JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. These two revisional applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India were heared analogously as common question of law is involved in these two applications. 2. Being dissatisfied with the order dated November 14, 2000 passed by the West Bengal Cooperative Tribunal in Appeal Case Nos. 46 of 1999 and 47 of 1999, these two revisional applications have been preferred. 3. By those orders, the Tribunal has rejected applications for condonation of delay in preferring those two appeals beyond the period of limitation. 4. At the very outset, Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has taken a preliminary point as regards the jurisdiction of the Tribunal below to entertain applications for condonation of delay in preferring such appeals. 5. Mr. Bhattacharjee by relaying upon he provisions contained in section -;, 136(2) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 ("Act") contends that the Tribunal has no authority to entertain an application for condonation of delay in view of the fact that the aforesaid provision prohibits application of the entire Limitation Act, 1963 before the Tribunal. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the Tribunal ought not to have even entertained those applications for condonation of delay and should have rejected those as not maintainable without entering into merit. Mr. Bhattacharjee thus contends that this court should not examine the propriety of the order refusing to condone delay on merit but instead, should dismiss these applications with a finding that the Tribunal had even no jurisdiction to entertain such applications for condonation of delay. 6. Mr. Bhuiya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners however has opposed the aforesaid contention of Mr.Bhattacharjee and has relied upon the decision of this court in the case of Nowda Thana Co-operative Agricultural Marketing Society vs. West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal & Ors., reported in 1979 (2) CRN page 487. In the said decision a learned Single Judge of this Court while interpreting section 134(2) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 which is similar to section 136(2) of the Act held that a Tribunal under such circumstances has jurisdiction to entertain and decide an application for condonation of delay in preferring any appeal before such Tribunal. 7. Mr. In the said decision a learned Single Judge of this Court while interpreting section 134(2) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 which is similar to section 136(2) of the Act held that a Tribunal under such circumstances has jurisdiction to entertain and decide an application for condonation of delay in preferring any appeal before such Tribunal. 7. Mr. Bhuiya further relies upon the provision of section 135(2) of the Act in support of his contention that the Tribunal rightly exercised such power of condonation of delay. 8. Therefore, the question that falls for determination in these two applications is whether a Tribunal created under the Act can entertain and decide an application for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal before such Tribunal on merit. 9. To appreciate the aforesaid question involved, the provisions contained in section 135(2) and section 136(2) of the Act are quoted below: "135(2). A Tribunal shall exercise all the powers conferred upon an Appellate Court by Order XLI in the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (5 of 1908). 136(2). The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall not apply to an appeal referred in sub-section (1)." 10. Mr. Bhuiya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has strenuously contended that by section 135(2) of the Act the Tribunal having been vested with all the powers conferred upon an Appellate Court by Order 41 of the 1st Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Tribunal rightly exercised its power of condonation of delay as provided in Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code. Mr. Bhuiya further submits that although there is some inconsistency between the provisions contained in section 135(2) and section 136(2) of the Act, in view of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India it should be presumed that the intention of the legislature was that at least the provision of condonation of delay as provided in Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code should be made applicable in a proceeding before Tribunal although other provisions of the Limitation Act may not be made applicable. At any rate, Mr. Bhuiya contends that the Parliament in enacting 1976 Amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure has expressly manifested its intention to cover the whole field of entry No.13 of concurrent list viz. At any rate, Mr. Bhuiya contends that the Parliament in enacting 1976 Amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure has expressly manifested its intention to cover the whole field of entry No.13 of concurrent list viz. Code of Civil Procedure and Limitation Act before the enactment of the present Act by the State Legislature and thus section 135(2) will prevail over section 136(2). In support of such contention Mr. Bhuiya refers to the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Thirumuruga Kirupanada Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and Charitable Trust vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC page 2384, and the other in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs. M/s. M.A. Tulloch & Anr., reported in AIR 1964 SC page 1284. According to Mr. Bhuiya this court should interpret the aforesaid two provisions in such a way that the same will not render section 135(2) of the Act nugatory, redundant or surplusage. 11. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after considering the respective submission of the parties I however find substance in the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee. 12. I am not at all convinced by the submission of Mr. Bhuiya that there is inconsistency between the provisions contained in section 135(2) and section 136(2) of the Act. By section 135(2) of the Act, the legislature has conferred upon the Tribunal all the powers of an appellate court mentioned in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 3A however is not the source of the power of the appellate court to condone the delay in preferring an appeal. It is the provision contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act that enables an appellate court to condone the delay in preferring appeal beyond the period of limitation if sufficient cause is shown. Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code merely provides that if any such application is filed before an appellate court, such application must be filed along with the memorandum of appeal supported by affidavit, stating forth the fact on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. By the said provision the appellate court has been directed to dispose of such application for condonation of delay before it decides to hear the appeal under Order 41 Rule 11 or Rule 13 of the Code. It further states that the court shall not grant stay of execution of the decree appealed against so long the court does not decide to hear the appeal after hearing under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code. Thus, the aforesaid provision was incorporated by way of amendment of 1976 in Order 41 of the Code with the object that the practice to admit appeal subject to the provision as to the limitation raised at the time of final hearing of the appeal is discontinued as the said practice prevailing in some High Courts was deprecated by the Privy Council. (See Objects and Reasons of incorporating Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code). 13. Therefore, the power to condone delay in preferring an appeal does not emanates from the provision contained in Order 41 Rule 3A of the Code but from the provision contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act. By incorporating section 135(2) of the Act the legislature intended that power of the appellate court as provided in Order 41 of the Code, for instance, power of remand, power to restore an appeal dismissed for default, power to take additional evidence etc. will be conferred upon the Tribunal. Therefore, there is no inconsistency between sections 135(2) and 136(2) of the Act. By incorporating section 136(2) of the Act the legislative intention was made clear that the Limitation Act, 1963 will not be applicable in a proceeding before Tribunal and thus section 5 thereof cannot be invoked before a Tribunal. 14. I have gone through the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Rules, 1987 framed by virtue of the power vested in the Act and I find that although in Rule 227(e) thereof, a duty has been cast upon the Secretary of the Tribunal to examine whether an appeal has been preferred within a period of limitation before the appeal is registered, there is no provision even in the Rule for making any application for condonation of delay in the event appeal is presented beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, the decisions cited by Mr. Therefore, the decisions cited by Mr. Bhuiya on the question of interpretation of Article 254 of the Constitution of India are of no avail to his clients as there is no inconsistency between the Central and the State Acts. 15. As regards the decision in the case of Nowda Thana Cooperative Agricultural Marketing Society (supra) , with great respect to the learned Single Judge I am unable to subscribe to the view taken therein of the following reasons:- a) His Lordship proceeded as if Order 41 Rule 3A gives the appellate court power to condone delay. I have already indicated the scope, object and reason of incorporating the said provision by the amendment of 1976 and I respectfully disagree with the view taken by His Lordship that the said provision is a source of power of condonation of delay. b) I am also unable to agree with His Lordship that there is any doubt as to the construction or interpretation of the aforesaid two provisions. The case of Nirmal Kumar Banerjee vs. Panihati Cooperative Bank Limited & Ors., reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta page 246, relied upon by His Lordship, cannot have any application to the fact of the present case. In the case of Nirmal Kumar Banerjee (supra) the question was whether Article 12(2) of the Limitation Act applies to an appeal to a Tribunal under the provision of West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1940. In the said Act of 1940 there was no express provision like one mentioned in section 136(2) of the Act excluding the operation of the Limitation Act. Thus 29(2) of the Limitatioll1.Act cannot be applied in the present case, in view of express exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act. c) In paragraph 9 of the judgment His Lordship held that for ends of justice, Tribunal hearing appeals under the Act should have also power to condone delay in terms of provision of section 133(2) of 1973 Act although such power has been sought to be curtailed by section 134(2) thereof. In my view, a court while interpreting a provision cannot express its view as to what ought to have been incorporated in the Act when the legislature has specifically enacted a provision without any ambiguity. 16. In my view, a court while interpreting a provision cannot express its view as to what ought to have been incorporated in the Act when the legislature has specifically enacted a provision without any ambiguity. 16. Thus, with great respect I am unable to adopt the view taken by M.N. Roy, J in the aforesaid case of Nowda Thana Co-operative Agricultural Marketing Society. 17. Thus, on consideration of my discussion above I am of the view that a Tribunal constituted under the Act is not vested with the authority to condone delay in preferring an appeal if the same is presented beyond the period of limitation. 18. Since my above decision taken in these revisional applications will affect the existing practice prevailing before the Tribunal in accordance with the decision in the case of Nowda Thana Co-operative Agricultural Marketing Society (supra), I propose to refer the matter to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Division Bench to hear this question as in my opinion the decision in the aforesaid case of Nowda Thana Co-operative Agricultural Marketing Society does not lay down correct interpretation of the provisions. Under the aforesaid circumstances, let the matter be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the matter to a Division Bench for the purpose of deciding whether a Tribunal constituted under the Act can condone delay in preferring an appeal before such Tribunal. 19. In the facts and circumstances there will be however no order as to costs. Matter referred to the Chief Justice.