaintiff as ordered above. Parties to bear their respective costs of this proceeding. A decree be drawn up accordingly.” 4. It is relevant to note that the respondent plaintiff has not taken exception to Clause 2 of the order which permits the appellant defendant to deduct sum of Rs. 42,954-66 ps. from the bills submitted by the respondent-plaintiff as detailed in Schedule 3 to Exhibit 37. A decree be drawn up accordingly.” 4. It is relevant to note that the respondent plaintiff has not taken exception to Clause 2 of the order which permits the appellant defendant to deduct sum of Rs. 42,954-66 ps. from the bills submitted by the respondent-plaintiff as detailed in Schedule 3 to Exhibit 37. Accordingly, the conclusion and decision arrived at by the trial Court with regard to the audit objection relating to the internal transport within the Satara district is not the subject-matter of challenge before us; and the impugned order to that extent has been allowed to become final. On the other hand, the impugned order has been challenged only by the appellant defendant rejecting their claim with reference to issue Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. Besides that the appellant also challenges Clause 4 of the order which has awarded interest to the respondent plaintiff at the rate of 9% p.a. on the amount of bills from the date of the suit till the payment. The last contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the decree as drawn is not in conformity with the judgment of the trial Court. These are the only points which are argued before us. 5. On the basis of the rival submissions the points that arise for our consideration would be as follows:--- “1. Whether the trial Court was right in answering issue No. 1 in the affirmative in so far as the claim of the respondent plaintiff for transport from Ratnagiri to Satara via Kolhapur? 2. Whether the trial Court was right in answering the issue No. 2 in the affirmative in so far as the respondent's claim for transporting the goods for distance of 00-00 km. to 100 kms? 3. Whether the trial Court was right in awarding interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the amount of bills from the date of the suit till the payment? 4. Whether the decree as drawn is in conformity with the judgment delivered by the trial Court?" POINT NO. 1 6. Before we proceed to decide the rival contentions we would like to discern the reasons recorded by the trial Court. The trial Court has accepted the explanation offered by the respondent plaintiff that the route via Chiplun was dangerous and accident prone for which reason cement was transported via Kolhapur route which was longer only by 20 kms. 1 6. Before we proceed to decide the rival contentions we would like to discern the reasons recorded by the trial Court. The trial Court has accepted the explanation offered by the respondent plaintiff that the route via Chiplun was dangerous and accident prone for which reason cement was transported via Kolhapur route which was longer only by 20 kms. The trial Court has held that the respondent was justified in taking route via Kolhapur in view of the onerous obligation placed on the respondent plaintiff due to condition Nos. 9 and 10 of the tender notice that the contractor was to remain responsible for any damage of the goods in transit and only goods in good condition were to be accepted. The trial Court has held that the respondent contractor was justified in transporting the goods via Kolhapur especially when the appellant Z.P. had permitted him to do so, as would be evident from the records placed before the Court. The trial Court further observed that no financial loss has been caused to the Z.P., inasmuch as when compared with the rates of P.W.D.-the billing done on the basis of goods having been transported via Kolhapur was still economic. The Court held that the auditors obviously over looked these crucial aspects while taking objection with regard to the bills submitted by the respondent. 7. In the backdrop of the abovesaid reasons the learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the tests applied by the trial Court were wholly inappropriate. He submits that the Court ought to have decided the matter on the basis of principles applicable to the law of tender. According to him, since no specific route was prescribed in the tender, it impliedly obligated the contractor to transport the goods only by the shortest route and in any case he could bill only on the basis of shortest route distance. He submits that instructions issued by the State Government which govern the field clearly provide that billing shall be on the basis of shortest route distance and that the concerned officer shall be responsible for any excess payment. According to him, no officer of the Z.P. much less the Chief Executive Officer could have on his own permitted the respondent contractor to transport the goods by longer route for whatever reason. According to him, no officer of the Z.P. much less the Chief Executive Officer could have on his own permitted the respondent contractor to transport the goods by longer route for whatever reason. He submits that in any case obligations placed on the respondent contractor by virtue of condition Nos. 9 and 10 cannot be the justification for authorizing payment of bills on the basis of route of longer distance. According to him, the table of distance notified by the Government of Maharashtra-Buildings and Communication Department from village to village basis prescribes the distance from factory site at Ratnagiri to Satara as 226 kms. only. It is contended that, on the other hand, the respondent submitted bills on the basis of distance of 256 kms. (i.e. on the basis of route via Kolhapur) which was obviously in excess of the prescribed distance. He further pointed out that audit objections have remained undecided because of the pendency of the present matter. He further submits that the Court below has applied entirely wrong tests, for that there is no financial loss caused to the appellant Z.P. He argued that merely because the rates provided in the subject tender were relatively lesser than the prescribed rates of P.W.D., that would not permit sanctioning of the bills which are otherwise excessive. He submits that what is to be seen is whether the billing has been done as per the tender rate and in accordance with the other applicable norms. He submits that the financial loss will have to be measured in the context of excess payment which will have to be made because of longer route; and, cannot be compared with the rates of the other departments. He therefore, submits that the trial Court has committed manifest error in taking the view that the respondent contractor was justified in billing on the basis of route via Kolhapur though it was of longer distance. 8. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent contractor mainly adopted the reasons given by the trial Court in answering the issue in affirmative in favour of the respondent. 8. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondent contractor mainly adopted the reasons given by the trial Court in answering the issue in affirmative in favour of the respondent. He submits that in the present case the respondent contractor had approached the Court of law with a specific case that tender was silent about the route by which the goods were to be transported; and, therefore, the respondent had option to transport the goods through the route via Kolhapur which has a safer route. Besides this it is pointed out that specific assertion has been made in the plaint that the respondent transported the goods with the knowledge and consent of the appellant. He further contends that the appellant had accepted similar bills submitted by the respondent in the past for almost 5 years. This assertion is found in para 5 of the plaint. It is respondent's case that the appellant has not denied this assertion. He submits that admittedly the appellant had consented and in any case acquiesced of the position that the respondent could transport via Kolhapur route. According to him, admittedly the respondent transported the goods via Kolhapur route only, therefore, was justified in submitting bills on that basis. He submits that the inter departmental communication which was now sought to be relied upon by the appellant to contend that it was impermissible to sanction bill for longer distance route, the same was of no avail and cannot bind the respondent. According to him, assuming that the extent guidelines provide billing only on the basis of shortest route, but the respondent has billed for the transport of goods by the route via Kolhapur through which route cement was actually transported on the instructions and consent of the appellant. In the circumstances he submits that assuming that the reasons assigned by the trial Court may not be sound, but, nevertheless, in law the bills submitted by the respondent cannot be withheld. He therefore, submits that no interference is warranted with the order passed by the trial Court on this issue. 9. In the circumstances he submits that assuming that the reasons assigned by the trial Court may not be sound, but, nevertheless, in law the bills submitted by the respondent cannot be withheld. He therefore, submits that no interference is warranted with the order passed by the trial Court on this issue. 9. Having considered the rival submissions we have no hesitation in accepting the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that though the tender did not provide for any specific route, but, in such a case, there was an implied condition on the contractor to transport the goods by shortest route-and, in any case, to bill on the basis of shortest pliable route. We also accede to the appellants submission that the shorter route via Chiplun was accident prone or dangerous one cannot be the justification for transporting the goods through some other route in absence of express agreement, in that behalf. The contractor cannot chose to transport the goods through a longer route merely because condition Nos. 9 and 10 in the tender placed onerous obligation on him to transport and deliver the goods in good condition only. Ordinarily, this would be the correct legal position. In that sense, these reasons assigned by the trial Court would not commend us to grant relief to the respondent. However, in the present case, we would still affirm the ultimate conclusion of the trial Court that the respondent would be entitled to claim bill for transporting goods via Kolhapur which is a longer route. We would do so because the respondent had approached the trial Court with a specific case that the respondent had transported goods via Kolhapur route with the knowledge and consent of the appellant. For, it is clearly averred in para 5 of the plaint that for the past almost five years the appellant has been sanctioning the bills on that basis. Thus a clear case of knowledge, consent and acquiescence has been made out in the plaint, which has unquestionably gone unchallenged rather admitted. Besides that, this position is also fortified from the official documents on record including D.O. letter dated June 7, 1989 of Shri A.R. Dalwai, the Chief Executive Officer Z.P. addressed to the State Government, which clearly admits of the said claim of the respondent. Besides that, this position is also fortified from the official documents on record including D.O. letter dated June 7, 1989 of Shri A.R. Dalwai, the Chief Executive Officer Z.P. addressed to the State Government, which clearly admits of the said claim of the respondent. With reference to the audit objection, the explanation offered on behalf of the appellant to the Auditor does plainly indicate that the officers of the appellant had permitted rather instructed the respondent contractor to transport the goods by Kolhapur route in the larger interest. The appellant has in the same explanation pleaded that, no financial loss has been caused to the appellant by permitting transport by that route and therefore the objection be disbanded. In this view of the matter, the conclusion reached by the trial Court that, though the tender did not provide for any specific route by which the goods were to be transported however the respondent acted on the instructions of the officers of the appellant to transport the goods via Kolhapur route cannot be taken exception to at all. A priori, the Court will have no option but to accept the case of the contractor that he would be entitled to submit the bills on the basis of route via Kolhapur. 10. Although we would accept the respondent's claim in this behalf, however, at the same time we have no hesitation in accepting the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant that it would be impermissible to allow transport of goods much less billing on the basis of route other than the shortest available route. Though in the facts of the present case the respondent cannot be said to be bound by the inter departmental instructions/communication, however, the officers of the appellant were surely bound by the said instructions issued by the State Government from time to time. The State Government vide its communication dated May 17, 1989 has issued plain instructions that those officers who have authorised the contractor to transport goods by a longer distance route or allowed the contractor to bill on that basis, would be personally responsible for the excess payment if any. The State Government vide its communication dated May 17, 1989 has issued plain instructions that those officers who have authorised the contractor to transport goods by a longer distance route or allowed the contractor to bill on that basis, would be personally responsible for the excess payment if any. No statutory provision, circular or any tender condition has been brought to our notice that any officer or for that matter the Chief Executive Officer of the appellant could have issued instructions to the respondent to transport goods by route other than the shortest pliable route. In absence thereof, we will have to hold that the appellant will be forced to make excess payment to the respondent because of the act of commission or omission of its officers. In such a case, the loss suffered by the appellant on this count will have to be recovered from the concerned officers in accordance with law. No doubt that matter will have to be examined by the auditors and the concerned authorities. We need not express any opinion in that behalf. We would, however, record that we are sceptical about the manner of handling of the matter on behalf of the appellant before the trial Court, for the written statement virtually admits the claim of the respondent-plaintiff and besides that the appellant chose not to adduce any oral evidence. The suit was decided in a record time of two months only, as parties chose not to adduce any oral evidence. Perhaps the attempt was to obtain a seal of approval of the Court on this issue so as to make the audit objection fate accompli, but in the process the contractor succeeded in his claim to recover bill on the basis of longer route, which has obviously resulted in dolling out public exchequer. If this be true then, it is a serious matter. We, therefore, hope and trust that the appropriate authority would be well advised to take such corrective measures as would be necessary against the delinquent officers. We are constrained to make these observations because it is the bounden duty of the courts to preserve the public interest. If this be true then, it is a serious matter. We, therefore, hope and trust that the appropriate authority would be well advised to take such corrective measures as would be necessary against the delinquent officers. We are constrained to make these observations because it is the bounden duty of the courts to preserve the public interest. In our view, loss of public exchequer on account of act of commission or omission of the officers of the appellant cannot be legitimatized in this manner, for it would be opposed to the rule of logic and more particularly the principle of accountability in public office. We cannot, therefore, countenance such a situation. For the present we would observe that, although payment of subject bills would be contrary to the instructions issued by the State Government, but that relief cannot be denied to the respondent contractor in view of the admitted facts on record. The respondent cannot be blamed for having transported the goods via Kolhapur route, and since he has actually transported the goods via, that route because of instructions, was entitled to bill on that basis. Thus, we have no option but to answer this point in favour of the respondent contractor. POINT NO. 2 11. Coming to the second point raised on behalf of the appellant, in our view, the trial Court, while discussing issue No. 2, has considered all the facets in connection with this issue in paras 18 and 19 of its judgment. We approve of the said view taken by the trial Court. That the tender provides for slabs on the basis of which rates for internal transport of goods will have to be charged. We are presently concerned with the third slab which provides that transport between 0-0 km. to 100 kms. per ton per km. (free). The stand taken on behalf of the appellant, obviously on the basis of audit object on is that, although the contractor would carry goods for distance between 0.00 km. to 100 kms. he would not be entitled for any charges. This argument has been rightly negatived by the trial Court. As observed earlier we have no hesitation in accepting the reasons assigned by the trial Court. The trial Court has rightly observed that Auditor has misread the slabs provided in the tender. to 100 kms. he would not be entitled for any charges. This argument has been rightly negatived by the trial Court. As observed earlier we have no hesitation in accepting the reasons assigned by the trial Court. The trial Court has rightly observed that Auditor has misread the slabs provided in the tender. The trial Court has, in our view, rightly observed that the appropriate interpretation of the said slab on conjoint reading with the second slab is that, the contractor would be entitled to charge only upto a initial distance of 50 kms. at the rate of Rs. 1/- per ton per km. although he would transport for a distance in excess of 51 kms, but upto 100 kms, only. In other words, it would mean that even if the contractor transports goods beyond 50 kms. but upto 99 km. or for that matter 100 kms. he would be entitled to claim sum of Rs. 50/- only which is the maximum amount provided in the second slab. This is the correct interpretation. Accordingly, even this issue will have to be answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. POINT NO. 3: 12. The third point is with regard to the rate of interest awarded by the trial Court at the rate of 9% p.a. on the amount of bills from the date of the suit till the payment. The trial Court has dealt with this aspect while dealing with issue No. 9, in para 24 of its judgment. We find that no reason whatsoever has been assigned by the trial Court for taking the view that the respondent would be entitled to claim interest at the rate of 9% p.a. instead of 18% p.a. as claimed by the respondent. As such we are at a loss to know as to on what basis the trial Court has reached to this conclusion. In this view of the matter, we will have to examine the question independently. Admittedly, the interest so granted is with reference to period after institution of the suit. Such interest can be awarded by the Court in exercise of powers under section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. It will be apposite to advert to the said provision before we proceed to examine the matter any further. Admittedly, the interest so granted is with reference to period after institution of the suit. Such interest can be awarded by the Court in exercise of powers under section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. It will be apposite to advert to the said provision before we proceed to examine the matter any further. The said section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure read thus:--- “34.(1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate not exceeding six per cent per annum as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit; (Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. Explanation I.---In this sub-section “nationalised bank” means a corresponding new bank as defined in the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970). Explanation II.---For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability). (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such principal sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefore shall not lie.” 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the respondent contractor is not entitled for any interest at all having regard to the condition prescribed in the tender that in case of any disputed amount or pending bill no interest will be payable. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the respondent contractor is not entitled for any interest at all having regard to the condition prescribed in the tender that in case of any disputed amount or pending bill no interest will be payable. This condition is found at Item No. 10 in instructions appended to the tender (page 109 of the paper book). The argument, therefore, proceeds on the premise that since there was a clear agreement between the parties that no interest is payable, the Court had no power to grant any interest to the respondent for whatsoever reason. It is next contended that in any case, by virtue of mandate of section 34 of the Code, the Court has exceeded its jurisdiction to Award interest in excess of 6% p.a. He submits that, assuming that the trial Court could grant interest in excess of 6% p.a, it could be granted only when the transaction is a commercial transaction. According to him, neither the pleadings nor the evidence would support the position that the subject transaction was a commercial transaction. In other words, he submits that the Court had no jurisdiction to Award interest at the rate higher than 6% p.a., as provided under section 34 of the Code. 14. On the other hand, the Counsel for the respondent submits that having regard to all the attending circumstances the trial Court had throught it appropriate to Award interest at the rate of 9% p.a. He submits that no interference is warranted with the said conclusion. He invited our attention to the various circumstances including the fact that respondent had to virtually dispose of all his assets including the trucks because of the withholding of the subject bills. He further submits that argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that there was agreement between the parties that no interest shall be payable is inappropriate. According to him, the dispute if any, at best pertained to the excess billing only; for which reason there was no justification for the appellant to withhold the remaining undisputed amount of the said bills. He submits that since the appellant unjustly withheld the undisputed amount of the bill, it necessarily follows that the respondent acquired an indefeasible right to get appropriate rate of interest. He submits that, therefore, interest awarded by the trial Court need not be interfered with. He submits that since the appellant unjustly withheld the undisputed amount of the bill, it necessarily follows that the respondent acquired an indefeasible right to get appropriate rate of interest. He submits that, therefore, interest awarded by the trial Court need not be interfered with. He further submits that, from the nature of transaction, it is seen that the transaction was a commercial transaction for which reason the trial Court could justly Award interest in excess of 6% p.a. as has been done in this case. To buttress his contention, he has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court (H.P. State Financial Corporation, Shimla v. Prem Nath Nanda and others)1, 2000(8) S.C.C. 528 , and (State of J. K. and another v. Dev Dutt Pandit)2, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3196. 15. Having considered the rival submissions we would first deal with the decisions relied by the learned Counsel for the respondent. The case reported in 2000(8) S.C.C. 528 , is a case arising from the proceedings under the State Financial Corporation Act. In that context the Court has held that in appropriate cases interest may be awarded in lieu of compensation or damages for allegedly wrongfully retaining the amount payable to a party. In our view, this authority has no application to the present case which is governed by the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The next authority is reported in A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3196. Even this authority deals with the proceedings arising under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. No doubt in para 21, the Court has made reference to the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, in that case the transaction was a commercial transaction. In our view, even this judgment would be of no avail for deciding the question in issue. 16. We would first deal with the appellant's contention that the respondent had no right to claim any interest on account of the express agreement between the parties in that behalf. In our view, even this judgment would be of no avail for deciding the question in issue. 16. We would first deal with the appellant's contention that the respondent had no right to claim any interest on account of the express agreement between the parties in that behalf. We have no hesitation in accepting the respondent's plea that assuming that condition No. 10 of the said instructions postulates that the respondent shall not be entitled to any interest in case of any disputed amount or pending bill, however, the dispute if any in respect of the subject bills was at best relating to the excess billing due to longer route distance which amount was very minuscule. The respondent is right in contending that admittedly there was no dispute regarding the remaining amount which was substantial and the appellant was therefore obliged to make that payment without any delay. In other words the appellants had unjustly withheld even the undisputed amounts, to which condition No. 10 had no application. A priori, condition No. 10 referred to above did not preclude the respondent or rob him of his right to claim interest in the amounts due and payable in accordance with law. 17. Reverting back to the purport of section 34 of the Code, it essentially empowers the Court to Award interest. This provisions authorises the Court to Award interest for three different periods, namely, (i) interest adjudged on the principal amount prior to the institution of the suit; (ii) between institution of the suit till the date of the decree and (iii) the third being from the date of the decree till the realisation or payment of the decretal amount. However, in this case we are concerned only with the second and third periods (i.e. (1) from the institution of the suit till the date of the decree and (2) from the date of the decree till payment). In so far as the former period is concerned (i.e. from the date of institution of the suit till the date of the decree), the Court is authorised to Award interest at such rate as it would deem reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged. Obviously, the rate of interest so determined by the Court will have to be consistent with the pleadings and the evidence on record. Obviously, the rate of interest so determined by the Court will have to be consistent with the pleadings and the evidence on record. Whereas, for the latter period (i.e. from the date of the decree till the payment), the Court is authorised to Award interest ordinarily at the maximum rate of 6% p.a. unless the transaction in question was a commercial transaction in which case it can be upto the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contactual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. 18. In the present case, the trial Court by the impugned order has awarded interest not only for the period between the date of institution of the suit till the date of the decree, but even for the subsequent period (i.e. from the date of the decree till the realisation) at the uniform rate of 9% p.a. For the present we would observe that there would be no much difficulty in maintaining the rate of interest determined by the trial Court for the period from the date of institution of the suit (i.e. from 17-2-1990 till the date of the decree on 25-4-1990. However, with regard to the latter period (i.e. from the date of the decree till the payment), there is nothing on record to show that the subject transaction is a commercial transaction. It is seen that there is no averment in the plaint that the subject transaction is a commercial transaction. Moreover, no evidence has been adduced that the subject transaction is a commercial transaction. In absence of any pleading or evidence in respect of the nature of the subject transaction whether it is a commercial transaction or not, the respondent contractor would not be entitled for interest in excess of 6% p.a. in view of the mandate of section 34 of the Code. Understood thus, the Court would have had no option but to Award interest at the rate of 6% p.a. only for the period between the date of the decree till the realisation of the amount. A priori, the trial Court has committed manifest error in awarding interest in excess of 6% p.a. in respect of the period after the date of the decree. A priori, the trial Court has committed manifest error in awarding interest in excess of 6% p.a. in respect of the period after the date of the decree. In other words, the impugned order of the trial Court awarding interest at the rate of 9% p.a. for the period after 25-4-1990 (i.e. the date of decree) till the payment or realization of the decretal amount is manifestly wrong and will have to be modified by providing interest at the rate of 6% p.a. only for the said period. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed only to this limited extent. POINT NO. 4: 19. The next point which arises for consideration is palpably devoid of merits. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant that the decree is not in conformity with the judgment of the trial Court, in our view, is ill founded. This grievance is made by the appellant by referring to the recitals of the decree. On the other hand the decree as drawn up is at page 65 which, in our view, is fully in consonance with the judgment of the trial Court. We would however observe that since the said decree was drawn on the basis of the judgment of the trial Court, whereas now we have modified the impugned order to the above extent, the decree will have to be drawn up accordingly. In our view, the argument that decree is not in conformity with the judgment is wholly ill advised and the same is therefore negatived. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, this appal partly succeeds. The impugned order and decree is modified only with reference to Clause 4 thereof. The same would read thus: “That defendant Satara Zilla Parishad do pay to the plaintiff interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the amounts of bills mentioned above from the date of the suit (i.e. 17-2-1990) till the date of the decree (i.e. 25-4-1990) and additionally at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of the decree (i.e. 25-4-1990) till the date of payment.” 21. The rest of the order is affirmed and needs no interference. 22. In the circumstances, the operative order in the suit would now read thus:--- ORDER 1. The suit of the plaintiff is hereby decree as follows:--- 2. The rest of the order is affirmed and needs no interference. 22. In the circumstances, the operative order in the suit would now read thus:--- ORDER 1. The suit of the plaintiff is hereby decree as follows:--- 2. The defendant Satara Zilla Parishad do pay to the plaintiff the amounts of all the bills submitted by the plaintiff to them for the work of the transport, done by the plaintiff after deducting therefrom a sum of Rs. 42,954.66 paise as detailed in Schedule 3 in view of Objection No. 1 of the objections of the Auditor (vide Exhibit 37). 3. The defendant Satara Zilla Parishad do scrutinize the pending bills of the plaintiff and pay the same to the plaintiff after deducting the amount, coming in the purview of objection No. 1 of the objections of the Auditor (vide Exhibit 37). 4. That defendant Satara Zilla Parishad do pay to the plaintiff interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the amounts of bills mentioned above from the date of suit (i.e. 17-2-1990) till the date of the decree (i.e. 25-4-1990) and additionally at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of the decree (i.e. 25-4-1990) till the date of payment. 5. The defendant do co-operative with the plaintiff to receive a sum of Rs. 38,325 on account of fixed deposit and do refund the earnest money of Rs. 8,000/- after settlement of the bills payable to the plaintiff as ordered above. Parties to bear their respective costs of this proceeding. A decree be drawn up accordingly. 23. Appeal partly allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. Copy of this decision be forwarded to the Secretary of the concerned Ministry of the Government of Maharashtra for necessary action in the context of observations in para 10 above. Parties to act on the copy of this order duly authenticated by Sheristedar of the Court. Order accordingly. -----