Judgment :- 1. Is Palani Catholic Mission a religious institution and it is so apparent requiring no further investigation is the question that comes up for consideration in these review applications No. 8 and 9 of 1997. The suit property belongs to this Palani Catholic Mission. The respondent is the lessee of the land. The super-structure was put up by the respondent. A suit for recovery of possession was filed in 1969. A compromise decree was passed, whereunder the respondent agreed to give vacant possession in one year. At this time, the City Tenants Protection Act hereinafter referred to as the Act had not been extended to Palani town where the property is situated. The compromise decree did not reach fruition and possession of the property continue with the respondent. Another suit for recovery of possession was filed in 1977. By this time, the Act was extended to Palani town. The respondent claiming benefits of this Act filed an application under Section 9 for buying the land. The suit was decreed and the petition under Section 9 was dismissed. Against that, the respondent filed an appeal and the petition under Section 9 was ordered issuing directions to deposit the value of the land. The Mission filed a Second Appeal before the High Court. The appeal was dismissed and so was the Special Leave Petition. Thereafter, the respondent filed an E.P. under Order 21, Rule 34, C.P.C. for executing the sale deed after depositing the amount, though belatedly. The petitioner herein opposed the application. The District Munsif, Palani ordered the E.P. filed by the respondent and dismissed the E.P. filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession as per the compromise decree. Against the dismissal of the E.P. for delivery of possession, the petitioner filed C.R.P. 1445/88 and against the order to execute the sale deed, C.M.A.16/88 was filed. The C.M.A was transferred to this Court to be heard along with the C.R.P. By the time the C.R.P. and C.M.A. were heard, the Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996 came into force exempting the tenancies of the lands owned by religious institutions from the provisions of the Act. Both the C.R.P. and C.M.A. were dismissed by this Court on 26.7.1996. Against this, the petitioner applied for Special Leave. On 28.10.1996, the District Munsif Palani ordered execution of sale deed. On 3.12.1996, the Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. filed by the petitioner. Both the C.R.P. and C.M.A. were dismissed by this Court on 26.7.1996. Against this, the petitioner applied for Special Leave. On 28.10.1996, the District Munsif Palani ordered execution of sale deed. On 3.12.1996, the Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.P. filed by the petitioner. Then the petitioner filed Review Applications 8 and 9 of 1997. These were also dismissed by this Court holding that the High Courts order had got merged in the dismissal of Special Leave Petition and therefore the review was not maintainable. Against this, the petitioner again went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order passed in the review application. The Supreme Court held that since, no leave was granted, there is no appeal in the eye of law in the superior Court and as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Kunhayammed v. Kerala ( 2000 (6) S.C.C. 359 ), a non-speaking order of the Supreme Court would not attract the doctrine of merger. Therefore, this Court was directed to consider afresh the review petition in accordance with law and as expeditiously as possible. This order was passed on 2.02.2001 and in compliance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court, these review applications have been taken up for final disposal. 2. Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner namely the Mission submitted that the language of Section 1(3) of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act as amended by Act 2 of 1996 is very clear and after the Act came into force i.e. on and from 11.1.1996, all proceedings that were pending abated and ceased. The learned Senior Counsel referred to various documents which would show that the petitioner came under the Roman Catholic Diocese which has its object the maintenance of Churches etc. and so obviously, it is a religious institution. He also submitted that this factor was not projected earlier because until the Act 2 of 1996 came into force, this was not relevant. He further submitted that even under the Constitution, they were guaranteed the right to administer their property and to own the same. He referred to the findings of the learned Judge that the petitioner is not a public religious and charitable institution. He further submitted that even under the Constitution, they were guaranteed the right to administer their property and to own the same. He referred to the findings of the learned Judge that the petitioner is not a public religious and charitable institution. The Certificate of registration was produced by the petitioner to substantiate its case that it is a religious institution and the learned Judge on a perusal of the same found that it was only a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and therefore not a public religious and charitable institution. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the fact that the petitioner had registered itself as a Society would not detract from its character as a public religious and charitable institution. An application was also filed by the petitioner herein in C.M.P.9995/2001 to produce various documents in the review petition. He referred to the following decisions to support his case. (1) Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1201) (2) Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education & Two ors. ( 1995 (2) C.T.C. 513 (3) Ghanashyam Dass & ors. v. Dominion of India and ors. (A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1004) = 1995 Writ L.R. 892 = 1995 2 L.W. 144 S.N.; (4) M. Satyanandam v. Dy. Secretary to the Government of A.P. and another (A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1968) (5) 1997 (9) S.C.C 69 , (6) Kiran Singh & ors. v. Chummun Paswan & ors. (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340) (7) N. Sreedaran Nair v. State of Tamil Nadu 2000 3 L.W. 271 = ( 2000 (3) M..L.J. 616 ) and (8) V. Srinivasa Mudaliar v. Sri Nagareeswarar Devasthanam rep. by its. Trustee T Srinivasan. He also referred to the pleadings which ex facie would show that the petitioner is a religious and charitable institution or at any rate, is dedicated to or for the benefit of the Christian Community as a place of public religious worship. Therefore, according to him, the order deserves to be reviewed and the petitioner shall be exempted from the provisions of the Act and that all proceedings that were pending abated on and from 11.01.1996 and also the execution of the sale deed on 28.10.1996 was null and void. 3. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submitted that the review itself was not maintainable. 3. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submitted that the review itself was not maintainable. He would submit that the scope for review falls within a small compass as laid down under Order 47, C.P.C. The petitioner was not entitled to a rehearing of the entire matter, but only a review. Even this would be done only if the error was apparent. A detailed investigation into the records and perusal of documents which were not filed earlier cannot be permitted in a review. According to the learned Senior Counsel, all these grounds were already urged before the Supreme Court, and it was not open to the petitioner to reagitate them in the guise of a review. Further, a wrong decision or a wrong construction of document will not give the right of review because those are matters that are appealable, to be set right by the appellate Court. When the appellate Court had found no ground for interference, the matter should rest there. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that with the dismissal of the C.M.A., the entire proceedings attained finality and the Act clearly says that the exemption will not invalidate a matter in which the decree has been executed. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the execution of the sale deed was a purely ministerial act. There was actually nothing for the court to do, the proceedings having come to a conclusion. He relied on the following decisions: (1) Sathyanarayan v. Mallikarjun (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 137; (2) 1998 (1) C.T.C. 25; (3) Chandra Kanta v. Sk. Habib, (A.I.R Habib (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1500); (4) Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary ( 1995 (1) S.C.C. 170 ); (5) Chidda Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation ( 1998 (3) S.C.C. 441 ); (6) Managing Director, Hindustan Photo Films Co. Ltd. Indu Nagar, Ootacamund & Others v. H.B. Vinoba & others , ( 1999 (1) C.T.C. 30 ) = 1998 Writ L.R. 581; and (7) Katuppiah Ambalam R.M.V. v. Sr. Govinda Iyer ( 1999 (3) C.T.C. 129 ) According to the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, the petitioner is merely trying to flog a dead horse which cannot be resuscitated. 4. C.M.P.9995/2001 has been filed for receiving certain documents. Govinda Iyer ( 1999 (3) C.T.C. 129 ) According to the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, the petitioner is merely trying to flog a dead horse which cannot be resuscitated. 4. C.M.P.9995/2001 has been filed for receiving certain documents. It is claimed, they are essential for a just and proper adjudication of the review petition, but there is nothing to show that this evidence has been discovered only now and inspite of diligence, was not within the petitioners knowledge or could not be produced when the original order was passed. In these circumstances, these documents cannot be allowed to be referred to or produced. CMP 9995/2001 is therefore, dismissed. 5. While a wrong application of law or a wrong construction of documents may not be agitated under the cover of review, if the error is so apparent that without further investigation or enquiry, only one conclusion can be drawn and that too in favour of the petitioner, then review will lie. If the petitioners entitlement to exemption from the provisions of the Act can be decided just by perusal of the records and it is manifest and clear, then the petitioner has no recourse, but to apply for review. In this case, the right of exemption from provisions of the Act was given to religious institutions only by the amendment Act. The amendment has also been upheld by a Full Bench of this Court. Therefore, if the petitioner is a religious institution, then, the right claimed has to be granted and if the petitioner is able to establish that just by a perusal of the records, he falls within the definition of a religious institution, then, to deny him the exemption would result in manifest injustice. It will be worthwhile to look at the relevant sections of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act as amended by Act 2 of 1996. Section 1(3): This Act shall apply provided that nothing contained in this Act shall apply to tenancies of land owned.. (f) by any religious institution or religious charity belonging to Hindu, Muslim. Christian or other religion. Section 1(3): This Act shall apply provided that nothing contained in this Act shall apply to tenancies of land owned.. (f) by any religious institution or religious charity belonging to Hindu, Muslim. Christian or other religion. Explanation: For the purpose of this clause (A) “religious institution” means any (i) Temple; (ii) Math; (iii) Mosque; (iv) Church or; (v) Other place by Whatever name known which is dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, any community or section thereof as a place of public religious workship. - - - Every proceedings instituted by a tenant in respect of any land owned by any religious institution or religious charity belonging to Hindu, Muslim, Christian or other religion and pending before any court or other authority or officer on the date of the publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette shall, in so far as the proceeding relates to any matter falling with in the scope of principal Act, as amended by this Act, in respect of such land, abate, and all rights and privileges which may have accrued to that tenant in respect of any such land and subsisting immediately before the said date shall in so far as such rights and privileges relate to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, cease and determine and shall not be enforceable. Provided that nothing contained in the section shall be deemed to invalidate any suit or proceedings in which a decree or order passed has been executed or satisfied in full before the said date”. 6. If the petitioner is a “religious institution” as defined in the Act, then automatically, the tenants proceedings abate, his rights and privileges subsisting immediately before the date on which the Act is extended to such lands shall cease, determine and cannot be enforced. Is there material on record to justify the application for review. The words used in Order 47 are “error apparent on the face of the record”. Therefore, the records themselves should show the apparent error. The following materials were referred to in support of the petitioners case. The description of the plaintiff namely the revision petitioner in O.S. 76/77 is “a Mission represented by a Rev. Father”. That the property belongs to this Palani Mission is not in dispute. Therefore, the records themselves should show the apparent error. The following materials were referred to in support of the petitioners case. The description of the plaintiff namely the revision petitioner in O.S. 76/77 is “a Mission represented by a Rev. Father”. That the property belongs to this Palani Mission is not in dispute. The persons who was in charge previously is referred to in paragraph 7 of the plaint as “the previous priest of the Parish Rev Father Susairaj”. The reason given for seeking delivery of possession is “Plaintiff requires the premises for the purpose of the Community Hall”. In the written statement filed by the respondent, there is an averment that the petitioner asked that the shop superstructure and residential super-structure should be conveyed to the plaintiff. As regards the identity of the person to whom it should be conveyed, it is stated: “He however wanted them to be conveyed to the Church”. The petitioners alleged reason for requiring the premises is playground for Christian children and for conducting bible classes. In the earlier suit which ended i n a compromise, the petitioner had pleaded that the Mission required the site for shifting a school called Therassama school. In the judgment of the learned District Munsif Palani on 27.7.1978, the finding is that the Therasama school is run by the plaintiff Mission. The requirement of the suit premises for playground for Christian children and for holding bible classes and for constructing a community hall for the purpose of delivering lectures in connection with religious matters is accepted in that judgment. The suit was decreed on the ground the respondent is not entitled to the benefit of the Act. On appeal, it was reversed holding that the respondent is entitled to the provisions of the Act. In that regard, the appellate Court had occasion to consider the scope of explanation to Section 9 of the Act and arrives at the conclu sion that lands which could be alienated are also included in the definition of “land” and held that the suit property could be sold without affecting the petitioner because there is a wall between the Church and the property. 7. 7. In the application under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act O.P.4/77, the counter was filed by the petitioner herein stating that the petition is not in time and the respondent is a religious institution and the premises are required for the purpose of constructing a community prayer hall. This counter was filed even long before the amendment Act 2 of 1996 came into force. The learned District Munsif dismissed the petition on the ground that it is out of time and also gave a finding that the suit properties are required for constructing community hall, for holding bible classes and for the Missions own use and occupation and not for other purposes. 8. Against this, C.M.A.94/78 was filed and the order passed in C.M.A. is almost identical to the order passed in A.S.121/78 referred to above and pronounced one day after the judgment in A.S.Ex.B17, a notice marked in O.S. 76/77 issued on behalf of the Roman Catholic Mission states that the property is required for the Missions use and occupation and it is purely religious, missionary and educational. So, all these matters are on record and have been there before the Amendment Act came into force. 9. Several authorities were cited for the proposition that reviews scope is limited and the Court will have to address itself to the question whether the matter sought to be reviewed falls within that ambit. In the case of Sathyanarayan v. Mallikarjun (A.I.R 1960 S.C. 137), it was held thus: “An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ”. and also “However wide it may be than the provisions of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is well established that the High Court cannot, in exercise of its power under that section, assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law”. 10. In Chidda Singh v. Dy. and also “However wide it may be than the provisions of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is well established that the High Court cannot, in exercise of its power under that section, assume appellate powers to correct every mistake of law”. 10. In Chidda Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation ( 1998 (3) S.C.C. 441 ), the Supreme Court deprecated practice of casual and irresponsible filing of review petitions and that sometimes, the grounds in the review and in the S.L.P. were even repeated verbatim. The Supreme Court had taken pains to extract the similarity in the grounds in S.L.P. and the grounds in review to demonstrate, how casually review petitions are filed. This was relied on to show that in this case the grounds in the S.L.P. and the grounds filed in the review petition are identical and therefore this decision would squarely apply to this case where the grounds raised in the S.L.P. were identical to the grounds raised in the review petition and therefore, the review itself was not maintainable. 11. The case of Karuppiah Ambalam, R.M.V. v. Sr. Govinda Iyer ( 1999 (3) C.T.C. 129 ) was referred to again for the proposition that the error apparent must be easily seen by one who reads it which does not require a process of reasoning for arriving at the right conclusions. In that case, the review was also dismissed on the ground that against the order passed in revision which was sought to be reviewed, an S.L.P. had been filed and dismissed and therefore, it was held that review was not possible. 12. The case of Chandra Kanta v. Sk. Habib (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1500) was referred to, to show that review of an order on the very same ground is not maintainable. The following paragraph in particular was referred to: “May be we were not right in refusing special leave right in the first round but, once an order has been passed by this court, a review thereof must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility”. 13. A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility”. 13. The case of The Managing Director, Hindustan Photo Films Co., Ltd., Indu Nagar, Ootacamund and others v. H.B. Viboba and others ( 1999 (1) C.T.C. 30 ) = 1998 Writ L.R. 581 was relied on again for the proposition that power of review cannot be exercised on the ground that the earlier decision was erroneous on merits since that would come within the province of appellate jurisdiction. The learned Judge referred to various decisions and came to the conclusion that a power of review cannot be confused with the appellate power which empowers a Court to correct all manners of errors. 14. The case of Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary ( 1995 (1) S.C.C 170 was referred to with specific reference to the following paragraph: “The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC, The review petition has to be entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. An error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably by two opinions. The limitation of powers of court under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC is similar to the jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226. In the present case the approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC by merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent by doing so. The Review Bench has re-appreciated the entire evidence, say almost as court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. It would not become a patent error or error apparent by doing so. The Review Bench has re-appreciated the entire evidence, say almost as court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. Even if the earlier Division Benchs findings were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate court. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It could not have been reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed”. 15. The case of A.T. Sharma v. A.P. Sharma (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1047) was referred to underline the limits of powers of review: “It is true there is nothing in Art. 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligency was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court”. 16. While one is acutely conscious of the very limited scope of review, ones hands are also not tied in circumstances where the error is apparent or there is an obvious or patent mistake, or is a palpable wrong. 16. While one is acutely conscious of the very limited scope of review, ones hands are also not tied in circumstances where the error is apparent or there is an obvious or patent mistake, or is a palpable wrong. The power of review, it has been held, can be exercised not only when the factors set out in Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. exist, but also on any analogous ground. Where the alleged error is self-evident, it cannot be argued that the review is not maintainable. The very paragraph cited above lays down the grounds for exercising the review jurisdiction. 17. The decision reported in the case of Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education, & 2 others ( 1995 (II) C.T.C. 513 = 1995 Writ L.R. 892 = 1995 2 L.W. 144 S.N.) has dealt with in detail, the important features of a review application. In particular, the decision refers to the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1531) where the Supreme Court referring to a decision of a Privy Council held that the Court could set right a decision which had been rendered on non-perception of certain provisions and certain authorities which would amount to derogation of constitutional rights of the citizen and that in those circumstances, the Court can act on itself ex debito justicial. The Division Bench in this decision also refers to the decision in the case of S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka (1993 Supp. (4) SCC 595) which stresses the paramount consideration that underlies every decision making process of this court. The following paragraph was extracted: “Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdictions exercised by the higher courts is found on equity and fairness. If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification depending on if it is fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the court. In Administrative Law the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its orders. Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality”, Then the Division Bench culled out the following principles: “(1) If the judgment is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record in the sense that it is evident on a mere looking at the record without any long-drawn process of reasoning, a review application is maintainable. (2) If there is a serious irregularity in the proceeding, such as violation of the principles of natural justice, a review application can be entertained. (3) If a mistake is committed by an erroneous assumption of a fact which allowed to stand would cause miscarriage of justice, then also an application for review can be entertained. It is not necessary to point out that the above principles are applicable dehors the provisions of Order XL VII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure”. 18. In the case, the amendment Act 2 of 1996 has given the petitioner, the valuable right of exemption from the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act. If the petitioner has demonstrated that it is apparent exfacie that the petitioner is a religious institution without any further investigation or convoluted reasoning or complicated deductions, then, the petitioner must be allowed to point out those mistakes. Undoubtedly, the review petitioner cannot agitate the same matter again and again. If the petitioner has demonstrated that it is apparent exfacie that the petitioner is a religious institution without any further investigation or convoluted reasoning or complicated deductions, then, the petitioner must be allowed to point out those mistakes. Undoubtedly, the review petitioner cannot agitate the same matter again and again. But, he can definitely point out that the order sought to be reviewed failed to perceive what was apparent. The grounds on which the petitioner attacked the C.R.P. were different. Of-course, it was also urged that the learned Judge ought to have seen that the petitioner is a religious institution. The copy of S.L.P.22925 to 22926 of 1996 shows that one of the grounds raised is that the High Court had erred in summarily dismissing the transfer of appeal on the ground that the petitioner was only a registered Society and not a religious institution or religious charity. But in the grounds filed against the dismissal of the review application which is S.L.P. Civil 6097-6098 of 1999, the question of law whether the party can approach the High Court for review after dismissal of S.L.P. was raised, but other questions of law were also raised as to whether a Christian Church is not a religious institution and whether, the exemption granted by Act 2 of 1996 is not applicable to the petitioner The Supreme Court admitted the S.L.P. granting leave and the appeals were numbered as C.A. 1055 and 1056 of 2001 and the order directed the High Court to consider the review petition afresh. Therefore, unlike the decision reported in 1998 (3) S.C.C. 441 (cited supra), the Supreme Court did not think that the review application was a regurgitation of the same matter. On the contrary, this Court was directed to decide the review application. Therefore, the scope of this review is definitely different from what was urged in the main C.R.P. If the petitioner satisfies this Court that there was a patent and palpable error, then the order must be reviewed. The petitioner cannot be shut out at the threshold. The review applications’ are maintainable. 19. Now, let us look at the meaning of the word “Mission” as given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th edition. The meaning that is applicable to this context is “vocation of a religious organisation to spread its faith”. The petitioner cannot be shut out at the threshold. The review applications’ are maintainable. 19. Now, let us look at the meaning of the word “Mission” as given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th edition. The meaning that is applicable to this context is “vocation of a religious organisation to spread its faith”. The origin of the word itself is stated to be derived from the sending of the Holy Spirit into the world. This Missions is a Roman Catholic Mission and if we look at the word “Roman Catholic”, it is seen that it relates to that part of the Christian Church which acknowledges Pope as its Head. The objects and reasons for bringing the amendment to the Act is explained in the “Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 3rd Edition. In times of necessity and want, the persons in the helm of administration of properties of religious institutions had to lease vacant lands. The tenants put up superstructure, paid a pittance as rent and lands worth several crores of rupees were enjoyed by these tenants. These religious and charitable institutions were not only deprived of their legitimate income, but also their valuable properties. Tenants flourished and the landlord institutions were crippled. In these circumstances, Act 2 of 1996 was enacted so that such tenants are not protected by the umbrella of the Act. 20. The references to the pleadings and even the judgment in the earlier proceedings showing that the plaintiff had all along been asserting that it is a religious institution have already been set out in the earlier paragraph. In addition to these materials, we see that in the appeal, the petitioner raised the objection that since the Mission required it for the use of Church, the respondent cannot claim the benefits of the Act. The Court below had rejected this objection on the ground that the definition of the landlord would include a trustee or Muthavalli or anyone acting on behalf of the legal owner who may be a deity or almighty. The Court below has referred to case of Sundareswarar Devasthanam, where the land belonged to a Hindu Trust and where it was held that where the lands belong to a Hindu Trust or Wakf, they are not excluded from the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. The Court below has referred to case of Sundareswarar Devasthanam, where the land belonged to a Hindu Trust and where it was held that where the lands belong to a Hindu Trust or Wakf, they are not excluded from the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. Therefore, the learned Judge arrived at the conclusion that this property would not be excluded from the provisions of the Act. As regards the sale of the suit property, the court below has concluded that since there is a compound wall between the Church and the suit property, separate and convenient enjoyment of the two properties by the Mission on the one hand and the respondent on the other is possible. The only logical conclusion that I am able to derive from this reasoning of the appellate Judge is that he holds that the provisions of the Act would apply to the tenancy notwithstanding the fact the property belongs to a Mission which as we have seen earlier is a religious institution. Actually, nothing remains to be demonstrated on this score further than this. The definition of the word “Mission” and the above judgment would show indisputably, that the petitioner is a religious institution. Though the learned counsel had referred to the various passages in the pleadings which show that the institution is a religious one, is dedicated to the community as a religious place and is for the benefit of the community as such, I am of the opinion, even this reasoning in this judgment shall suffice for the purpose. All the other references only add strength to the case of the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner is a religious institution is apparent without any further investigation or logical deduction or detailed reasoning. 21. What are the consequences, if the petitioner is a religious institution. Section 1(f) of the Amendment Act 2 of 1996 provides that all the proceedings instituted by a tenant will abate. All which are pending before any Court as and from the date of publication of this Act. The amendment Act came into force from 11.1.1996. The Transfer C.M.A. which was a continuation of the application under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act filed by the respondent who is the tenant was still pending, the proceedings had not attained finality. Therefore, they terminated and they became unenforceable. The amendment Act came into force from 11.1.1996. The Transfer C.M.A. which was a continuation of the application under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act filed by the respondent who is the tenant was still pending, the proceedings had not attained finality. Therefore, they terminated and they became unenforceable. On the date when the first appeal and the C.M.A. were disposed of tenancy granted by religious institutions were still governed by the provisions of the Act. Now, by the introduction of Act 2 of 1996, they cease to apply, ergo all proceedings instituted by the tenant shall abate. All rights and privileges that may have accrued to her cease. They come to an end and they shall not be enforceable. The jurisdiction of the Court to decide the tenants claim ceased. 22. The case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340) was cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as to the effect of a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction where it was held thus: “It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.” It is a nullity and it is a defect which cannot be cured. 23. Similarly, in the decision reported in Union of India v. Sube Ram ( 1997 (9) S.C.C. 69 ), the Supreme Court considered the effect of an order allowing the benefits to the claimants under the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The Supreme Court held that the claimants would be entitled to the benefits only if proceedings were pending either before the Land Acquisition Officer or the Court. The Supreme Court held that when the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the application itself is in question, this can be raised at any stage and where Courts have no jurisdiction, the order is a nullity. 24. The Supreme Court held that when the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the application itself is in question, this can be raised at any stage and where Courts have no jurisdiction, the order is a nullity. 24. Similarly, in Sunder Dass v. Ramprakash (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1201) the Supreme Court held that an executing Court though barred from going behind the decree, is bound to entertain the objection that the decree is a nullity. The Supreme Court held that by doing so, “the Executing Court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all”. 25. What follows therefrom is that the decree in O.P. No. 4/77 become a nullity on and from 11.1.1996 and there was no alternative to the courts but to dismiss the O.P. The Court below erred in executing the sale deed after the coming of the Act 2 of 1996. 26. Another submission made on behalf of the respondent was that the proceedings came to an end in so far as the tenant was concerned when he deposited the sale consideration and thereafter, nothing remained to be done, the execution of the sale deed being merely an administrative act. So, strength was drawn from the proviso to Section 1(f) of the amendment Act 2 of 1996 that the exemption granted by the amendment Act will not invalidate any matter in which the decree or order had been executed or satisfied in full before the relevant date. The relevant date is 11.1.1996. The sale deed was executed only on 28.10.1996. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the decision reported in N. Sreedharan Nair v. State of Tamil Nadu ( 2000 (3) M.L.J. 216 = 2000 3 L.W. 271). In that case the suit property belonged to a temple. The tenant filed an application under Section 9. It was dismissed. The tenants appeal was allowed and remanded for fixing the market, value. The market value was fixed by the trial Court and directions were given for deposit of the amount. The temple filed a C.M.A. This appeal was also allowed to redetermine the value. The tenant filed an application under Section 9. It was dismissed. The tenants appeal was allowed and remanded for fixing the market, value. The market value was fixed by the trial Court and directions were given for deposit of the amount. The temple filed a C.M.A. This appeal was also allowed to redetermine the value. Against that, the tenant filed the revision and in the C.R.P. this Court fixed the market value and the tenant was directed to deposit the balance amount which was also deposited by the tenant. Thereafter, he filed E.P.306/93 for direction to execute the sale deed. When this E.P. was pending, the amendment Act came into force. Therefore, the temple filed E.A.314/96 to declare the proceedings as abated in view of the amendment Act. The learned District Munsif came to the conclusion that the proceedings had abated. Against that, the revision was filed. This Court held that unless the sale deed is executed by the Devasthanam or by the Court, the fruits of the decree will not be realised by the tenant and the proceedings will come to an end only upon the execution of the sale deed. This applies to the case on hand. The fruits of the decree could not have been realised by the respondent until he had the sale deed on hand. Therefore, he cannot be heard to say that the proviso applies to him and that the proceedings are not invalidated. The decree not having been executed by means of a sale deed, the proceedings are deemed to be pending and therefore were determined with the coming of the amendment Act. 27. The order passed in the C.R.P. 1445/88 and the Tr. C.M.A 7678/89 in which the new contention regarding exemptions from the provisions of the Act are concerned appears to have been based on a perusal of the certificate of registration which only showed that it was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, but the discussion in the aforesaid paragraph would show that there is no scope for any ambiguity or doubt regarding the character of the petitioner as a religious institution. No other document needs to be looked into and when the fact that the petitioner is a religious mission is apparent even on the face of it, to deny the petitioner the benefits of Act 2 of 1996 would result in miscarriage of justice and as held in 1995 (2) C.T.C. 513 (cited supra), such a miscarriage of justice cannot be allowed to be continued and the matter has to be rectified. If as per the definition in the Act, the petitioner is a “religious institution”, the fact it has been registered as a Society will no t make it any less so. 28. In the decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1500 (cited supra)), it was stressed that a review must be subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly entertained. It is a serious step and it must be resorted to reluctantly only in exceptional circumstances which had arisen by “judicial fallibility” Mere repetitions or traversing ineffectually covered ground were held to be insufficient. To deny the Mission, the benefit that has been be stowed upon them by the Legislature merely on the ground that review cannot be resorted to lightly would result in grave injustice. The very purpose for which the amendment Act 2 of 1996 was enacted would be rendered impotent. I also draw strength from the words in 1995 (2) C.T.C. 513 where a Division Bench of this Court held that a review application is maintainable if the judgment is vitiated by an apparent error, serious irregularity or an erroneous assumption of fact resulting in miscarriage of justice and these principles are applicable over and above what the Court provides under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. This case is an excellent example where justice would have been negated to the religious institution when it was obviously entitled to certain rights. Review applications 8 and 9 are therefore, allowed. The application filed by the respondent under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act is dismissed. In the circumstances, no orders as to costs.