Judgment S.N.Pathak, J. 1. This Miscellaneous appeal is directed against the award given by the Claims Tribunal cum-Additional District Judge, II, Darbhanga, in Claim Case No. 14 of 1991. The Insurance Company is the appellant before this Court. 2. It was submitted by the appellants lawyer that on the date when the accident took place, i.e. 5th August, 1991, the Insurance Policy for the vehicle of the owner was already cancelled. Therefore, the Insurance Company was not liable for paying the compensation amount to the claimants for the death of Rama Shankar Tripathy, who was knocked down by Bus No. BPF 5051, when he was driving his scooter. The owner failed to examine himself as a witness in denial of the appellants assertion that his Insurance policy was cancelled before the date of accident. So the insurance Company was not liable to pay the compensation amount. 3. In this appeal, the appellant and the owner both were heard. 4. Admittedly, in this case, the accident took place on 5th August 1991. It was the contention of the appellant that, of course, the policy was issued by the Insurance Company on the basis of a cheque issued by the respondent no. 2 Vijay Shankar Pd. Singh for Rs. 9,208/- on 12th September 1990 as premium but the cheque bounced and the Insurance Company intimated the owner regarding dishonouring of the cheque. Subsequently the Insurance Policy was cancelled and the owner was intimated about this cancellation. So on the date of occurrence, there was no valid insurance policy. So the entire liability to pay the compensation amount fell upon the shoulders of the owner of the concerned vehicle. 5. The Tribunal discussed the evidence of the witnesses and held that the accident involving the concerned vehicle in which the deceased was killed was proved. However the Tribunal held on the basis of Exts-A, B & C which are Insurance Policy, cover note and the receipt, regarding the acknowledgement of the cheque, in question that it was proved that the concerned vehicle was insured. The learned Tribunal further held that from the evidence on behalf of Insurance Company, it did not appear that the policy was cancelled. The learned Tribunal further held that from the evidence on behalf of Insurance Company, it did not appear that the policy was cancelled. Perhaps, the tribunal took into consideration the statement of Binay Verma, examined on behalf of the Insurance Company, at Para-5, to the effect that he did not know what action was taken by the Insurance Company, when the cheque was dishonoured and held that the cancellation of the policy was not proved. In this connection, it was submitted by the appellants lawyer that there was definite pleading of the Insurance Company in its W.S. that the insurance policy was cancelled and it had annexed the cancellation notification in its W.S. But the owner of the vehicle failed to appear before the court as a witness to deny the assertion of cancellation of the insurance policy on account of bouncing of the concerned cheque. Therefore, it was to be presumed that the Insurance policy was cancelled before the date of accident. 6. So far the evidence of Binay Kumar Verma is concerned, I find that he has stated in his chief in a positive statement that cheque in question was referred to the drawee through an advice on 22nd October, 1990. He further stated that after this cheque bounced, the Insurance policy was cancelled. At Paragraph-5 he said that he had no knowledge whether any paper was filed on behalf of Insurance Company in this case. He further stated that he had no knowledge whether there was any action taken by the Insurance Company against the policy holder. In answer to court question, he said that as per rules the insurance policy is issued without waiting for the encashment of the cheque. So when there was a positive statement inchief by this witness that his Insurance policy was cancelled when the cheque bounced on 22nd October 1990 itself, his statement in cross-examination at Paragraph 5 that he had no knowledge that what action was taken by the Insurance Company against the policy holder was immaterial and it could not be considered in isolation of his positive statement in chief. The interpretation of the tribunal of the statement made in his cross-examination at Paragraph 5 was wrong interpretation, regarding the cancellation of the Insurance policy, in the face of the averments of the Insurance Company in its W.S. at Paragraph 7 that the insurance policy was not in force on the date of accident because there was violation of Section 64 VB of the Insurance Act. In this view of the matter, it was incumbent on the part of the owner to appear before the Court and deny the alleged averment that the insurance policy was not valid on the date of accident. It also transpires from the lower court records that cancellation order was tagged with rejoinder to the application of the claimants for interim compensation. This canceiiation order has also been annexed with the Memo of appeal and it shows that on account of dishonouring of the cheque issued by the owner, the policy was cancelled from its very inception. 7. Now the question is whether in spite of cancellation of the insurance policy, the company was liable for paying compensation to the claimants. In this connection owners lawyer referred to the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court, as reported in (2000) 3 SCC 195 . I find that the insurance policy was issued on 8th November 1991 and the alleged accident took place on the same date. Of course, the cheque paid by the owner bounced but in the aforesaid reported case it was decided that the 3rd party was not concerned with the agreement between the insurer and the insured and the fact whether premium was paid or not. The only question considered by the Hon ble Supreme Court was that on the date of accident, there was a policy issued by the Insurance Company which was subsisting. So Insurance company was fastened with the liability to pay the compensation amount. In the aforesaid reported case, it was not disclosed whether the insurance policy was cancelled from the date of insurance itself or from the subsequent date. i.e. the date of dishonour of the cheque. However, the Insurance Company (appellant before this Court) also referred to a decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court, as reported in A.C.J. 2001 Page 638. In the aforesaid reported case, it was not disclosed whether the insurance policy was cancelled from the date of insurance itself or from the subsequent date. i.e. the date of dishonour of the cheque. However, the Insurance Company (appellant before this Court) also referred to a decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court, as reported in A.C.J. 2001 Page 638. In this reported case, the Hon ble Supreme Court decided that the Insurance Company would not be liable to pay the compensation amount to the claimant in view of the fact that the cheque issued by the owner was dishonoured and, thus, there was violation of Section 64 VB of the Insurance Act. In this very reported case, claim was preferred by the insured but the principle in the aforesaid decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court is that since the insurance policy did not subsist on the date of accident, the Insurance Company was not liable to pay the compensation amount. In the case before this Court also, it is evident that the date of. accident is 5th August 1991 and the cheque issued by the owner had bounced on 28th October 1990 itself. So by the time the accident took place the owner must have been informed of dishonouring of the cheque. Moreover, when the owner himself avoided to appear as a witness to deny the averment of the W.S. of the Insurance Company, it was also to be presumed that he had knowledge of cancellation of his policy. So the case reported in SCC 2000 (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the fact of this case. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this decision is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 8. As a result of aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the appellant before this Court is not liable to pay any compensation amount to the claimants. So this appeal is allowed and it is directed that the owner of the vehicle in question, namely, respondent no. 2 Vijay Shankar Prasad Singh shall pay the compensation amount fixed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal shall proceed to realise this amount from the owner of the vehicle in question and I need not interfere with the compensation amount granted by the Tribunal, because the same has not been challenged before this Court.